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THE WAR:
WHO'S TO BLAME?

OR,

THE EASTERN QUESTION INVESTIGATED

FROM THE

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

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P R E F A C E.

THE writer of the following pages was induced, with much reluctance, to undertake the heavy and unpalatable labour of analyzing the voluminous documents (1,300 closely printed folio pages) that have been published by the British Government, on what is technically called, "THE EASTERN QUESTION."

The labour became more irksome and unpleasant as, independent of all other authority, the close examination of the documents referred to compels him to come to the conclusion, that his country was completely wrong in the proceedings which have led to the terrible contest into which she has unguardedly rushed; and that every step she takes in carrying on will only add to her complications, difficulties, dangers, and expenses, without acquiring therefrom one additional (quite the reverse) solid mark or point of national honour, power, or security. The regret that he felt at seeing this generous country so misled and maddened by the greatest, and the grossest, and most extensive system of error and fabrication ever before organized in any age or country, urged and impelled him in the discharge of a duty which he considered was due to his country, even if he should stand alone in the contest, to do his utmost to expose and condemn the disgraceful and dangerous system alluded to.

How far the work undertaken has been satisfactorily performed, is left to the reader to decide. Amidst considerable

experience in attending to and investigating public documents, the writer never had occasion to witness so much deceit, concealment, misrepresentation, and mystification, not to use harsher names, than the papers under consideration contain. Our ambassadors, and the ambassadors of our ally, cut a deplorable figure in the eyes of plain dealing and truth. The errors, fabrications, and misrepresentations, to which these papers have at the same time given rise, are scarcely credible, and can hardly be believed. The work itself will sufficiently show and prove this. Sir H. Seymour has taught us that it is lawful to call things by their right names: truth demands it. Republican France abrogated the treaties of 1815. She next violated the treaty of 1841, by thrusting a three-decker through the Dardanelles, to menace Turkey, and promise her support against Russia, if she would beard the latter. She succeeded. She "*frightened the unhappy Turks,*" and "gained moral weight" by her "threats," says Seymour. Turkey broke her engagements with Russia under this pressure. Russia sought redress calmly. After much delay and chicanery, it was given: a firman by the Sultan, and an autograph letter from him to the Emperor Nicholas, appeared to settle everything. Both were instantly violated. The question was reopened by France. Prince Menchikoff was sent to Constantinople. The tales of his menaces and threats, and arrogance, were all Turkish, French, and English fabrications. It is not true that he *first* settled the question of the Holy Places, and then brought forward new and severer propositions. His propositions were one and the same throughout, and all well known to Lord Stratford, though he has denied it: his letters will show this. He settled the question of the Holy Places as between Russia and France; but as between Russia and Turkey, that part, the most important part, "reparation for the past and security for

the future,"—in other words, a "*national engagement*," in one binding shape or another, embracing the recognition of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople,—was pointedly refused; and this, too, done by the advice of Lord Stratford, the British ambassador. This refusal of a just demand justified Russia in declaring war against Turkey. She took, as Lord Stratford admits, a milder course, by first occupying the Principalities, a fief of, but not an integral portion of Turkey.

This state of things produced the war in which we are now engaged. Europe framed a pacific note to satisfy both parties. Russia at once accepted it. Turkey refused it, as she had been secretly taught to do. Our declaration of war against Russia suppresses the truth at this point: it asserts that Russia refused the acceptance of the Vienna note, though urged repeatedly upon her by the four great powers of Europe! *That is not correct*; the first note framed by these four powers was accepted by Russia at once. It was sent to Lord Stratford at Constantinople, to urge, in the most earnest manner, its acceptance by the Turkish Government. His Lordship tells us (Part II. p. 69), "When I delivered it to the Turkish minister, I called his attention to the *strong and earnest recommendation* to the Porte, *not only* by her Majesty's Government, but also *by the cabinets of Austria, France, and Prussia,*" &c. This fact is wholly suppressed in the DECLARATION, and a note as amended by Turkey was substituted for it, which the Emperor of Russia did decline to accept, though subsequently recommended by the four powers to do so, because it gave no satisfaction for the wrong committed, and at the same time destroyed the letter and spirit of the treaties existing between the two empires,—the great and secret object of the new alliance to accomplish!

Several notes were subsequently presented, and made out by the four powers. All were rejected by Turkey; one, especially,

by Lord Clarendon himself, was summarily dismissed with the taunt, that it *was worse for them* than Prince Menchikoff's proposition!

Prince Menchikoff reached Constantinople on the 5th March. The French fleet was, without consulting this country, and contrary to our remonstrances, ordered on the 22d March, to proceed from Toulon to Salamis, to overawe Greece, and to be at the command of their ambassador, to proceed to Constantinople to support Turkey; and all this done, before any point of Menchikoff's proceedings were known, and ten weeks before the occupation of the Principalities was thought of, and sixteen weeks before that took place.

What are we to think of such suppressions and such conduct? But still worse took place under the Secret Correspondence. Thus, while Lord John Russell and Lord Clarendon both admitted and advised the superintendence of Russia over the Greek Christians in Turkey, as a matter of *right* and of *duty*, their ambassador at Constantinople denied both, and taught the Turks to deny them. The Secret Correspondence, moreover, ended, as it was sought and intended it should end, namely, in an understanding or agreement between England and Russia, that they, as the parties most deeply interested, should both do their utmost to uphold, as long as possible, the existence of the Ottoman Government, should dangers which could not be foreseen or prevented precipitate its fall; and that both parties should always cordially work together to render its dissolution as little injurious to the great interests of Europe as possible. This is and was the result of the Secret and Confidential Correspondence violated by France and England, not by Russia. Moreover, almost every despatch from Lord Stratford, and also from Lord Clarendon, went to show that Turkey was not only and simply "*sick*," but dying of an incurable disease, brought on

by a long life spent in immorality, cruelty, and oppression. Let Lord Clarendon (June 24th, 1853) himself tell the tale:—

“Your Excellency is instructed to state to the Porte, that it is the deliberate opinion of her Majesty’s Government . . . that it is *impossible* to suppose that any true sympathy for their cause will be felt by the Christians, so long as they are made to experience, *in all their daily transactions*, the *inferiority* of their position, as compared with that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects—so long as they are aware that they will *seek in vain for justice* for wrongs done either to their persons or their properties, because they are deemed a *degraded race* unworthy to be put into comparison with the followers of Mahomet. Your Excellency will **PLAINLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY** state to the Porte, that this state of things cannot be longer tolerated by Christendom. The Porte must decide between the maintenance of an erroneous religious principle, and the loss of the sympathy and support of its allies. You will point out to the Porte the immense importance of the election which it has to make; and her Majesty’s Government conceive that very little reflection will suffice to satisfy the Turkish Ministers, that the Porte can no longer reckon upon its Mussulman subjects alone as a safeguard against external danger; and that without the hearty assistance of its Christian dependents, and the powerful sympathy and support of its Christian *allies*, **THE TURKISH EMPIRE MUST SOON CEASE TO EXIST!**”

Was Russia wrong, then, to seek to retain the power she possessed by treaty, to repress as far as possible such intolerable evils? “*The cruel wrongs*,” says Lord Stratford, “of 400 years!” Already the artful promises and pretences of the allies, and their professed objects as regards Turkey, are blown to the winds; and, as a beginning of evils, insurmountable difficulties rise before them. They cannot maintain the Mahomedan power in independence. Its days are numbered by unerring Wisdom. Its “power to make war” was to continue 1260 prophetic years, and no longer. The allies, as they are called, cannot roll back the tide of time, nor even reproduce yesterday. Every one who studies the official documents referred to, and the subject seriously, must come to the conclusion that Count Nesselrode did; namely, that France and England are solely and entirely to blame for the melancholy results that

have taken place; and also concur in his opinion, expressed in Part II. p. 181, on the evils of "war between two powerful countries—two old allies, like England and Russia—countries which, whilst they may be of infinite use to one another, possessed each the means of inflicting great injury upon its antagonist; and that if, for any motives known to him, war should be declared against Russia by England, it must be the *most unintelligible and the least justifiable war ever entered upon!*" Lord Clarendon, Part II. p. 144, characterizes the contest with equal force and accuracy: "If," says he, "Europe is for such causes to be exposed to the calamities of war, they will be *without parallel in history!*" and at p. 111, he says, "*war would entail the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire!*" Yet we are at war. Our "rowers have brought us into deep waters." Unparalleled in history, this war will be, and most certainly unparalleled in its results. It will terminate for ever a cruel system—a daring imposture and *delusion*, the opponent of the Majesty of Heaven, that has tyrannised over, and trampled upon, a very large portion of the human race for 1260 years. It must perish, like all its great tyrannic predecessors. We see, we know, the fate of the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Persian, the Macedonian, and the Roman empires; all swept from the face of the earth! So, too, Mahomedanism must perish.

England stands before the world in a new character. She now avows that her object is to waste and to destroy utterly, whatever she can; and not to preserve and protect, as formerly! Moreover, dignify or degrade it as we may, the truth stands prominent, that she is leagued with France to sustain the impiety and blasphemy of "THE FALSE PROPHET," and to exalt "THE LATIN CHURCH" as the supreme Church of this world!!

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THE WAR: WHO'S TO BLAME?

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS—SPEECH OF NAPOLEON III.—FRENCH POLICY—
FRENCH PROTECTORATE—LATIN CHURCH IN THE EAST—OCCURRENCE AND
PROCEEDINGS TILL PRINCE MENSCHIKOFF WAS SENT TO CONSTANTINOPLE.

“ We are at war ! We are at war—at war after we and Europe have been forty years at peace.” Such are the hypocritical lamentations and avowals of all those who have been the great advocates for war, who are now its principal supporters, and whose fables, inventions, and mischievous falsehoods, have been the chief cause of producing the deplorable result. Their fables and inventions, which have chiefly tended to produce hostilities, are, at the same time, as baseless as their thoughtless averment,—that the world, Great Britain included, had been in a state of profound tranquillity during the last thirty-nine years.

Let us, for a moment, attend to facts. During the period mentioned, France has had about half-a-dozen great and bloody internal revolutions,—a war with Spain,—a war with and the conquest of Rome,—a war in and the conquest (not yet concluded) of Algiers—a war which has continued for twenty-four years, and which is not yet finished,¹—a tousel with Mexico, Morocco and Tunis, Buenos Ayres and Tahiti, exclusive of some serious conflicts in which she acted in

¹ From a Paris paper.—“ Algiers, June 25th ; Marseilles, June 30th, 1851. The army in Africa had had, to them, a disastrous engagement with a tribe of the Kabyles, numbering 100,000 souls, and mustering 15,000 warriors. Their country is very difficult, consisting of mountains and rocks. They are more civilized than the Bedouins, and are becoming more formidable daily. The French army was commanded by General Renden, the governor of the colony. He was completely defeated. A colonel and major were killed, several officers wounded, and 300 men put *hors de combat*.”

What a strange contrast does the conduct of nations afford to the close observer of human affairs ! Here we have a great European nation crushing independent Mahommedan tribes on Mount Atlas, at “ the same moment that she is encouraging and advising the wilder and more barbarous tribes of the Caucasus to rush into war in order to secure their independence.”

conjunction with England. In Africa she has conquered a country equal in extent to France herself, besides the addition of the Society Islands, the Friendly Islands, New Caledonia, and a settlement on New Guinea. Austria has had a terrible revolution which nearly overthrew her empire, and two bloody contests with Piedmont, and serious disputes with Switzerland. Switzerland herself has had serious internal commotions. Naples has been engaged in bloody strife with her dependency, Sicily. Prussia, besides a war with Denmark, has had a revolution which nearly overthrew her monarchy. Russia has had a bloody civil war in Poland, one bloody war against Turkey, two serious wars with Persia, and two wars to support Turkey against Mehemet Ali, exclusive of her interference to quell the Hungarian insurrection, and her aid to separate Greece from Turkey. The latter power, when not engaged in war with her neighbours, is almost constantly engaged in quelling revolts of her barbarous pashas, or in aiding them, by the application of brute force, to oppress and massacre her unhappy Christian subjects. Russia, since 1815, has only added to her territory a few points on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, and a small slip on the Georgian frontier not larger than the county of Kent.

During the period in question, the United Kingdom has had a rebellion in Canada, a rebellion in Ireland, a bloody contest, in conjunction with France, to deprive our old ally, the King of Holland, of Belgium, allotted to him by the treaties of 1815; one war to deprive Turkey of Greece; one to deliver Turkey from the victorious march of Mehemet Ali; a mongrel war in and about Spain; another such in and about Portugal; and nearly another such about Tahiti; a mighty tousel with poor Greece about Don Pacifico's bed and his wife's linen or flannel petticoats. She has also had two Kaffir rebellions and wars; a severe war with China, the chief object of which was to compel the Chinese to purchase from us and to eat smuggled opium; two bloody wars with Affghanistan, two bloody wars with the Sikhs; one bloody war with the Ameers of Scinde, and two wars with the Burmese; in which three latter we have added to our territories a greater extent of dominion than the whole superficies of the United Kingdom! and, lastly, we had an important contest amidst the swamps of Nicaragua to maintain the sovereignty of our illustrious ally, the drunken king of the Musquito coast!

Such a state of things, we are confidently but audaciously told, constituted general and profound tranquillity; therefore, by way of change, we must now have a war, the sweeping operations and terrible results of which, shall eclipse all those tumults combined!

England especially calls for such a contest, because she has not for centuries known what war really is within the boundary of her own shores, and because the present generation does not recollect the war of twenty-five years' duration, which cut off 8,000,000 of men, the flower of Europe, and which covered Europe with misery, destruction, and blood, and added 560,000,000*l.* to her National Debt, besides 750,000,000*l.* more to her National Expenditure.

Under such circumstances Great Britain, in conjunction with France, have entered into war with Russia. The reasons for this terrible step—for terrible it will be found to be before all is over—may be given in the words of two Ministers of the Crown in their place in Parliament, when the subject was officially brought before it by command of her Majesty, thus :¹—

LORD PALMERSTON.—“It is said these were the military armaments of Russia. But then the armaments, we were always assured, were only to counteract the menacing language which had been held by the representative of France on the question of the Holy Places. It is said there was a *secret treaty* by reason of the disregard of pledges and firmans already issued by the Sultan. There never, Sir, was the slightest intimation given that there was any other question than that to be settled. And when Count Nesselrode asserted that the Government of this country had been from the beginning informed of the demands of Russia, he states what was *utterly untrue (sensation)*. Sir, it is painful to speak of a Government like that of Russia in such terms of condemnation, but I must say, in vindication of the Government of her Majesty, that through the whole course of these negotiations, Russia exhausted all her agents, and by every means, by every modification of untruth, concealment, and equivocation, ending in the assertion of *UTTER FALSEHOOD (considerable sensation)*. Well, Sir, has anything been lost by the forbearance which the Government of her Majesty has manifested ?” &c.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL.—“The whole of her (Russia) conduct was no doubt deception (*Hear, hear*). There was concealment, and there was deception, on the part of Russia toward the Government of this country (*renewed Hear, hear*). But they (the British Government) feel the cause is still more—it is to maintain that peace of Europe, of which the Emperor of Russia is the wanton disturber (*Hear, and cheers*). It is to throw back on the head of that disturber of the peace of Europe, the consequences which he has so violently, and I believe so imprudently, evoked. It is to maintain the independence, not only of Turkey, but of Germany and all the European nations,” &c. “But if this is not to be done, and if peace is not consistent with our duty to England, with our duty to Europe, and with our duty to the world—if this enormous power of Russia is to go to such a pitch that even its moderation is more ambitious than the ambition of other nations—if Russia will not be content with any less than the possession of Constan-

¹ First Debate, Eastern Question, House of Commons, April 17th, 1854.

tinople,—if such are her meaning and her objects, we can only enter into the contest with strong heart, and *may God defend the right!* In fact, I will willingly bear my share of the burden and responsibility (*cheers*).—*Rep. Speech, Stamford, April 18th.*

The responsibility, terrible as that is, Lord John has yet to learn in the injury and humiliation of his country ; while the wicked bravado discovers the bitter feeling of a statesman having unexpectedly, and from his own imprudence, had some secret, selfish, and roguish political scheme prematurely forced into the light of day, and compelled to appear in all its naked deformity.¹

The statements here made, and the language here used, against a great nation, are indeed strong, and may well be supposed to be able to stand the strictest scrutiny ; but which the use of so many “*ifs*” fully leads us to doubt. Lord John’s appeal bears that he is right, and that certain and complete victory is to be for him ! Lord Palmerston’s great political experience and prudence give his declarations great weight, and confer on them an importance which, coming from any other quarter, they would not have deserved. Still, the subject is of such vast importance, that, as it is the right, so it becomes the duty of every free British subject, to inquire into the matter, and, by the lights which Government has given us, to ascertain if his Lordship is, in all points, strictly correct. With reference to Lord John Russell, he is so well known to allow, on particular occasions, his feelings to outrun his discretion (witness “*nummeries of religion*”—denounced, then succumbed to), that his words might be left to pass for what they are considered worth, and his “*ifs*,” and objects, and “*great heart*,” be left to find their level with those clap-traps which statesmen, when they feel their cause to be feeble, and their conduct to have been wrong, are so apt to launch forth, and to brave by boast what cannot stand inquiry.

The appeal, however, which his Lordship here makes is most serious and most solemn, and is, and ought always to be, the last resort of pure innocence—it is TO THE ALMIGHTY ! to Him to whom all hearts are open, and from whom no secrets are hid ; to Him by whom kings reign, and princes decree judgment ; to Him who always “mustereth the hosts of the battle ;” to Him who alone gives, and who alone can give, *victory* ; and to Him who “ruleth among the kingdoms of men, and

¹ A close examination of the official Papers alone will, it is to be feared, and as we shall learn, prove the conclusion to be just, that a less solemn but more appropriate appeal ought to have been made ; such as, We are in for it—we have brought the country into it—we mean to maintain our position by war.—“The sword of Mahomet is the KEY of heaven,” and it does not require *absolute wisdom* to make it also the key of Downing Street—“a material guarantee” for our future security !

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giveth them to whomsoever He will." This is the great Being that is appealed to! and his Lordship makes the appeal under the clearest conviction that he, and this country, and France, are right, and that the Emperor of Russia is wholly wrong. It will be fortunate for this country if he is so. It may be presumed that the matter will stand inquiry. If Lord John has *not* supplied us with all the documents which can enable us to judge correctly, that is his blame; but, taking the ponderous volumes with which we have been furnished, let us carefully examine who is right, or who is wrong, and, finally, who is to blame in the matter. The inquiry will be laborious—it cannot be pleasant—and is most certain, for the moment, to be unpopular. But truth can know no fear; and, while guided by her, every personal offence against individuals or communities of men will, in our pursuit, be carefully, and to the utmost that is possible, avoided. Yet, thus situated, it must be permitted, *without giving offence*, "*to call things by their right names*,"—which Sir H. Seymour told his wondering hearers, at the Mansion House, is never done, "*in English*," at St. Petersburg. This he proved in his own person.

In order to understand the Eastern question fully, and the strange proceedings which have plunged Europe and Asia into a dreadful war, it is necessary to turn to the beginning of the diplomatic discussions which have taken place in our day, and also to revert shortly to the proceedings and views of European Powers in reference to the Turkish Empire in former times. It is proposed to do this in a narrative, as continued and as connected as possible, and in regular order of the dates belonging to each subject; the whole selected from the voluminous official Papers that have been published, extending, to this date (Sept. 20th), to 1,300 closely printed folio pages. The confused manner in which these documents have been published—where we find confusion worse confounded reigning—together with the endless repetitions and extraneous rubbish connected with each particular portion of the subject, renders the task undertaken all but impracticable, and might well induce the boldest to avoid such a work, in despair of getting through it in a satisfactory manner: it is something like seeking for a grain of wheat in a sack of chaff. Lord Derby acknowledged (House of Lords) that he had lost his way, and got bewildered, before he got to the end of the first volume (400 pages). Still, it is evident, notwithstanding the very great number of Papers that have been published, that many of those have been mutilated; while it is also clear that others have been withheld—a practice very reprehensible, but very common with official people, when it does not suit their purpose to tell all things that relate to public affairs of great moment.

The continued and steady policy of the French Government and the French nation, more than any other European power, England scarcely excepted, it is here proper to observe, has, as is well known, long been to extend the authority and the influence of France around the shores of the Mediterranean. This has been the policy of her rulers for centuries. Many of the severest wars between the Mahomedans and Christians, in Eastern Europe, were produced or instigated by the influence and intrigues of France; whilst she pursued her aggressive and ambitious policy against Christian powers in Germany, and Italy, and other parts of the world. The records of history so fully confirm this truth, that it would be a waste of words and time to dwell on or to particularise the instances. The present Emperor, in his opening speech to his legislature this year, emphatically reminds them of this policy; and others of his countrymen are equally explicit. He says:—

“France has as much, and perhaps more interest than England in preventing the *influence* of Russia from extending itself indefinitely over Constantinople; for to be supreme in Constantinople is to be supreme in the Mediterranean; and no one of you, gentlemen, I think, will say that England alone is largely interested in a sea which waters 300 leagues of our coast.”—“This policy does not date from yesterday; FOR AGES every national Government in France has maintained it, and *I will not desert it*. Let them not come and ask us, What are you going to do at Constantinople? We are going there with England to defend the cause of the Sultan, and none the less to *protect* the rights of the Christians. We are going there to *defend the freedom of the seas*, and *our just influence in the Mediterranean*. We are going there with Germany, to aid her in preserving the rank from which it seems they wish to degrade her,—to secure her frontiers against the preponderance of its principal neighbour. We are going there, in fact, with all those who *desire the triumph of right, of justice, and of CIVILIZATION*.”—*Speech of Napoleon III. March 2d, 1854.*

This special-pleading document is of pure French manufacture, and is made to cover the most determined and insatiable ambition. “*The freedom of the seas*,” in French phraseology, was formerly well understood by England, and cost her a war of twenty-five years duration against France to oppose it. The “just rights of France in the Mediterranean,”—in the true object thereof, will soon be made apparent to the world; and the consideration expressed for the freedom and rights of Germany, will soon be found to mean, to coerce her to combat for French interests and ambition. How far the Emperor intends to carry out this French policy at this season, time will show, and may also depend upon what the general feeling in France may DIRECT him to do. Professions of politicians and states are not worth a straw when opportunity offers to gratify national feeling, policy, interest,

and ambition. History tells us that nearly all the wars that afflicted Europe and Germany, especially of Turkey against the latter, during a period of 200 years, were all encouraged by the intrigues and advice of France; that by means of the Turks, always ready pupils for the work of war, she might attack Germany—*Christians*—from the south-east and east, while she directed her immediate power and strength against Germany and the rest of Europe, on the Rhine, and on the sea, as long as she was able to do the latter. If the policy and ambition of France, directed to the Mediterranean, a few years ago alarmed, and justly alarmed, eminent Whig statesmen and writers, when that power held only 240 geographical miles of the coast of that sea, what must be their feeling now, when they are told by the French sovereign that they have—as they really have—720 geographical miles (840 English) of the coasts of that sea,—with, moreover, a French garrison at Rome, a French garrison in Greece, and a preponderating military force in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus? But let one of these authorities speak for themselves:—

“TURKEY—*First Step to Improvement, to improve the Army.*—The intercourse with a powerful ally would certainly tend to weaken the hatred and contempt in which infidels and their institutions are at present held. Nor can it be doubted, that in every point of view, by their power, their abilities, their manners, and their activity, the French are peculiarly well adapted to work the changes in question. Indeed, were it not from the *dangerous consequences* of such an event to our own country, we should be justified in wishing well to the progress of the Turks in their new alliance. Certainly between the Russians and the French, in so far as regards Turkey, there can be no room for hesitating. *But who can view, without dismay, the addition of all the coasts and forests of Greece* to the already enormous maritime resources of France in the Mediterranean? Our desire for the improvement of the Turks must be vehement indeed, if it can lead us to deprecate their having Russian instructors.

“But, unhappily, the influence of France in the affairs of the Porte is no longer a matter of speculation. The ascendant, which Russia might have gained in them, had she reserved herself for better opportunities, is now sacrificed to her premature efforts in the cause of the German powers. The subjugation of Austria and the destruction of Prussia, have brought France and Russia together. Instead of fighting for Germany, or even for Turkey, they are now contending for Petersburg.”—*Edinburgh Review*, vol. x. p. 271.

Moreover, the spiritual supremacy in the Eastern world, or rather in those portions of Eastern Europe and Western Asia at present ruled by Mahommedan powers, has for nearly 1,200 years been the steady aim of the Roman or Latin Church; and the proceedings taken to attain this end have been the means of frequently entailing much

misery on different places and upon many millions of men. The Republican Revolution that dethroned Louis Philippe was encouraged and supported by the whole weight and influence of the more domineering and ambitious Romanists in France. Every form of government that has lately succeeded Republicanism in France has based its chief support upon the same power and influence, and which is prepared to act, as opportunity may occur, upon and with the vast increasing Romanist power in every portion of the world, preparatory to that great contest with Protestantism, which rash and headstrong Romanists court, and calculate to be near at hand. The present Emperor of France is looked upon by them as their great champion; and policy, supposing no other motive, leads him and his Government to flatter them and to seek their support. The Papers which we are about to consider will bring some of these facts before us in a very striking point of view.

This Lord Clarendon knows and acknowledges. "Her Majesty's Government," says he, "were not insensible to the *superior claims of Russia*, both as respected the treaty obligations of Turkey, and the loss of *moral influence* that the Emperor would sustain throughout his dominions, if, in the position occupied by his Majesty with reference to the Greek Church, he was to yield any privileges it had hitherto enjoyed to the LATIN CHURCH OF WHICH THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH CLAIMED to be the PROTECTOR."—*Secret Correspondence*, p. 23.

The very first act of the French Revolutionary Government of 1848 was to abrogate all the treaties between France and the other European powers made in the year 1815, at the conclusion of the bloody and destructive war wholly entailed on Europe by the restless and unscrupulous ambition of France. The decree proclaiming this abrogation of treaties stands to this day unrepealed, ready to be acted upon as occasion may present itself and events may draw forth. The first step taken by the Revolutionary Government was to send an ambassador to Constantinople to demand of the Government of Turkey concessions and privileges which, granted, would have constituted the Church of Rome, or the Latin Church, the supreme Christian Church in the Eastern world, and the French Government, as a matter of course, the ruler and protector thereof. This step was taken and supported by the Pope of Rome and all his more ambitious followers throughout Europe. Religion was to be made the moving spring to aid and extend ambition and political power. In this movement the projectors calculated, and calculated correctly, that they would speedily come in contact with the Greek Church and the power of Russia, against which they considered that they might readily depend upon

the Turks as their willing assistants. With their aid, and probably also with the assistance of some other stupid European power, prompted by hostility to Russia, France doubtless calculated that she would revenge on Russia the terrible disasters which in a just war Russia had made France suffer in 1812, and in subsequent years.

Before entering upon the minute consideration of these Official Papers, it is necessary to observe that more than one of the most important are wanting. Thus in No. 140,¹ Sir H. Seymour adverts to a despatch shown to him by Count Nesselrode, and which was to be despatched to London next day, of which he says, "*The whole language and purport of this paper gave me very great pleasure.*" His summary is, first, the satisfaction felt by the Emperor at the proof of confidence in his word manifested by her Majesty's Government—*this is expressed in plain words*; second, which is plainly to be seen, the apprehension entertained by the Russian Cabinet of an alliance, having for its object a joint action upon the affairs of Turkey, between England and France; and, third, the almost equally evident desire of proving that such an alliance must, from the opposing interests of the two parties, *exist more in appearance than in reality.*" We search in vain through the papers for any such despatch of the date alluded to.

Next, in No. 66,² Count Nesselrode adverts strongly to "*the late confidential overtures* which Sir Hamilton Seymour has been instructed to make to us, manifested on the part of the British Government, of a *conciliatory disposition on which we set a high value,*" &c. Where is this despatch? It must have been very important, and must bear strongly upon the question in dispute.

Again, it must be asked, what has become of the despatch which was written (such a despatch must have been penned) to Lord Stratford, calling for explanation about the difference in the Menschikoff note of the 14th March,³ as sent to the Foreign Office by Colonel Rose, and the genuine note transmitted from St. Petersburg to Baron Brunow in London, and which he was directed to place in Lord Clarendon's hands? It is easy to perceive that the nature of this despatch must have had a direct and important bearing upon the dispute going on. It is, however, nowhere to be found amongst the papers that have been produced! Such conduct and proceedings are most discreditable.

Everything must have a beginning, and a small spark may produce a most extensive and destructive conflagration. The Holy Places in

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, April 7th, 1853, Part I. p. 120.

² Nesselrode to Brunow, 13th August, 1853, Part II. p. 54.

³ See Stratford's reply, Part I. p. 264, May, 1853.

Palestine were made the first bone of contention ; but it is clear from the Official Papers about to be considered, that this was merely the small edge of the wedge that was intended to be driven home as soon as possible, and that a supremacy of a much more extensive kind was contemplated and intended. Sir Stratford Canning, now Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his letter No. 1,¹ states that by General Aupeck's instructions from Paris, "it appears that the *Pope of Rome* has been made to exert his influence in furtherance of the views adopted by France, and that ALL the Catholic powers will be engaged by his Holiness to co-operate for the same purpose." The same authority tells us, No. 3,² that the Spanish, Sardinian, and Neapolitan representatives have severally given in notes to the Porte, seconding the French demand, and stating that they act by the express command of their respective Governments. In No. 5,³ the same authority tells us that "the Portuguese *chargé des affaires* is seconding General Aupeck, by means of an official note." In No. 13,⁴ the same authority transmits us the official note of the Austrian *chargé des affaires*, M. de Klere, dated 3d July, 1851, "that he had received orders from the Imperial Government to support the claims of the Latin monks in Palestine," &c. The same authority tells, No. 10,⁵ that "General Aupeck is not at liberty to modify his present course, without fresh instructions from Paris." In an enclosure with No. 11,⁶ we find General Aupeck in the matter, protesting, both in the name of France, and in that of *Catholicism at large*; and in another enclosure in No. 12,⁷ we find General Aupeck contending with the Russian Government, for "the just rights" and for the "*essential interests* of a cause which it is defending in behalf of *Catholicism at large*." In No. 5,⁸ Sir Stratford Canning, on perceiving the serious contest going on, and after having in No. 3 told us, that "the Porte is fully aware of the important *political considerations* involved, and the strong conflicting passions likely to be engaged in the pending controversy," observes, "No Englishman, alive to the interests of a true European policy in the East, could witness without regret and anxiety the triumph of a POLITICAL INFLUENCE, which would always be ready to overflow its bounds." "No one seems to doubt that every nerve

¹ Stratford to Palmerston, May 20th, 1850, Part I. p. 1.

² Stratford to Palmerston, June 5th, 1850, Part I. p. 2.

³ Stratford to Palmerston, July 5th, 1850, Part I. p. 3.

⁴ Stratford to Palmerston, March 6th, 1850, Part I. p. 14.

⁵ Stratford to Palmerston, January 6th, 1851, Part I. p. 11.

⁶ Stratford to Palmerston, January 7th, 1851, Part I. p. 11.

⁷ Stratford to Palmerston, February 25th, 1851, Part I. p. 12.

⁸ Stratford to Palmerston, July 5th, 1850, Part I. p. 2.

will be strained by the Greek Church and nation to maintain their vantage-ground ; and that Russian influence, however masked, will be vigorously exerted, as on former occasions, to defeat the attack of the Latin party." In No. 8,¹ Sir Stratford emphatically says, "Those of her (Turkey) friends who wish to see her free from foreign influences, and who cannot shut their eyes to the probable POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES of that success which the French Government seeks naturally to obtain AT THE HEAD of the Roman Catholic representatives, cannot fail to sympathise with the Turkish Ministry in their view, if such be really their view of the pending case."

History establishes the fact that France both claimed and exercised the right of the Protector of the Roman Catholic Religion in the East. In 1819, when an understanding was come to between the Porte, the Emperor Alexander, and Louis XVIII. of France, regarding the state of the Greeks, the latter acted upon the ground that he was acknowledged Protector of the Roman Catholics in the East ; and the Emperor of Russia, that he was the sovereign of the greater number of the followers of the Greek Church, &c. (see article in *Times*, March 29th, 1853). Furthermore, and to the point, it was only a few months ago that the French Minister at Constantinople (*Gen. Baraguay d'Hilliers*), on the occasion of the expulsion of all the Greeks belonging to the Government of Greece, resisted the expulsion of the Roman Catholic Greeks, in his capacity as representative of France, and doubtless by the authority of his Government, as the Protector of the Roman Catholics throughout the Turkish empire. The Divan yielded to his remonstrances, till opposed by the British Minister, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The dispute became so serious that the French minister broke off all communication with the Ottoman Government, at that critical moment, and with much difficulty was prevented from taking his departure for France. The peculiar crisis induced his Government to suspend their claim ; but there can be no doubt that he acted in the affair in obedience to his instructions, and that France considers herself now, as she has always done, the legitimate and acknowledged Protector of the Roman Catholics in all the Turkish empire.² The following clear and unanswerable document sets the point disputed completely at rest :—

¹ Stratford to Palmerston, September 4th, 1850, Part I. p. 8.

² Yet M. Drouyn de Lhuys affects boldly to deny this. On his authority, Lord Cowley tells Lord Clarendon, May 31st, 1853, p. 210, that "the ambassadors of France have always repudiated the religious protection of Turkish Roman Catholic subjects." In his letter to Count Walewski, June 25th, 1853, p. 305, M. Drouyn de Lhuys denies that France was entitled, or ever exercised such a power. It suited his purpose to do so at this moment ; and thus statesmen, to suit their views and their countries' ambition, trifle with facts, however

"FRENCH PROTECTORATE.—The French and English press, with reference to Prince Menschikoff's mission, is seeking to prove that the Protectorate exercised by France over the Catholics in the East cannot be cited by Russia, at the present time, as an example and precedent, inasmuch as that Protectorate only applies to foreign Catholics domiciled in Turkey, and not to Catholics subject to the rule of the Porte.

"Those who follow the movements of French policy in the East, especially as regards the Syrians and the Maronites, can easily adduce facts to the contrary. Moreover, the idea, which in this respect has always influenced the French Government, is expressed in an unequivocal manner in a public document, namely, in a protocol on the affairs of Greece, of the 3d of February, 1830, No. 3. That protocol, which was signed on behalf of France by her plenipotentiary, the Count de Montmorency Laval, contains the following passage, which we will quote word for word :—

"The French plenipotentiary requested the attention of the conference to the particular position in which his Government is placed relative to a portion of the Greek population.

"He represented that, for many ages, France has been entitled to exercise, in favour of the Catholics subject to the Sultan, an especial protection, which his most Christian Majesty deems it to be his duty to deposit, at the present time, in the hands of the future sovereign of Greece, so far as the provinces which are to form the new state are concerned; but, in divesting himself of this prerogative, his most Christian Majesty owes it to himself, and he owes it to a people who have lived so long under the *protection of his ancestors*, to require that the Catholics of the Continent and of the islands shall find, in the organization which is about to be given to Greece, guarantees which may stand in lieu of the influence which France has hitherto exercised in their favour.

"The plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Russia appreciated the justice of this demand, and it was decided that the Catholic religion shall enjoy, in the new state, the free and public exercise of its worship; that its property shall be guaranteed to it; that its bishops shall be maintained in the integrity of the functions, rights, and privileges which they have enjoyed under the *protection* of the kings of France; and that, lastly, agreeably to the same principle, the properties belonging to the ancient French missions, or French establishments, shall be recognised and respected."

"Thus, on the one hand, we perceive that France in nowise hesitates to declare, in a formal diplomatic act, that she exercises a special patronage in behalf of the Catholic subjects of the Sultan, and that she deems it to be her duty to place that patronage in the hands of the future sovereign of Greece, in so far as regards the provinces which are to compose the new state; on the other hand, that the plenipotentiary of Great Britain has, in

obvious and important, considering that their rank and authority will insure them credit amongst the mass of mankind. On the establishment of the kingdom of Greece, France relinquished her right, as Catholic Protector in the East, in favour of that kingdom, but of it only.

like manner, no scruple to affix his signature thereto, probably because his Government did not perceive, in the explicit mention of the French Protectorate, any impeachment of the independence of Turkey and the sovereignty of the Sultan.

"Why, then, has this manner of looking upon the question changed, from the time that there is a question of applying it to Russia?"—*No. 284, June 17th, 1853, Part I. p. 296. Seymer—Russian Memorandum.*

This speaks for itself, and if we wanted further proof of its accuracy, we have it in the annexed article in the *Times*, intimating that it will be withdrawn, to establish a more general system :—

"We observe with satisfaction, that as France herself proposes that *no official protectorate* should be exercised over the subjects of the Porte, to whatever ritual they may belong, and Austria concurs in the same principle, those Catholic powers are prepared to *offer the protectorate they have hitherto claimed over certain of the Catholic subjects of Turkey*, to merge in the general guarantee SECURED by the Sultan and *his allies* to every denomination of Christians."—*Times, August 13th, 1854.*

But the following, from the same superior source of information, proves still stronger, that that which has been so positively and officially denied *as not existing*, has always been *claimed and exercised* by France and other powers, in Turkey. "It is," says that well-informed journal—

"No slight sign of *the sincerity* of the three friendly powers, that they have declared their willingness to forego those *exclusive religious claims* which defeated all hopes of tranquillity, and were only kept up through a mistaken sense of honour. If the French Emperor yields *his hereditary right* in favour of the Catholics, he will have conferred a service on the world, and even, whatever they may think, on the Levantines themselves. Above all, he will render *the policy of France* more reputable, and her influence really stronger, as it will no longer be in the hands of a class which is far from being popular. Hitherto the course has been this. Every French ambassador has, on his arrival, found himself surrounded by a body of co-religionists, demanding his protection, and offering their assistance. A fanatical body of Levantine Catholics exists in the capital, under the name of PERITES. These people, *without country*, position, intellectual culture, or elevated aims, have taken up or inherited ultramontane views, which, by the natural process of religious antagonism, have been dispersed by the contact with Greeks and Armenians."—"A French ambassador arrives... Whatever may be the power of the nation he represents, his personal authority in a strange country, and at an ignorant court, is but small ; and that personal authority is the only means of influence. *The Catholics* can give him nearly all he wants. They have *an agent* in every remote town of Roumelia and Anatolia, who can supply him with intelligence, and get up little grievances, which will give him an opportunity of showing *his spirit* at the

Porte. He will have a *net-work* of *co-operators* throughout the country, far superior to that given by the consular system."—"Furthermore, there is an impulse of *national vanity*, connected, in some manner, with the Crusades, Louis IX., Francis I., and the various chapels at Calvary and Bethlehem ; therefore he enters into all the ecclesiastical schemes of the degenerate race that surrounds him, and *becomes a potentate like his rivals*," &c.—*Times*, Sept. 21st, 1851. *Correspondent, Constantinople, Sept. 10th.*

It is no mean source or authority that furnishes the above truthful particulars. Stratford de Redcliffe has already got a rival potentate—a *master*. He feels it—he deserves it. Let Protestant England, Europe, and America look to it.

The Porte declined to comply with the peremptory and exclusive demand of General Aupeck, and referred to a general commission to examine the treaties under which the French Government founded their claims. Against this General Aupeck strongly protested, stating (August 12th, 1850) that his "basis was incontestable," and that "CATHOLIC EUROPE, friendly to the Ottoman empire, awaits with impatience the satisfactory solution of the negotiation which has been begun."

During these proceedings it appears that M. Titoff, the Russian ambassador, did little more than communicate with his court what was going on ; and we have no documents in the papers before us, to show anything that that court said or directed. At this time General Aupeck was recalled, and M. de Lavalette succeeded him as French ambassador at Constantinople. He assumed a high and decided tone, and in his first communication (No. 15),¹ stated "the high importance attached to the matter by his Government." In No. 17, p. 18, we find him stating, "that if the moderation of his Government, in seeking only a joint participation of the buildings in question were not appreciated, the claim of *undivided possession* by the Latins would be urged with all the weight of a demand warranted by treaty." At this stage Russia began to be heard of. Sir Stratford Canning (No. 19²) informs Lord Palmerston that M. Titoff, by command of the Emperor of Russia, had intimated, "that no change would be allowed to take place in the possession of those sanctuaries." Lavalette proceeded. The Divan declined to agree to his dictation, and asserted that "no one Government can prevent another Government from exercising that right," or "of explaining and determining, by common consent, articles of treaties. This right appertains equally to all powers"

¹ Stratford to Palmerston, May 19th and July 10th, 1851, with enclosures, Part I. pp. 14, 17.

² Stratford to Palmerston, Oct. 17th, 1853, Part I. p. 18.

(p. 17). In No. 20¹ Sir Stratford Canning informs Lord Palmerston that "the question has assumed a character of extreme gravity." Neither Lavalette, nor the Russian ambassador Titoff, nor the Divan, could agree upon various points. In reference to the point of joint possession, Lavalette would agree to that, yet, "in so doing, he would have anticipated the instructions of his Government, and exposed himself to the *animadversion of Rome*, and of *certain parties in France*." At the same time, he thinks it impossible to submit with honour to the present plan of proceeding. His Government having embarked in the question, cannot, with any degree of credit or consistency, stop short under the dictation of Russia; *the national party in France, THE CATHOLIC PARTY THERE AND ELSEWHERE*, will press for the FULL assertion of right under treaty; and as for himself, he will retire rather than be made the instrument, as he conceives he would be in the supposed case, of his country's humiliation; nay more, if [it depended upon him, he would not hesitate to make use of the great naval force in the Mediterranean, and by blockading the Dardanelles, bring the question in debate forthwith to a *satisfactory issue*!"]

At this stage of the business Sir Stratford tells us (No. 20²), "their (the Turks') object, *as usual, is to temporise*; their inclination would seem to be rather towards France; not that they can feel any direct concern in the question at issue, but, as deeming a concession to *French influence* less dangerous than the triumph of Russian sympathy for the Greeks, whose cause, however, as that of an important section of their own fellow-subjects, they can hardly afford to neglect." It would be tedious, and is deemed unnecessary, to quote the treaties and concessions made with and to Christian powers (these occupy eight pages), especially as the points immediately connected with them were ultimately settled to the satisfaction, at least the apparent satisfaction, of both Russia and France. This position of the subject is dwelt upon chiefly to show the spirit in which the dispute was carried on, and the *political feeling* and jealousy which that dispute called forth amongst the contending powers. The conduct of France was the most violent and menacing, and Turkey clearly wanted to favour her at the expense of her relations with Russia. To carry the object in their favour, a mixed commission was appointed, who, to show the partiality in favour of French claims, actually threw aside, as valueless, the original charter granted to the Greek Christians at Jerusalem by Caliph Omar, on the conquest of that place in 636, "by virtue of which the Holy Sepulchre and *its dependencies* were placed under the control of the

¹ Stratford to Palmerston, Nov. 10th, 1851, Part I. p. 19.

² Stratford to Palmerston, Nov. 6th, 1851, Part I. p. 19.

Greek Patriarch, and the other rites and religions made subject to him in this respect, so that complete immunity was accorded to the convent of the Holy Sepulchre," &c. (p. 25.) This decision being about to be communicated to M. Titoff, the Russian ambassador, he warmly remonstrated against it, and said, "that he thought it his duty to tell him (Ali Pasha) frankly, that any further step, foreign to the *status quo* of the Holy Places, would exceedingly annoy the Emperor; in which case he (M. Titoff) would find himself compelled to abandon the confidential ground upon which he had acted up to this moment, and officially to protest against the Porte. He further added, that he very clearly saw the Porte's intention to accept the *protectorate of France* in this affair." In No. 25¹ Sir Stratford tells that the Turks, "in order, no doubt, to gain time," proposed to refer the question to "a council of state, composed of members of the Ulemah and some of the principal ministers." "M. Lavalette (No. 20) objected to this course, and the Porte persisted in pursuing its own course." In No. 30 p. 33,² Sir Stratford informs us that M. Lavalette, with great difficulty, consented to allow the Turkish minister a few days more to produce his final answer, adding, "that if the answer of the Porte was such as to hurt the honour of France, he should be obliged to break off the negotiation." At last, after considerable squabbling, the dispute was arranged, as Sir Stratford informs us (No. 33,³ Jan. 17th, 1852), "by the concession to the Latins of the right of officiating at the shrine of the Virgin, near Jerusalem, together with the keys to the Church of the Nativity, at Bethlehem." "This intended departure from the *status quo* has induced the Russian envoy to look out for some concession in favour of the Greeks; and I am informed, that an equivalent is to be given to them in the shape of an admission to the right of officiating, on certain occasions, in the Mosque of Mount Olivet." In No. 38,⁴ Lord Cowley tells us, in reference to the negotiations connected with this matter, "M. Turgot had more than once been urged to make a demonstration to back the claim of the French Legation at Constantinople, by ordering a French fleet to the Dardanelles; but he had always resisted having recourse to anything like a threat, because he felt the peril of provoking a collision in that part of the world."

In conclusion of the arrangement No. 40,⁵ "an imperial firman invested with a *hatti-scheriff* was delivered to the Greeks, and a lega-

¹ Stratford to Palmerston, Nov. 19th, 1851, Part I. p. 30.

² Stratford to Palmerston, Dec. 18th, 1851, Part I. p. 33.

³ Stratford to Granville, Jan. 17th, 1851, Part I. p. 34.

⁴ Cowley to Granville, March 5th, 1852, Part I. p. 38.

⁵ Stratford to Malmesbury, March 19th, 1852 Part I. p. 39.

lized copy of the same to the Latins. This document," says M. Pisani, "is addressed to the Governor, the Cadi, and the members of the Council of Jerusalem, with an injunction to attend scrupulously to the execution of its contents, and to have it duly registered in the *Meh-keme*, or court of justice." At the same time, and in company with a copy of these documents, an autograph letter of congratulation was addressed by the Sultan (July 9th, 1852) to the Emperor of Russia, who, relying on the correspondence and documents sent to him as being sincere and correct, was satisfied with the arrangement.

In the meantime, and immediately after this, Sir Stratford Canning returned to England, and was succeeded at Constantinople by Colonel Rose. Lavalette also returned to France on leave of absence. During all these discussions, and for some time subsequent, the British ministers at the Porte were directed by the British Government, viz. by Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Lord Granville, Lord Malmesbury, and Lord Clarendon, not to interfere in the matter in any way as principals, but simply to confine themselves to giving calm advice to both parties, and to transmit what took place to the British Government. That was a great oversight and a great misfortune, as there can be little doubt that if Great Britain had interfered in a decided and friendly manner, the dispute would then have been completely settled. The declarations of the Russian Government decidedly enable us to come to this conclusion.

In the meantime, official and accredited individuals from the Ottoman Government, the French Legation, and the Russian Legation, proceeded to Jerusalem with the firmans, &c., to have these legally and publicly read and recorded. After some delay, and to the surprise of the Russian delegates, the Turkish authorities *refused* to read the Greek firmans, and not only so, but the very secretary who had in Constantinople written the papers, denied that he had done so, or that he had been directed by his superiors to read any such document. Mr. Basily afterwards, (No. 49,¹) called on the Commissioner at his own house, and insisted upon the Greek firman being read. The latter inquired, "What firman?" "*That which you yourself drew up, and wrote with your own hand, as second secretary, in Constantinople,* declaring that the Latin claims to the Sanctuaries were null and void. The Bey explained that he had no directions to read it, that he had no copy of it with him, and could not go beyond *his special instructions!!*"

But this is not all. M. Lavalette returned to Constantinople about the middle of August, and by order of his Government immediately reopened the dangerous question, and disputed the validity of the

¹ Consul Finn to Malmesbury, Jerusalem, Oct. 27th, 1852, Part I. p. 45.

firmans of February. Colonel Rose, (No. 41,¹) tells us, that "His Excellency says that, even allowing that the firman does not state that the claims of the Latins are '*injustes et mal fondés*,' the whole purport of it goes to deny the right of the Latins, that is, France, to the Holy Places," "that the Porte gave, the *day after he left Constantinople on leave*, a firman to the Greeks, which made out the *treaty* (French) to be valueless!" Colonel Rose, (No. 42,²) states that the Russian ambassador, M. de Ozeroff, "says positively that M. de Lavalette knew the tenor of the firman from the Porte, before it was issued." Sir Hugh Seymour, (No. 45,³) tells Lord Malmesbury, the account of these fresh disputes having then reached St. Petersburg, "his conviction was that very serious consequences would be likely to follow *any successful attempt, on the part of the French Government*, to have explained away or modified the firman regarding the Holy Places which has lately been issued." M. de Siniavine's language upon this point appears to be very significant. He says that "the firman has been officially notified to the Imperial Cabinet, though it has not been published, because the Government are always desirous of avoiding causes of offence and altercation; but that the Government are prepared to uphold provisions which they consider to be only such as the Greeks are justly entitled to; that the Emperor is always ready to make allowance for the interests and feelings of others; but that unquestionably, upon a subject to which he attaches so much importance, his Majesty is little disposed to permit his rights to be encroached upon."

Colonel Rose, in No. 50,⁴ repeats his alarm at the conduct of the Divan. "All the evils," says he, "arising from the contradictory nature of the concessions made in February last by the Porte, in the note of the 9th February and the firman to the Greeks, to the two rival interests engaged in this ill-omened difference, are coming into evident and striking contrast, as the time approaches when Asif Bey, the Porte's commissioner at Jerusalem, is to perform the difficult task of executing the *Porte's conflicting decisions* as to the Sanctuaries. The Russian Government consider the firman the charter of the Greek Church. The President (Louis Napoleon) and M. Lavalette consider it an *affront to France*, because it describes her claims, grounded on the treaty of 1740, as '*haksig*' (*unjust*), and establishes a *status quo* which wholly invalidates that treaty. M. Lavalette tells me that the Porte promised to M. Sabatier that it should not be read

¹ Rose to Malmesbury, August 14th, 1852, Part I. p. 42.

² Rose to Malmesbury, August 18th, 1852, Part I. p. 43.

³ Seymour to Malmesbury, Sept. 17th, 1852, Part I. p. 43.

⁴ Rose to Malmesbury, Sept. 23d, 1853, Part I. p. 44.

at Jerusalem. M. de Ozeroff tells the Porte that the firman must be read at Jerusalem; he declares that if it be not read, according to usage, in the *Medgliss* at Jerusalem, before the Pasha, Cadi, members of the Council, Patriarch, and the different sects, it will be valueless and a dead letter, and that, consequently, faith will have been broken with Russia." In No. 51,¹ Colonel Rose gets alarmed. "The question of the Holy Places," says he, "is becoming more serious." "M. Lavalette menaces to defend the advantages that he has gained since his return from leave, whilst M. de Ozeroff menaces to regain what he has lost." "M. de Lavalette has induced the Porte to address to him a note which nullifies the *status quo* established by the firman to the Greeks, and states that nothing can be done by the Porte affecting the treaty of 1740, without the consent of France. The French Government have expressed their *approbation* of this note. M. de Lavalette has also addressed instructions to M. Botta, at Jerusalem, in which he enjoins him to watch vigilantly over the strict execution of the note of the 9th February;" and "protects his position by announcing the *extreme measures* he would take, should the Porte leave any engagements to him unfulfilled. He has, more than once, talked of the appearance, in that case, of a French fleet off Jaffa; and once he alluded to a French occupation of Jerusalem, 'when,' he said, 'we shall have all the Sanctuaries!'" The struggle, Colonel Rose is *obliged to confess*, is "in reality a vital struggle between France and Russia for *political influence*,"² at the Porte's cost, in her dominions."

In this menacing state of things, all parties began to be alarmed, and to pause in their hasty course. The French Government, by the advice of Lord Cowley,³ who represented that his Government had desired him "to press earnestly on the French Government the necessity of its (the dispute) being terminated as promptly as possible;" and M. Drouyn de Lhuys said he would instruct the French ambassadors accordingly. The Grand Vizier and Fuad Effendi applied to Colonel Rose⁴ for advice, stating that they were "resolved to extricate the Porte from the critical position in which she had been involved by the *contradictory promises* of the last ministry respecting the question of Jerusalem," &c.; when he (Colonel Rose) was obliged to reply

¹ Rose to Malmesbury, Nov. 20th, 1852, Part I. p. 47.

² M. Drouyn de Lhuys, when he comes to be more explicit, speaks of Turkey (Part I. p. 305) thus,—“Embarrassments of a power who, under the influence of two *opposing currents of equal force*, conceived it could only keep its balance by alternately contracting contradictory engagements.” Thus opposed by France, Russia was justified in attending to her own safety and interests.

³ Cowley to Russell, Dec. 30th, 1852, Part I. p. 53.

⁴ Rose to Malmesbury, Dec. 5th, 1852, Part I. p. 51.

that my "instructions did not permit me to interfere in that question ; and that even if they did, I could not safely have given an opinion as to decisions of one day, contradicted by those of the next, not knowing, besides, whether other counter engagements may not have been given *secretly*, or unknown to me." It was therefore just and proper, on the part of Russia, to require from such a Government something more binding than promises.

During all these equivocations and delays on the part of the Turkish Government, and menaces on the part of the French ambassador, the utmost length that M. Titoff, the Russian ambassador, went, was (see enclosure, No. 53),¹ to state to Ali Pasha, in November last, that if a single thing was changed in the *status quo*² as to the Holy Places, it would be considered as an offence by the Emperor, and that he (M. Titoff) would in that case leave Constantinople, with all the members of his mission, in twenty-four hours." It is necessary here to glance for a moment to what was passing at Jerusalem. Consul Finn tells us, (No. 58),³ "that the firman which confirms the property of the Sanctuaries to the Greek community here, as alluded to in my dispatch of the 27th October, was read in public Divan on the 29th November, in presence of the three Patriarchs and the French consul." Colonel Rose (No. 80, January 4th, 1853, p. 69) denies the accuracy of this statement, and says, "*neither the Latin Patriarch nor the French consul were present at the reading of the firman.*" And in No. 63,⁴ Consul Finn states, "I have to report that, on Wednesday last, the 22d instant, the silver star for the sanctuary of Bethlehem was deposited, in place of the long-missed one, by the Latin Patriarch, with great ceremony. It had been brought up a few days before, with much pomp, from Jaffa. Some of the Moslem Effendis went down to Jaffa to escort it, and the rest rode out a considerable distance on the road, to bring it into Jerusalem with triumph. At the time of depositing the star, the *Latin authorities* received the keys into possession, not only of the inner, but of the outer church at Bethlehem, *which were taken from the Greeks to be given to them.*"

Colonel Rose (No. 152, March 21st, 1853) denies the accuracy of this. M. Pisani says "that Asif Bey, who was at Jerusalem at the time, assured him that the star was sent to him by the Pasha of Saida, in a box sealed up with the seal of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that

¹ Rose to Malmesbury, Dec. 4th, 1853, Part I. p. 49 ; enclosure Dec. 4th, Pisani.

² M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated (May 17th, 1853, p. 175), that "the *status quo* was more favourable for France than the arrangement subsequently made, and which he had insisted upon."

³ Consul Finn to Malmesbury, Dec. 9th, 1852, Part I. p. 52.

⁴ Consul Finn to Malmesbury, Dec. 28th, 1853, Part I. p. 55.

it was accompanied by only one officer of the Pasha's household. The star remained sealed as it was for upwards of twenty days in Asif Bey's room, and nobody knew of its arrival until the moment it was brought into the Church of Bethlehem, to be fixed in the place of the older one." "The keys," as Mr. Finn states, "were not taken from the Greeks to be given to the Latins; but three new keys were made by the Pasha's orders, and delivered to the Latins the day the star was fixed."

Who are we to believe of these officials? The one who *saw*, or the one who only *heard*, such as Pisani?

It would have been strange indeed had Russia, the party most deeply interested, patiently submitted longer to such a state of things. She had either been grossly deceived and imposed upon by the Ottoman Government, or the latter had deceived the Government of France. This latter supposition, however, was certainly not the case, as everything shows that the Turkish Government intended and wished to advance the interests and influence of France at all hazards, and to look to her for protection and support. The annals of political diplomatic profligacy afford no parallel to the disgraceful scenes here exhibited, and which the champions and admirers of Turkey keep wholly in the back-ground, nor venture even to allude to them. It is a most remarkable fact, that Lord Malmesbury (No. 52¹) had to that date never heard of Basily's, or the great Greek firman. Can Sir Stratford Canning have withheld this, or did the Turkish minister deceive him, and never inform him about it? It is for the British ambassador to explain this, and the point most certainly demands clear and explicit explanation. Brevity compels me to pass over correspondence occupying several pages, and, for the reason mentioned, to prevent different parties each from telling his own tale regarding the dispute at this stage of it. This course becomes the more proper, because more important agents and actors come more immediately on the stage, while the whole subject is forcibly and fairly condensed, and brought before us, in the official documents about to be quoted, as addressed by the Russian Government to the Governments of Great Britain and France, at this stage of the dispute and the important negotiations. Amidst what may be considered the weightier metal now brought into the field, we find Sir H. Seymour, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, who, by every exertion and possibility, on all occasions to the utmost of his power, volunteers to cast doubts on the proceedings and declarations of Russia, while he extenuates to the utmost the reprehensible and dishonest proceedings of her opponents, and whose defence of the Turks is the most strange one, namely, that they do wrong and act

¹ Malmesbury to Rose, Dec. 14th, 1852, Part I. p. 49.

dishonestly, "*through weakness!*" and (Part V. p. 11) "*from the excessive apprehensions of the French entertained by the unfortunate Turks.*"

A striking instance of his partiality and error is found in his memorandum, presented to Count Nesselrode, January 8th, 1853, p. 58. The moment he heard of the serious turn things had taken at Constantinople, and the scandalous proceedings there, he, without any instructions from his Government, gratuitously cautions Russia against anger or precipitation, because, he said, there is considerable reason for believing "that the critical state of things originated not so much in the decisions of the Cabinet (French), as in the *personal views of a diplomatic agent*;" and further, "that grounds are not wanting for imagining that the French Government may not be reluctant to withdraw, if enabled to do so with dignity, from a diplomatic contest entered upon without sufficient reflection." Unfortunately for this piece of special pleading, Colonel Rose tells us (No. 80, Constantinople, January 4th, 1853) that M. Drouyn de Lhuys instructed M. de Lavalette, that to allow the Latins to '*officier*' in the tomb, and then not let them have the means of doing so, was '*dérisoire*' and not to be thought of. M. de Lavalette says that he has *received very strong instructions as to the Holy Places from his Government*; that they express the greatest displeasure at the public reading of the firman, and insist on a literal execution of all the provisions in favour of the Latins contained in the note of 9th February last. It appears that the firman was read with more publicity than Fuad Effendi had promised M. de Lavalette that it should be." What has Sir H. Seymour to say to this?

In No. 72,¹ Count Nesselrode, in the name of his master, thus addressed Count Brunnow, the Russian ambassador in London, to be by him communicated to Lord John Russell for his Government:—

"You had already touched upon the subject with Lord Malmesbury, when he was going out of office; and your endeavours to make him see it in its true light could not but be approved by our august master. Unhappily the steps which your Excellency had sought to induce him to take, as well at Paris as at Constantinople, had reference to a state of things which is now no longer the same. At that time the proceedings of the French ambassador in Turkey, and his menaces to compel the Ottoman minister to evade the execution of the firman, had not as yet finally succeeded. A hope might still be entertained that the representations of England to the French Cabinet might have the effect of arresting M. de Lavalette in his course. That hope has been disappointed; since that time the efforts of the French embassy have triumphed at Constantinople. Not only has the firman, sanctioned by the Sultan's *hatti-scherif*, not been executed at

¹ Nesselrode to Brunnow, 14th June, 1853, Part I. p. 43.

Jerusalem, but it has been treated with derision by his Highness's ministers. To the indignation of the whole Greek population, the key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made over to the Latins, so AS PUBLICLY TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR RELIGIOUS SUPREMACY IN THE EAST.

"The mischief, then, is done, M. le Baron; and there is no longer any question of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it. The immunities of the orthodox religion, which have been injured—the promise which the Sultan had solemnly given to the Emperor, and which has been violated—require some reparation. We must labour to attain it. Such is the present state of the question. If we took for our example the impetuous and violent proceedings which have brought France to this result; if, like her, we were indifferent to the dignity of the Porte, to the consequences which an heroic remedy may have in a constitution already so shattered as that of the Ottoman empire,—our course would be already marked out for us, and we should not have long to reflect upon it. Menace, recourse to force, would be our immediate means. The cannon has been called the last argument of kings: the French Government has made it its first. It is the argument with which, at the outset, it declared its intention to commence its proceedings at Tripoli, as well as at Constantinople. Notwithstanding our legitimate causes of complaint, and at the risk of waiting some time longer for redress, we shall seek to take a less expeditious course. We still desire, as we have always desired, the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, as being, take it all in all, the least mischievous arrangement for all European interests, which would not fail to come into violent collision in the East, if the gap existed. We will accordingly use our utmost efforts to avoid to the last, as far as depends on us, without prejudice to our honour, whatever may be calculated still further to shake this body, at once so feeble and so tottering, at the risk of causing it to fall into powder. Although we have in vain attempted, up to the present time, to make the Porte accessible to reason, we are about to make one further and last conciliatory endeavour. We are, consequently, seeking at the present time for an arrangement which may restore to the firman the force of which it has been deprived—*may replace at Jerusalem the two creeds on an equal footing*—and reconcile their pretensions without prejudice to the rights of either. The object of the pacific but firm advice with which this proposal might be accompanied, will be to enlighten the Porte as to the consequences of the fault which, out of weakness, it has committed towards us; and at the same time reassure it against the contingencies which disturb and alarm it on the side of France. The Emperor has already made up his mind to the principal bases of this arrangement; and as soon as his Majesty shall have finally decided upon them, I will not fail, M. le Baron, to communicate them to your Excellency.

"But, while firmly desiring and wishing to employ only pacific means, there is one consideration of which we have not been able altogether to lose sight; it is, that the moral ascendancy of France at Constantinople has acquired such dimensions, that it is much to be feared that all our endeavours may fail, before the impression entertained by the Sultan's counsellors of the *irresistible* force of the French Government. It may

happen that France, perceiving that the Porte hesitates, may again have recourse to her system of menace, and press upon it so as to prevent it from listening to our just demands. The match is too unequal between us and the French Government, if, while the latter moves its squadron about, without opposition, in all parts of the Mediterranean, and presents its least demand at the cannon's mouth, we allow the notion of our inability to defend them, and likewise to protect our own interests, indefinitely to take root in the mind of the Turks. The Emperor has, therefore, considered it necessary to adopt in the outset some precautionary measures, in order to support our negotiations, to neutralise the effect of M. de Laval-ette's threats, and to guard himself in any contingency which may arise against the attempts of a government accustomed to act by surprises. *The object of our measures is not in any way to throw doubt on the independence of the Ottoman empire.* On the contrary, they are designed to maintain that independence against foreign dictation, by securing the tranquillity of the Sultan, and re-establishing his authority, which the French ambassador has impaired in the estimation of his subjects of the Greek faith, who, in Europe, form the majority of the population of his dominions. Thus, M. le Baron, in the view of the Emperor, the purport of our preparations is to produce a moral rather than a material effect.

"As the exaggerated reports which are already in circulation on this subject might give rise to alarm, it was important for us to explain clearly the true character of our intentions. We trust that the English Government will not misunderstand their nature. The proofs of moderation which the Emperor has given in his conduct towards Turkey, on so many former occasions, are a pledge that, on the present, he will not deviate from the same principles. *A common interest requires England as well as Russia to watch over the maintainance of peace in the East.* We appeal to this interest, while addressing ourselves with frankness, at the present time, to the impartiality of the British Government. If, as we do not doubt, it attaches as much importance as we do to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the East, it becomes it now to raise its voice, to assist us at Constantinople in dispelling the blindness or panic fear of the Turks; at Paris, to bring back the French Cabinet to prudent counsels. Such, in our opinion, should be the two-fold task of the English ministers; and, if they will be pleased to undertake it, the negotiations which we are about to commence will, we trust, be brought to a close without danger for the peace of the East.

"The Emperor enjoins you, M. le Baron, to employ all your efforts and zeal in acting upon the British Government in this sense.

"Receive, &c. (Signed) NESSELRODE."

Pages 67 to 77.—Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley.

"Foreign Office, January 28th, 1853.

"MY LORD,—A few days ago M. Baudin, the Chargé d'Affaires of France, read to me a despatch which he had received from his Government, addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Castelbajac, the Minister of France at St. Petersburg.

"Some days later Baron Brunnow read to me a despatch, addressed to him by Count Nesselrode.

"Both these despatches relate to the question of the Holy Places.

"It is with great regret that her Majesty's Government have perceived that this question is not yet settled, although the instructions given to Castelbajac may lead to a favourable termination of this unfortunate dispute. As, however, this happy result may not be attained, it is desirable that you should be made aware of the view which is taken by her Majesty's Government.

"In the first place, her Majesty's Government desire to abstain altogether from giving any opinion on the merits of the question. Treaties, conventions, and firmans are quoted with equal confidence on both sides.

"But her Majesty's Government cannot avoid perceiving, that the ambassador of France at Constantinople *was the first* to disturb the *status quo* in which the matter rested. Not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches were not very active, *but that without some political action on the part of France*, those quarrels would never have troubled the relations of friendly powers.

"In the next place, if report is to be believed, the French ambassador was the first to speak of having recourse to force, and to threaten the intervention of a French fleet, to enforce the demands of his country.

"I regret to say that this evil example has been partly followed by Russia; and, although the report of the march of 50,000 Russian troops to the Turkish frontier appears to have been unfounded or premature, yet it is but too certain that, if the quarrel is prolonged, the Emperor means to support his negotiations by arms.

* * * * *

"Your Excellency will understand, therefore, first, that into the merits of this dispute her Majesty's Government will not enter; secondly, that her Majesty's Government disapprove of every threat, and still more of the actual employment of force; thirdly, that both parties should be told, that if they are sincere in their professions of a desire to maintain the independence of the Porte, they ought to abstain from the employment of any means calculated to display the weakness of the Ottoman empire. Above all, they ought to refrain from putting armies and fleets in motion for the purpose of making the tomb of Christ a cause of quarrel among Christians.

"I am, &c. (Signed) J. RUSSELL."

Page 73, No. 83.—Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseloff (communicated to Lord John Russell, by Baron Brunnow, February 1853).

"St. Petersburg, January 27th,
February 8th, 1853.

"You doubtless, Sir, recollect the communication which, in November 1851, we instructed you to make to the French Ministry, and the reply which Count Turgot, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, made to it, giving you the most positive assurance that we might consider this affair as set at rest in Constantinople; and that it was, consequently, useless to discuss it in Paris.

"The same assurances, and in still more explicit terms, were given to Baron Brunnow in London, by Count Walewski, on the part of the President.

"From that time we were justified in looking upon this discussion as not to be again revived; at all events, in the terms in which General Aupick, and subsequently M. de Lavalette, had put it forward at Constantinople.

"The Ottoman Government, for its part, had so well understood that by annulling all the edicts of the Sultan issued since 1756, and in going back more than one hundred years in order to revive disputed and disputable rights, for the benefit of a creed which is not that of nearly the whole of its Christian subjects, it would give occasion for the most violent discontent among its people, that it determined, on mature deliberation, and after having submitted the question, and the documents bearing upon it, to the scrutiny of a special commission of the chief Ulemas of the empire, to pronounce a final decision on the matter, expressed in a firman and autograph *hatti-scheriff* of the Sultan, which were formally delivered to the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and copies whereof were officially communicated to our mission at Constantinople. This solution was, in our estimation, equitable, for, far from depriving the Catholic religion, and its ministers at Jerusalem, of the establishments and oratories possessed by them, it granted to them, on the contrary, access to certain sanctuaries, reserved, up to this time, to other creeds. Far from placing the Roman Catholic religion, in Palestine, in an inferior or humiliating position, it placed it more on an equality with the other sects. It appears to us, that it was not possible to demand more from a Mussulman Prince, who reckons in his dominions more than ten million subjects belonging to the Orthodox Greek Church. None of the Catholic powers represented at Constantinople, and as much interested in the question, on moral and religious grounds, as France herself, remonstrated or complained, as far as we know, against these arrangements made by the sovereign of Turkey. In a word, we were entitled to suppose that the Cabinet of Paris, which had just expressed to us its intention of letting this matter rest, and of restraining the excessive zeal of its ambassador, would at least have tacitly acquiesced in the conciliatory course adopted by the Porte.

"We will leave the French Ministry to judge of the painful surprise which we have experienced, on learning that, *upon his return to Constantinople after a short stay in France*, M. de Lavalette had again mooted the question, requiring the Porte, in peremptory terms and under threat of a rupture with France, to suppress the last firman; to send a Turkish commissioner to Jerusalem, with fresh instructions; to make over to the Latin clergy the key and the guardianship of the great Church at Bethlehem; to place on the altar of the Grotto of the Nativity, a star with the French arms, which it was said was formerly there, and which had been removed; to attach to the Latin Convent at Jerusalem, a building belonging to the Cupola of the Holy Sepulchre; to make, in fine, other concessions, which at a distance may appear trifling, *but which on the spot, and in*

the estimation of the native population, including even the Mussulmans, are so many acts of injustice and wrong done to the other Christian communities; so many grounds for dissension and animosity between them and THE CHURCH OF ROME, whose interests it is sought to uphold by these means.

"We are reluctant to recapitulate the scandalous scenes which have already occurred at Jerusalem, in consequence of these measures, to which the Porte has had the weakness to lend itself, and which have already been partly carried into execution, contrary to the tenor of the recent firman, which, by another strange contradiction, it caused to be read to the local authorities, at the very time that it directed them to violate its principal conditions.

"We will mention, in the last place, a circumstance sufficiently recent to be within the memory of all persons, and which, upon a question, and in a country where precedent carries weight, may establish, in favour of the Orthodox Church, and of the nations who hold its dogmas, a right difficult to be contested. When, in 1808, a violent fire consumed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Patriarch of Jerusalem claimed and obtained, from the Sultan, authority to rebuild the church according to its ancient form and dimensions, without any foreign intervention whatever, and by the sole means of offerings made by the Greco-Slave population.

"It may be remembered, too, that at that time we were at open war with Turkey; that no diplomatic pressure or intervention, on our part, could have influenced the determinations of the Porte, or counteract the representations which the Catholic Powers, and France herself, at that time governed by the Emperor Napoleon, might have considered themselves authorized to prefer.

"This precedent appears to us to be more particularly adapted to be put before the present Government of France, in support of the intentions which it has evinced, and of the assurances which it gives us of not having contemplated withdrawing, from the Christians of the Greek Church, the right to enjoy the advantages which length of time has secured to them.

"On this basis, which is exactly what we desire, and which equally agrees with the text of the late firman of the Porte, of which we demand the faithful execution, an understanding on the principle would be, at once, established. The only difficulties which would then have to be removed would relate to its application, and to the questions of detail, which would necessarily have to be regulated on the spot, in the sense of the late firman, and which would probably have been so already, *if the contradictory orders of the Porte, the duplicity of its agents, and the exaggerated pretensions of the Catholic Clergy*, had not essentially prejudiced this work of conciliation and of peace, and left everything undecided up to the present time.

"The Imperial Cabinet will neglect no means for hastening a conclusion on so many grounds desirable, and in which the whole of Russia takes the most serious and most legitimate interest. It has pleasure in reckoning upon the disposition and concurrence of France. It entertains no doubt of the efficacious co-operation of the Imperial Court of Austria, which is called upon by its treaties with Turkey to take part in the question.

"It is in this sense that we are about to take at Constantinople further and energetic steps, which, while reminding the Porte of its engagements towards us, will, it is to be hoped, convince it that there is, in fact, neither contest nor antagonism between us and France at the present more than at any other time, as regards the state of things established for ages in the venerated spots of Palestine; that all the great powers of Europe equally desire the preservation of the Ottoman empire, its internal tranquillity, and the independence of its Government, in the actions which may be prescribed to it by justice and by its own interests."

The language used in all the preceding documents quoted is quite clear; and also, in reference to the facts of the case, quite correct; they cannot be gainsayed. Lord Clarendon (No. 94)¹ justly states that the privileges of the Greek Christians in Turkey is a question of "*vital importance*" to Russia, while "political interest" was in it mixed up with "religious zeal." If it is of "*vital importance*" to Russia, so also must it be to the Turkish empire. Lord John Russell very properly states in his letter to Colonel Rose² (No. 6), "the real interest which the Porte must have in the appropriation of any portion of these Holy Places to any particular Christian sect, *must be limited* by the consideration of what is due *to the feelings* of its own Christian subjects, of whom the greater proportion are members of the Greek Church." His Lordship concludes this despatch with the following judicious advice:—

"It appears, therefore, to her Majesty's Government, that the Porte might with honour extricate itself from the difficult and embarrassing position to which the discussions on this subject have reduced it, by expressing its willingness to sanction any arrangement in regard to these Holy Places not inconsistent with the rights of the Sultan as territorial sovereign, which might be recommended for its adoption conjointly by the French and Russian Governments, which, as advocates of the respective claims of the Latin and Greek Churches, have taken the prominent part in the late discussions."

The advice here given was rejected by the Turks, which shows the true spirit that actuated them. "I endeavoured," says Colonel Rose, (No. 98, February 22d, 1853,) to induce his Excellency (Fuad Effendi) to come into the views of her Majesty's Government respecting the advantage to the Porte's sanctioning any arrangement about the Holy Places which might be recommended for its adoption conjointly by the French and Russian Governments. Fuad Effendi did not seem to approve the plan, *alleging* that it would be an acknowledgment of the right of Russia to interfere in and protect the Greek interest in

¹ Clarendon to Stratford, February 25th, 1853, Part I. p. 80.

² Russell to Rose, January 28th, 1853, Part I. p. 67.

Turkey;" but "he ultimately yielded, and said he would recommend the council to adopt the suggestions of her Majesty's Government." This, however, he never did.

His Lordship further adds (No. 77¹), and properly adds, "Her Majesty's Government cannot avoid perceiving, that the ambassador of France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the *status quo* in which the matter rested. Not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches were not very active, but that without *some political action on the part of France* those quarrels would never have troubled the relations of friendly powers. In the next place, if report is to be believed, the French ambassador was the first to speak of having recourse to force, and to threaten the intervention of a French fleet to enforce the demands of his country."

Lord Clarendon (p. 95) confirms this, and says, "Indeed, the position for some time occupied by France with respect to the Holy Places, and *the interest as well as the political feeling* embarked in the question, are the only grounds for now apprehending embarrassment in the East."

It is of importance at this stage of the proceedings to notice the admission which Sir H. Seymour is compelled to make, (No. 64,²) that in reference to the reports of military preparations on the part of Russia,—namely, that "he could not help connecting those military preparations with the threat partly made by the French Government of sending an expedition to Syria, in the event of satisfaction not being obtained for the claims of the Latin Church." Yet, without inquiry, every reported Russian movement, true or false, was asserted to be against Turkey!

Considering the numerous references that have been made to the official documents, as quoted in the preceding pages, it is plain that *political feelings* and views guided the disputants, but more especially France, and that the Latin Church, through France, sought to exalt herself to the supremacy in the East; while it is at the same time evident that, when they thought at all upon the subject, her Majesty's Government, through successive administrations, were of the same opinion. As we proceed in investigating the rest of the correspondence, these facts will even more clearly appear; while it is scarcely necessary to observe that nothing could tend to produce more disastrous consequences in the East than for the Latin Church to attempt to gain the supremacy there and to attain it. The too probable consequences are frightful to contemplate.

¹ Russell to Cowley, January 28th, 1853, Part I. p. 67.

² Seymour to Clarendon, January 6th, 1853, Part I. p. 86.

CHAPTER II.

OCCURRENCES ON MENCHIKOFF'S ARRIVAL AT CONSTANTINOPLE—HIS PROCEEDINGS THERE—OFFICIAL NOTES, DEMANDS, AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH AMBASSADORS AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT—DECLARATIONS—EMPEROR OF RUSSIA—FAILURE OF MENCHIKOFF'S MISSION—HIS DEPARTURE—CONSEQUENCES.

CONSIDERING the serious position in which affairs stood at the date of the close of the last chapter, it can occasion no surprise in any quarter that Russia should take more decided steps in the pending and protracted negotiations, and that she should endeavour to put matters on a more permanent and satisfactory footing, both as regards the present and the future. Indeed, if the Emperor's advice and suggestions had been attended to earlier, much, if not the whole, of the complications might have been avoided. According to Lord Cowley (No. 75¹), his advice was that the two contending Christian powers, France and Russia, should, in a matter in which only Christians could feel an interest, come to a decision about what they would require from the Sultan, and then obtain his sanction thereto. This advice the Government, but when too late, readily adopted. Russia, in furtherance of her views, intimated (No. 83²) to both France and England, that, in order to bring the discussions to a close, she intended to send an ambassador of high rank to Constantinople. Prince Menchikoff was selected for this important object. The Prince was a man of high rank and great abilities, and much in confidence of the Emperor. Bad health detained him at St. Petersburg till towards the middle of February. The Prince belonged to the high section of the Greek Church; he had denounced (see Stratford, p. 139) the Latin Church as "*the encroaching spirit which proclaims itself universal;*" and looked for its real cause in the unceasing desire to extend the sphere of its action and influence at every favourable opportunity. On that account alone it had become

¹ Cowley to Russell, January 24th, 1853, Part I. p. 65.

² Nesselrode to Kisseleff, February 8th, 1853, Part I. p. 71.

necessary for Russia to fix some limit to such an objectionable tendency. All the world knows that what the Prince says of the Latin Church is quite true ; but, because he had acted thus, he drew down on his head the vengeance and reproaches of the Roman Catholic organs throughout Europe ; and, strange to say, Protestant organs in the United Kingdom followed their example in this inglorious warfare.

The Prince reached Constantinople on the 5th March, and soon after entered upon the objects of his important mission. At this time matters stood nearly as follows :—At page 66, Part I., Lord Cowley informs us that “the Emperor of Russia wished to uphold, not to destroy, the Sultan’s authority,” and asked France to aid him in the work. At page 83, Lord Cowley again tells us that the Emperor of Russia assured M. Castelbajac, that he “would be too happy to act with France to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish empire. It was the last thing that his imperial majesty desired.” At page 101, Col. Rose (March 15th) tells us that Menschikoff assured him it was his and Russia’s wish to support the Porte. We shall soon see how all these peaceable views were blasted.

“*The policy of suspicion*,” the bane of every thing, was at once at work. The moment Prince Menchikoff’s arrival at Constantinople was heard of at Paris, Lord Cowley informs us (No. 114¹), that, in opposition to his earnest advice and remonstrances, the French fleet was, on the 22d, ordered from Toulon to Salamis ; and that the French minister at Constantinople was instructed (No. 220²) to call it to the assistance of Turkey, and additional forces, if necessary, to defend the Sultan against Russia ! Sir Stratford Canning, now Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was directed to proceed from London to Constantinople, taking Paris and Vienna in his way. It is not easy, at this his outset, to ascertain whether he was secretly instructed to act in opposition to the views of France, or those of Russia, but, judging from the sequel, most probably the latter. In the meantime, let us see his instructions, thus (No. 80³) :—

“The Queen has been pleased to direct that, at this critical period of the fate of the Ottoman empire, your Excellency should return to your embassy for a special purpose, and charged with special instructions.

“Your Excellency is aware that the preservation of the independence and integrity of Turkey enters into the general and established system of European policy ; that the principle is solemnly declared and sanctioned by the Convention of 1841, and is acknowledged by all the great powers of Europe.

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, March 24th, 1853, Part I. p. 95.

² Cowley to Clarendon, June 5th, 1853, Part I. p. 225.

³ Clarendon to Stratford, February 25th, 1853, Part I. p. 80.

“The object of your Excellency’s mission at this time, is to counsel prudence to the Porte, and forbearance to those powers who are urging her compliance with their demands. You are instructed to use every effort to ward off a Turkish war, and to persuade the powers interested, to look to an amicable termination of existing disputes.

“The question of the Holy Places in Syria offers danger to the peace of Turkey. However indifferent to their respective merits, the Porte is now unavoidably exposed to the rival pretensions of Russia and France, *each animated by a political interest as well as by religious zeal*, and both appealing to engagements alleged to have been contracted towards each of them by the Porte. Threatened from both sides, and unable to satisfy one party without displeasing the other, the Sultan is placed in a position of embarrassment and danger, rendered more critical *by the internal weakness of the empire*, and the special character of the points at issue.

“It is, therefore, to be feared that if the two Governments do not modify their demands, and should continue to maintain towards the Porte the dictatorial, if not menacing, attitude they have lately assumed, they may, without any deliberate intention of departing from those principles of European policy to which I have above alluded, accelerate the dissolution of the Turkish empire, and produce the catastrophe that all are concerned in averting.

“England, however, is in a position to neutralise, by her moral influence, these alarming contingencies ; and the Porte will learn with satisfaction that, even before your arrival at Constantinople, the best efforts of her Majesty’s Government have been directed to restrain encroachment, and to obtain every fair concession calculated to settle the existing differences.

“With this object, your Excellency is instructed to proceed to Constantinople, by way of Paris and Vienna.

“You will inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that her Majesty’s Government have great satisfaction in believing that the interests of France and England in the East are identical, and that nothing, therefore, need prevent their cordial co-operation in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire. In communicating with M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the Holy Places in Syria, your Excellency will govern yourself by the language of the despatches of Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley and Colonel Rose, copies of which are herewith enclosed ; and you will explain to him the fatal embarrassment to which the Sultan may be exposed, if unduly pressed by France upon a question *of such vital importance to the power from which Turkey has most to apprehend*.

“At Vienna, your Excellency will state to Count Buol that her Majesty’s Government have received with sincere pleasure the assurances that the friendly disposition of Austria towards the Porte was unchanged, and that her conservative policy in the East would be rigidly adhered to ; *that the increasing tendency to disorder and weakness in the Turkish empire calls for moderation and forbearance on the part of the Sultan’s allies ; and in such a policy, the cordial co-operation of her Majesty’s Government may be relied on by Austria*.

"To the Sultan you will say, that her Majesty, in directing your Excellency to proceed forthwith to Constantinople, manifests the feelings of friendship by which she is animated towards his Highness, and, at the same time, her opinion of the gravity of the circumstances in which her Majesty has reason to fear the Ottoman empire is now placed.

"As regards the Holy Places, her Majesty's Government are unwilling to give you any special instructions, and prefer to leave your Excellency unfettered in the exercise of your judgment and discretion, as much may depend upon your communications with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and upon the state in which you find the negotiation between Russia and the Porte on your arrival at Constantinople.

"Your Excellency will, with all the frankness and unreserve that may be consistent with prudence and the dignity of the Sultan, *explain the reasons which lead her Majesty's Government to fear that the Ottoman empire is now in a position of peculiar danger. The accumulated grievances of foreign nations which the Porte IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO REDRESS, the mal-administration of its own affairs, and the increasing weakness of executive power in Turkey*, have caused the allies of the Porte latterly to assume a tone alike novel and alarming, and which, if persevered in, may lead to a general revolt among the Christian subjects of the Porte, and prove fatal to the independence and integrity of the empire,—a catastrophe that would be deeply deplored by her Majesty's Government, but which it is their duty to represent to the Porte, is considered probable and impending by some of the great European powers.

"Your Excellency will explain to the Sultan that it is with the object of pointing out these dangers, and with the hope of averting them, that her Majesty's Government have now directed you to proceed to Constantinople. You will endeavour to convince the Sultan and his Ministers that the crisis is one which requires the utmost prudence on their part, and confidence *in the sincerity and soundness of the advice they will receive from you*, to resolve it favourably for their future peace and independence.

"Your Excellency's long residence at the Porte, and intimate knowledge of the affairs of Turkey, will enable you to point out those reforms and improvements which the Sultan, under his present difficulties, may have the means of carrying into effect; and in what manner the Porte may best establish a system of administration calculated to afford reasonable security for the development of its commercial measures, and the maintenance of its independence, recognised by the great Christian powers, on the presumption of its proving a reality and a stable bond of peace in their respective relations with the Porte, and generally throughout the Levant. *Nor will you disguise from the Sultan and his Ministers, that perseverance in their present course must end in alienating the sympathies of the British nation, and making it impossible for her Majesty's Government to shelter them from the impending danger, or to overlook THE EXIGENCIES OF CHRISTENDOM, exposed to the natural consequences of their unwise policy and reckless mal-administration.*

"It remains only for me to say, that in the event, which her Majesty's Government earnestly hope may not arise, of imminent danger to the

existence of the Turkish Government, your Excellency will, in such case, dispatch a messenger at once to Malta, requesting the Admiral to hold himself in readiness; but you will not direct him to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from her Majesty's Government."

With such instructions in his hands, it might reasonably be supposed that this British ambassador would first have advised the Turks to act justly to their next neighbours, to remedy the insufferable abuses that disfigured and disgraced the whole of their internal establishments, and to have watched at least as eagerly the proceedings of France as those of Russia. And, it may be asked, was it to guard against the designs and works of France that the order to call in the assistance of the British fleet, if necessary, was at this time given? The passage, however, directing that the fleet should not pass the Dardanelles without direct instructions from the Government of England to that effect, brings us to the conclusion that it was Russia, not France and Turkey, that was to be opposed.

"A POLICY OF SUSPICION," says Lord Clarendon (No. 111¹) to Count Walewski, when adverting to the hasty steps taken, and sought to be taken, by France,—"*a policy of suspicion was neither wise nor safe, and often led to hasty determinations.*" This, as Count Nesselrode justly remarks, (No. 208,²) was the policy pursued towards Russia. "Count Nesselrode then," says Seymour, "remarked upon the unfair and prejudiced manner in which the claims and the grievances of Russia were always received by foreign cabinets. On those occasions the eternal jealousy of Russia came to light. France had intended to bombard Tripolis,—not a word of blame was to be heard; Russia sought temperately for redress of serious grievances, and exceptions were instantly raised,—instantly Russia was charged with a wish to destroy the independence of Turkey." This is quite true; and to this "policy of suspicion" are we, is the whole world, indebted for the present state of things; and all this merely to constitute the obstinate and suspicious Turk in the right, and to crown, as the acme of wisdom, the rash and inconsiderate proceedings of certain European cabinets, and their officious diplomatic servants.

It has been stated that peremptory orders had been given by the British ministry, under all its varying and incessant changes, to their representatives at Constantinople, not in any way to interfere with, or take a part in, the discussions going on between France, Russia, and Turkey about the Holy Places. Order after order, command after command, was transmitted to Constantinople to that effect. But those

¹ Clarendon to Cowley, March 22d, 1853, Part I. p. 93.

² Seymour to Clarendon, June 10th, 1853, p. 278.

orders were disobeyed. The arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople frightened Colonel Rose out of the little senses he ever had, and, acting upon the idle tales which he heard about Pera, and falsehoods intentionally circulated by the Turkish ministers, or, as he says, (p. 109,) the "results from the *confidential statements* made to me on those occasions by the Turkish ministers," especially by *Fuad Effendi*, the greatest offender in those matters,—he ordered Admiral Dundas to bring the British fleet from Malta to the Dardanelles, in order to support him and his Turkish allies. This, too, he did in the face of the fact which he states (March 7th, 1853) to Lord John Russell, "that the declarations of the Russian ambassador are *pacific*." But hear his reasons for this unauthorized and dangerous act. In his letter to Lord John Russell, dated March 7th, 1853 (p. 87), he proceeds, "The Grand Vizier said that the Russian Government evidently intended to win some important *right* from Turkey, which would destroy her independence, and asked me to request the British admiral to bring up his squadron to Vourla Bay from Malta. Feeling the intimate conviction, that if the Sultan were not supported on this occasion, he would *call to his councils* a ministry selected under Russian influence, I informed his Highness that I would tell your Lordship that I *FELT* convinced that the safety of Turkey required the presence of the British squadron *in those waters*. M. Benedetti (French Chargé des Affaires) said the same as regards the French fleet. But those assurances did not tranquillize the Grand Vizier's mind; he thought Turkey would be lost before an answer could arrive from England and France."—"Under these circumstances, I acquainted the Grand Vizier that I would request the admiral commanding at Malta to bring up his squadron to Vourla Bay." For this act of willing obedience, he received the "sincere thanks and heartfelt gratitude" of the Grand Vizier and the Sultan (see Pisani, p. 88); and informing us, at the same time, that on the question of the Holy Places, Turkey "*had been coerced*" by France.

"The French fleet, as we shall see by-and-by at greater length, was at Paris ordered, on the 21st or 22d of March, to proceed from Toulon to Salamis. These proceedings were justly condemned by Lord Clarendon (No. 111¹). "Her Majesty's Government had not thought Colonel Rose justified in requesting that the British fleet should come to Vourla, and they have learned with much satisfaction, that Admiral Dundas had considered it his duty to remain at Malta until he received instructions from England. For similar reasons, her Majesty's Government regretted the order given to the French fleet to sail for

¹ Clarendon to Cowley, March 22d, 1853, Part I. p. 93.

the Greek waters." Count Walewski finally agreed with his Lordship that "if Prince Menchikoff's mission was of a friendly nature, the arrival of a fleet at Constantinople or the neighbourhood would be useless, or possibly *worse than useless*, as it might give a *hostile character to the Russian policy*."

It was on the 2d or 3d of March that Prince Menchikoff reached Constantinople. Several days elapsed before he proceeded to actual official business, and it was *before* he opened his lips that Colonel Rose took the rash steps that he did. On his arrival at his destination, the most unfounded and false reports were circulated regarding his behaviour, conduct, and objects. The press of Europe, and especially the press of Great Britain, resounded with these, and at the same time accompanied by every aggravating surmise and observation. We were told that previous to his leaving Russia he was engaged in reviewing hostile military corps; that he *commanded* the dismissal of Fuad Effendi, "because he was," says Colonel Rose (p. 87), "*the cleverest man in the Turkish ministry*;" that his behaviour was most insolent and overbearing, his language and propositions arbitrary and menacing; that Russia intended to make war upon Turkey (*Chabert*, p. 110); that she sought "a *secret treaty*" with Turkey (*Chabert*, p. 111); that Menchikoff required that all his propositions and proceedings should be kept secret, especially from the British and French ministers (*Chabert*, p. 111); that innumerable Russian armies were moving to attack and to crush Turkey; that Menchikoff "secretly demanded an addition to the treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek Church should be placed entirely under Russian protection, *without reference to Turkey*" (*Doria*, p. 112).

These and multitudes of similar stories, and fabricated pretended conversations, were eagerly circulated and swallowed by Doria, Chabert, Benedetti, and Rose; and we shall by-and-by see that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe unfortunately believed in, and acted upon some of them. But the whole of them were mischievous and intentional fictions, calculated to irritate and mislead Europe. Lord Cowley, who had been shown Benedetti's (French minister) despatches, assures us (No. 100¹) his statement is "*confined to surmises*," and (No. 122²) that he, Benedetti, "continues to draw conclusions adverse to the good faith of Russia from what is passing at Constantinople, *but he cites* no facts to prove his case." In reference to the movement of some Russian troops, Rose tells us (No. 119³) that he found that the movement was

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, March 19th, 1853, Part I. p. 91.

² Cowley to Clarendon, March 31st, 1853, Part I. p. 100.

³ Rose to Russell, March 10th, 1853, Part I. p. 99.

connected with the Montenegro affair. This was subsequently confirmed to Sir H. Seymour by Count Nesselrode. In reference to Fuad Effendi, Lord Clarendon tells us (No. 111¹) that Fuad Effendi had "retired" because the Emperor of Russia had announced, nearly two months ago, that he had declined to hold official intercourse with Fuad Effendi, "because that minister, in the opinion of his Imperial Majesty, had acted with bad faith to Russia,"—as was really the fact,—but Prince Menchikoff had not "*required this*," and still less demanded his dismissal. He simply requested that another commissioner should be appointed to negotiate with him in place of the man who, as has been previously shown, had acted such a treacherous and disgraceful part as Fuad Effendi had done. Lord Clarendon further tells us, (p. 93,) that he had seen a copy of the letter sent by the Emperor to the Sultan, "which was written in the most *friendly spirit*, and exhibited much *respect for the authority of his Highness*." Rose is compelled to acknowledge this truth, and that the retirement of Fuad Effendi from office "formed a part of that reparation" (No. 120²) which Russia sought from Turkey. As regards the reviews and movements of troops in Russia by Prince Menchikoff, previous to his embarkation for Constantinople, Consul Yeames, in his letter to Lord Stratford, (No. 164,³) disposes of that shortly, thus: "The ships have not yet left their winter berths. I need scarcely say that the newspaper reports of reviews by Prince Menchikoff, of armies and fleets, before proceeding on his mission, are *entirely unfounded*." Furthermore, in reference to the secret commission to frame a treaty with the Prince, Chabert is compelled to deny that report (No. 136⁴). "At the interview with the Prince and Rifaat Pasha, March 31st, the Prince did not speak at all of a *secret treaty* which he was desirous of making between his Government and the Porte,"—"and that the information that had been given to us, that his Highness's Government had named three plenipotentiaries to confer with the Russian Prince, *is as gratuitous as the supposition that the object of their meeting was to make a secret treaty* similar to that of *Unkiar Skelessi*." Again, the large military force which Russia offered, as it was said, to bring forward, was not to attack Turkey and invade her, but to protect her and uphold her against France, as Nesselrode said,⁵ but, in the words of Doria, (No. 136,⁶) "to place a fleet and 400,000 men at her disposal, if

¹ Clarendon to Cowley, March 22d, 1853, Part I. p. 93.

² Rose to Russell, March 10th, 1853, Part I. p. 99.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, April 15th, 1853, Inclosure, April 11th, Part I. pp. 153, 154.

⁴ Chabert to Rose, April 1st, 1853, Part I. p. 113.

⁵ Seymour to Clarendon, April 21st, 1853, Part I. p. 140.

⁶ Doria to Rose, April 1st, 1853, p. 112, Part I.

she ever needed aid against any Western Power whatever." Lastly, we find Colonel Rose telling us, (No. 123,¹) that " M. Benedetti had a long and pacific conversation with Prince Menchikoff, yesterday, respecting the Holy Places ;" and further, that " Prince Menchikoff assured both M. Benedetti and myself of Russia's wish TO SUPPORT *the Porte*."

It is unnecessary to multiply quotations to show the rashness and dangerous precipitation of Colonel Rose and others, and of the groundless nature of all the idle reports that they heard, and to which they cheerfully gave circulation. It is indeed probable that, in order to cover its own errors and objects, the Divan helped to propagate such stories ; but the duty of a British minister, placed in the position of Colonel Rose, ought to have been, to have made himself quite certain of their accuracy before he troubled his Government about them, and took steps that might have plunged his country and the world into a dreadful war without any just grounds ; and those steps, too, taken by him without any authority. He was soon obliged to desire Admiral Dundas not to stir ; but Lord Cowley informs us (No. 114²), that he had endeavoured in vain to induce the French Government to recall the order sent on the 22d, for their fleet to proceed from Toulon to Salamis, as it was most desirable that no false move should be made which *might prove a source of future embarrassment*. Lord Clarendon was of the same opinion, and energetically stated to Count Walewski (No. 118³), that " he still thought the orders for the sailing of the fleet were given hastily and without reason ; and that, although he hoped the two Governments would always act together when their policy and their interests were identical, yet, he must frankly say, that *the recent proceedings of the French Government* were not the best calculated to secure that desirable result ; for the fleet had been ordered to sail without consultation or communication with us, at a moment, too, when the French Government were either in possession of their despatches from Constantinople, or were hourly expecting their arrival ; and when, moreover, they knew from him (Count Walewski) that her Majesty's Government hoped and believed that the Admiral at Malta would not comply with the request addressed to him by Colonel ROSE ; and that, *notwithstanding the earnest request of your Excellency, no delay in the departure of the fleet, nor change in its destination, could be procured*." The Russian Government justly viewed the proceeding in a similar light. Count Nesselrode tells us (No. 138⁴), that " in relying

¹ Rose to Clarendon, March 15th, 1853, Part I. p. 101.

² Cowley to Clarendon, March 24th, 1853, Part I. p. 95.

³ Clarendon to Cowley, March 29th, 1853, Part I. p. 98.

⁴ Nesselrode to Brunnow, April 9th, 1853, Part I. p. 108.

upon our assurances in refusing to follow France in a step, if not hostile, at least marked with distrust towards us, England, under present circumstances, has performed an act of wise policy." "Everything in Europe might at once have been placed in a false position. The simultaneous appearance of the two fleets would have prevented the possibility of the question being settled at Constantinople. It would have placed us in a position in which we could not have acquiesced, and which would no longer have allowed the Emperor, thus exposed to a demonstration of a threatening nature, freely to follow his own pacific and conservative impulses."

All these points and particular details have been minutely adverted to, in order to show more clearly the blunders that have been committed by rashness, ignorance, and "a policy of suspicion;" and which, if the fair details had been kept in mind, might have prevented much, if not the whole, of the mischief which subsequently took place. But these, instead of being attended to and guarded against, every succeeding step taken by France and England tended only to increase the evils, and to bring both these great countries to "*follow in the wake*" of the unscrupulous Turks, in order, thereby, to save them, and to do the dirty work of the bigoted and untractable Mussulman.

In following out the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff, to which particular attention must now be directed, it is considered unnecessary to advert minutely and largely to those points of the correspondence regarding the Holy Places, as that portion of the question was ultimately and in part settled to the satisfaction of the Greek and Latin Churches; but rather to bring the subsequent inquiry into a shape as condensed as possible, so that the main and leading points in dispute between Russia and Turkey, which remained, and still remain, unsettled, may more readily appear. This great feature in the case has always been kept back from the public eye, or, when glanced at, attempted to be mystified or evaded.

As the basis of Menchikoff's negotiations and mission with and to Turkey were founded, to some extent, upon the treaty of Kainardji, it becomes necessary to advert specifically to that treaty, and the clauses of it on which the Russian right is founded. In doing this we shall show, from the specific clauses in the treaty itself, how these can be, and are mutilated by diplomatists to conceal their secret ambitious views, and to support their erroneous arguments. Those articles in contrast stand thus:—

Extracts from Treaty of Kainardji, as quoted by Rose, Part I. p. 51.

"ART. 7.—The Porte promises to protect the Christian religion and its churches, and the ministers of Russia shall be allowed to make representa-

tions in favour of the new church of which mention is made in the 14th Article.

"ART. 8.—The subjects of the Russian empire shall be permitted to visit the city of Jerusalem and the Holy Places; and no duty or contribution shall be exacted from them, either at Jerusalem or elsewhere.

"ART. 14.—The Court of Russia is permitted, besides the chapel built in the minister's house, to build in the quarter of Galata, in the street named Bey Aglon, a public church of the Greek rite, which shall always be under the protection of the Russian minister, and secure from all vexation and exaction."

Explanatory Convention of Constantinople of the 21st March, 1779.

"ART. 7.—1. The Porte shall not interfere in any manner with the exercise of the Christian religion in those provinces (Wallachia and Moldavia), and the Greeks shall be perfectly at liberty to build new churches, as well as to repair the old ones.

"2. It will restore to the convents, as well as to private individuals, the lands and property which belonged to them in the environs of Brailow, of Choczim, of Bender, &c.

"3. It will grant to the ecclesiastics of these principalities all the consideration and distinctions due to their rank."—*Quoted by Sir Stratford Canning, Part I. p. 28.*

Extracts from the correct copy of the Treaty of Kainardji.¹

"ART. 7.—The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches, and it ALSO allows the ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in Article 14th, as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power.

"ART. 8.—The subjects of the Russian empire, as well laymen as ecclesiastics, shall have full liberty and permission to visit the holy city of Jerusalem, and other places deserving of attention. No charatsch, contribution, duty, or other tax, shall be exacted from those pilgrims and travellers by any one whomsoever, either at Jerusalem or elsewhere, or on the road; but they shall be provided with such passports and firmans as are given to the subjects of the other friendly powers. During their sojourn in the Ottoman empire, they shall not suffer the least wrong or injury; but, on the contrary, shall be under the strictest protection of the laws.

"ART. 14.—After the manner of the other powers, permission is given to the high court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the minister's residence, to erect, in one of the quarters of Galata, a church of the Greek ritual, which shall always be under the protection of the ministers of that empire, and secure from all coercion and outrage.

"ART. 11.—For the convenience and advantage of the two empires, there shall be a free and unimpeded navigation for the merchant ships belonging

¹ Treaties Russia and Turkey, Paper by command, No. 88 of 1854, p. 41.

to the two contracting powers, in all the seas which wash their shores. The Sublime Porte grants to Russian merchant vessels, namely, such as are generally employed by the other powers for commerce, and in the ports, a free passage from the Black Sea into the White Sea, and reciprocally from the White Sea into the Black Sea, as also the power of entering all the ports and harbours situated either on the sea coasts, or in the passages and channels which join those seas. In like manner the Sublime Porte allows Russian subjects to trade in its states by land as well as by water, and upon the Danube, in their ships, in conformity with what has been specified above in this article, with all the same privileges and advantages as are enjoyed in its states by the most friendly nations whom the Sublime Porte favours most in trade, such as the French and English; and the capitulations of those two nations and others shall, just as if they were here inserted word for word, serve as a rule under all circumstances, and in every place, for whatever concerns commerce, as well as Russian merchants, who, upon paying the same duties, may import and export all kinds of goods, and disembark their merchandise at every port and harbour, as well upon the Black as upon the other seas, Constantinople being expressly included in the number."

The treaty of Kainardji concluded a bloody war between Russia and Turkey. It was most disastrous to the latter power; but it was a war of her own seeking, and to which she was instigated by France. Russia restored a great extent of conquest to Turkey, and, for the first time, got the whole of the coasts of the Black Sea, not shut up—as is asserted, and also in some quarters believed—but laid open to the commerce of the world. The treaty, in all its parts, was confirmed by the treaty of Adrianople in 1829, and by every other and subsequent treaty between Russia and Turkey, down to the last concluded in 1849 about Moldavia and Wallachia. Now, it is this treaty especially, and all the subsequent treaties between Russia and Turkey, and obligations contained in them founded upon it, to protect the Christian religion and its teachers throughout the Ottoman dominions, and other just rights that Russia has enjoyed under them, that the Turks secretly seek to get clear of, and that France and England, the former more especially, seek to alter, nay, demand that they should be wholly done away with; and that all the future relations between Turkey and Russia, if the latter is suffered to exist an independent power, shall, at the point of the bayonet, and by the strength of military and despotic power, be maintained exactly as it may suit their policy and their interests during all time coming. This, *à la Seymour*, "*to call things by their right names*," is the true state of the case. This is to be what is stupidly called the balance of power in Europe. Since the days of Napoleon the First, and of Mahomed II., no such profligate

system and application of force, partial interests, and vindictive, political, and national, nay, it may even be said, in more points than one, personal pique and ill-will, was ever propounded to an astonished and terrified world. Like all the other hideous systems above alluded to, it will, however, after doing inconceivable mischief to the world, come to a similar disastrous and humiliating end. But, in the meantime, woe to those who may, in future, disturb any false system or false prophet in any quarter of the world.

It would be an insult to human reason to suppose, or to affirm, that the constant protection here promised to the Christian religion and its churches, does not include the whole Christian religion and its churches, especially the Greek Church, throughout the whole Turkish dominions; and also all the privileges and immunities belonging to those who teach, conduct, and govern them in all spiritual matters, as those stood at the date of the treaty, and which were all to be protected in the same manner as the Russian Church and its ministers at Constantinople, by Article XIV. No quibble, and no chicanery or dishonesty of diplomacy, can get clear of this truth. We shall see as we proceed, that no statesman in Europe, not even the Turks themselves, for a period of many months, attempted to dispute or deny the full validity of those treaties. In No. 294,¹ Drouyn de Lhuys thus states and thus restricts the matter: — “The treaty of Kainardji specifically only confers on Russia a *limited* defensive right of protection *over a Church* administered by Russian priests, which there was a question of founding at Galata.” In No. 71,² Rifaat Pasha tells us: “As no one can deny the existence of that treaty, and that it is confirmed by that of Adrianople, it is clearly manifest that the exact provisions of it will be faithfully observed.” Yet, referring specifically to this treaty, Rifaat Pasha (No. 163³) states to Prince Menchikoff: “I beg leave to observe, that the article stipulated in the treaty you mention, does *not contain any provisions* for the churches *in general*, and the four patriarchs, but only bears upon particular points; whereas what you now propose is a general and exclusive protection over the whole Greek population, their clergy, and their churches.” In No. 202,⁴ Sir H. Seymour gives us “the *English view*” of this treaty, namely, that what Menchikoff required “beyond being a confirmation, was a very great extension of the rights secured to the Russian crown by the treaty of Kainardji; that the *old rights applied to the Danubian*

¹ Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, June 25th, 1853, Part I. pp. 301—304.

² Stratford to Clarendon, August 20th, 1853, Part II. p. 75 (Inclosure, p. 79).

³ Stratford to Clarendon, April 15th, 1853, Part I. p. 152 (Inclosure, p. 153).

⁴ Seymour to Clarendon, May 27th, 1853, Part I. p. 211.

Provinces, whilst those proposed were to range over the whole of Turkey."

These designing and deceitful statesmen read treaties to please themselves, well knowing how few possess the means of contradicting them. The French minister had reasons of his own which it was not politic for him then to avow, for his mutilation of the treaty in question. By his restriction Russia was, to some extent, wrong in what she demanded; but by the plain meaning of the treaty she is right, and France knows that she is so. Moreover, the Holy Places at Jerusalem being specifically mentioned and included in the treaty of Kainardji, besides being provided for by special and solemn promises, it follows that the deception practised upon Russia, and wrong inflicted upon her at the demand of France, in regard to those places, was a violation of that treaty, for which she has sought in vain for redress. It is, therefore, strange that Lord Clarendon (No. 234¹) should assert, as he does, that the Russian manifesto "declares that Turkey has violated treaties between her and Russia, *but not a single instance of this has been adduced by Russia throughout the whole of the discussions!*" The treaty of Kainardji, and the voluminous complaints and correspondence of Russia under this head, negative completely the assertions here made. Besides, his Lordship surely does not mean to say, and to maintain, that the violation of a solemn firman, by the Ottoman sovereign, is no violation of a national engagement; or that such a firman was not, in justice, equal to a treaty. If this is his view of the subject, it is a miserable quibble, and fully justifies Russia in no longer trusting to any firman on any question between the two nations.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe succeeded Colonel Rose as British minister at Constantinople; but before his arrival (April 5th), some important proceedings took place between Prince Menchikoff and the Turkish Government. These must be related, partly under the authority of Colonel Rose, and his colleagues and assistants, British, French, Turks, Greeks, &c., and the intentional misrepresentations and falsehoods advanced by the Turkish ministers. Prince Menchikoff's first official communication to the Porte was dated March 16th, 1853 (No. 134²). It was left with Rifaat Pasha on the 17th. Dates are here of much importance to be attended to. It is a very able document, but brevity compels me to confine myself to the following important paragraphs extracted from it (No. 160³):—

¹ Clarendon to Loftus, Nov. 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 233.

² Rose to Clarendon, March 25th, 1853, Part I. p. 107 (Inclosure, p. 108).

³ Nesselrode to Brunnow, 21st April, 1853 (Inclosure, p. 147).

Extracts from the Note verbale, addressed by Prince Menchikoff to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated March 1st, 1853, Part I. p. 147.

"Prince Menchikoff, ambassador from Russia, has the honour to state to the Sublime Porte as follows :—

"His Majesty the Sultan, by his letter of ^{January 29th,} February 10th, 1852, announced to the Emperor the definitive settlement of the question concerning the Holy Places, which had been raised by the French Embassy at Constantinople. That letter contained the most solemn promises as to the maintenance of the ancient rights granted by the Sublime Porte to the Greek communities. It established, as the only alteration in the *status quo*, the admission of the Latins to Gethsemane, and, by way of compensation, the admission of the Greeks to Koublet ul Messad.

"A firman was at the same time promulgated for the confirmation of this arrangement. A *hatti-scherif*, at the commencement of the firman, recognised and established in the most positive manner the former privileges which had been accorded to the Greeks at different periods, and which were renewed by Sultan Mahmoud, of glorious memory, and confirmed by his Majesty the present Sultan.

"We accepted those instruments, and attached to them the character of a solemn and definitive transaction. Although differing both in spirit and in letter from the *status quo*, which we were always anxious to maintain, they still appeared in some degree to satisfy the just solicitude of the Imperial Government for the interests of the Orthodox religion, and the immunities of the Patriarchal Church of Jerusalem." * * *

"During the delay which took place in sending out the Patriarch and a commissioner to carry out the firman, the most explicit promises as to the strict application of the *hatti-scherif* were reiterated by the ministers of the Porte. * * *

"The concealments and delays of the Porte, its unwillingness to communicate to us, with all the sincerity which was our due, the instructions sent out to its commissioner in Jerusalem, inspired us, it is true, with just suspicions. But the Emperor placed the fullest confidence in the honour of his Majesty the Sultan. Positive information from Jerusalem soon proved to him how far the counsellors of his august Ally had succeeded in abusing his good faith, to the detriment of his own subjects, as well as in disregard of the consideration which he had a right to expect.

"Our suspicions were very soon confirmed by facts, and we were able to prove that the august word pledged to the Emperor had been disregarded ; that an act emanating from the sovereign will of the Sultan had been treated as illusory.

"Instead of proceeding to the immediate repair of the cupola, with the exclusive concurrence of the Greeks, the Ottoman authorities of Jerusalem, in an unprecedented manner, took counsel with the delegates of the different sects, tempting them with a share in that undertaking, and thus awakening inveterate hatreds and jealousies. The Greek Patriarch was

excluded from the councils which were held under these circumstances. This opportunity was taken to endow the Catholic monks with property on the terraces of the temple, which up to the present time belonged exclusively to the Greeks, in spite of the promises made to the Russian Legation that the buildings outside the dome should be made neutral ground, inaccessible to all the sects.

"Although specially charged to promulgate and to carry into effect the last *hatti-scherif*, the Ottoman commissioner loudly declared that he knew nothing of that document, and that he would confine himself strictly within the limits of his instructions.

"In the sense of those instructions, he insisted that the firman should neither be read nor registered. *Though it was read and registered afterwards, it was so with restrictions derogatory to the Orthodox faith*, and which amounted to an act of disobedience to the sovereign will. Immediately after the accomplishment of these formalities, and while the Imperial Legation was receiving from the Ottoman Ministers the most solemn assurances of the strict execution of the firman, the principal provisions of that act were openly transgressed in Jerusalem.

"The Porte, yielding to malicious suggestions, thought fit to decide upon a matter of great importance, without waiting for or taking the opinion of the august Ally, who had expressed himself with entire frankness and confidence on the subject to his Majesty the Sultan. *Thus the dignity of both sovereigns was wounded*; and thus, in opposition to the strict meaning of the firman, the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem was granted to the Latins, without heed to the protest of the Patriarch of Jerusalem and of the reports of the Ottoman commissioner himself, who considered this new concession as superfluous and unreasonable. The Latin monks were not slow in using this key to enter the Church of Bethlehem with pomp and with ostentation. Having had free access to it hitherto, they were eager thus to establish a new right, a fresh encroachment upon the privileges of the Greeks.

* * * *

"The right of precedence of the Greeks was assailed by the regulation, that at Gethsemane the Orthodox clergy and the Latins should perform the service there on alternate days. An unjust disproportion was thereby established between 15,000,000 of the Sultan's subjects and a community of foreign priests.

"Finally, as, while the Imperial Mission kept aloof from all discussion on the subject of the Holy Places, the Porte was carrying on an official correspondence on the subject with the French Embassy, of which we were utterly ignorant, other advantages and concessions may have been granted, contrary to the engagements already entered into with the Imperial Court.

* * * *

"As far as a practical view of the question will admit, that arrangement will be framed in a spirit of toleration and good understanding; but it can no longer be confined to barren and unsatisfactory promises, which may be broken at a future period. A solemn engagement must henceforward

attest the sincerity of the understanding which it has become so important to establish in this matter between the two Governments.

"A review of the history of those countries, sufficiently proves that the whole of the existing property of the Latin monks in Palestine results from encroachments similar to those now committed, which, followed up step by step, with the assistance of the political support proceeding from the West, have reached such a pitch as to threaten the Greek Church with a general assault, which would be at the same time a fatal blow to the sovereign rights of Turkey.

"But, while indulging the most sanguine hopes that this good understanding may be brought about, the ambassador cannot refrain from here expressing the painful impression which has been left upon the Imperial Government by the mistrust and ill-will which the ministers of the Porte have for some time past manifested, in regard to the pious and magnanimous interest professed by the Emperor for the Christians of the East."

The Prince then adds :—

"It is sufficient in this place briefly to mention, in support of these assertions, the manner in which the Porte received the counsels of the Imperial Government on the questions of Montenegro, of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and of the acts of injustice committed against the Christian rayahs."

"The ambassador is instructed to bring these complaints before his Majesty the Sultan, and to represent to him, with all the respect due to his person, the necessity of appeasing the deep and well-grounded discontent felt on this account by his ancient and best ally, by an *act of confidence which shall obviate for the future every shadow of disagreement between the two sovereigns.*

"The present ministers of the Sublime Porte will, I trust, be pleased to appreciate the full importance of the wish which the ambassador is instructed to express to his Majesty the Sultan; and of which he has thought it right, in the first instance, to apprise his counsellors, in order to secure their intelligent and sincere concurrence for the interests of both countries, whose disunion might entail the most serious consequences upon the well-being of Turkey, as well as upon the peace of the whole of Europe."

Here there is certainly no ambiguity or duplicity; it is a clear and decided appeal, and, in every statement made, is borne out by all the previous proceedings, as these are recorded in the official papers under review. Sir H. Seymour (No. 158¹) gives us his opinion of the document, which was shown to him at St. Petersburg, thus :—

"As far as a hasty perusal enables me to form an opinion, *no exception*, I should say, could be taken to the language of this

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, April 21st, 1853, Part I. p. 140.

document. It is written in the language of remonstrance, rather than of menace, and contains *a temperate* although serious enunciation of the grievances of which the Emperor has to complain, in consequence of the concessions made to the Latin Church, at *the expense* of those interests which the Emperor is *especially* BOUND TO PROTECT." "Count Nesselrode said, that it was intended that the Porte should redress the grievances which had been set forth in the preceding passages of the note, and that it was desired that recognition of the *rights to be secured to the GREEK CHURCH* should be sanctioned by such formalities as would give it the character of *international engagement* between Russia and Turkey;" in short, "it was therefore desired that an arrangement, *which should be permanent*, should possess *an unquestionable character of this description*." Plainer and more comprehensive language could scarcely be used, and they must be dull indeed who cannot understand it, and the cogent reasons for adopting such a course.

It was not till the 2d of May that these important documents were received in London, having been transmitted by the Russian Government for the information of the British Government. Why it was not transmitted from Constantinople direct, like other documents connected with the important question, is somewhat remarkable, and for more reasons than one demands inquiry. It would appear that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been applied to about it; but he denied all knowledge of it. In No. 249, received June 12th,¹ he says, "I think it my duty to record that the *note verbale* presented to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff on the $\frac{4}{16}$ th March, and inclosed with Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the $\frac{9}{21}$ st ultimo, was never communicated to this embassy. I have *questioned M. Pisani* on the subject, and *he assures* me that Rifaat Pasha would never be brought to admit its existence: *that minister was probably restrained from disclosing it by the Russian ambassador's intimidating language*. Your Lordship has too much discernment not to have noticed the *deceptive* manner in which the intended demand of a guarantee is vaguely associated with the Greeks at large, while limited in appearance to the sanctuaries in Palestine!"

It is difficult to find language to characterise the preceding remarkable communication, in the manner in which it appears to deserve. But, fortunately, there are references to show and to prove that what Lord Stratford has been led here to state is contrary to the fact. In reference to the supposed intimidating language of the Russian am-

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 27th, 1853, Part I. p. 264.

bassador about this note, we find, on turning to page 108, that M. Pisani says that Rifaat Pasha told him, that the identical note was left with that minister on the 17th March, and that he told him (Pisani) its general contents, as did also the Grand Vizier, all of which he communicated to Colonel Rose! Not a syllable is said about threatening or intimidating language on that occasion. The note being delivered on the 17th, we find Colonel Rose stating, that he had heard this, (No. 133¹) but that Rifaat Pasha "*denied*" that he had received the note on the 17th; and, on the authority of M. Pisani, that the latter had, on the 19th, communicated, according to his instructions of that date, with Rifaat Pasha and the Grand Vizier, the latter of whom informed him, that "*the language now held by Prince Menchikoff is exceedingly mild and very friendly.*" Again, in No. 134,² we find Colonel Rose stating that, in an interview which he had had on the preceding day with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, they not only told him of this note, but declared that they were "*determined*" to make everything that Menchikoff said or proposed "*known to her Majesty's Government!!*"

Her Majesty's embassy, therefore, did know of it, and it also was certainly communicated to them. M. Pisani, who is attached to the British embassy, did know of it. Unless Colonel Rose made away with or concealed it, Lord Stratford must have received it. But, to show the profligacy that has been put in operation by the Turks and their admirers, let us place before the reader the whole of Pisani's (Rose's) version of it:—³

"Rifaat Pasha, in the interview which we had yesterday with him, stated that Prince Menchikoff had left him on the 17th instant a 'note verbale.' The note began by stating that the Emperor was very angry about what the Porte had done respecting the Holy Places, and that he would have receded from that arrangement; but that, desirous not to involve the Porte in new difficulties with another power, he would have no objection to accept the arrangement of February last, provided the Porte would give unequivocal assurances that she would maintain the *status quo* of the sanctuaries in future; that, as the Emperor could not rely upon verbal assurances after all the contradictions which had taken place in the question at issue, he was very anxious that a treaty should be entered into between the Porte and Russia respecting that matter. Rifaat Pasha observed, that he suspects that the object of the treaty would be the exclusive protectorate, by Russia, of the Greeks and the Armenians throughout the Sultan's dominions; that Prince Menchikoff does not

¹ Rose to Clarendon, March 24th, 1853, Part I. p. 107.

² Rose to Clarendon, March 24th, 1853, Part I. p. 107.

³ Inclosure in No. 134, March 25th, p. 108, (Memorandum of M. Pisani to Col. Rose.)

make any objection to the cupola being repaired by the Sultan at his Majesty's expense, on condition that it will be so repaired under the superintendence of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem. Prince Menchikoff demands permission to build an hospital and a church for the Russian priests at Jerusalem; he demands that the two houses next to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which are Tékés or Turkish convents, should be pulled down. They give to understand that the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople should be entirely independent of the Porte. Rifaat Pasha said that the treaty proposed by Prince Menchikoff is more than the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. The Grand Vizier, whom we subsequently saw, was more frank and communicative than Rifaat Pasha; his Excellency said that, in the *note verbale* presented by Prince Menchikoff, it is stated that since some time, the Porte was misled by the advice of ill-disposed powers; that in the end of the note France was mentioned, separately, as being one of those powers; that Prince Menchikoff does not at all approve of the interference of foreign embassies concerning the Patriarchate, and highly disapproves of Lord Ponsonby's behaviour in the matter of the dismissal of the Patriarch Gregorius, whom they wish to have reinstated; and he expresses a wish that the Patriarch should be appointed for life. With respect to the treaty, the Grand Vizier repeated again what he said to me on the 19th instant, that as long as he was at the head of the ministry, no such treaty shall be signed, as he considers it ruinous to the country.

(Signed) "ET. PISANI."

Contrary, therefore, to what Lord Stratford so confidently asserts, this note was not only well known to, but also communicated to the British embassy; and if Colonel Rose did his duty, he must have delivered a copy of it, along with the archives of the embassy, to his successor, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.¹ The reader will readily perceive the distorted, and in the most material parts, falsehoods, which are contained in the copy which Colonel Rose sent to England. He will also see the duplicity and the chicanery of the Turkish ministers on this occasion. Justly, therefore, was Russia suspicious and strict with such people, and well might she consider that England and her ambassadors favoured them against truth and justice, when England and her servants suffered themselves to be guided by such misrepresented, nay false authority. From the specimen here given, the value of all such authorities, Turkish and others, may be appreciated. Such conduct and such proceedings, however, were more the rule than the exception. If the gentlemen in Downing Street had been sufficiently attentive to their duty, or inclined to perform it properly, they would

¹ This, be it observed, is the version of the note that Lord Clarendon boasted he communicated to Baron Brunnow, as the first notice the latter had of Prince Menchikoff's proceedings (No. 273, p. 289, June 21st):—"Some of Prince Menchikoff's demands were made known to him by me, and were received with doubt by him." Yes, Rose's misrepresentations alluded to!

at once have discovered that Rose's version of the note did not bear the least resemblance to Russian official writings on public business. Inquiry would have soon disclosed the impositions that were imposed, or attempted to be imposed, upon them. Discovering this, their remedy to prevent a recurrence of such disgraceful and dangerous conduct, was to dismiss and cashier representatives who had shown themselves to be either knaves or blockheads. Had this been done, we should have had no Russian war, with all its fearful and fatal consequences. In reference, also, to the note in question, it is curious and instructive to observe, that while Sir H. Seymour, anti-Russian as he is to the backbone, says the true note is unexceptionable, that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe denounces it, in the point at issue, as intentionally "deceptive" and dishonest!!

The Russian Government, better informed fortunately, took a more correct view of these matters. Sir H. Seymour (No. 140¹) informs Lord Clarendon that Count Nesselrode told him thus:—"It was," he said, "certain that her Majesty's *Chargé des Affaires* (Colonel Rose) had acted upon incorrect impressions;" but it was "certain that a very practised diplomatist might have been misled by the *false statements* so constantly current at Pera, and doubly so at moments of great excitement." As regarded the movement of the French squadron, "he had no desire of attaching an overdue importance" to it. The following is the clear and specific opinion of the Russian Government on this portion of the subject (No. 138²):—

"M. LE BARON,—It has given us much satisfaction to perceive, as well by this despatch as by the summary of your communications with the British ministers, that all the first reports spread at Constantinople, in regard to her intentions, had caused no alarm or apprehension to the Cabinet of London; satisfied by the personal assurances which it has received in this matter from the Emperor, that his Majesty's desire and determination are to respect the independence and the integrity of the Turkish empire; and that, if his views in this respect should undergo any change, our august master would be the first to apprise the English Government of it.

"You will assure the ministers of the Queen, in the most positive terms, that the intentions of the Emperor are still the same, and that all the idle rumours to which the arrival of Prince Menchikoff in the Ottoman capital has given rise—the occupation of the Principalities, territorial aggrandisement on our Asiatic frontier, the pretension to secure to ourselves the nomination of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople—hostile and threatening language held to the Porte by our Ambassador—are not only exag-

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, April 5th, 1853, Part I. p. 119.

² Nesselrode to Brunnov, 7th April, 1853, Part I. pp. 115—117.

gerated, but even destitute of any sort of foundation ; that, in a word, the mission of Prince Menchikoff never has had, nor has now, any object but that which your Excellency has been instructed to communicate to the British Government.

"As regards the recommendation which is given us to humour as much as possible the susceptibilities of France, in the delicate question of the Holy Places, and whilst insisting upon the rights of the Greek Church, to endeavour to impose nothing upon the Latins which might too directly wound the honour and the interests of that power, you may equally assure the English ministers, that in the arrangement to be negotiated it is not a question of withdrawing, or of taking from the Latins the late concessions which they have obtained by the Ottoman note of the 9th of February of last year, but merely of adapting those concessions to the stipulations of the *hatti-scherif*, by removing from them anything they may contain of an exclusive character—of obtaining for the Greeks some recompense for the wrong which has been done them—and, above all, of securing them from further injury.

"In general, we ask nothing better than to come to a friendly understanding with the French Government, taking into account the position in which it has placed itself, although all the concessions that can be made to its susceptibility *have*, almost invariably, the effect of *rendering it more exacting*, inasmuch as it looks upon them in the light of a success which justifies it in seeking to obtain more. But it must itself contribute to facilitate for us the means of doing so, instead of acting in a contrary sense, as it has just now done with so much precipitation by a demonstration, the consequences of which may place in antagonism our desire for conciliation, and the protection of our own dignity. The English Government must themselves see *that France is not always accessible to counsels of moderation*, since the wise representations which they made to her, through Lord Cowley, have not availed to prevent the departure of the French squadron.

"The Emperor desires you, M. le Baron, to thank Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon very particularly in his name, for the salutary impulse which they have recently given to the decisions of the British Cabinet. The former has on this occasion shown us a new proof of confidence, of which our august master is highly sensible. The latter, with whom our relations have hardly yet commenced, thus enters upon them under auspices which justify us in hoping that they will be of the most satisfactory nature. In relying upon our assurances in refusing to follow France in a step, if not hostile, at least marked with distrust towards us, England, under present circumstances, has performed an act of wise policy. Nothing would have been more to be regretted than to see the two great maritime powers combining together, were it but for the moment, and in appearance rather than in fact, upon the Eastern question as it now stands. Although their views, in this respect, differ in reality *toto celo*, nevertheless, as the European public is by no means competent to draw the distinction, their ostensible identity would not have failed to represent them under the aspect of an intimate alliance. The ardent spirit of France would eagerly have exagge-

rated for the advancement of her own interests these fresh evidences of cordial understanding, and everything in Europe might at once have been placed in a false position. The simultaneous appearance of the two fleets would have prevented the possibility of the question being solved at Constantinople. It would have placed us in a position in which we could not have acquiesced, and which would no longer have allowed the Emperor, thus exposed to a demonstration of a threatening nature, freely to follow his own pacific and conservative impulses.

"France acting alone, the measure is attended with less inconvenience, although it is still far from being free of it. The Emperor, accordingly, attaches but little importance to it, and his Majesty sees in it no reason for changing, at the present time, his previous views and intentions. The attitude of England will suffice to neutralize what, on the part of the French or the Turks, if the latter should feel encouraged by the presence of the French fleet, might embarrass or retard too long the favourable solution of the question in dispute. In this point of view, Lord Aberdeen appears to us to have fully understood the important part which England had to play, and we are happy to congratulate him upon it, persuaded beforehand of the impartiality which he will display in carrying it out."

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived at Constantinople on the morning of the 5th April. He without delay commenced his diplomatic operations. In his communication to Lord Clarendon (No. 150¹) he says, Prince Menchikoff's objects "and requisitions" according to the Turkish ministers, "were" chiefly "as to the Holy Places; that the Porte, after giving satisfaction for a vacillation of conduct offensive to Russia, should adhere with steadiness to the arrangement proclaimed by the Sultan's firman, and pledge itself to a complete and undisturbed maintenance of the *status quo* in future, by *some form of written agreement*"—"to a *more clear* and comprehensive definition of Russian right under treaty, to protect the Greek and Armenian subjects of the Porte in *religious matters—and to the conclusion of a formal agreement*, comprising those points, between the two Governments." "The tone of intimidation was *explained* to consist in a peremptory demand of reparation for an alleged offence." "The Ottoman ministers informed him, that nothing had yet been settled between the Porte and the Russian embassy; that the *note verbale*, containing Prince Menchikoff's propositions respecting the Holy Places, and *modified at their suggestions*, would probably be laid before the Council in three days;" that "its contents were to be communicated to the French embassy." The ministers then proceeded to "conjectural inquiries as to what was to be done in certain cases." "The sum, I said in reply, is this; endeavour to keep the affair of the Holy Places *separate* from the ulterior

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, April 6th, 1853, Part I. p. 125.

proposals, whatever they may be, of Russia." He put, he says, his replies hypothetically, thus beginning "a policy of suspicion."¹

There were, however, no "ulterior propositions," no "secret demands." The whole case is here acknowledged, together with Menchikoff's *note verbale*, which was, as it appears, made known to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and which he six weeks afterwards denied all knowledge of, and of which both France and England proclaim that they never heard. But his Lordship, shortly after this, was repeatedly consulted about and advised concerning it. Comment on such conduct is altogether unnecessary. No wonder terrible mischief follows such political dishonesty, connected with such serious national matters.

The proceedings and requisitions of Russia on the great point at issue never varied. This we shall see as we proceed. They were clear and decided for the written and solemn engagement, in a shape that might be most binding, and least liable to give offence to independence, as regarded Turkey. Wherever or whenever the form or details appeared to trench upon the political sovereignty of the Sultan, they were at once relinquished. "The *solemn engagement*" formed always part, and the most important part, of Menchikoff's mission. It is not true that it was separate and concealed, and brought forward as something new after the other was settled. Great Britain and France, and their ambassadors, in order to screen their own errors or real objects, have asserted differently, but without a single fact to support their statements. In No. 143, Lord Redcliffe, on the authority of M. Pisani, tells Lord Clarendon,² that Menchikoff told "Rifaat Pasha, that the objects of Russia in all this, were positive and unequivocal assurances for the future; and how could she rely upon them if they are not in writing, and put in a proper shape? To-morrow the present ministry may be changed, and superseded by men like those lately in office. What guarantee will she have, then, that things will not take another turn again, and that the Emperor will not be treated in the same disrespectful manner?" "With regard to the objects sought by Russia," says Sir H. Seymour, (No. 141³), "they were precisely those which had from *the outset* been professed, and all the ambitious

¹ Here we have a complete avowal that Lord Stratford, on the 7th April, had a complete knowledge of the note of 16th March, but which he denied all knowledge of on the 27th May following! Nay more, that by his advice both the Turkish ministers, and probably Prince Menchikoff, separated his propositions into two parts, to keep the guarantee and agreement last, that a handle might be made of it as a new proposal; whereas it always constituted a portion of the question to be settled, and, in fact, the main portion of it. What disingenuous and dangerous conduct!

² Stratford to Clarendon, April 15th, 1853, Part I. p. 152.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, April 7th, 1853, Part I. p. 120.

schemes imputed to her were not exaggerated rumours, but rumours *devoid of all foundation!*" "The object of Prince Menchikoff," Lord Stratford (No. 152¹) tells Lord Clarendon, were:—"That the Russian ambassador does not object by his demands to such privileges as are known to have been obtained latterly by France in favour of the Latins, and that *his principal aim is to fix and secure the present state of possession and usage by that kind of formal and explicit agreement which may preclude all further pretensions on the side of France, and make the Porte directly responsible to Russia for any future innovation respecting the Holy Places.*" To this no honest power could object. In No. 144,² Lord Stratford tells Lord Clarendon, "that his (Prince Menchikoff's) Government *disclaimed* all intention of interfering with the Sultan's subjects *in any political sense.* He has since read over to me his amended draft of a convention, framed with the view of repeating and confirming *the privileges secured to the Greek religion and its places of worship in Turkey by former treaties, and particularly by THAT OF KAINARDJI.* This agreement, whatever may be its name or its form, is to have the **FORCE OF A TREATY.**"

In No. 168,³ Lord Stratford speaks of "the *moderate dispositions* manifested, on the whole, by Prince Menchikoff in his intercourse with me," and that he "entered *confidentially with me* on the subject of the *remaining demands, in a tone of the most moderate description!*" Here it is again plain that this country and her ambassador were made acquainted with everything. But how does Lord Stratford proceed under such circumstances? Why we learn from Lord Cowley (No. 149⁴) that "Lord Stratford had therefore strongly urged upon M. de la Cour the policy of making concessions, in order to get rid of the question of the Sacred Places, and enable the two embassies to act more positively in concert, should the Porte, *in consequence of the exigencies of Russia, require their joint support.* M. Drouyn de Lhuys assented to the *prudence of this policy.*" After adverting to the strong ground on which some of the Greek claims stood, and the concessions made by Russia to France on two important points connected with the Sacred Places, Lord Stratford (No. 165⁵) tells Lord Clarendon that he urged upon M. de la Cour "the importance of regulating all that concerns the Holy Places without further delay, in order that the ulterior PROPOSITIONS of Russia might rest upon their own merits, and be dealt

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, April 9th, 1853, Part I. p. 127.

² Stratford to Clarendon, April 20th, 1853, Part I. p. 155.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, April 23d, 1853, p. 157.

⁴ Cowley to Clarendon, April 29th, 1853, p. 143.

⁵ Stratford to Clarendon, April 16th, 1853, p. 154.

with accordingly; not for the extension of a *single influence*, nor for the benefit of a single class of Christians, but on *TRUE principles of European policy*, and, if possible, for the advantage of all the Sultan's tributary subjects. I must do M. de la Cour the justice to state, that he appeared to *enter into the spirit* of my suggestions, at the same time that he did not give up his objections to the Russian plan of settlement."

This is another step in the disingenuous, dangerous movement of "a policy of suspicion." This is letting the cat out of the bag, showing that the full and declared objects of Russia were, from the outset, well known to all, and to the British ambassador at Constantinople in particular; and that, without having had the manliness openly to avow it, his design, and the design and intention of France and England, was to set aside the treaties of Kainardji, Adrianople, &c., and all the rights and claims of Russia under them to the supervision of the Greek Christians in Turkey, in which, as the next neighbour, she was more immediately and deeply interested, and to place Turkey, and all the people in it, under the control and protection of France and England. At the same time, these parties had already acknowledged that there was no *new* or separate requisition or demand brought forward by Prince Menchikoff, but simply that for their own objects, interests, and ambition, they were determined to aid the Turks, and to oppose Russia in the last and most important portion of her just and reasonable demand. All this secret and deceitful dealing is very unaccountable, but it is the real facts of the case.

The reader will do well to bear in mind, once for all, that although the business connected with the Holy Places was settled as between Russia and France, and for which Prince Menchikoff thanked the English ambassador, and prematurely and incautiously thanked him, yet that the great point, namely, the general Greek Churches, and the solemn engagement for the future, as between Russia and Turkey, never was settled, but on all occasions denied and obstinately refused by the Turks, secretly counselled by some friends in Western Europe.

On the 19th of April, Prince Menchikoff presented, by command of his Government, his second *note verbale* (No. 168¹), in which he urges the Turkish ministers to come to a decision upon the demands that, in discharge of his duty, he had made upon them. He says:—

"Pera, April 17th, 1854.

"His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in becoming acquainted, on his entrance into office, with the negotiations which have taken place, has seen the duplicity of his predecessor. He must have been convinced

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, April 23d, 1853, Part I. Inclosure, p. 159.

to what extent the respect due to the Emperor of Russia has been disregarded, and how great is his magnanimity in offering to the Porte the means of escaping from the embarrassments occasioned to it by the bad faith of its ministers. They have set at naught the good faith of their sovereign, by placing him in contradiction with his own words, and putting him, in regard to his ally and his friend, in lieu of those positions which are incompatible with propriety and with the dignity of a sovereign.

"While desiring to overlook the past ——— the Emperor was compelled to demand sure guarantees for the future.

"He requires that they should be formal, positive, and that they shall afford security for the inviolability of the religion professed by the great majority of the Christian subjects, as well of the Sublime Porte as of the Emperor, and in fine, by the Emperor himself.

"He can desire no other than such as he will henceforth find in an act equivalent to a treaty, and secure from the interpretation of a functionary ill-advised and little conscientious. * * *

"A sened or convention for the guarantee of the strict *status quo* of the privileges of the Catholic Greco-Russian rite of the Eastern Church, and of the sanctuaries which are possessed by that rite, either exclusively, or in common with other rites at Jerusalem.

"The Ambassador must here repeat to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, what he has already had occasion more than once to state to him, that Russia does not require of the Porte political concessions. She desires to set at ease religious scruples, by the certainty of the maintenance of what is, and what has always been, the practice up to the present time.

"In consequence of the hostile tendencies manifested for some years past, in regard to whatever relates to Russia, she requires in behalf of the religious immunities of the Orthodox Church, an explanatory and positive act of guarantee; an act which would in nowise affect either the other sects, or the relations of the Porte with other powers."

No attention was paid to this communication. Under one pretence or other, the Divan and its advisers continued silent, even as regarded the promised firmans about the main point in dispute as *settled*. On the 5th of May Prince Menchikoff transmitted them the following note and articles, urging a reply by the 10th, and at the same time expressing his great disappointment at the delay that had already taken place (No. 179¹).

"As regards the form, the Ambassador abides by his declaration, that a long and painful experience of the past requires, in order to avoid all coldness or mistrust between the two Governments for the future, a solemn engagement having the force of a treaty.

"In order to settle the contents and terms of that act, he required that there should be a previous understanding; and seeing with great pain the delays of the Ottoman Government in the matter, and its evident wish to

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 6th, 1853, Part I. Inclosure, p. 166.

evade the discussion, he found himself compelled, in his verbal note of April 19th, to recapitulate his demands, and to put them forward with the utmost urgency.

"The note of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 20th Redjib (^{April 23d}_{May 5th}), accompanying the certified copies of the two sovereign orders as to the Sanctuaries and the Cupola of the Holy Sepulchre, only reached the Ambassador to-day. He considers that communication as a compliance with the first two demands made in his note of April 19th, and he will make it his duty to place these documents before his Government.

"But not having, up to the present time, obtained any answer upon the *third and most important point*, which requires guarantees for the future, and having very recently received orders to redouble his exertions for the immediate settlement of the question which forms the principal object of the solicitude of his Majesty the Emperor, the Ambassador finds himself constrained now to address his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, strictly confining his demands, on this occasion, to the orders which he has received from his superiors.

"The bases of the arrangement which he is instructed to obtain are substantially the same.

"The Orthodox Eastern religion, its clergy, and its possessions, shall enjoy, for the future, *without any prejudice, under the protection of his Majesty the Sultan*, the privileges and immunities which are assured to them *ab antiquo*, and, upon a principle of perfect equity, shall participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects."

Page 169, Inclosure II. No. 179.

"ART. 1.—No change shall be made as regards the rights, privileges, and immunities which have been enjoyed by, or are possessed *ab antiquo* by the Orthodox Churches, pious institutions, and clergy, in the dominions of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, which is pleased to secure the same to them in perpetuity, on the strict basis of the *status quo* now existing.

"ART. 2.—The rights and advantages conceded by the Ottoman Government, or which shall hereafter be conceded, to the other Christian rites, by treaties, conventions, or special arrangements, shall be considered as belonging also to the Orthodox Church.

"ART. 3.—It being acknowledged and proved by historical tradition, and by numerous documents, that the Orthodox Greek Church of Jerusalem, its Patriarchate, and the Bishops subject to it, have been, since the time of the Caliphs, and under the successive reigns of all the Ottoman Emperors, particularly protected, honoured, and confirmed in their ancient rights and immunities, the Sublime Porte, in its solicitude for the conscience and religious convictions of its subjects of that faith, as well as of all other Christians who profess it, and whose piety has been alarmed by several occurrences, promises to maintain, and to cause to be respected, those rights and those immunities, both within and without the city of Jerusalem, *without any*

prejudice to the other Christian communities of natives, rayahs, or foreigners, who are admitted to the adoration of the Holy Sepulchre, and of the other sanctuaries, either in common with the Greeks, or in their own separate oratories.

"ART. 5.—As the subjects of the empire of Russia, secular as well as ecclesiastic, who are permitted by the treaties to visit the holy city of Jerusalem, and other places of devotion, are to be treated and considered on an equality with the subjects of the most favoured nations; and as these, *as well Catholic as* PROTESTANT, have their special prelates and ecclesiastical establishments, the Sublime Porte promises, in the event of the Imperial Court of Russia making such a demand, to assign a suitable locality in the city or environs of Jerusalem for the construction of a church, to be set apart for the celebration of Divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of an hospital for indigent or sick pilgrims, which institutions shall be under the superintendence of the Russian Consulate-General in Syria and Palestine."

At this stage of the proceedings, and even after the firmans had been granted which referred to the Holy Places, Lord Stratford (No. 181¹) tells us that these firmans might have settled that *portion* of the matter, "but that a certain degree of *doubt and uneasiness* is still kept up by the *variable language and procrastination of the Turkish ministers*. It is more than time for this vacillation to cease; and my opinion has been strongly and repeatedly expressed, not only to the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, *but even to the Sultan himself*."² Yet Menchikoff was accused of harshness, precipitation, and hurry, with such people!

His Lordship concludes the communication of the date quoted, thus: "The difficulties which unfortunately remain to be overcome, before the relations of the Porte with Russia can be settled on a stable and friendly basis, appear, from my last communication with the Russian embassy, to be still of a very serious nature." Yes, of a very serious nature indeed, as the sequel will show us; and this no one *knew* so well as his Lordship.

The more decided proceedings of the Russian ambassador, taken to bring the negotiations to a conclusion, brought Lord Stratford more into the field, and began to disclose to our view his policy—his "English view of the question," so long kept in the background (No. 184³). He informs Lord Clarendon that the Turkish ministers requested his advice on the occasion; and that, after consulting M. de la Cour, who

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 5th, 1853, Part I. p. 174.

² The fact seems to be, that Stratford was afraid that his fickle Turkish friends might repudiate even the minor points they had yielded, when all his deep-laid schemes would have been scattered to the winds.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, May 9th, 1853, Part I. p. 176.

was nervous when "he entered into all those considerations" which naturally result from the "weakness of the Ottoman empire," and the "occasional *imprudence* of its Government," but that they should frame an answer which the Turkish ministers should return to the Russian ambassador, so as to make the question from that time forward *a European, not a Russian question*. In the meantime, without telling him this, they were to see Prince Menchikoff, and try what they could make out of him. "The Prince would not admit that his propositions lay open to any unfavourable construction. He gave me to understand, that having run out the whole line of his moderation, he could go no further, and that his Government could no longer submit to the state of inferiority in which he pretended that Russia was held with respect to those who, in this country, profess the same religion as the Emperor Nicholas himself." The Grand Vizier, Rifaat Pasha, and the Seraskier, says Lord Stratford, he "advised" that, without "any essential sacrifice," they should "open a door for negotiation in the note to be prepared, and to withhold no concession compatible with the real welfare and independence of the empire. I could not *in conscience* advise them to accept the Russian demands as now presented to them, but reminded them of the GUARANTEE REQUIRED by Prince Menchikoff, and strongly recommended, that if the guarantee he required was inadmissible, a substitute for it should be found in a frank and comprehensive exercise of the Sultan's authority, on the promulgation of a firman securing both the spiritual and temporal privileges of all the Porte's tributary subjects, and, by way of *further security*, communicated officially to the *five great powers of Christendom*!"¹

Conscience and cunning, it appears, are thus the same in the vocabulary of statesmen and diplomatists. You are in a fix, my worthy Turkish friends, says Stratford. To get clear of the spiritual supervision of Russia, you must place both the spiritual and temporal protectorate—the secret but intended object—in the hands of France and England; you must place Christianity on a level with Islamism,—in short, burn the Koran, and *say your prayers in Latin as Rome directs you*,—and then we will protect you! Had Russia put forth such an extreme and

¹ See Russian Declaration, June 1st, Part I. p. 243.—"We are aware," says this declaration, "of the efforts which he employed with the Sultan, and also with the members of his council, to encourage him to resistance, by seeking to persuade him that our menaces would not go beyond a moral pressure, by *promising him the support and the sympathies of Europe, if he granted to his subjects equality in the eye of the law, and privileges more in accordance with the liberal habits of the West*," &c. Yet, when the charge was made, and which, as we have seen, *he himself here acknowledges*, we shall see presently the hue and cry that was made against Russia for having made a false charge against his Lordship! Such exposures are most humiliating to our national character and honour.

extensive demand, what a hue and cry would have been raised against her! Yet there was her error; and of this error, as we shall see, Western statesmen, in furtherance of their own political views and interests, now seek to take the advantage. The Grand Vizier seems to have been staggered at the advice, for no reply is given; but we are left to infer that some glimmering of political knowledge and foresight remained in his head, and that before they submitted to that state of things some exertions would be made, for he calmly asked, "whether any reliance could be placed on the *eventual approach of her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean.*" To this it was answered, that proceedings of a "*moral character*" must be met by "demonstrations of a similar description;" a reply which the Turk did not seem to comprehend or to relish, for we find in No. 184,¹ that in "conversation" with M. de la Cour, "the Turkish ministers had been more urgent in their expressions, and had indicated a hope of this kind," especially from considering that their rejection of the Russian propositions "*would be appreciated by France.*" But this "hope" M. de la Cour did not "exactly" encourage, indicating, however, in the cautious terms of his despatch, that "*a nod* was as good as a wink to a blind horse." This old adage is strikingly exemplified in Lord Stratford's despatch (No. 248²), where he states, that "Reschid Pasha sent to inform me yesterday, that he intended to instruct the Sultan's ambassadors at their courts, to express a hope that they would give the Porte their moral, and, if necessary, *their material assistance at the present alarming juncture.* He wished to know whether I saw any objection to his making such a communication, and I replied that it was for the Porte to consider the necessities of its own position, and that *I should not feel myself justified in discouraging a precautionary appeal suggested by its sense of them.*" That such application was then made direct to the British Government is not to be doubted, yet we do not find it in the volumes published. That Lord Stratford earnestly pressed it, he tells us; and Lord Clarendon has informed us (Part VII. p. 42), that the Turks frequently applied to the French Government for both naval and military assistance.

While the proceedings and advice just adverted to were turning everything *topsy turvey* at Constantinople, the belief at St. Petersburg, from previous advices, was that the whole affair might be considered as settled. In No. 185³ Sir Hugh Seymour tells Lord Clarendon, that Count Nesselrode informed him "that the questions which have been

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, May 23d, 1853, p. 181.

² Stratford to Clarendon, May 27th, 1853, p. 263.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, May 14th, 1853, p. 180.

agitated at Constantinople might be considered as virtually settled; *that, as regards the Holy Places*, an arrangement had been made which was satisfactory both to Prince Menchikoff and M. de la Cour; and that with regard to *the sanction* to be given to the arrangement, as the *form of a treaty* had been considered objectionable both by the Queen's ambassador and by the Porte, *some other would be devised*. What it would be, he was unable to say; but full latitude had been given to the Russian negotiator, and the point was one which was sure to be speedily adjusted." The proposed convention had, he added, been sent to London, but it had subsequently been greatly modified.

Count Nesselrode, nor any other reasonable man, could not for a moment suppose that the remaining point, namely, the guarantee for the future that Russia expected, would be withheld. He was mistaken. But that this point was always and chiefly kept in view, and not a *new point* brought forward, as has been asserted, is most clear and obvious by all the documents already quoted; it is also clearly maintained by the able memorandum (No. 191¹) made out and laid before Lord Clarendon, by Baron Brunnow, by order of his Government. Brevity compels me to limit the notice of this important document to the following extracts:—

"London, May ½³th, 1853.

"The desire which I was instructed to express on this subject met with the most friendly reception on the part of her Britannic Majesty's ministers. They admitted that the difficulties which had arisen at Constantinople had originated in the embarrassments created by the demands of the French ambassador; they understood, moreover, that the natural feeling of Russia, which could never remain indifferent to the infringement of the immunities of the Eastern Church by concessions made to the Latin Clergy, must be taken into account." * * *

"I first explained to him the reasons which would prevent Prince Menchikoff from entering into negotiation with Fuad Effendi,—the latter minister having caused the breach of the formal engagements entered into by the Sultan towards the Emperor, in regard to the maintenance of the *status quo* legally established by the Imperial *hatti-scherifs*, assuredly could not with any advantage be employed as the medium of a negotiation intended to secure a reparation for an offence of which he had been the author. This consideration must of necessity have convinced the Sultan himself, that it was of consequence to place in other hands the conduct of a negotiation in which such vast interests were involved. Russia never required, as has been falsely alleged, the dismissal of this minister; she expected of the wisdom of the Sultan the nomination of a more impartial plenipotentiary,—of one more capable of conducting the

¹ Memorandum, Brunnow, May 26th, 1853, pp. 184—194.

negotiation to a happy result. The resignation of Fuad Effendi was voluntary." * * *

"In the third place, I said that the breach of faith of which the Porte had been guilty towards the Emperor, constituted an offence for which his Majesty demanded redress ; that, besides, the infraction of the last firman, which had been annulled by the Porte almost at the very moment when it was issued, no longer permitted us to give full credence to a similar document ; that, consequently, the Imperial cabinet must insist upon an explanatory and more solemn act, obligatory in its character, in order to prevent the recurrence of fresh causes of misunderstanding between Russia and the Porte." * * *

"In this state of things, England, as I have just said, kept herself free as regarded her counsels. If this assertion stood in need of proof, it would be most clearly established by the full and entire freedom with which her Britannic Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople interposed his counsels, and expressed his opinion upon the proposals, of which Prince Menchikoff was the *first* to communicate to him the sense." * * *

"It is not necessary for me here to dwell upon the alarming intelligence then circulated at Pera, which found credence at Paris and in London, as to the intentions of Russia ; the arrival of the Sebastopol squadron in the Bosphorus—the occupation of the Principalities—the extension of our Asiatic frontier—the pretension to secure to ourselves the nomination of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople—the premeditated insurrection of the Greek population in the Ottoman empire—the renewal of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi : all these assertions, upon which I will not here enlarge, must still be present to the memory of her Britannic Majesty's ministers.

"They will, I am sure, likewise recollect the calmness with which I met these reports, and the firmness with which I did not hesitate to deny their truth.

"For my part, I shall always retain a most grateful recollection of the frankness with which the intimate explanations, which I exchanged with her Majesty's ministers at this critical moment, were characterised."

* * *
 "Lord Clarendon had just then assumed the direction of foreign affairs. I appeal to his testimony to bear witness to the language which I held to him, in order to place the facts in their true light. At our first interview, I placed in his hands the *lettre de cabinet* with which the Emperor had furnished Prince Menchikoff, on accrediting him his ambassador to the Sultan. It contains this passage : 'In the present question, I can only recommend to you to maintain the rights which have existed for ages, and which have been recognised by all your illustrious predecessors, and confirmed by yourself, in favour of the Orthodox Church, whose doctrines are professed by the Christian populations who are under your rule, as well as by the great majority of my own subjects.' " * * *

"I quote these words because they characterise the intentions and mark the policy of the Emperor. He is aware that the tranquillity of Turkey is wholly dependent on the immense majority of the population

of the Orthodox Greek religion in the Ottoman empire being protected from any molestation. He is aware, also, that the permanence of relations of good understanding between Russia and Turkey is wholly dependent on the Porte being faithful to its engagements, which date from the treaty of Kainardji, granting to the Orthodox Church that freedom of worship, that tranquillity of conscience, and that peaceable possession of rights, the inviolability of which Russia will never cease to watch over with the whole force of her natural and religious convictions. The history of the two empires must indeed be little known, and above all, the great interests involved in the preservation of peace between both must be lost sight of, for it to be forgotten that the Emperor, when counselling and requiring the preservation of the Eastern Church in its rights, speaks and acts as a friend who is desirous of the tranquillity of the Ottoman empire, and who watches over the existence of Turkey in its independence and its integrity." * * *

"The third passage stands thus: 'The simultaneous appearance of the two fleets would have prevented the possibility of the question being solved at Constantinople. It would have placed us in a position in which we could not have acquiesced, and which would no longer have allowed the Emperor, thus exposed to a demonstration of a threatening nature, freely to follow his own pacific and conservative impulses.'" * * *

"Prince Menchikoff, in transmitting to me the project of Sened (presented the 5th of May), was good enough to accompany it with a despatch, of which I will transcribe the following words: '*We do not demand the right of protecting Christians of the Orthodox rite, subjects of the Porte; but the maintenance of the religious status quo of that rite, the existence of which has been seriously threatened, by the inclination manifested by the Porte to countenance the encroachments of the Latin rite upon that which is professed by the majority of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.*'" * * *

"The Sultan began by a breach of faith towards the Emperor.

"His Majesty found himself under the necessity of demanding reparation for this offence committed against his dignity.

"In order to obtain this reparation, the Emperor made choice of the means of a pacific negotiation, in preference to the immediate employment of force.

"In demanding this satisfaction from the Porte by persuasion, and not by measures of hostility, he kept solely in view the protection of the Orthodox Church in Turkey against the encroachments and the wrongs by which it had lately been unjustly and flagrantly assailed.

"With this object in view, he considered that a simple firman would be insufficient to atone for the wrong committed, as regarded the past, or to prevent the recurrence of similar causes of complaint for the future.

"Therefore he determined on requiring and obtaining from the Porte a formal act—an explanatory act—such as I have mentioned.

"The sole purpose of this act, in his Majesty's opinion, should be the confirmation of the Orthodox Church in the possession of those rights which it enjoys in the East.

"The Emperor requires neither more nor less. He desires that what now exists should remain intact; that the religion professed by Russia should remain unrestricted, respected, and inviolable under the Ottoman rule. His Majesty requires this guarantee; he has recommended the Porte to give it, in the twofold interest of rendering the internal tranquillity of the Turkish empire more secure, and its peace with Russia more lasting.

"Could those powers who desire the preservation of Turkey entertain any jealousy at witnessing the accomplishment of this act of peace through the counsels of Russia? Would they prefer that the Greek Orthodox Church, without any security, and engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Latin Church, should become a lasting cause of disorder, of disquietude, and possibly of dissolution in the heart of the Ottoman empire? This view, I venture to remark, would not be in character with the foresight of the great powers, friends of Turkey. * * *

"Now, the greatest proof of respect which can be shown to an independent sovereign, is to place no impediment in the way of his fulfilling his engagements towards a friendly and neighbouring state. If he is no longer free to keep his word, or to make reparation for the wrongs which he has committed, he ceases to be independent.

"The second conclusion to which the perusal of the treaty of 1841 leads me, is that the powers who are animated by a sincere desire to witness the consolidation of the tranquillity of the Ottoman empire, should be the first to counsel the Sultan not to refuse to the Greek Church the pledge of security such as Russia has required, which should tend to keep the immense majority of the Christian population of the Ottoman empire within the limits of submission and tranquillity as to their religious belief."

They must be very obstinate and exceedingly thick-headed who, in the face of all such evidence, can accuse Russia of duplicity and concealment. Whether she was right or not in her pursuit, is not at present the question; but, did she follow her object openly and fairly? This she certainly did. The Turk understood her fully, and wanted to get clear of her demands by annulling or denying all his previous engagements contracted with her. In fact, and in short, he wanted to retain the Christian population in that state of helpless subjection, amenable to no one; or, where he relaxed in favour of Christianity, that that relaxation should be to extend the Latin supremacy over the Christian Churches of the East, as the most pleasing and advantageous to France and the Roman Catholic world. Sir H. Seymour gives us his view of the point at issue, when he tells us (No. 6¹) that the conduct of Turkey to Russia "is not referable to ill-will towards you, but to the *excessive apprehensions of the French entertained by the*

¹ Seymour to Russell, Secret Correspondence, February 22d, 1853, p. 11.

unfortunate Turks." This apprehension ought to be our guide and our caution.

A lengthened diplomatic correspondence took place in reference to Menchikoff's last communication, which was chiefly quibbling about Russian promises and rights. Thus Lord Stratford reminded the Prince (p. 129), that his master said he sought no "extension of right or of power in this country beyond what was assured him by the existing treaties," and that "the communications" between them had "afforded me (Lord Stratford) the assurance that the same sentiments of moderation" "would not in the last instance be wanting on his part." Why, all this is true, only Lord Stratford would not understand it so, because he would not trust him in the sincerity of his declarations. Lord Stratford had himself told us (April 6th, p. 125), that one great object sought by Russia was "*a more clear and comprehensive definition of Russian right under treaty*;" and no one can say that the object was unreasonable, after the strange construction the statesmen of this day attempted to put upon them.

Events at Constantinople hurried on previous to Prince Menchikoff's departure. A change in the Turkish ministry took place on the 13th, for no object, it appears, but to gain time and to induce, or rather force, the Prince to prolong his stay. Various expedients were resorted to by Lord Stratford to patch up matters; amongst these was a scheme worthy of his Lordship, which he informs us (No. 193¹) "gave everything required by Russia but a *form of guarantee*,"—the very thing that was wanted, and the only thing that remained to be obtained to terminate the protracted and serious discussions. In an evasive note, Rifaat Pasha (No. 193²) tells Prince Menchikoff that his remaining object, a form of treaty, was in its nature the stone on which "the independence" of Turkey was "grounded," but also "her independence itself in its very foundations." The Prince, in reply,³ took a different and reasonable view of the matter. He expressed his "astonishment at the distrust that appears in the interpretation which the Sublime Porte attaches to his Majesty's intentions,"—"of being desirous of obtaining a *new right*, to the prejudice of the independence and sovereignty of the Sublime Porte." "The Emperor appeals to the friendship of his august ally, and only requires of him, *without any prejudice to the sacred and inviolable power* of his Majesty the Sultan, a manifest proof of his solicitude for the Orthodox Greek religion, which is the religion of Russia, and whereof the Emperor is the natural

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 15th, 1853, Part I. p. 195.

² Stratford to Clarendon, Inclosure, May 10th, 1853, p. 197.

³ Inclosure No. 3, p. 197.

defender." Therefore, continues he, "an act emanating from the sovereign will of the Sultan, an engagement free but solemn, can alone efface the painful recollection of the faults committed by some clumsy and ill-disposed counsellor of his Majesty the Sultan;" that if such is not obtained, he declares with pain, that he "must consider his mission at an end,—must break off relations with the cabinet of his Majesty the Sultan,—and throw upon the responsibility of his ministers all the consequences that may ensue."

A reply to this note was requested by the 14th of May. On the 15th of May, Reschid Pasha urges a delay of five or six days to prepare his answer, on account of the change that had taken place in the ministry. On the 18th, Menchikoff, in reference to the note of the 15th, from Reschid Pasha, (No. 196,¹) states thus:—

"The two firmans designed to close the discussion in regard to the Holy Places at Jerusalem cannot, considering what has occurred, offer *the guarantee desired by the EMPEROR*. The isolated promise to extend to our subjects the privileges enjoyed at Jerusalem by the pilgrims and establishments of other nations, merely confirms an indisputable right, for the exercise of which the sovereign sanction was alone required. The Sublime Porte, by rejecting with distrust the wishes of the Emperor in favour of the orthodox Greco-Russian religion, has failed in what was due to an august and ancient ally. It has only added a fresh injury to those in which the undersigned was ordered to demand redress, and has justified the serious apprehensions of the Imperial Government for the security and maintenance of the ancient rights of the Eastern Church. The identity of religion—that secular bond cemented by the reciprocal wants and interests of the two countries, as much as by their geographical position—instead of being a pledge of solid friendship, thus becomes, from a lamentable misapprehension in the minds of the Ottoman Government, the permanent cause of an attitude injurious to Russia."—"The communications of the Sublime Porte, taken altogether, having therefore convinced the undersigned of the inutility of his efforts to effect, in regard to his demands, a satisfactory arrangement in conformity with the dignity of his great master, he finds himself compelled to declare—

"That he considers his mission at an end: that the Imperial court cannot, without prejudice to its dignity, and exposing itself to fresh insults, continue to maintain a mission at Constantinople, and to keep up on their ancient footing its political relations with the Ottoman Government: that in consequence and in virtue of the FULL POWERS² with which the undersigned is provided, he will quit Constantinople, taking with him the whole staff of the Imperial legation, with the exception of the Commercial Chancery, who, with the officers attached to him, will continue to

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 19th, 1853, Inclosure, No. 1, p. 207.

² The Emperor soon after fully sanctioned and approved of this, and the conduct of his minister.

carry on the affairs of navigation and commerce, and to protect the interests of Russian subjects, and the dispatch of their vessels."—"That he deeply regrets that he must take this determination."—"That the refusal of a *guarantee* for the Orthodox Greco-Russian religion, will henceforth impose upon the Imperial Government the necessity of *seeking one in its own power*."¹—"That, accordingly, any infringement of the *status quo* of the Eastern Church, and of its integrity, will be looked upon by the Emperor as tantamount to an infringement of the spirit and letter of existing stipulations, and as an act of hostility to Russia, which would impose upon his Imperial Majesty the necessity of having recourse to means which, in his constant anxiety for the stability of the Ottoman empire, and his sincere friendship for his Majesty the Sultan, and that which he has professed for his august father, the Emperor has always had at heart to avoid."

In these important documents, there is no improper, harsh, menacing, or threatening language. Yet Lord Stratford describes it (p. 205),—"their tone is harsh, and their aspect is threatening."

On the 8th and 9th May, a private correspondence took place between Lord Stratford and Prince Menchikoff (No. 206²). The parts connected with the main but unsettled part of the question at issue are these:—

Lord Stratford (Inclosure No. 3) says:—

"The guarantee required by Russia is objectionable to the Porte, on the grounds of real danger to its independence. A more legitimate guarantee, which can hardly be refused without offence, is given instead."

Prince Menchikoff replies:—

"A sure guarantee for the future condition of the religion professed by his Majesty. The mistrust and ill-disposition of the Ottoman Government, in regard to us, turned especially on this point."

No. 7, Lord Stratford says:—

"I do not complain of *insincerity* on Prince Menchikoff's part to me; but what may to all appearance be justly complained of, is the *utter want of agreement* between his principal requisition and the assurances of his Court. Still less is he entitled to complain of me." "I gave him distinctly to understand that I could not support his ulterior pretensions, and did so

¹ These words seem to have frightened Lord Clarendon out of his wits, for he gives them as a reason for commanding the fleets to advance. Now, in all the history of nations, it is always found that when negotiations fail, arms are resorted to. Lord Redcliffe informs us, (No. 70, Part II. p. 73,) that this is the proper and lawful course, "*to prepare for the effectual employment of other means* in case negotiation should fail!" If we are blameless in acting thus, surely so is Russia for doing the same thing.

² Stratford to Clarendon, May 14th, 1853, Part I. pp. 215—217 (Inclosures). Much of the correspondence is rather of a personal nature: I confine myself to the parts which are of public interest.

at an early period of our intercourse, at the risk of drawing down his resentment on the minister *from whom I derived my knowledge*, and whom he had threatened with the fate of Garaschanen, if his communications with the Porte were in any way divulged."¹

The Prince replies :—

"I am not conscious of having disregarded the frank assurances as to our views with respect to Turkey given by the Imperial Ministry to the Queen's Cabinet. I have shown the greatest sincerity to your Excellency, and I must confess that I looked for frank cooperation on your side."

No concession whatever on the main point could be obtained from the Turkish Government. The representatives of the four European powers at Constantinople endeavoured, as they say, in vain to make either party concede anything. On the 18th, the Russian ambassador declared, as has already been stated, his mission at an end, but remained at Constantinople till the 21st May; leaving in the interim, unofficially, a note proposed to be addressed to him after his departure, should the Ottoman Government feel disposed to yield to, or to meet his wishes, and receiving at the same time a reply from Reschid Pasha to his communication of the 18th, but in an unofficial shape, because it had not been prepared before the Prince had declared his mission to be at an end. These documents, the first in No. 210², and the second and third enclosed in No. 239.³ As these papers are of considerable importance, and referred to in subsequent important communications, they are here inserted at length. On the 21st May, Prince Menchikoff advised the other European ministers of his intended immediate departure (No. 238⁴). He consequently left Constantinople on the evening of the day mentioned, and reached Odessa on the 25th, from which place he without delay transmitted the account of his return, unsuccessful, to St. Petersburg.

¹ This is a purely diplomatic manœuvre and dodge for the occasion, and a silly invention of the Turkish ministers, and fraud practised upon the Ambassador. Lord Stratford has again and again told us, that at an early period, Prince Menchikoff told him what his plans and objects were—that he not only consulted him "*confidentially*," but publicly and openly about them—and that the Divan also told him everything, though it is plain that they told him matters only in their own way. At page 125, Part I., we find him stating, that the day after his arrival, the Turkish ministers laid the case before him; and on April 16th, eleven days only after his arrival, we find him stating that he discussed the whole question with Prince Menchikoff. It is, then, clear no threats were necessary to keep anything secret, when the principal party concerned readily communicated full details to Lord Stratford. At p. 192, Part I., we find Count Brunnow distinctly stating to Lord Clarendon, that Lord Stratford was informed by Prince Menchikoff of all his "proceedings, before even the Russian Government was."

² Stratford to Clarendon, May 22d, 1853, Part I. p. 219.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, May 25th, 1853, Part I. pp. 252, 253.

⁴ Stratford to Clarendon, May 25th, 1853, Part I. p. 251, (Inclosure No. 1.)

Page 196, Inclosure I. No. 193.

Paper presented by LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE to RESCHID PASHA.

"The Orthodox religion of the East and its clergy, as well as those of the other Christian denominations, shall continue, as regards spiritual matters, to enjoy, under the sovereign protection of his Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them at different times by the Imperial favour.

"Their churches, and their other possessions legally acquired, shall be respectively preserved to them.

"At Jerusalem, the Russian clergy and pilgrims shall be placed on the same footing, in regard to protection and rights, as those of other foreign nations.

"The new explanatory firmans, respecting the Holy Places at Jerusalem, shall be considered to have the force of a formal engagement.

"A church and hospital at Jerusalem shall be granted to the Russians.

"These different points should be guaranteed by an Imperial declaration in the most solemn form, publicly promulgated, and communicated to the Court of Russia, and to the other great powers of Christendom."

Page 221, Inclosure I. in No. 210.

Draft of Note proposed by PRINCE MENCHIKOFF, to be addressed to him by the Porte.

"The Sublime Porte, after the most attentive and the most serious examination of the demands which form the object of the extraordinary mission entrusted to the Ambassador of Russia, Prince Menchikoff, and after having submitted the result of this examination to his Majesty the Sultan, makes it his duty to communicate by the present to his Highness the Ambassador, the Imperial decision in this respect, promulgated by a supreme Iradé, dated the —

"His Majesty the Sultan, being desirous of giving to his august friend and ally, the Emperor of Russia, a fresh proof of his very sincere friendship, and of his earnest desire to strengthen the ancient relations of good neighbourhood and of perfect understanding which exist between the two states—reposing, at the same time, entire confidence in the ever-benevolent intentions of his Imperial Majesty for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire—has vouchsafed to appreciate and to take into his serious consideration the frank and cordial representations of which the Russian Ambassador has been the medium, in favour of the Orthodox Greco-Russian religion, professed as well by his august ally as by the majority of their respective subjects.

"The undersigned has, in consequence, been desired to give, by means of the present note, the most solemn assurance to the Government of Russia, of which his Highness Prince Menchikoff is the representative at the Court of his Majesty the Sultan, of the unalterable solicitude, and of

the generous and tolerant sentiments which animate his Majesty the Sultan for the security and prosperity, in his dominions, of the clergy of the churches and of the religious establishments of the Oriental Christian religion.

"In order to render these assurances more explicit, and to lay down in a formal manner the principal objects of this deep solicitude,—to confirm by supplementary explanations, which the progress of time renders necessary, the meaning of the articles which, in the former treaties concluded between the two powers, have reference to religious questions,—and, lastly, to prevent for ever any shadow of misunderstanding and of disagreement in this respect between the two Governments,—the undersigned is authorized by his Majesty the Sultan to make the following declarations:—

"1. The Orthodox religion of the East, its clergy, its churches, and its possessions, as well as its religious establishments, shall enjoy for the future, without any detriment, under the protection of his Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which are secured to them *ab antiquo*, or which have been granted to them at various times by the Imperial favour; and, on a principle of high equity, shall participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects, as well as to the foreign legations accredited to the Sublime Porte by convention or special arrangement.

"2. His Majesty the Sultan having deemed it necessary and just to corroborate and to explain his sovereign firman, adorned with the *hatti-houmayoun* of the 15th of the month of Rabi-el-Akhir, 1268, (Feb. 9th, 1852,) by his sovereign firman of the ———, and to order besides by another firman, dated ———, the repair of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, these two firmans shall be literally carried out and faithfully observed, so as to maintain for ever the present *status quo* of the sanctuaries possessed by the Greeks exclusively, or in common with other religious sects.

"It is understood that this engagement extends equally to the maintenance of the rights and immunities which the Orthodox Church and its clergy enjoy *ab antiquo*, as well within as without the city of Jerusalem, without any prejudice to the other Christian communities.

"3. On the Imperial Court of Russia making the request, a suitable locality shall be assigned within the city of Jerusalem, or in its environs, for the construction of a church appropriated to the celebration of Divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of an hospital for indigent or sick pilgrims, which foundations shall be under the special superintendence of the Russian Consulate-General in Syria and in Palestine.

"4. The necessary firmans and orders shall be given to those whom it may concern, and to the Greek Patriarchs, for the execution of these sovereign decisions; and the arrangement of the matters of detail, which shall not have found place either in the firmans concerning the Holy Places of Jerusalem, or in the present notification, shall form the subject of a subsequent understanding."

Page 252, Inclosure I. No. 239.

RESCHID PASHA to PRINCE MENCHIKOFF.

"The statement made by Prince Menchikoff, in his written and verbal communications concerning the doubts and want of confidence entertained by the Porte with regard to his Majesty the Emperor's good intentions, has been seen with great regret. His Majesty the Sultan has perfect faith and confidence in his Majesty the Emperor, and highly appreciates the great qualities and spirit of justice which animate his august ally and neighbour; and it is a great honour for me to proclaim, that it has always been his Majesty the Sultan's desire to consolidate and strengthen the friendly relations happily subsisting between the two countries.

"With reference to the religious privileges of the Greek churches and clergy, the honour of the Porte requires that the exclusively spiritual privileges granted under the Sultan's predecessors, and confirmed by his Majesty, should be now and henceforward preserved unimpaired and in force; and the equitable system pursued by the Porte towards its subjects demands that any spiritual privilege whatever, granted henceforward to one class of Christian subjects, should not be refused to the Greek clergy. It would be a cause of much regret that the fixed intentions of his Majesty the Sultan in this respect should be called into question.

"Nevertheless, the imperial firman now granted to the Greek Patriarchate confirming the religious privileges, is considered to afford a new proof of his Imperial Majesty's benevolent sentiments in this respect, and the general promulgation thereof must afford every security, and remove for ever from his Imperial Majesty's mind all doubts for the future, respecting the religion he professes, and it is with pleasure I perform the duty of making this declaration.

"In order that there should be no alteration respecting the shrine at Jerusalem, it is formally promised that for security in the future thereon, the Sublime Porte will take no step concerning them without the knowledge of the French embassy also to this purpose.

"The Sultan consents that a church and hospital should be built at Jerusalem (for the Russians); and the Porte is ready and disposed to conclude a Sened, both on this subject, and concerning the special privileges of the Russian monks at that place."

Page 253, Inclosure II. No. 239.

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF to RESCHID PASHA.

"Buyukdérè, May 2^d, 1853.

"At the moment of his departure from Constantinople, the undersigned, Ambassador of Russia, has learnt that the Sublime Porte has manifested the intention of proclaiming a guarantee for the exercise of the spiritual rights possessed by the clergy of the Orthodox Eastern Church, a step which would seem to render doubtful the maintenance of the other privileges which it enjoys.

"Whatever may be the motive of this determination, the undersigned is under the necessity of acquainting his Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that a declaration, or any other act of that kind, which might tend, while maintaining unimpaired the merely spiritual rights of the Orthodox Eastern religion, to invalidate the other rights, privileges, and immunities, granted to that religion and to its clergy from the most remote period, and which they now enjoy, would be considered by the Imperial Cabinet as an act of hostility towards Russia and her religion.

"The undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

"MENCHIKOFF."

The documents referred to show that there was no concealment or duplicity practised by Russia or her ambassador with regard to these objects. These were all made known to our Government, and to our ambassadors, Colonel Rose and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; and, in fact, that in almost everything, and especially in the main point at issue, the Government of Turkey consulted the latter, were advised by him, and in every step followed his counsels. To baffle Russia, and to support the cause of Turkey, every plan was devised and subterfuge adopted. Take the following (No. 209¹), given to Reschid Pasha, and on which his last note was founded:—"It was proposed to make one document of all the Turkish concessions; to give that document the form of an official note, having the *force of a treaty*, and to *erase* the limitation conveyed in the term *spiritual*, as applied to the privileges and immunities of the Greek clergy. This note was shown to Reschid Pasha, but not left with him." To this subterfuge and counsel, Prince Menchikoff no doubt refers (p. 253), and inserted above. To establish further the fact of Menchikoff's proposals and objects being well known, the declarations and confessions of the Turkish ministers themselves may here be adduced. In his note addressed to the representatives of the four powers (No. 244²) he states:—

"The question of the Holy Places, which formed *one of the objects of* the mission of Prince Menchikoff, Ambassador Extraordinary from Russia, has been settled to the satisfaction of both parties." There remained, however, he says, unsettled, "the proposals of an extraordinary character, made by the Prince, on the subject of the privileges of the Greek religion and clergy." "Unhappily it has been found impossible to establish any agreement between the two parties upon this matter." In further proof that nothing new or separate was brought forward at any time, Lord Stratford tells us (No. 210, p. 220) that Reschid Pasha informed M. Pisani, "that the Porte had already adopted the resolution

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 20th, 1853, Part I. p. 219.

² Inclosure from M. Musurus to Lord Clarendon, dated May 26th, 1853, Part I. p. 261.

of resisting the objectionable part of the Russian demands." As the rupture of the negotiations approached, the most thoughtless, and those who spurred on the mischief to gratify their personal pique, or the ambition and designs of their country, began to contemplate with alarm the too probable and terrible consequences. Thus, in No. 183,¹ Lord Cowley tells us, that, in reference to this matter, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that, while he dreaded the results of a Russian protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey by Russia, yet that the French ambassador, M. de la Cour "is not to take upon himself the responsibility of exciting the Ottoman Government to refuse the demands of Russia." And in No. 186,² Lord Cowley further tells us, on the authority of Drouyn de Lhuys, that M. de la Cour considered that "the Porte would be perfectly justified in refusing the demands of Prince Menchikoff, *"without, however, advising her to adopt that line of conduct."* They left this advice to Lord Stratford to give, and he did so to their entire satisfaction. It is necessary here to remark, that Russia, in her demands throughout, fixed the freedom in religious privileges upon the firm basis of the right acquired by the treaty of Kainardji, and as these were confirmed by subsequent treaties between the two empires.

In fact, it was not till the latest period of the discussions, that the letter and the spirit of the treaty of Kainardji was called in question, and then only in the construction to be put upon some words in it. In the Secret Correspondence, Lord John Russell (p. 8), and Lord Clarendon (p. 22), both admit its full force and meaning, not only as a right but as a "*duty*." Lord Clarendon, Part I. p. 232, admits this treaty, and that it would have been reasonable had Russia stood upon "*a restatement or fresh confirmations of its provisions*." In Part II. p. 144, his Lordship turns round and says, the demands of Russia were based upon "*a strained construction of the Treaty of Kainardji*." The Turks, after admitting its full force, and, consequently, that fresh confirmation of it was not necessary, boldly assert, (Part II. p. 79,) that "*the purport of, and real and exact provisions of, that treaty, is confined to the single promise of the Sultan to protect,*" &c. And in Part I. p. 390, they say, "*the promise is of general import*." In short, they only can interpret the treaty in question. Lord Stratford, who reads Eastern treaties with the Koran as his guide, again and again admits the claims of Russia for redress, but simply considers that she ought to have been content with what he thought proper to

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, May 19th, 1853, Part I. p. 175.

² Cowley to Clarendon, May 23d, 1853, Part I. 181.

allow her. Sir H. Seymour, who reads treaties according as his spirit is expanded or condensed by the climate of St. Petersburg, admits the Russian rights under this treaty, but adds, that in his opinion, Part II. p. 205, "an *undue extension* had been sought upon a particular point!" In short, he and he only, a third party and not immediately interested, was to be allowed to be the sole judge on the matter at issue.

During the time that these weightier proceedings were going on between Menchikoff and the Ottoman Government, several important facts oozed out in the general *mêlée* of correspondence which was running about in all directions. A few of these may be useful to notice, as bearing upon the general question. At page 134, Lord Stratford informs us (April 11th), that Prince Menchikoff's "tone is considerably softened" (it was never harsh); and that there was no question of a defensive treaty with Turkey and Russia, and "*no thought of military intimidation* for the present," unless the movement from Toulon should produce it hereafter. A secret treaty reported was a fiction, and the proposals first attributed to Prince Menchikoff, gross Turkish exaggerations and misrepresentations. At pages 161 and 162, Sir H. Seymour tells us that Menchikoff wished to arrange the Greek and Latin rights together, and to settle the whole with M. de la Cour, the French ambassador. And in page 211, the same diplomatist informs us that (May 24th) Count Nesselrode specifically told him that there were always "*two points*" to settle at Constantinople, namely, "*satisfaction for the past and security for the future.*" The latter has never been obtained. In page 151, we find Lord Stratford, while admitting to a certain extent the fair claims of Russia, telling us that the Austrian ambassador said, rather than that Menchikoff should withdraw unsuccessful, he would advise the Porte to concede all his demands; a concession which Lord Stratford told him he did not think, from what he had heard at Vienna, that the Austrian Government would accede to. At page 160, we find Sir H. Seymour telling us that Russia required "no offensive alliance with Turkey," and that Russia had offered Turkey assistance if she should be *attacked by France!*" At page 166, we find Lord Cowley telling us that, as regards the general protectorate of the Greek Church, asserted to be sought by Russia, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, France could not act alone in it, but only in conjunction with the other four powers.

CHAPTER III.

CONSTANTINOPLE AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF MENCHIKOFF—MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEETS—OCCUPATIONS OF THE PRINCIPALITIES—DECLARATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND TURKEY—THE VIENNA CONFERENCE—THE VIENNA NOTE, PROCEEDINGS REGARDING IT, ETC.

THE departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople created a great stir throughout Europe. Cabinets, ministers, and diplomatists, awakened as from a sleep, were everywhere on the alert to excuse themselves and to blame others; but each wishing to advance the character and interests of their respective countries, and to shake the blame from their own shoulders of having tended to produce the fearful result that loomed in the distance as regards the future. Those who were the most to blame were the most vociferous. Russia was in every way blackened, and described as incapable of uttering a word of truth, while Turkey, on the contrary, whitewashed from every stain, was described as a nation who erred and did wrong entirely from "weakness and harmless prejudices." A regularly organized system of falsehood and misrepresentation was established, the great centres of which were London and Paris, which misled or guided the press in general throughout Europe, to mystify and to mislead the public mind everywhere, as regards the real merits and bearing of the great question under consideration. To such a length was falsehood and misrepresentation carried, that the deputation from Finsbury or Marylebone, which waited upon Lord Clarendon last autumn to complain of the silence of Government, and of not obtaining authentic information such as foreigners gave them, that his Lordship justly and correctly informed them, that in all that these foreigners had told them, during many months, in reference to the Russian and Turkish dispute, there "*were not two words of truth.*"

Before entering more at large into the further details of this quarrel, it may be proper to state, as concisely as possible, the real object and meaning of the demands made upon Turkey by Russia. We have

considered the just and pressing causes which compelled the former to make those demands upon the latter. The real objects sought were, as we learn, 1st, from Baron Brunnow's official memorandum (No. 191¹), on the authority of Prince Menchikoff's Sened of the 5th May, thus :—

“ We do not demand the right of protecting Christians of the Orthodox rite, subjects of the Porte, but the maintenance of the religious *status quo* of that rite, the existence of which has been *seriously threatened* by the inclination manifested by the Porte to *countenance the encroachments of the Latin rite* upon that which is professed by a majority of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.”

Secondly, in No. 318², the Emperor Nicholas tells us :—

“ Your Government is going very far in search of the meaning of the term *ab antiquo*. When we demand the maintenance of the rights, privileges, and immunities granted by the Sultan to the Greek religion *ab antiquo*, we mean to say the maintenance of the rights, &c. &c., which that religion at present enjoys, and which the enjoyment *ab antiquo*, has, by that usage, been confirmed ; but we have no intention of disinterring *ex antiquo*, or of looking for *in antiquo* (I am not sure of speaking Latin correctly), rights which the religion and the clergy may have originally enjoyed in former times, but which they no longer enjoy at present.” * *

“ At a time when, apparently, you did not consider as affecting in principle the independence of the Sultan, the protectorate which France, more explicit and frank than now, declared that she exercised traditionally over the Catholic subjects of the Sultan, you yourselves, *in conjunction with us*, imposed on independent Greece the maintenance of immunities such as those we ask for. It was settled by you (Great Britain, and that by a diplomatic act more significant than a simple note), that the Catholic religion should enjoy, in the new State, the free and public exercise of its worship ; that its properties should be respected ; that its bishops should be maintained in the full possession of the *functions*, rights, and privileges, which they had previously enjoyed under the patronage of the kings of France, &c. &c. Well, that is *precisely the kind of rights, immunities, or privileges*, the maintenance of which we demand in Turkey for our religion, our clergy, and its possessions ; *the whole under the protection of the Sultan*, which is certainly more considerate in regard to him than the patronage, so plainly expressed, of the kings of France.”

“ Do you require a precedent ? We stand by that one. We wish to preserve, not to resuscitate ; we ask for nothing new, and likewise nothing retroactive.” “ Be persuaded, then, that in regard to privileges, we only demand what exists, *not what may have existed heretofore.*”

“ We can only deplore the exaggeration of the notion by which, after the experience of *eighty years*, this simple patronage is suddenly looked

¹ Brunnow to the British Government, May 26th, 1853, Part I. pp. 189—194.

² Seymour to Clarendon, June 27th, 1853, Part I. p. 324, (Inclosure, Nicholas to Seymour, p. 327.)

upon as an entirely novel, religious, and political protectorate, which would henceforth make the Emperor of Russia the real sovereign of Turkey, and reduce the Sultan to the condition of a vassal."

"If it is desired to proceed further, and to make war upon us, in order to deprive us of it, the Emperor is placed under the necessity of *defending it to the last extremity*, because that patronage constitutes a portion of the inheritance of his ancestors, as also of the strength of his empire; and in order to avert an *imaginary* danger, a certain danger will have been created, and a flame lighted up, of which the consequences are incalculable, and of which the responsibility will certainly not attach to us."

In No. 268¹ says Sir H. Seymour, speaking to Count Nesselrode, "I spoke of some middle course, which it would not be difficult to suggest, for an adjustment of differences. The Chancellor had thought upon the point, but could not see any that could be devised. You have known me," he said, "for two years; you have seen that I am *not inclined to violent measures*. Well, I declare to you that I could *not advise the Emperor to recede*; his dignity would be lowered, his position would be compromised; it would be a triumph to the Turks, and a *humiliation* to Russia. The inevitable result would be war with Turkey. The insolence of the Turks would become such, that friendly relations with them would become impossible."

All this is sufficiently plain, and, at the same time, quite unanswerable. It is their own interests and power, therefore, not the independence and the integrity of Turkey, that they (the allies) are looking after. If religious protection in Turkey adds to the political power of Russia, as they say it does, the result is, that the religious and *civil* protectorate in Turkey, which they seek, must, if obtained, add to their political power and influence; and, consequently, under this union, especially in such pursuits, it becomes more dangerous to the peace and to the liberties of the world. M. Drouyn de Lhuys helps us (No. 225²) to a clear solution of this matter, and his aim on the occasion. "France," he says, "has an equal desire" with England "to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire *in its present condition*," and to "encourage the Sultan continually to improve the condition of the Christians subject to his rule," "without *any foreign power* being permitted to stipulate by itself in favour of *one class* amongst the subjects of the Grand Seignior, on *whatever* interest each stipulation is intended to bear." There is no mistaking this Frenchified orientalism. It means, as the protectorate, or asserted protectorate of a portion of the Sultan's subjects, is a good thing for Russia, so it must be a good thing for us; but "the present condition" maintained, how "progress-

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, June 10th, 1853, p. 278.

² Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, June 5th, 1853, Part I. pp. 227—229.

sive *improvement*" is to go on, his Excellency does not condescend to tell us, nor was it necessary. France and England united are, he considers, strong enough to do anything they meditate; therefore Russia shall no longer possess the supposed power, but we will take it to ourselves, and use it to our advantage. The Sultan, under our protection or coercion, must do as we bid him; and our united power, "*by threats and by caresses*," is sufficient to compel every other European power to submit to our rule and government, and in this way to preserve what we consider to be the proper equilibrium and balance of power in Europe!

Under this reign of peace, and improvement, and "*civilization*," the Latin Church—the Church of Rome—will take, as is her right, the supremacy in the East; and then, with M. Lavalette, France will "have all the Holy Places."

From the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople to the time of the celebrated Vienna note, a great deal of diplomatic work, such as it was, was done. The British Foreign Office seems to have laboured hardest, and seems to have enjoyed the work, and to have considered everything penned therein as unanswerable and sacred as the Koran, which they had volunteered to defend against all assailants. Stratford and Seymour had henceforward their full swing. Whether for browbeating or bothering a Russian Emperor or Chancellor, or for counselling and encouraging a Turkish Divan, preparatory to turning them into *honest* Christians like themselves, and misleading and irritating a Coalition British Cabinet, certainly no better working diplomatists could have been chosen. They were cordially aided by our "gallant" ally France. Every one of them conceived (the only proof of their sanity) that Russia, after the failure of her ambassador at Constantinople, would have instantly done what France and England would have done had they been in her situation, namely, commenced hostilities in every quarter which she might consider most convenient and advisable. This course has always been the custom followed and adopted by all nations, especially by such great and civilized nations as France and England. Considering such a result as certain, the allies, as they call themselves, set all their wits to work to retard or prevent it.

Lord Stratford eagerly began the further embroilment. He had, on the 19th May,¹ asserted, "that it was now the business of Prince Menchikoff to paint, in imposing colours," "the observations of resentment" and "their contingent ends" which he had created. In short, he was to be made the scapegoat for all the errors, to give them

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 22d, 1853, Part I. p. 235.

no harsher name, of all the other parties. The voluminous diplomatic correspondence which, for a time, inundated and fevered Europe, was grounded in quibbling about the right acquired by Russia under the treaty of Kainardji, some denying that it conferred any right of "supervision and remonstrance" whatever, and that the object of Menchikoff's mission was, as they had all along been distinctly informed by the Russian Government, the Holy Places only. Both these assertions have already been shown to be groundless.

Of the reckless nature of the statements made by prejudiced diplomats, the following, made by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, comes properly to be noticed in this place as not the least remarkable. The dispute between Russia and Turkey "had," he says (No. 234¹), "been settled to the *apparent* satisfaction of those concerned." Mark the quibble and concealment that lies under the word "*apparent*." Now no one knew better than his Lordship, that the dispute with Russia had not been settled, because the guarantee and "solemn national engagement" as regarded the future never had been given, and was always refused, notwithstanding that all the great powers of Europe then acknowledged that it was due and should be given. Had it been given, there would have been no war. In No. 184, by and on the very eve of Prince Menchikoff's leaving Constantinople, his Lordship states, that at an urgent interview he had with the Turkish ministers, he "*reminded* them of the *guarantee* required by Prince Menchikoff, and strongly recommended, that if the guarantee was inadmissible, a substitute should be found in a frank and comprehensive exercise of the Sultan's authority." He thus admits that what was required had not been given, and, consequently, that the dispute was *not* settled. But mark *his* guarantee, and how he means to escape from the position in which the obstinacy and injustice on the part of the Turks, by his advice, had plunged themselves into. He calls upon, or commands the Sultan to use his "authority in the promulgation of a firman, securing both the *spiritual and temporal* privileges of all the Porte's tributary subjects; and by way of *further security*, communicate it *officially* to the *five great powers of Christendom*!" What a subterfuge! What duplicity and dishonesty! Russia, the acknowledged offended power, instead of meeting reparation, is to be placed as the culprit before the tribunal of Europe, who seeks to screen the delinquent, and to wrest, not only the justice due to Russia from her, but to leave it in the power of the domineering states of Western Europe to declare that all the treaties which had been made between Russia and Turkey for upwards

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 9th, 1853, Part I. p. 176.

of eighty years were of no validity, and to be regulated in future as two powers in Europe considered it their interest! These powers were content, in furtherance of their ambitious views, to take the simple word of the Sultan as redress in a matter in which they were not principals, nor immediately interested, in order to share between them the influence and the power which legitimately and justly belonged to Russia. How kind! France readily renounced all claim to her former protectorate in favour of this new plan, which would give her a right larger than what she before enjoyed, and which would ultimately, according to her calculations, make her the chief ruler of Turkey. In No. 183, Part I. p. 175, May 19th, 1853, Lord Cowley tells us that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was satisfied with the arrangement about the Jerusalem affairs, and that La Cour was instructed "neither to protest nor to make reserves" against it, as he had previously been directed to do. At the same time, he could *not agree* to the principle, that it was right that Russia should have the *status quo* maintained at that place.

It was at this period that Lord Stratford and his colleagues, in their plan to overthrow Russian right established by treaty—which they found to be unassailable, or at that moment dangerous to propound—and Russian influence on the score of religion, that Lord Stratford (see pages 155, 156, April 20th) stated the principle, that the question should be made a European question, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys had also done. In No. 176, p. 163, May 16th, Lord Clarendon tells us, that "religious influence" gives Russia "*political power*" in Turkey, consequently the allies must by means of religion, "in some way acquire all, or at least the preponderance of political power" there, by similar means; and as France and Austria are Papal, and England ruled by a coalition, being bound to consider this faith as entitled to equality, at the least there will be no great difficulty, with the aid of Islamism, to secure the object, namely, the subversion of the Greek Church in Turkey, and which will give us the supreme command in Turkey. This is the natural consequence of the course counselled to be adopted, though probably Downing Street did not at the time see it. But Lord Clarendon goes further in reference to Russia, when in his official circular, (No. 195, p. 202, May 31st,) he asserts that Russia sought that she "should enjoy the *exclusive* right of intervening for the effectual protection of all the members of the Greek Church," &c. Now, there is not one passage throughout the whole correspondence where such words or proposition, as "*exclusive right*," is used or even insinuated. She sought only to retain that which she possessed; and

the undeniable fact that she never interfered or complained at the very frequent and just remonstrances of Lord Stratford against the cruelties and oppressions committed upon the Greek Christians, or rather all Christians throughout the Ottoman empire, is an invincible proof that she sought nothing *exclusive* in such matters, and, that his Lordship is wholly wrong, in bringing such an unjust, and at this moment, irritating but claptrap charge against her. It was specially unworthy the character of a British minister.

The fact is that Russia never did any more, or sought to do any more, in this matter, than what England and every Christian power in Europe, they admit, had done and would continue to do. Lord Stratford's interference in such matters, and that too often justly called for, is well known. Nor did he act in this capacity as a private individual, but as the representative of the British Government and the British nation. Lord Palmerston tells us this explicitly in the House of Commons, July 20th, in 1846, when Sir Stratford Canning was sent back to Constantinople by him: "He said he would go to Constantinople *but on one condition*—that he should be at liberty to exert *all his influence, as the ambassador of England*, to induce the Turkish Government to go on in her system of internal reform, and finally to place the Christians and Mahommedans *on equal footing*. I closed with his offer, saying I was only too happy to have the benefit of his services, and to possess so trustworthy and deserving a minister." This being his object and commission in 1846, it may readily be supposed that, on his return in 1853, he was entrusted with the same powers, if not greater, (the circumstances of the case demanding more extensive powers,) than what he held in 1846. The further consideration of the subject will show us, and from his own communications, how little he has effected in Turkey. Yet, though acting in the manner he did, as the organ of the British Government, Russia made no complaints against him or his proceedings; and therefore her protectorate, as it is called, was not "*exclusive*." Moreover, it may be asked, Why should Russia be condemned for doing that for her co-religionists and next neighbours, which England and France, who have no immediate neighbourhood with her, or affinity in point of religion, have been praised and commended for attending to?

In his very valorous letter, (No. 234, May 22d, 1853, Part I. p. 235,) Lord Stratford calls upon Lord Clarendon for immediate hostilities—for such, amidst his high-sounding orientalisms, is clearly his meaning:—"Far from blaming the *reservation*" of the Turks, "I cannot conceal from your Lordship that I approve and admire it, even while lamenting the necessity, and deprecating the consequences." "If the

Porte be right in its *apprehensions* and *resistance*, her Majesty's Government will, no doubt, employ their available means for the purpose of rescuing it from an imminent danger." In the most ungenerous manner, he denounces the intentions of Russia towards Turkey to be "to exclude all other influence, and to secure the means of hastening the downfall of this empire, at least of obstructing its improvement,¹ and settling its future destinies for the profit and advantage of Russia, whenever a propitious juncture should arrive." "Those objections," he continues, "to the extension of a legalised *influence* over the *millions* who profess the Greek religion in Turkey, ought by no means to exempt the Ottoman Government from the duty of *securing* to the Greeks, and indeed to their tributary subjects in general, the full and free exercise of their religious worship," &c.

It has been already stated and shown, and which will appear in a still stronger light hereafter, that the views and intentions of Russia were the reverse in everything to what is here assumed ; and, moreover, that Lord Stratford was well acquainted with the facts. But then, had these been allowed to take their course, Lord Stratford would not have had the high honour—some would account it degradation—of following, and bringing his country to follow, "*in the wake of the Turks*" (his own words), as both have done ; nor of leaving "millions of Greek Christians who dwell in the Ottoman territory, formerly the rightful inheritance of their forefathers, under the sceptre of the vindictive and ignorant Mussulman !"

"What," says Lord Stratford, with a triumphant air, "what would be thought in Europe, if France or Austria were to demand a guarantee from Great Britain for the protection and good treatment of the Roman Catholic priesthood in Ireland ? What if her Majesty's Government were to interfere in a similar manner on behalf of the Protestants in France ?" &c. Can muddy-headed confusion go further ? If Protestants in France and Roman Catholics in Ireland were treated as Christians in Turkey are treated—were they kept a separate and degraded race—were all their lands seized and appropriated to their own use by the barbarous conqueror and oppressor—were neither life, liberty, nor property safe for one moment—were their evidence not admitted in a court of justice against the murdering oppressor, which is the real state of affairs with regard to Christians in Turkey—and had the powers alluded to a right by treaty to remonstrate and call for redress by their government for such enormities, then

¹ This is exactly the grounds taken by Lord John Russell, and statements made by him, in a late debate in the House of Commons. He must be very silly indeed who can believe that improvement in Turkey, with Mahommedanism the dictator, is possible or practicable.

France, Austria, and England, as the case might be, would be perfectly justified in interfering, and, if not listened to, to prevent by force the oppressor. There is no analogy whatever in the cases adduced by his Lordship. It is melancholy to think that such perversity should exist, or be permitted to guide or influence the counsels of this country.

Well, so far Menchikoff has done good. Without him we should never have heard of this claptrap; for claptrap it is, while it acknowledges that *such concessions* and reforms were necessary, and remained at that time undone. At last a firman, addressed to the Greek Patriarch, appeared, (No. 258,¹) announcing to him "that the immunities and privileges granted to the Greek churches and convents in my dominions, with the lands and *real property*² dependent thereon, or other places consecrated for religious purposes, and other kinds of oratories, —that the immunities and rights which peculiarly appertain to the Greek clergy,—and, in a word, that the privileges and concessions of that kind which are inserted in the *Berats*, containing the conditions relating to the Patriarchs and Bishops,—be for ever maintained," &c. A similar instrument was, we are told, to be issued "to the heads of the Armenian, Catholic, Protestant, and Israelite communities," and "that all those documents were to be communicated to the representatives of the friendly powers; and the several privileges and immunities, which are recorded more at length in ancient patents or commissions, will be repeated in connexion with the firmans." If any more or all such were at this time issued, no sight of them is to be found amongst the papers that have been published; and when we come to consider the real state of Turkey, we will see, from Lord Stratford's own letters, that they had never been heard of, and that they were, and could only have been, intended as a deception and snare.

The fact is, this is the shuffling way that the Turks always pursue; their religion teaches them to sacrifice everything for it. "When thou canst not conquer thine enemy by force, attack him by cunning," says their legislator. When in danger, any promises that they make in order to escape from it for the moment, are not considered binding, but may, for the sake of maintaining or extending their faith, be set aside whenever an opportunity offers to enable them to do so with safety.

Conscious of the mischief that had been created, and in which he knew that he had had the principal share, Lord Stratford, No. 240,³

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 30th, 1853, p. 270.

² These two words show the English hand that drew up the document.

³ Stratford to Seymour, May 23d, 1853, p. 253.

addressed his fellow-labourer, Sir H. Seymour, in a remarkable style, and differing much from his communication to Lord Clarendon at the same time and on the same subject. This letter to Seymour was penned the second day after Prince Menchikoff had quitted Constantinople, and was intended to vindicate his own peaceable and disinterested conduct, and to urge Sir Hugh to exert himself to prevent the Russian Government from doing that which he conceived they would do, and what they would have been justified if they had done. He says:—

“I shall deem myself sufficiently fortunate, if my letter arrives in time to give you a *just* notion of the causes of his failure, before any mistaken or hasty resolution be adopted by the Russian Cabinet in consequence of that disappointment. I am the more desirous of bringing the case to your knowledge in its true colours, because it has come round to me that I am *suspected* of having mainly contributed to the ambassador’s *discomfiture*.”

He then repeats the old story that no one knew of the extent of Prince Menchikoff’s demands,—no, not at Vienna,—which demands,

“When finally made known to the Turkish ministers, were *strictly confined to them*, as matters not to be divulged with impunity to any third party. *Though I was not long in obtaining access to the secret*, I did not the less endeavour to promote an early and amicable adjustment of what belonged more particularly to the Holy Places; and I had the good fortune to receive an acknowledgment of my friendly offices from Prince Menchikoff himself. The *confidential* interviews which took place between us, afforded me in *due time* an *opportunity*, of which I availed myself, to apprise his Excellency of the difficulties which I *foresaw* that he would encounter, whenever he entered upon the ground of the Russian protection and Greek privileges.” “The *confidential* letter subsequently addressed by me to the Russian ambassador,” was “less with any hope of inducing him to alter his views, than for the purpose of undeceiving him as to the reliance, which I was privately told that he persisted, however strangely, in placing on my cooperation.”

Of the Turks he adds:—

“A government exposing itself courageously to peril on the strength of their own convictions, and supported by such a mass of concurrent opinion, is surely entitled to respect, *notwithstanding its numerous errors and prejudices*.”

Nations can never enjoy peace while diplomatists and statesmen are insincere or dishonest. No Jesuit could have confused or misled more adroitly. The “*confidential letter*” was written after Prince Menchikoff had decided to leave Constantinople. Here it is unblushingly confessed that he knew the whole of Prince Menchikoff’s demands from the Turkish ministers, while it has been previously shown from Lord

Stratford's own correspondence, that Prince Menchikoff informed both them and him from the outset what the whole of those demands were, and also consulted the latter about them. The settlement between France and Russia was one thing ; the settlement between Russia and Turkey was another. Stratford attempts to confound them, and to make them out one. It was for the *former* that he received the Prince's thanks. We shall by-and-by see more about these generous Turks, and this too upon Lord Stratford's authority. They must be weak-minded and credulous indeed, who can believe that it was not his Lordship's advice that guided and directed the Turks. He says he advised the course they adopted. They knew a French fleet was at Salamis at their command, and they also knew that his Lordship had the British fleet at his and their service at a moment's notice. But Russia was not deceived.

On the 31st of May, Lord Clarendon (No. 194¹,—attention to dates is now very important) directed the British fleet at Malta to proceed to Besika Bay, to support Turkey against Russia ; the British Government conceiving no doubt that Russia would, after the customary course pursued by civilized nations, declare war and attack Turkey. Hence the fleets were directed to be within hail of Constantinople ; the French Government, at the same time, directing their fleet to proceed from Salamis to the same place. "The danger which threatens the Porte," says Lord Clarendon, "may be so imminent, that it appears indispensable to take measures for the protection of the Sultan, and to aid his Highness in repelling any attack that may be made upon his territory." Here there is no mistaking the object, nor misunderstanding the *menace*. From the moment that the fleet moved to any point for the purpose mentioned, the peace that had existed between England and Russia was broken by the former. And (in No. 203²) Lord Stratford privately tells the Sultan : "In the event of imminent danger, I was instructed to request the commander of her Majesty's FORCES in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness."

On the 31st May (No. 234³) Count Nesselrode addressed Reschid Pasha a solemn and decided note, stating his great regret at the failure of Prince Menchikoff's mission. He states :—

"Prince Menchikoff was compelled to come to the determination which the Emperor learns with pain, but which his Majesty cannot do otherwise than entirely approve."—"Therefore, in addressing this letter to your Excellency

¹ Clarendon to Stratford, May 31st, 1853, p. 199.

² Stratford to Clarendon, May 10th, 1853, p. 213.¹

³ Inclosure, Nesselrode to Reschid Pasha, May 31st, 1853, p. 246.

I have no other object than to enable you, while it is still in your power, to render your sovereign a most important service. Lay once more, Sir, before his Highness the true situation of affairs ; the moderation and the justice of the demands of Russia ; the very serious offence offered to the Emperor, by opposing to his intentions, always so friendly and so generous, a distrust for which there is no cause, and refusals for which there is no excuse. His Majesty's dignity, the interest of his empire, the voice of his conscience, will not allow him to tolerate such conduct in return for that which he has always shown, and is still desirous to show, to Turkey. He must endeavour to obtain redress for it, and to *guard himself against a recurrence of it for the future*. Within a few weeks, his troops will receive orders to pass the frontiers of the empire, not in order to make war upon the Sultan—a war which it is repugnant to his Majesty to undertake against a sovereign whom he has always had pleasure in looking upon as a sincere ally, and as a well-disposed neighbour, but in order that he may possess material guarantees until such time as the Ottoman Government, returning to more just sentiments, shall give to Russia the *moral securities* which she has in vain demanded for two years by her representatives at Constantinople, and, latterly, by her ambassador.”

He concludes by calling upon him to

“Sign the draft note which Prince Menchikoff drew up before his departure, and which he submitted to you, and is still in your hands,” and “to forward it *as it stands*, within a week at the latest, to our ambassador at Odessa, where he will still be.”

Till the result of this communication was received at St. Petersburg, no further steps were to be taken by Russia.

That communication arrived in England on the 8th or 9th of June, and with it an able Russian communication (No. 234¹) from Nesselrode to Brunnow, from which I select the following important passages :

COUNT NESSELRODE to BARON BRUNNOW, *communicated to the EARL OF CLARENDON by BARON BRUNNOW, June 8th.*

“St. Petersburg, ^{May 20th,} June 1st, 1853.

“M. LE BARON,—Prince Menchikoff had previously sent to you the two firmans more especially relating to the Holy Places—had communicated to you the modifications introduced into the first draft of Convention, intended to guarantee us against a recurrence of the difficulties which those firmans have just removed—and had acquainted you with the vehement opposition which our demands met with, principally on the part of the English ambassador.” * * * *

“Several clauses of that Sened, especially those which related to the Patriarchs, Metropolitans, and Bishops of the Eastern Church, having also

¹ Nesselrode to Brunnow, June 1st, 1853, p. 241.

given rise to objections, Prince Menchikoff took upon himself to suppress those clauses entirely. Finally, at the last moment, and when the negotiation was already broken off officially, the Porte persisting in refusing any bilateral act whatever; our ambassador went so far as to declare that he would be satisfied with an engagement in the form of an official note, such as that of which he forwarded a copy to your Excellency. All these concessions were, in their turn, found of no avail. A mistrust, as unjust as it was offensive to the Emperor's feelings, obstinately rejected them; so that after several months of fruitless negotiations, although our more urgent grievances may have been redressed for the time, they still refuse us the formal and positive guarantee against *the recurrence of similar acts for the future*, which we had considered as the indispensable reparation for the breach of faith of which we have had to complain, and without which guarantee the new firmans have no more real value than the one, the tenor and execution of which we have lately seen disregarded, notwithstanding the solemn promises of the Sultan.

"The time has therefore arrived when, in spite of the most pacific intentions, the Emperor, out of regard for his own dignity, and in the fulfilment of his duty to Russia, finds himself obliged to adopt towards Turkey a line of policy different from that which he would willingly have continued to follow.

"He now hastens to lay before her Britannic Majesty's Ministers, unreservedly, the further measures which he is about to take in the present crisis, which has been brought about by a blind obstinacy."

* * * *

"He will order his troops to occupy the Principalities, which he will retain as a deposit until he has obtained the satisfaction above-mentioned.

"It is not without extreme and profound regret, that the Emperor finds himself forced into adopting such a measure. Even whilst adopting it, he still intends to remain faithful to the fundamental principle of his policy, that of not wishing to subvert the Ottoman empire. The Emperor, then, will not seek any aggrandisement of territory, although occupying, for a time, a portion of the Porte's possessions. He will avoid favouring, knowingly and voluntarily, any attempt at insurrection among the Christian populations. He only wishes to attain the end, which he will have been deliberately forced into seeking by other means than those which he has employed without success."

"In acting as he has done, and as he intends to do if he is not compelled, the Emperor considers that he has remained faithful to the declarations made by him to the English Government."

* * * *

"It appeared satisfied with our conciliatory intentions. It frankly assisted us at Paris, in that delicate part of the question of the Holy Places which was to be arranged with France. When the latter power, on the strength of lying rumours current in Constantinople, sent her fleet into the Greek waters, the English squadron at Malta did not move. Unhappily, the ambassador of England at Constantinople was animated by

different feelings towards us. An incurable mistrust, a vehement activity, have characterised the whole of his conduct during the latter part of the negotiation. Even after the conversion of the project of Convention into a simple Sened,—even after the important modifications introduced into the latter by the suppression of the article referring to the Patriarchs,—he persisted in refusing us *any kind of guarantee* whatever for the future. We are aware of the efforts which he employed with the Sultan, and also with the members of his council, to encourage him to resistance, by seeking to persuade him that our menaces would not go beyond the limits of a moral pressure, *by promising him the support and the sympathies of Europe, if he granted to his subjects equality in the eye of the law*, and privileges more in accordance with the liberal habits of the West. Finally, at the last moment, when Prince Menchikoff had consented to abandon even the modified Sened, and to content himself with a note,—when Reschid Pasha himself, struck with the dangers which the departure of our legation might entail upon the Porte, *earnestly conjured the British ambassador not to oppose the acceptance of the note* drawn up by Prince Menchikoff,—Lord Redcliffe prevented its acceptance, by declaring that the note was equivalent to a treaty, and was inadmissible.

“ We appeal from this opinion, originating in passion, to the reason and impartiality of the British Government itself.

“ Is it merely a question of principle ? But in principle such a transaction would be no more derogatory to the rights and independence of the sovereign of Turkey, than the capitulations or treaties which the Ottoman Porte has concluded with France and Austria. In principle, have not we ourselves, by our treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, obtained the right of watching over the interests of our coreligionists in the Turkish provinces ? The settlement, by treaty, of one or more ecclesiastical affairs,—a guarantee, likewise secured by treaty, in favour of the interests of a foreign communion, are no new things,—are in no respect unusual in the relations between one power and another. History furnishes us with more than one instance which we might cite in support of this. Thus, among other instances, in Austria,—we will only speak of a great state, whose power and full independence will certainly not be denied by any one,—the civil position of the Protestants originated in treaties concluded in their favour by the princes of Germany, who embraced the Reformation and took it under their guarantee, without such stipulations having ever been considered as derogatory, in their principle, to the Emperor's rights of sovereignty. If such covenants could be made with Christian states without compromising their dignity, *à fortiori* may they be entered into with a Mussulman government,—with a government especially under which the Christians have so often seen, not only their religious immunities, but their property, and even their lives, menaced.”

* * * *

“ Let the English Government permit us to tell them, with all frankness, that in thus troubling themselves so much about the inexpediency of a Convention, as giving to Russia rights of interference which she did not

possess, they are creating a bugbear for themselves, and contending against a phantom. Is it seriously supposed that we stand in need of such an act in order to interfere in Turkey in favour of the Orthodox Greeks, if they should be threatened in their rights, their interests, their properties, or their lives? Did we possess such an act when, at the period of the Greek Revolution, we broke off our relations with the Porte, in consequence of the persecutions carried on against the Orthodox faith? Has the absence of such a Convention prevented England, and France herself, from interfering in Turkey whenever the principles of religious toleration appeared to them to be disregarded by the Ottoman Government?

"There is one fact which all the precautions and suspicions of diplomacy will never be able to gainsay. It is the fact of the sympathy, and of the community of interests, which attach our population of fifty millions of the Orthodox to the twelve millions and more which compose the majority of the Sultan's subjects. However distressing this fact may be to those whom our influence alarms, it is still not the less a fact. In all likelihood, we shall not be required to renounce that influence in order to dispel exaggerated alarms. Even in the impossible supposition that we should wish to do so, we could not. All the opposition arrayed against this fact—all the marked affectation of precautions against it—all the endeavours to force the Porte to brave us out, in order to avert the eventual consequences of idle suppositions—only serve to place the matter in a still clearer light before the eyes of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and proportionately to weaken in their minds the moral authority of the latter; and instead of manifesting towards us, on that account, a distrust as unfounded as it is offensive, it would be better to trust to the Emperor's moderation the care of not abusing this influence.

"But, moreover, that is no longer the question. At present there is no longer any question of a bilateral Convention, or even of a *Sened*, but of a simple note. The rejection of that note, if we were to tolerate it, would be for us a moral defeat, to which we cannot submit; and having now, by concession after concession, reached the extreme limits to which a spirit of conciliation can extend, we are bound in honour to abide by this last demand. Upon its unqualified acceptance depend the measures to be adopted by us."

The reasoning here advanced, and the statements here made, cannot be gainsayed. Every page of the correspondence attests its accuracy as to facts. But "the policy of suspicion, neither wise nor safe," was fast ripening into fruit. They who suspect unreasonably and unjustly, cannot feel surprise if their conduct and proceedings create suspicion in return; and thus evils that might have been avoided by confidence and plain dealing, are always dangerously increased.

In adopting the course which she took, namely, entering the Principalities, it is evident that Russia adopted the mildest mode to gain her object. Lord Stratford is compelled to acknowledge this. In No. 308¹

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, June 20th, 1853, p. 317.

he says, "It is notorious that the Principalities are placed under circumstances of a *special* character with reference to the neighbouring powers; and the consequences of a foreign military occupation *within these limits* are, in practice, by no means so likely to disturb the interests of the Porte, as if a similar act of aggression were committed against those parts of the empire which are directly administered by this Government. It may be added that, in a military point of view, resistance could not be offered to Russia in that quarter, under present circumstances, with any prospect of success."—"And therefore the Porte, I conceive, may defer the moment of actual and reciprocal hostilities without discredit or increase of risk, until an opportunity is afforded for learning the sentiments entertained by her Majesty's Government, as well as by that of France." In reference to this subject, the *Times* journal made, at the time, the following very pertinent observations:—

"The Principalities," says the *Times*, July 8th, 1853, "are already virtually dissevered from Turkey." The population are wholly Greek Christians. "The Principalities," says the *Times*, July 11th, "are not now an integral part of the Turkish empire." Again, *Times*, June 21st, "Hence their condition is extremely distinct, for their Christian administration by native princes or hospodars, and with a deliberative assembly of Boyards (which was secured by the act of 1849), *take them altogether* out of the proper dominions of the Ottoman empire; and it was distinctly contended by Mr. Braham, their organ in this country, when he addressed Lord Palmerston in 1849, that they did not form integral parts of Turkey, though subject to her supremacy." The Turks are next denounced, and represented as lost by their precipitation and heartless violence against peace. In looking at the dates, it will be readily seen that the articles and opinions of the *Times* were in accordance with the views of Government at the time, and proves also the quarter whence that journal receives, at times, very important information. Hence these articles in it are referred to as satisfactory authority.

Lord Clarendon, as if awaking from a sound sleep, proceeds under a great alarm (No. 195¹) to prove, from selecting particular parts of despatches, and omitting others, that he was taught to believe that, by every one of his correspondents, Prince Menchikoff's mission related entirely to the Holy Places, and a *special engagement* connected with them. In this he occupies five folio pages, which never touch the main point (Drouyn de Lhuys followed in the same strain), and, consequently, go for nothing in the dispute: having expended his anger against Russia in a way in which, had he been correct, he lowered his

¹ Clarendon to Seymour, May 31st, 1853, p. 200.

country by uttering one peaceable word unto her. But a week's reflection brought him to think differently. In No. 230,¹ he instructs Sir H. Seymour to say at St. Petersburg thus: "The Emperor cannot doubt the *warm feelings of friendship* towards himself entertained by our gracious sovereign; and his Imperial Majesty must also be aware that it is alike the duty and the desire of her Majesty's Government to maintain *the most cordial relations with Russia*, feeling how essential such relations are to the peace of Europe, and viewing, as they do, with alarm and abhorrence, whatever may tend to the interruption of that peace." "They do not believe that the door will be finally closed against an arrangement which, to them, appears to be still practicable; and they venture, therefore, to hope, that the demands of Russia may be confined to the recapitulation of *existing treaties* and their due fulfilment" (this, in fact, was really all that was required), "but without seeking to extend that influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte, *that Russia must always and necessarily exercise.*" But how was this settlement to be effected if Russia was wholly wrong; and when, as his Lordship informs us (No. 226²), "that her Majesty's Government cannot but approve of the rejection, by Turkey, of Prince Menchikoff's proposals, which were incompatible with Turkish independence?"

Continuing in his warlike humour, Lord Clarendon (No. 251³) makes the following startling announcements:—"Under the *plea* of confirming ancient treaties, further demands were put forward by the Russian ambassador, involving a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, not only as regards the spiritual, *but also the civil rights and immunities of its members.* Every concession that could be made was offered by the Turkish Government, who, throughout these trying negotiations, displayed a most moderate and conciliatory spirit."—"Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, entirely approved the *advice given* by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte. In these views and opinions there is a complete agreement between her Majesty's Government and the French Government; and the English and French fleets, which have been ordered to approach the Dardanelles, will act in concert under the orders of the respective ambassadors of the two countries." In no part of the correspondence is there the slightest trace of Russia urging the demand upon Turkey—the power, or any power, over the "*civil rights and immunities*" of the Greek Christians. The statement is therefore of a piece with other extraordinary and unfounded averments, which the papers before us

¹ Clarendon to Seymour, June 8th, 1853, p. 233.

² Clarendon to Bloomfield, June 7th, 1853, p. 229.

³ Circular to her Majesty's Ministers abroad, June 13th, 1853, p. 264.

contain. It was, in fact, France and England that started at the *eleventh hour* the proposal to include "civil rights!"

That Russia was not wrong in the principle of her demands, is proven by the anxiety which England and other powers evinced to bring matters to a peaceful termination. For this purpose, Lord Clarendon especially applies to Austria for her good offices. In No. 252,¹ he states: "The policy of England was essentially pacific; and that her Majesty's Government, so far from entertaining any hostile feeling towards Russia, made every allowance for the difficulty in which the Emperor found himself placed."—"His position was one of singular embarrassment, from which it would be *difficult for him to recede with honour, or to advance without endangering the general peace*, which, in common with every other sovereign of Europe, it was his duty and his interest to maintain."—"It is the earnest desire of her Majesty's Government, that in the event of the Porte *again refusing* to comply with the demands of Russia, negotiation should again be resorted to, and the friendly intervention of other powers should be accepted." Austria was fixed upon as the mediator, as the most likely, for various reasons, to be successful, because, says his Lordship, "if the Russian army proceeded beyond the Principalities, and other provinces of Turkey were invaded, a *general rising* of the Christian population would probably ensue,—*not in favour of Russia*, nor in support of the Sultan, but for their own independence; and it would be needless to add that such a revolt would not be long in extending itself to the Danubian provinces of Austria; but it would be for the Austrian Government to judge of the effect it might produce on *Hungary and in Italy*, and the encouragement it might give to the promoters of disorder throughout Europe, whom Austria has reason to fear, and who even now would appear to think the moment is at hand for the realization of their projects." In such a too probable state of things, what are we to think of those statesmen who would face and advance such dangers simply to humour the pride of tyrannical Mahommedans! It is clear from the whole tenor of this despatch, that it was Turkey, and not Russia, that ought first to have been commanded, if the four powers at all interfered, to listen to reason; while it is at the same time perfectly clear that it was their own interest and safety, and not the safety of Turkey, that occupied all their thoughts, and guided all their proceedings.

Lord Clarendon's pugnacious feelings again however return; and Baron Brunnov's pointed memorandum, instead of enlightening, makes him more decidedly a Turk, while he adds: "It must be quite

¹ Clarendon to Stratford, June 14th, 1853, p. 265.

unnecessary for me to observe that her Majesty's Government pretend not to interfere with the *just claim of Russia* upon the Porte, nor to *dispute her right rigidly* to enforce the fulfilment of treaties ; but they desire that the independence of Turkey may be maintained," &c. Well, if Turkey refuses, as she did do, to fulfil the treaties, and Russia is compelled to enforce them, who is to blame if, during such enforcement, the power of Turkey is weakened ? Not Russia, certainly.

Here it is necessary to advert to the fleets. It was, as we have seen, on the 31st of May that Lord Clarendon ordered the British fleet to leave Malta. The Admiralty order left London on the 2d of June (see No. 198, p. 210). The directions for the French fleet to proceed to Besika Bay, left Paris on the 4th or 5th of June (see No. 220, p. 225). The British fleet reached Besika Bay on the 13th of June, and was heard of at Constantinople on the 16th of June. At Besika Bay it was soon after joined by the French fleet. The Russian messenger, bearing the rejection by the Turkish Government of Count Nesselrode's proposition of the 31st May, left Constantinople on the 18th June ; and the known arrival of the fleets no doubt influenced—and *did influence*—the Ottoman Government in that decision. In reference to the movement and advance of the Russian troops beyond their own territories, Sir H. Seymour tells us, (No. 271,¹) " I have the satisfaction of acquainting your Lordship, upon the authority of the Chancellor, that the final resolution of the Imperial Cabinet as to the occupation of the Principalities *will be taken only* upon the answer of the Porte to the last intimation being known at St. Petersburg." That order was not therefore given till the return of the messenger from Constantinople with the refusal of the demand made. It was dated the 27th of June, (No. 316,²) and the troops did not cross the Pruth till the 4th and 7th of July. Consequently the fleets were ordered to Besika Bay one month before it was, or could be, known that the troops would be directed to advance, and more before the troops crossed the Pruth ; nor would they have moved at all had the Ottoman Government acceded to the last demand of Russia, or even shown a disposition to have done so.

Simultaneously with his message to Reschid Pasha of the 31st of May, Count Nesselrode issued a most important circular (No. 270³) to the Russian ministers in all parts of the world. It placed all the parts of the question to the date of it in a clear and visible light. My limits compel me to restrict the notice of it to the following

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, June 14th, 1853, p. 288.

² Seymour to Clarendon, June 28th, 1853, p. 329.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, June 12th, 1853, p. 284, Inclosure, June 11th.

extracts. The facts stated, the argument upon the treaty of Kainardji, and that grounded upon the indisputable fact that Russia did not take advantage of the disturbed state of all Europe a few years before (1848) to subdue Turkey, if she really meditated to do so, appears to be irresistible, and clearly shows to everything but prejudice, suspicion, and hostility the most inveterate, that she never had any such intention.

Inclosure in No. 270.—Extract from the “ Journal de Saint Pétersbourg.”
Circulaire.

“ St. Petersburg, May 30th, 1853.

“ I deem it superfluous to inform you, that there is not a word of truth in the pretensions attributed to us by the newspapers, of requiring either a fresh aggrandisement of territory, or a more advantageous settlement of our Asiatic frontier, or the right of nomination or revocation of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, or, in fine, any other religious protectorate whatever which should go beyond that which we traditionally exercise, in fact and by right, in Turkey, in virtue of our former treaties. You are sufficiently acquainted with the policy of the Emperor to know that his Majesty does not desire the ruin and the destruction of the Ottoman empire, which he has himself on *two occasions preserved!* that, on the contrary, he has always considered, and still considers, the actual state of things as the best possible combination which can be interposed between all the European interests, which would not fail to clash in the East if the opening should there present itself; and that, as regards the protection of the Russian-Greek religion in Turkey, we have need of no other rights for watching over its interests than those assured to us by our treaties, by our position, by the influence resulting from the religious sympathy which exists between fifty millions of Russians of the Greek Church, and the great majority of the Christian subjects of the Sultan; a secular influence, and one which is inevitable, because it rests on facts and not on words,—an influence which the Emperor found already established when he ascended the throne, and which he cannot renounce out of deference to the unjust suspicions which it excites, without abandoning the glorious inheritance of his august predecessors.

“ This will inform you how unfounded are all the reports which have been spread abroad on the subject of Prince Menchikoff’s mission, which has never had any other object than the settlement of the affair of the Holy Places.

“ It would be too long to recapitulate to you in detail the history of all the phases through which this affair has passed since the year 1850. We are conscious of not having been the first to raise this question. We were too well aware how pregnant it was of results for the peace of the East—perhaps even for the peace of the world. We have not ceased from its commencement, to call the serious attention of the great cabinets to the position in which it would place us, and to the serious contingencies which

might spring from it; and its continued development, by producing at length the present crisis, has but too well justified our sad anticipations."

After recapitulating some proceedings, the circular adds:—

"A firman containing the details of the arrangement was at the same time communicated to us. At the head of this firman an autograph *hatti-scherif* of the Sultan recognised and confirmed, in the most formal manner, the previous acts granted to the Greeks at different periods, renewed by Sultan Mahmoud, and confirmed by the present sovereign.

"Notwithstanding that this letter and this firman were conceived in a spirit and in terms which deviated in some degree from that strict *status quo* which we had always insisted upon maintaining; those documents having, however, appeared to the Emperor to satisfy up to a certain extent his just solicitude for the interests and immunities of the Greco-Russian religion at Jerusalem, a conciliatory desire induced his Majesty to accept them. He took note of them, so as to give them the value of a *solemn* and *definitive* transaction."—"You are aware that, unhappily, such has not been the case." * * *

"I should be led on too far were I to recount here all the acts of weakness, of tergiversation, of duplicity, which signalized the conduct of the Turkish authorities, when the question arose of carrying out the engagements entered into with us, and of proceeding at Jerusalem according to the customary forms, to the promulgation, enrolment, and execution of the firman. The Turkish commissioner dispatched for this purpose to the Holy City, according to the explicit assurance which our mission at Constantinople had received, when once upon the spot, dared to declare to our consul, who insisted on the firman being read and enrolled, that he had no knowledge of that instrument, and that no mention was made of it in his instructions. Although at a later period, on our representations, the firman was finally read and enrolled at Jerusalem, it was not so without restrictions injurious to the Eastern religion. But as regards the instrument itself, with the exception of the fulfilment of these mere formalities, the principal dispositions of it have been openly transgressed. The most flagrant infraction of it has been that of placing in the hands of the Latin Patriarch the key of the principal door of the Church of Bethlehem. This delivery of the key was contrary to the precise terms of the firman. It was a severe blow to the clergy and the whole population of the Russo-Greek rite, because, according to the received ideas in Palestine, the mere possession of the key seems to imply that of the entire Church. The Turkish Government thus demonstrated in the eyes of all, even against its own interest, the supremacy which it grants to a religion other than that to which the majority of its subjects subscribe.

"Such a disregard of the most positive promises given in the Sultan's letter to the Emperor,—so manifest a breach of faith, aggravated still more by the proceedings and derisive language of the counsellors of his Highness,—assuredly authorized our august master, wounded in his dignity, in

his friendly confidence, in his religion, and in the religious sentiments which he holds in common with his people, to demand at once some unequivocal satisfaction. His Majesty might have done so, if, as he is incessantly accused by an opinion altogether erroneous, he sought only a pretext for overthrowing the Ottoman empire. But he did not desire this. He preferred to obtain this satisfaction by means of a pacific negotiation. He strove once more to enlighten the sovereign of Turkey as to the wrongs he was inflicting upon us, as well as upon his own interests,—to appeal to his wisdom from the faults of his council; and it was to this end that he sent Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople.

“His mission had two objects, still relating to the affair of the Holy Places.

“1st, To negotiate, in lieu of the firman which had been annulled, a new arrangement, which, without depriving the Latins of what they had lately acquired (for we wished to avoid, by requiring this retractation, placing the Ottoman Porte precisely in the same false position towards France in which it stood towards ourselves), should at least explain those concessions, in such a manner as to take from them the appearance of a victory obtained over the Greco-Russian religion, and should reestablish, by means of some legitimate compensation, the equilibrium which had been destroyed at the expense of the latter.

“2d. To consolidate this arrangement by an authentic act, which should serve us at once for a reparation as to the past, and for a guarantee as to the future.

“As regards this first portion of the business of the mission of our Ambassador Extraordinary, very difficult and very embarrassing in itself, inasmuch as the question was to reconcile the reciprocal yet contradictory rights and interests of Russia and of France, we consider that we evinced an extreme spirit of conciliation, a disposition to which, it gives us pleasure to say, the French Government has on its part responded. After lengthy discussions, it at length produced its fruits, and the result of it was the framing of two new firmans, obtained without opposition from the ambassador of France.

“But, as I have said above, the question to be negotiated presented still another aspect. To obtain an arrangement was not all. Without an act which should render this valid, which should offer us security that the new firmans should be for the future carried out, and religiously observed in their principle and in their consequences, it is clear that these documents, after the flagrant violation of the one which had preceded them, would have no more real value than the latter in our eyes.” * *

“Prince Menchikoff was instructed to endeavour to obtain this, by means of a Convention which he was to sign with the Turkish Government. Of a treaty, properly so called, there has never been any question. An outcry has been raised against the form of this Convention, as being injurious in principle to the Sultan's rights of sovereignty; as, in point of fact, conferring upon us, in the name of religion, a right of permanent interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. It appears to us that this is but creating a

phantom, and prepossessing the mind with fears for which the foundation is more specious than real.

"In principle, such a Convention, or even treaty, would present nothing unusual ; and we do not understand in what they would be more dangerous to the rights of the sovereign and independent government of the Sultan, than the capitulations or other acts which France and Austria already possess in Turkey. For, as regards the mere principle, that is to say, as far as regards the independence of the Sultan, it is of little moment whether an act applies to a larger or to a smaller number of his subjects, in whose favour a right of foreign protection might be exercised. The guarantee by treaty, secured in another state to the interests of a foreign communion, has been customary from time immemorial. At the period of the Reformation, for example, states, even great Catholic states, concluded with others treaties, or conventions, by which they guaranteed to the Protestant communion within their dominions certain privileges, franchises, and immunities ; so that, even at the present time, the civil position of that communion rests in such states upon those foundations, without the states which have given such a guarantee considering themselves on that account to be injured in their sovereign rights, or in their political independence. To a still greater degree, in principle, may such acts be concluded with a Mussulman state, whose Christian subjects have suffered, and do still so frequently suffer, not only in their privileges, but in their properties and in their lives.

"As a matter of fact, as far as concerns us, the thing already exists, and the form of a Convention which we have proposed would offer nothing new as regards religious protection. The treaty of Kainardji, by which the Porte engages constantly to protect in its states the Christian religion and churches, sufficiently implies as regards us a right of superintendence and of remonstrance. This right is laid down anew, and still more clearly specified in the treaty of Adrianople, which confirmed all our previous engagements. That of Kainardji dates from 1774. Here, then, we actually possess in writing for nearly eighty years, the very right which is now disputed with us, and the present mention of which is regarded as necessarily effecting quite a new revolution in our relations with the Ottoman Porte, by conferring on us real sovereignty over the immense majority of her subjects. Surely, during this lapse of time, if we had been disposed to abuse it, as the incurable suspicions of some will have it, the opportunity for doing so would not have been wanting, especially of late, when Europe was given up to anarchy, when the governments, powerless against internal discord, were absorbed or distracted by the revolutions in the West, and left in the East free scope for the ambitious views which are attributed to us. If we had the intentions which people choose to imagine, should we have waited to put them into execution until peace was reestablished in Europe ? Should we have so disposed of our forces as to offer to our neighbours their moral or material assistance ? Should we have laboured zealously, as we have done, to reconcile our allies, and to obviate everything which could injure the intimate union of the Powers ? On the contrary, we should have sought to perpetuate their misunderstandings. We

should have left the European governments to contend among themselves, or with their revolted populations, and, profiting by their embarrassment, we should have hastened without impediment to secure the object of what is constantly called our grasping policy. Now that social order is happily everywhere reestablished, and that the states, settled on their bases, can dispose more freely of their action as well as of their force, the moment would be strangely chosen for carrying out such a policy." * *

"Moreover, Sir, we have never made a Convention, properly so called, the condition *sine quâ non* of our reconciliation with the Porte. When the minute of the stipulations which he would have to negotiate was delivered in this form to Prince Menchikoff, on dispatching him to Constantinople, full and entire latitude was left him, not only to modify them as to their terms, but also to obtain them under whatever other form might be less objectionable to the susceptibilities of the Porte, or of foreign diplomacy. It is in accordance with this authority that our negotiator, having arrived on the spot, and having convinced himself of the obstacles which our draft of Convention would encounter, confined himself to requiring, under the title of *Sened*, an act more in conformity with Oriental usage, and less so with the solemn meaning which the word Convention ordinarily implies in the public law of Europe. Two comprehensive clauses of this first draft of *Sened*, by which we required, not, as has been pretended, the right of confirming the election of the Patriarch of Constantinople, but simply the maintenance of the religious immunities and temporal advantages accorded *ab antiquo* by the Porte to the four Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as to the Metropolitans, Bishops, and other spiritual heads of the Eastern Church, having given rise to serious objections, Prince Menchikoff consented entirely to suppress those two clauses.

"The result of this was a second draft of *Sened*, on the acceptance of which he long insisted. However, at the last moment, the Porte persisting in rejecting every kind of engagement which should assume any bilateral and synallagmatic form whatever, our ambassador, acting in the spirit of his instructions, went so far as to declare that if the Porte would accept and sign at once a note similar to that of which you will find the literal draft hereunto annexed, he would, on his side, consent to be satisfied with such a document, and to consider it as sufficient reparation and guarantee.

"This, then, was the real ultimatum insisted on by the Imperial Government at the moment when Prince Menchikoff left Constantinople; and it was in consequence of the delay of the Porte in accepting the document in question, that our negotiator at last weighed anchor for Odessa, and broke off our diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Government." * *

"After three consecutive months of laborious negotiation, having thus gone to the utmost limit of concessions, the Emperor considers himself obliged henceforth to insist peremptorily upon the plain and simple acceptance of the draft of note. Nevertheless, still influenced by the considerations of patience and of forbearance which have hitherto guided him, he grants the Porte a fresh delay of eight days to come to a decision; after

which, whatever effort it may cost his conciliatory desires, he will feel himself compelled to take measures for obtaining, by a more determined attitude, that satisfaction which he has hitherto in vain endeavoured to procure by pacific means.

"It is not without sincere and deep regret that he will adopt this attitude; but it has been sought by blindness and obstinacy to thrust him into a situation in which Russia, driven, so to speak, to the extreme limit of moderation, could not yield another step except at the cost of her political dignity." * * *

"This examination will suffice, we trust, to dispel the false reports circulated as to our ambitious pretensions, and to show that, if the rejection of the final means of accommodation which we propose for the solution of the difficulties which have been opposed to us in the affair of the Holy Places should lead to complications dangerous to peace, *it is not upon us that, in the eyes of the world, the responsibility ought to rest.*"

"A heavy responsibility," says Lord Stratford (No. 234¹), "must weigh upon that government which has unnecessarily brought matters to so dangerous a pass,"—yes, heavy indeed, on such a government and its agents; and history will most unquestionably throw his Lordship into that weight, when it examines his views and his schemes in reference to Turkey, exposes their errors, and records their failure. "There is nothing," says Sir H. Seymour (No. 244²) "in the demands which can fairly be made by Russia on the Porte, which, under temperate negotiation, or *impartial arbitration*, could not be obtained with honour to the Emperor, and without danger either to the independence of Turkey, or to the peace of Europe." So common sense and honesty, not acting under a "policy of suspicion," would say and believe. Austria, in this state of things, was referred to as the "*impartial*" arbitrator. She accepted the important and disagreeable office at the request of France and England, and with the cordial approbation of Russia. We shall shortly see how far she succeeded. In No. 274³ Lord Clarendon tells us that Count Buol, her minister, asked "for the cooperation of her Majesty's Government with the Turkish Government, and the intimation of our confidence in the Emperor of Russia, whose assurances that by the occupation of the Principalities he does not intend war nor territorial aggression," being satisfactory, he "expressed an earnest hope that the powers will abstain from all demonstrations that might excite the hopes of the Porte, and still further embarrass the Emperor of Russia with reference to the national and religious feelings of his people." With that "policy of suspicion" which seems constantly to haunt and

¹ Redcliffe to Clarendon, May 22d, 1853, p. 235.

² Seymour to Clarendon, June 9th, 1853, p. 275.

³ Clarendon to Westmorland, June 21st, 1853, p. 290.

to animate him, Lord Clarendon tells the Austrian ambassador that his communication from his Government "would be more satisfactory if it were less *one-sided*," in other words, to please us you should side with Turkey,—certainly not a very auspicious sign of *impartial* arbitration, or decided honest negotiation. The views of Austria at this time, in reference to the quarrel, are explicitly stated by Lord Westmorland (No. 272¹), "If war were to be the consequence of what may take place, the policy of Austria would be to acknowledge the right of each of the four Powers to act according to its own convictions: the Austrian Government will take no engagement either with Turkey to support her, or with Russia not to oppose her,—it will remain free to act according to its own judgment:" and, subsequently, he at different times stated that Austria was resolved to maintain a "strict neutrality," in the event of hostilities taking place.

Previous to the commencement of the Vienna note manufacture, some strange circumstances occurred, and statements were made in more quarters than one that are not unworthy of notice. Thus we find that Sir H. Seymour has either a very bad, or a very convenient memory: in No. 248,² that Count Nesselrode informed him that "the orders for the advance of the troops would be given by the general in command there" (Odessa), as soon as the messenger with the refusal of the Turks to accede to the note of the 31st May, should arrive at that place. In No. 271³ he tells us, on the authority of the same Count Nesselrode, that "the *final* resolution of the Imperial Cabinet as to the occupation of the Principalities, will be *taken only* upon the answer of the Porte to the last intimation being known at St. Petersburg." In No. 285⁴ he further says, that at that date "no very decided course appears to be fixed by the Imperial Cabinet." Such inconsistencies in such important matters are not only most reprehensible, but dangerous, and go to destroy confidence in such authority.

Again (in No. 330⁵), Sir Hamilton Seymour tells us that the Emperor of Russia was much pleased with a plan devised by the French ambassador at Vienna, M. Bourqueney, and which he would readily accept. In No. 317⁶ Seymour sketches this plan thus: "According to M. de Bourqueney's plan, a Turkish minister should be despatched to St. Petersburg, as bearer of the note twice proposed in vain by Russia. It was, however, to be agreed, that this note was to be delivered only

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, June 11th, 1853, p. 271.

² Seymour to Clarendon, June 10th, 1853, p. 277.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, June 14th, 1853, p. 288.

⁴ Seymour to Clarendon, June 14th, 1853, p. 295.

⁵ Seymour to Clarendon, June 28th, 1853, p. 330.

⁶ Seymour to Clarendon, June 27th, 1853, p. 324.

upon the clear understanding that a corresponding answer (the terms of which should be previously agreed upon) should be returned on the behalf of the Emperor, in which his Majesty should express the sense which he attributed to the protecting powers conferred upon him, and should at the same time give satisfactory assurances of the temperate use which he should make of them." In No. 315¹ Lord Cowley tells us, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys told him, on the authority of Bourqueney, 11th June, that the plan was one of the schemes "put forward on the part of the Russian minister, in consultation with the Russian minister, M. Meyendorff." In No. 339² Lord Cowley tells us that "M. Bourqueney denies, in the most positive terms, being the author of the project for the settlement of the Oriental question, which bears his name!!"

In No. 323³ Lord Stratford transmits the firman dated 7th June, announcing religious freedom and security to the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews (a similar firman in favour of the Protestants had also been issued, see No. 307, June 12th, 1853, p. 316), in the Ottoman empire. It is a repetition of unmeaning Oriental words, but proves that such an order was wanted, and that none of them had previously enjoyed complete religious freedom and security. At this moment, however, it was a delusion, and intended as such. It was never put in execution, nor intended to be so; nor would it ever have been thought of, had it not been to oppose and to thwart Menchikoff. Not a word is said about political rights previously *quietly* advised by Stratford; and this fact we shall prove from his subsequent correspondence, when we come to that more particular notice of the general subject, which, though promised, had not then been put in execution.

But the most extraordinary part of the proceedings is disclosed in No. 321⁴ and its inclosures, the latter occupying some pages, in the vindication of the character and political sincerity of Lord Stratford, in those momentous negotiations contained in the charge brought against him by Russia, that it was his advice that induced the Porte to refuse the propositions of Russia. No one who peruses the correspondence can fail to see that it was Stratford's advice, given on every occasion to the Turks, that induced them to remain obstinate; and that that advice was what they sought, courted, and obtained from their preceptor. The authority adduced in his favour is that of M. Pisani, the Turkish minister Reschid Pasha, and one Alison. The authority

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, July 4th, 1853, p. 322.

² Cowley to Clarendon, July 11th, 1853, p. 357.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, June 24th, 1853, p. 338.

⁴ Stratford to Clarendon, June 24th, 1853, p. 331.

of such personages goes for very little. It is not likely that they would criminate themselves, while it has been shown, previously, how little they are entitled to credit for plain dealing. Moreover, the day was, when no British ambassador would ever have thought, for one moment, of seeking a vindication of character for any part of his public conduct and proceedings, or the British Government dreamed of requiring it. But both, in this case, felt they required it, and their *protégés*, the virtuous, holy, and veracious Mohammedans, were, as a matter of course and gratitude, their ready supporters. They readily asserted that Lord Stratford's acts were their acts alone, though, at the same moment, they unblushingly avow that they joyfully received his kindred advice in everything. Lord Stratford is compelled to admit (No. 206¹) that, even at that date, thus : "The resistance which he (Menchikoff) encounters at the Porte *may be steadied* by foreign sympathies." Certainly ; of this there can be no doubt. When Stratford, to advance his views, and to gratify his predilections, had suffered the Turks to ride over him, and he and his country to be "*led in their wake*," as we shall by-and-by find is admitted to be the case, we shall see what his Lordship thinks of such supporters.

At this time the general manufactories for notes and protocols throughout Europe were established. A strange collection and formidable array they were ; nothing like it was ever before witnessed in Europe or the world. There was one in London, one in Paris, one at Vienna, one at Constantinople, one at Berlin, and one at St. Petersburg, each consisting of five ministers, exclusive of the cabinet bureaux, each of those consisting of from two to four acting members. Shakspeare's WITCHES were only *three* in number, and had only ONE CAULDRON ; but here we have five deputy cauldrons, and twenty deputy witches, besides five head cauldrons with, we shall say, from fifteen to twenty efficient witches to each. That for Great Britain, Lord Clarendon informs us consisted of himself and three other members of the cabinet, namely, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Palmerston, and Lord John Russell, the master spirit. The Turkish number was much greater, exceeding, on some occasions, 120. Each were indefatigable in his way in procuring and throwing in mischievous ingredients into their particular, and also the general or head-quarters' cauldrons. But Stratford finally prevailed. He either forestalled their best-laid plans with something new and uncertain—"the Turkish view of the question"—or knocked them on the head as soon as they came to light. All parties got bewildered. Russia gave up concert as impracticable, and confined herself to her own cauldron. The British Cabinet seemed either to have had no judgment of its own,

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 14th, 1853, p. 216.

or to have surrendered it wholly to the judgment of others. They unsaid to-morrow what they had said to-day, and at last yielded to whatever Stratford told them. France, for a time, affected to follow in their wake, till, having got them so far in that they could not securely retreat, she tripped up their heels, though not without some unmeaning grumbling, and endeavoured to take the lead. They plagued Lord Stratford, but still he, apparently, maintained his ground, till finally he, the Turk, and his country, produced, as we shall finally see, and as this country will bitterly feel, their MASTER!

If the enemy of mankind himself had been set to concert a system to produce mischief, he could not have been more successful in such a combination of politicians and diplomatists as were here arrayed without any definite object. The result was and might have been anticipated—"double, double, toil and trouble"—confusion and war, such as we now see spread and spreading over the world.

The first production of this mighty and holy Mussulman alliance was the celebrated Vienna note. The correspondence about it extends over 150 folio pages. Intermixed as the question and pages are with a vast mass of rubbish, it is difficult to grasp, or to condense into any readable or moderate space, the real and substantial merits of the proposition, which, after all, could have been comprehended in a nutshell, or at least into an oystershell, the contents being equally brainless. The substance of the first Vienna note was drawn up in Paris, and with the assent of the British Government, afterwards worked up (what little remained to be done) at Vienna, in the official and supposed perfect shape in which it came forth to the world. But, before this, the Russian Government issued another circular of great importance, as showing fully their objects, and the grounds of their demands. It may be advisable to advert to this in the proper order of the subject, and as bringing us to understand more clearly the merits or the defects of the Vienna note alluded to. It is found in No. 329.¹ The following extracts are clear and important :—

Circular Despatch from COUNT NESSELRODE to the Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts (communicated to the EARL OF CLARENDON by BARON BRUNNOW, July 9).

June 20th, 1853.
" St. Petersburg, July 2d,

" SIR,"

[After adverting to the note required from Turkey regarding the Holy Places, and stating that that note "contains in reality nothing

¹ Circular by Nesselrode, July 2d, 1853, p. 345.

as regards the general guarantee required in favour of religion, but the *mere confirmation of what we long since possess*," it proceeds :—]

"In offering this alternative to the Porte, we had more particularly apprised the great cabinets of our intentions. We had specifically urged France and Great Britain not to complicate the difficulties of the case by the attitude which they might assume, nor to take precipitately measures which, on the one hand, might be calculated to encourage the resistance of the Porte, and on the other might involve, still more than they were already implicated in the question, the honour and dignity of the Emperor.

"I regret now to announce to you that this twofold attempt has unfortunately been fruitless.

"The Porte, as you will perceive by Reschid Pasha's enclosed letter, has returned a negative, or, at all events, an evasive answer to the letter which I had addressed to him.

"On the other hand, the two maritime powers have not thought fit to defer to the considerations which we had submitted to their serious attention. Taking before us the initiative, they have deemed it indispensable to anticipate at once, by an effective measure, the measures which we had announced as merely eventual, since we made the execution of them to depend on the final resolutions of the Porte; and at the time I am writing, *the execution of them has not commenced*. They have forthwith sent their fleets to the neighbourhood of Constantinople; they already occupy the waters and ports of Turkey within reach of the Dardanelles. By this advanced attitude, the two powers have subjected us to the pressure of a menacing demonstration, which, as we had given them to understand, must still further complicate the existing crisis.

"Having to deal with the refusal of the Porte, supported by the manifestation of France and England, it is more than ever impossible for us to modify the resolutions which the Emperor had made to depend on it.

"Accordingly, his Imperial Majesty has sent orders to the corps of our army at present stationed in Bessarabia, to pass the frontier in order to occupy the Principalities."

* * * *

"In occupying the Principalities for a time, we disclaim at once all notion of conquest. We do not seek to obtain any aggrandisement of territory. Knowingly and voluntarily, we will not seek to excite any commotion among the Christian population of Turkey. So soon as the latter shall have granted to us the satisfaction which is our due, and *so soon as the pressure upon us, caused by the attitude of the two maritime powers shall cease*, our troops will instantly retire within the Russian frontiers."

* * * *

"We do not conceal from ourselves, Sir, the importance of the position which we have taken up, and the consequences which may eventually result from it, if the Turkish Government should force us to pass beyond the narrow and limited circle to which we desire to restrict ourselves."—
"Moreover, the principles so peremptorily laid down, notwithstanding the

moderate language in which they are couched, in Reschid Pasha's reply, as likewise in his note of the 26th of May last to the representatives of the four powers at Constantinople, would tend to nothing else, if taken literally, than to call in question all the rights which we have acquired, and to nullify all our antecedent compacts.

"In fact, if the Ottoman Government deems every diplomatic engagement whatever, even under the form of a simple note, in which it might be proposed to stipulate with a foreign government concerning religion and churches, to be opposed to its independence and its rights of sovereignty, what becomes of the engagement which it has heretofore contracted with us in a form far more obligatory, to protect in its dominions our religion and its churches ?

"If we should admit so absolute a principle, WE MUST, *with our own hands, tear in pieces the treaty of Kainardji, as well as all those which confirm it*, and voluntarily renounce the right which they have conferred upon us, of watching over the effectual protection of the Greek religion in Turkey.

"Is that what the Porte desires ? Does it propose to extricate itself from all its former obligations, and to extract from the existing crisis the perpetual abolition of an entire state of things which was long since established ? Impartial Europe will understand that, if the question is stated in these terms, it would, notwithstanding the most conciliatory intentions, never admit, as far as Russia is concerned, of a pacific solution ; for our treaties, our secular influence, our moral credit, and our most cherished feelings, national as well as religious, would be at stake.

"Let us be allowed to say it ; the present discussion, and all the clamour which the press, independently of the cabinets, has made about it, rest on a mere misunderstanding, or on want of sufficient attention to all our political antecedents.

"People seem to be ignorant, or to lose sight, of the fact that Russia, from her position and by treaty, virtually enjoys an ancient right of watching over the effectual protection of her religion in the East ; and the maintenance of this ancient right, which she cannot abandon, is represented as implying the wholly novel pretension to a protectorate at once religious and political, the future extent and consequences of which are exaggerated. The whole of the present crisis is the result of this misconception.

"The extent and consequences of our pretended new political protectorate have no real existence. We only ask for our coreligionists in the East, the strict *status quo*, the maintenance of the privileges which they possess *ab antiquo* under the protection of their sovereign.

"We will not deny that there accrues to Russia from this state of things what may justly be designated as a religious patronage. It is what we have from all time exercised in the East. Consequently if, up to the present time, the independence and sovereignty of Turkey have been able to co-exist with the exercise of this patronage, why should either of them suffer from it hereafter, from the time that our pretensions are reduced to what, in fact, amounts to nothing more than its mere confirmation ?"

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"We have said, and we repeat it, the Emperor is no more desirous now than he has been heretofore, of overthrowing the Ottoman empire, or of aggrandising himself at its expense. After the very moderate use which, in 1829, he made of the victory of Adrianople, when that victory and its consequences placed the Porte at his mercy; after having, alone of all the powers in Europe, preserved Turkey in 1833 from an inevitable dismemberment; after having, in 1839, taken the initiative with the other powers in the proposition which, being executed in common, again prevented the Sultan from witnessing his throne give place to a new Arab empire; it is almost tiresome to adduce proofs of this truth. On the contrary, the fundamental principle of our august master's policy has always been to uphold, as long as possible, the actual *status quo* of the East. He has desired, and still desires it, because such is, after all, the well-understood interest of Russia, already too vast to require an extension of territory;—because the Ottoman empire, prosperous, peaceable, inoffensive, placed as an useful intermediary between powerful states, arrests the conflict of rival interests, which, were it to fall, would instantly come into collision and contend among themselves for its ruins;—because human foresight wearies itself to no purpose in the search of the arrangements best adapted to supply the void which the disappearance of this great body would occasion in the political balance. But if such are the real, avowed, and sincere views of the Emperor, it is necessary, in order that he may *be able faithfully to adhere to them, that Turkey should act towards us in such a manner as to offer us a chance of co-existing with her*; that she should respect our special treaties, and the consequences resulting from them; that acts of bad faith, that underhand persecutions, continued vexations directed against our religion, should not produce a state of things which, insupportable in the long run, should compel us to trust for a remedy to uncertain chance."

No declaration, no explanation of her proceedings, nor denial of the ambitious charges brought against her, were of any avail on the part of Russia. Mecca and Rome, Paris and London, Protestant and Papist fraternised together, and arrayed themselves in the crusade against the Greek Church, in order, through Russia, to crush it, and leave it to be trampled under the hoofs of Islamism,—that compound of the leopard, the bear, and the lion,—which had trampled it in the dust for so many ages. To their shame, as they will also and certainly ultimately feel to their sorrow, and in order to support the worldly interests and ambition of each, Turkey, France, and England hurried on the contest, which is to shake the world, and with it their strength and their power, amongst that of others. Protocols and plans became for a time as plenty as blackberries in a fine autumn; each considering the berry that grew on his own field the best. Lord Clarendon led the way, and, as he informs us, with the approval of France. In No. 330¹ he gives us his plan, and a simple one it was; but how it

¹ Clarendon to Stratford, July 9th, 1853, p. 349.

was cushioned or cut up the papers do not show. Next we have, in No. 344,¹ Seymour's, which Count Nesselrode thought might pass and terminate the dispute; but in Nos. 351 and 352,² Lord Clarendon informs us that though he approved of, it could not be recommended, "because two, *if not three*, projects are now under consideration, and any addition to the number would cause loss of time, and might possibly lead to confusion!" All those recognised the full force and validity of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, on which Russia grounded her demands on Turkey, and the validity and authority of which were afterwards denied by the same parties in other places.

Another remarkable feature of the case now comes into view, namely, that Lord Clarendon recommends the plan for a settlement of the quarrel to be drawn up as a *convention*, the form originally proposed by Prince Menchikoff, and which had been so violently and virulently denounced and assailed by the same parties. Count Buol entered upon his mediatory course with vigour. Regretting the hasty (as he then considered it) step taken by Russia, in the occupation of the Principalities, he nevertheless was eager, for the sake of peace, to bring the Turks to listen to reason and truth. In No. 332,³ Lord Clarendon lets us know Count Buol's opinion on various points. He asserts that "Prince Menchikoff's note contained no other engagement than that which the Porte in its last note was willing to give."—"To this naval possession Russia can only oppose a military possession. By thus compromising the dignity of Russia, and giving encouragement to the Porte, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has been placed in a position to render all negotiation impossible, whatever modifications might be proposed to the Russian note."—"Russia asks nothing more, nothing that implies an intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey, nothing that will go beyond the right of superintendence (*surveillance*) over the Orthodox creed and its churches, resulting from the treaty of Kainardji." In No. 333,⁴ Count Buol proceeds: "But if, emboldened by foreign sympathy, it withdraws from that which it has already conceded by the note transmitted to Prince Menchikoff; and if it (the Porte) thinks, that notwithstanding the gravity of the circumstances, it can decline any description of diplomatic engagement, even such an one as should be confined to a promise given in a note, it would, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, *commit a grave error*, which might have the most disastrous consequences." Count Buol also

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, July 8th, 1853, p. 359.

² Clarendon to Cowley and Clarendon to Seymour, July 19th, 1853, p. 369.

³ Clarendon to Westmorland, July 9th, 1853, p. 351.

⁴ Clarendon to Westmorland, July 9th, 1853, p. 353.

decidedly states, "that the Porte *must* consider the occupation of the Principalities as a *direct consequence* of its 'INEFFICIENT' answer to the Russian Cabinet, and will have to bear all the responsibility of it." Those facts or points Count Buol engaged to urge upon the Ottoman Government, and requested that our ambassador at Constantinople might be instructed to support the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople in forwarding his object. Those declarations were unpalatable to Lord Clarendon, who quibbled about dates and times, to enable him to get clear of the error that he had committed; and not only *declined* (p. 352) to give any assurance that the fleets would be withdrawn from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, but turns round and calls upon Count Buol "to urge upon the Emperor of Russia the necessity of modifying his demands," for the strongest of all reasons, but which is of a piece with all the other reasoning advanced on the Turkish side of the question, namely, "that the *spirit of fanaticism* in Turkey was quite equal to that which had been *excited* in Russia!" Count Buol, however, commits a serious mistake (No. 334, Clarendon to Westmorland, Part I. p. 354, July 11th, 1853) when he places the Turkish firmans, confirming the religious privileges of the Greeks, as a sufficient substitute for "the guarantee for the future" required by Russia; because, first, these firmans were promulgated long after the dispute began, indeed, not till it reached its culminating point; and, secondly, that Russia might and justly have sought for some "national engagement having the force of a treaty, because previous firmans had been violated; and what one firman conceded, another firman could at a future day cancel, and could never be considered as binding upon the Turkish Government." On the point adverted to, the declaration of the Russian Government was clear and explicit, and founded upon undeniable facts. In No. 319, Seymour says, on the direct authority of Count Nesselrode,—“The Emperor's Government could not accept of any firman in the light of an adequate reparation; that which *one* firman granted, another, as had been seen, *could overthrow*; and, consequently, that the Emperor desired the concessions made by the Porte should be sanctioned by some instrument having the force of a *national engagement*.” Consul Neale tells us, and tells us truly, that Turkish firmans are "*waste paper*," and that under such regulations and apparent concessions the Christian population (p. 55) will "*be worse off*" than ever.

From page 360 to page 367, inclusive, is occupied by the lengthened circulars of Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Clarendon—the one the echo of the other, and on this occasion the Siamese twins of the diplomatic farce enacting. They are both equally composed of quibbles, and mis-

statements, and misrepresentations about Prince Menchikoff's proceedings and objects, and about the movement of the fleets as contrasted with the Russian occupation of the Principalities. All these statements, and averments made to make them appear innocent, have been sufficiently disproven in the preceding narrative of the transactions. It shows a sad want of facts, and just reasoning, and honesty, on the part of those statesmen, to have had recourse to them.

At this moment, having taken two weeks to collect his breath, and before he could have learned from his Government, or any other quarter, the effects which the failure of Prince Menchikoff's negotiations had produced at any other place, Lord Stratford (No. 353¹) again urges his Government to war, and assures them that the Turks were determined upon it. This extraordinary communication shows the schemes of the individual, and the dangerous spirit which had long guided and animated him. Canting all the while about the blessings of peace, and the great *moral* ascendancy that Turkey had gained and Russia had lost during the previous proceedings, he tells Lord Clarendon to buckle on his armour, and, in conjunction with France, to take the field without delay; and for this he gives some extraordinary reasons, and jumps at strange conclusions. He says,—

The Porte "has made every reasonable concession;" insinuates that the colossal power of Russia is and may be doubted, "when fairly put to the test by operations in a foreign country."—"If the ultimate *exclusion* of Russia from the Greek protectorate, or from the Principalities, is really that important object which has hitherto been presumed, *success*, I humbly conceive, will never be achieved, according to any reasonable calculation, without a previous understanding on the part of England and France to *stop at no sacrifice* necessary to secure it."

Bewailing the great embarrassments which have visited Turkey, and expenses which she had incurred, and as if her state only deserved consideration, and how much these may be increased by circumstances, he proceeds:—

"Already the *disaffection* prevailing in Bulgaria threatens to end in an insurrection of the Christians. A party in Servia is at the same time suspected—I hope erroneously—of looking to the first occasion for making a push towards *independence*. The whole of European Turkey, from the frontier of Austria to that of Greece, is almost denuded of regular soldiers, and *exposed to the protection* of Albanian hordes, habituated to turbulence and *plunder*."—"The Montenegrins are preparing to make an incursion into Turkey, with the prospect of finding sympathy and cooperation among the Christian tribes in that neighbourhood. A spirit of *fanaticism*, dangerous alike to the rayahs and to the authorities—dangerous to neglect, and difficult to control—appears to be rising in other parts of the

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, July 4th, 1853, p. 370.

country. The Greeks, though still quiet, have taken up a position, and hold in society a language which indicates views of ambition unrestrained by principles or by treaties."—"I have the honour to enclose, under another despatch, the various extracts of consular correspondence on which these apprehensions are principally founded."—"The Sultan's Mussulman subjects are generally animated with a *noble spirit* of loyalty and devotion, though tainted with feelings of *cruelty and fanaticism*, while the Government themselves are ready to *stake all* upon the question at issue, provided they may reckon upon the *cordial support and cooperation of England and France*. The resources of the country are also known to be immense."—"The necessities of a *hazardous position* are not unlikely to bring them into fuller activity *for the benefit of other and more enterprising nations*. But the efficient aid of powerful auxiliaries would seem to be the indispensable condition of a protracted and *successful contest*."

"In no direction is the prospect a cheering one,—and should a resort to force be unavoidable, the struggle must necessarily be sharp, and the contest uncertain. In any case, nothing can be worse than a *hesitating*, uncalculated course."—"Let it be remembered that an evil which is only *postponed*, or evaded, is liable to recur with more inconvenience and danger at no remote period, and that by venturing at once to look it in the face, we afford ourselves the best chance of viewing it in its proper proportions, and employing the most judicious means for its correction. Henceforward that extensive empire, of which Constantinople is the capital, must in all likelihood either take colour from Russia, or be *assimilated* to Europe. In the latter case, BRITISH INFLUENCES AND INTERESTS *may be expected to find a widening field for their development*: in the former, they may be tolerated for a time, but they will probably decline by degrees, and be finally excluded. I can hardly doubt that *the notion* of Reschid Pasha and his friends, *if fully* supported from without, is, in failure of negotiation, to *settle accounts with Russia once for all*, and in pursuance of *his earlier promises, and of my urgent and repeated representations*, to carry out a system of internal improvement calculated to *raise the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects*, and to place the Turkish empire on a footing of close connexion with the leading, and particularly *with the Western, Powers of Europe*. The idea is no less brilliant than benevolent; but to realise it would be difficult, though far from impossible; and the Porte's existing sense of danger, and need of assistance, are powerful aids to success," &c.

Where, it may be asked, was the chance that war could be avoided, under such guides, advisers, and inspirations? It is clear that the course to be pursued was taken and predetermined, namely, to tear asunder all existing treaties between Turkey and Russia, in order that the influence and rights that these gave the latter, might be transferred to the "influence and the interests" of England (what of France? what of Austria?), under whose dictation and sceptre Turkey was to be changed—regenerated—while continuing to be ruled by Mahommedan despotism and intolerance; so that Lord Stratford, at

the expense of this country, might be enabled to try to carry out his crude and impracticable theories. None who peruse the communication just quoted can be at a loss to ascertain the channels of information which filled, guided, and directed the columns of portions of the periodical press, in different parts of Europe and in this country at this period.

Take, for example, the following correct specimen on this subject, by the most influential and important member of that press, namely the *Times*; while it is worthy of remark, that by comparing the tone and details of the official correspondence, the official and authentic channels from which the journal in question derived its information, and the writers thereof, are at once and clearly ascertained and established. Like its office informants, as its dates clearly show us, the journal was for a time in favour of Russia; but, as the views and opinions of Government changed, and became Turk, so it became Turk also. The quotations are therefore made, because these are considered as, at the time, speaking the sentiments of the British Government upon the question.

After bitter and just complaints of the delay and the proceedings on the part of the Turks, the *Times* proceeds:—

“She seems to be taking advantage of the interposition of Europe in her favour, *to hold out for more than the award of Europe has conceded to her. Turkey declines the recommendations of the allied powers.*”—*Times*, August 27th, 1853.

“Russia assented to the Vienna note within twenty-four hours from the receipt of it, and also accepted, with equal alacrity, the verbal alterations subsequently made in it. The clear object of the delay of the Turks is to prolong the negotiations, and possibly to take steps *which will lead to hostilities.* A danger to Turkey is assuming a high tone not meeting the support of Europe.”—*Times*, August 29th, 1853.

“This note was altered by the party in Turkey which are determined on war. The Turks are excited by hosts of renegadoes and refugees, whose chief object is to kindle a conflagration in Europe, without a thought of the fatal consequences to the sovereign and the country which gives them an asylum.”—*Times*, Sept 2d, 1853.

“The rejection of the Vienna note to discriminate between the course which public duty and our national interests may lead us to pursue, and the measures recommended by a party who seem to think any occasion sufficient to justify hostilities against Russia. The policy of England and the great powers of Europe with whom she has acted on this question, is not to be governed by the *turbulent passions* of the Turkish Divan, nor are we to be plunged into difficulties, of which we do not see the end, merely because the Ottoman army is eager for war on the banks of the Danube. There is evidently a material difference between the cause which originally *induced this country* to interpose its authority and naval power

between Turkey and Russia some months ago, and the attitude now assumed by the Porte; and it does not follow that because we thought it our duty to protect that empire against unwarrantable aggression, we are to bind ourselves to all that may follow from the rejection of the terms *recommended to the Sultan by the rest of Europe*. We presume that it will be admitted that our interposition, such as it is, is based not upon predilections or obligations, such as the maintenance of peace and the balance of power. It argues more than common effrontery of professed agitators to call on this country *to go to war for the defence of Mahomedanism in Europe—for the support of the brutal military despotism of three millions of Mussulmans over twenty millions of Christians*—and for the protection of a state which has so misgoverned one of the finest empires on the globe, that it is now really dependent on *foreign ministers for counsel*, and foreign fleets for defence, and on foreign renegadoes for the command of its own troops. That these things are in themselves evils, and, perhaps, the greatest of evils now existing in the political condition of Europe, it seems to us impossible to deny. The religion is false, the government is barbarous, the empire is weak. To use the words of an eminent Whig writer, ‘Is Christendom, by interposing a cordon of ambassadors between the advanced posts of an invading army and the capital, to perpetuate a daily accumulating mass of internal misery, merely lest the *diplomatic balances* should risk being deranged? Russia is sufficiently powerful by herself to force an answer to the formidable question. The notion that the states of Europe are to negative for ever such an interrogatory is as fine a nursery for endless conferences and campaigns, and as unprincipled an encouragement to misgovernment, as the genius of diplomacy could devise. It is a case in which, after all the breath, the ink, the blood that may be spent over it, the Sultan must minister to himself.’ (*Edin. Rev.* January, 1830.)

“But, in the meantime, it is evident that an important change had occurred in the temper of the Divan, &c. . . The army (Omar Pasha’s) and the staff of the commander-in-chief is to a great extent Polish and Magyar renegadoes. Mr. Shene says, in his recent volume, that when he visited the quarters of Omar Pasha, he *found only one* native Turkish officer in his staff! All the rest were refugees who had renounced Christianity, and embraced Islamism. He adds, that these soldiers of fortune appeared to care very little for their adopted country.

“It cannot safely be inferred that, because it was the height of rashness in Turkey to plunge into such a contest, she will have the wisdom to abstain from that danger.”—*Times*, Sept. 10th, 1853.

“Russia has accepted a form of a note (Vienna note) drawn up on behalf of the Porte *by a member of the French Government*. Russia took fright at the fleets, and in twenty-four hours acceded to the note above mentioned. As she had given way so far, it was necessary that Turkey should act in a similar manner.”—*Times*, Sept. 13th, 1853.

The Turks knew that they had France and England hooked, and therefore were determined to have their own way, and draw these great, and also willing powers in their wake!

CHAPTER IV.

VIENNA NOTE—ITS REJECTION BY TURKEY—OPINIONS OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE "TIMES" ABOUT IT—ALTERATIONS BY THE TURKS IN THAT NOTE—NESSELRODE'S REMARKS THEREON—LORD CLARENDON'S LONG AND ABLE LETTER ON REJECTION OF FRENCH PROPOSALS, AND NEW NOTE—CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT IT BY THE DIFFERENT POWERS.

DIPLOMATISTS, like corporations, have neither shame nor conscience. If Lord Stratford had been possessed of either, he would have blushed when he wrote about such general disaffection amongst the Christian population in Turkey, when he recollected, as he ought to have done, the information which he had conveyed almost in the same breath, perhaps with the same pen, of their loyalty and contentment under the benign Mussulman rule, and which, be it observed, he in other places again affirms to be directly the reverse. We shall presently have occasion to bring these discordant statements into full and remarkable contrast. To do so is both painful and disgusting, because it tends to tarnish the fame and the good name of our country. But previous to entering fully into this part of the subject, it is considered advisable to bring everything connected with the celebrated Vienna note to a conclusion.

In No. 358,¹ Lord Clarendon lets us know that "the French project of note" for settling differences had been forwarded to Constantinople, with directions to the Austrian ambassador there to "recommend its immediate adoption by the Porte, if the Austrian project then under consideration had not yet been agreed to." This course Lord Clarendon considered judicious, and urged to avoid delay. In No. 345,² Lord Cowley tells us, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had stated to him that he would recommend Lord Clarendon's plan of a Convention at Constantinople, or anywhere else, providing that none of the other schemes that had been proposed had been agreed to. All that England wanted

¹ Clarendon to Westmorland, July 21st, 1853, p. 388.

² Cowley to Clarendon, July 24th, 1853, p. 391.

was a speedy settlement of the dispute. At page 392, we find Count Buol informing Lord Westmorland, that "Austria would take no engagement with Russia not to oppose her by arms; and he would take none for engaging in hostilities on either side." In No. 369,¹ Lord Clarendon, writing to Lord Stratford, says, "that her Majesty's Government have been greatly disappointed at finding, by your Excellency's despatch of the 9th July, that *above a fortnight* had then elapsed without any decision having been adopted; although it appears that the Sultan had actually approved of a note being prepared in conformity with the suggestions made by Austria, and *supported* by the representatives in their memorandum of the 24th June," and urging him to transmit to her Majesty's Government the cause of such procrastination and delay!

The cobbling attempted by Lord Stratford took place the 23d July (No. 39),² when he concocted and produced to his colleagues a draft note, which, *if* sent and accepted, would settle everything. This draft contained only promises founded on firmans, but avoided all mention of a "national engagement," or guarantee, or treaty, old or new. The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs "declared officially that the Porte" (instructed no doubt by Lord Stratford) "was resolved not to go beyond the terms of a note strictly conformable to this draft;" adding, that "the war which might ensue would only be looked upon *by him* as a contest for the maintenance of his independence." In No. 40,³ Count Buol declares that he "declined to transmit Reschid Pasha's note to Count Nesselrode, or to St. Petersburg, or to recommend it or the documents which accompanied it."—"Further, he did not conceive that any addition made to the mode of addressing the Emperor, by sending a protest against his proceedings, could render the communication more likely to be accepted by him."—"Nor would France and England 'remove the fleets from the Dardanelles' simultaneously with the evacuation of the Principalities." Therefore the Emperor of Austria directed him to say, that they must adhere to and support the original Vienna note, as the only scheme that could remove all the difficulties that lay in the way of settling the dispute. M. Drouyn de Lhuys (No. 42, p. 37) supported this view of the question.

The memorable Vienna note deserves minute consideration. This will bring before us the remarkable doctoring and chicanery which guided the counsellors that concocted it, and the cunning of the Turks

¹ Clarendon to Stratford, July 28th, 1853, Part I. p. 398.

² Stratford to Clarendon, July 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 30.

³ Westmorland to Clarendon, July 29th, 1853, Part II. p. 35.

who refused to accept it. The French draft of the plan, approved of by Lord Clarendon, is first presented to the reader. To avoid prolixity as much as possible, it may be stated that the passages relating to the Holy Places, as also the preambles, are omitted, the latter being mere verbiage, and the former of minor importance, and, moreover, in all their material parts, had been arranged, and as contained in different notes, would only be a repetition of the same matter and words. This note was presented by Count Walewski to Lord Clarendon, on the 27th June, and is numbered 295, in Part I. p. 307 of the correspondence.

"If the emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them by solemn acts, testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects. His Majesty, the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, now reigning, inspired with the same dispositions, and being desirous of giving to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, and of his hearty desire to consolidate the ancient relations of good neighbourhood and thorough understanding existing between the two states, has been solely influenced by his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into serious consideration the representations of which Prince Menchikoff was the organ.

"The undersigned has accordingly received orders to declare by the present note, that the Government of his Majesty the Sultan¹ considers itself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by his Majesty's august ancestors to the Orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him; and, moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by Convention or special arrangement.

"Furthermore, as the Imperial firman, which has just been granted to the Greek Patriarch and clergy, and which contains the confirmation of their spiritual privileges, ought to be looked upon as a fresh proof of those noble sentiments, and as, moreover, the proclamation of that firman, which affords all security, ought to dispel for ever all apprehension in regard to the rite which is the religion of his Majesty the Emperor, I am happy to be charged with the duty of making the present notification.

"As regards the guarantee that hereafter there shall no change be made as to the places of pilgrimage at Jerusalem, that results from the firman

¹ Here Count Buol afterwards added the words, "*will remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion and his Majesty,*" &c. These words were inserted and maintained by the Vienna Conference, but their omission in the original draft shows the trick that "*the allies*" wished to practise, and their secret and ultimate object.

invested with the *hatti-humayoun* of the 15th of the month of Rebi-ul-akhir (February 1852), explained and corroborated by the firmans of

and it is the formal intention of his Majesty the Sultan to cause his sovereign decisions to be executed without any alteration.

"The Sublime Porte, moreover, officially promises that the existing state of things shall in nowise be modified,¹ without previous communication to the Governments of France and Russia. The same notification shall be made to the ambassador of his Majesty the Emperor of the French.

"In case the Imperial Court of Russia should require it, a suitable spot shall be assigned in the city of Jerusalem, or in its neighbourhood, for the construction of a church destined for the celebration of Divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of a hospital for the indigent or sick pilgrims of the same nation.

"The Sublime Porte engages from the present time to agree to a solemn act in this respect, whereby these religious foundations shall be placed under the special superintendence of the Consulate-General of Russia in Syria and in Palestine."

This celebrated and important Vienna diplomatic communication, amended (see a subsequent page), was transmitted by the Austrian Government to Constantinople, with the most urgent commands to their minister, Baron Bruck, to use all his energies and influence with the Ottoman Government to induce them to accept it. The same command and recommendation was conveyed by the Russian Government to their ambassador. On the part of Great Britain, Lord Clarendon (No. 32²) for her Majesty's Government states:—"They consider that it *fully guards* the principle for which throughout we have been contending, and that it may therefore *with perfect safety be signed by the Porte*; and they further hope that your Excellency, before the receipt of this despatch, will have found no difficulty in procuring the assent of the Turkish Government to a project *which the allies of the Sultan unanimously recommend for his adoption*." In No. 42³ Lord Cowley informs us that France pursued the same course. M. Drouyn de Lhuys would "write to M. de la Cour, explaining why the French Government preferred the note which had been agreed to at Vienna to that sent by Reschid Pasha from Constantinople, and instructing him to use *all his influence with the Porte to obtain its assent* to the project recommended by *the four Powers*," adding that "the Turkish ambassador at Paris has written in the same sense to his Government."

¹ In that portion regarding the Holy Places, he also altered and added, "without previous understanding with the Governments of France and Russia, and without any prejudice to the different Christian communities."

² Clarendon to Stratford, August 2d, 1853, Part II. p. 27.

³ Cowley to Clarendon, August 4th, 1853, Part II. p. 37.

Under such circumstances it was surely neither unjust nor unreasonable for Russia, in her manifesto (No. 224¹), to state:—"To no purpose have the *principal powers of Europe* sought, by their exhortations, to shake the blind obstinacy of the Ottoman Government. It has replied to the pacific efforts made by Europe, as well as to our forbearance, by a declaration of war, by a proclamation replete with false accusations against Russia." Surely it was, to say the least of it, more than rash for Lord Loftus (see same paper 224), in reply to the Prussian minister, Baron Manteuffel, who remarked to him that the Russian documents (manifesto included) "were written in a moderate and pacific spirit," to say "that the arguments they contained, and the statements on which those arguments were based, *were wholly false and unfounded.*" And it must excite no little surprise that Lord Clarendon, in his own name and in the name of his country, not only justifies such language on the part of Lord Loftus, but adds thus (No. 234²): "It" (the Russian manifesto) "declares that Turkey has violated treaties between her and Russia; but not a single instance of this has been *advanced by Russia throughout the whole of the discussions, nor has a single instance* been adduced of the *ill-treatment of Christians*, which should call forth the solicitude of the Emperor of Russia." In No. 242,³ after his Lordship had submitted to Turkish discipline, he says, "Facts do not bear out the statement that the *principal powers of Europe* had in vain endeavoured to shake the blind obstinacy of the Porte," &c. After this, he goes on to state no violation of treaties, no ill-treatment of Christians, in Turkey had been adduced. These points, together with the unfounded assertion made in No. 234, that the sole cause of the dispute, "the Holy Places, was at once and satisfactorily settled," as also the portion about "no ill-treatment of Christians," will come better under a future head, and tell with tenfold force and severity under that head. In the meantime, it is melancholy, and most injurious to the national character, that any servant of the Crown and of the country should so far stray from the honest, straightforward path of truth and justice, as to make statements so utterly unfounded and ungenerous. This will be more fully shown presently, but, in the meantime, let us consider his Lordship's opinions and statements made on the subject at the moment. We find these at great length in the official correspondence and notes about to follow this.

Lord Clarendon and France demurred to some of Count Buol's

¹ Loftus to Clarendon, Nov. 7th, 1853, p. 225, Inclosure No. 2, Part II. p. 228.

² Clarendon to Loftus, Nov. 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 233.

³ Clarendon to Seymour, Nov. 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 240.

⁴ Clarendon to Stratford, Sept. 11th, 1853, Part II. p. 91, &c.

corrections, but they were fully arranged, according to the note finally sent and about to be quoted. In the meantime, or rather at this time, Lord Stratford tells Lord Clarendon (No. 11¹) that the Turkish ministers were "unanimous in their resolution to oppose them" (Russian demands) "to the last. I left them," says he, "with the impression that there would be more to apprehend from their rashness than from their timidity!" And (in No. 18²) he further states, that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated distinctly that his Government "could by no means desist from the resolution *which it had already announced*, that is to say, that of never entering into diplomatic engagement with Russia relative to the privileges of the Greek Church." Yet, in the face of these decided declarations, Reschid Pasha has the boldness to declare (No. 18³) that "the Sublime Porte has *carefully avoided everything that could have rendered the existing state of things more difficult!*" In No. 21⁴, we find the Emperor of Austria telling Lord Westmorland about the "anxiety he felt that the project proposed by Count Buol should be adopted." The note completed was finally despatched from Vienna to Constantinople on the 24th July; some fresh half-and-half scheme from Lord Stratford, hatched at Constantinople (see Part II. p. 30, for this notable scheme and its Turkish announcements), being rejected by both the French and British Governments as dangerous, as it "would interfere with the discussions already commenced."⁵ In this matter it is of great consequence that dates should be attended to, as from attention to these the real objects and intentions of parties can only be correctly ascertained. At this moment, it may be said, the Porte issued a proclamation (No. 37⁶), where they probably unguardedly state "the real cause of the existing dispute with Russia, is the desire of that power to obtain a binding and *exclusive*⁷ engagement from the Porte concerning the religious privileges of the Greek churches and priesthood, which the Porte cannot in justice be expected to give," concluding by declaring how happy, loyal, and contented every Christian was under the Ottoman sway!

Let us, with these observations, proceed to the official correspondence alluded to thus:—

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, July 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 5.

² Stratford to Clarendon, July 20th, 1853, Part II. p. 11, Inclosure No. 1.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, July 20th, 1853, Inclosure No. 3, Part II. p. 15.

⁴ Westmorland to Clarendon, July 25th, 1853, Part II. p. 18.

⁵ Cowley to Clarendon, July 29th, 1853, Part II. p. 21.

⁶ Stratford to Clarendon, July 20th, 1853, Part II. Inclosure, p. 29.

⁷ The word "*exclusive*" is a gratuitous and unfounded assumption. Mark, also, the evasion of all allusion to the treaty of Kainardji, or the right of Russia to surveillance or superintendence under it.

Page 23, No. 31, Part II.—The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

“ Foreign Office, August 2d, 1853.

“ MY LORD,—I transmitted to your Excellency, in my private letter of the 18th ultimo, a copy of the draft of a note which had been submitted to her Majesty's Government towards the end of June by the French Government, as being, in their opinion, calculated, if addressed by the Porte to Russia, to lead to a solution of the present differences between these powers.

“ I learned from Lord Westmorland, on the 25th ultimo, that Count Buol conceived that a note might be framed for the acceptance of the Porte based on the French draft ; and your Excellency will find in my despatch to Lord Cowley, and in the telegraphic despatches which have since passed between Lord Westmorland and myself, of which copies are now transmitted to you, the details of the course which has since been taken in regard to the Austrian proposal.

“ I now transmit to your Excellency a copy of the note in the terms to which her Majesty's Government have assented, and in which they understand it will have been forwarded from Vienna to Constantinople.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed)

CLARENDON.”

Page 26, Inclosure 10, No. 31.—Draft of Note proposed by the French Government to be addressed by the Porte to Russia, as altered at Vienna and London.

“ If the emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them by solemn acts, testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects. His Majesty, the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, now reigning, inspired with the same dispositions, and being desirous of giving to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, and of his hearty desire to consolidate the ancient relations of good neighbourhood and thorough understanding existing between the two states, has been solely influenced by his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into his serious consideration the representations which his Excellency Prince Menchikoff conveyed to him.”

“ The undersigned has, in consequence, received orders to declare, by the present note, that the Government of his Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion, and that his Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted, by his Majesty's august ancestors, to the Orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him ; and, moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites, by Convention or special arrangement.”

"Furthermore, as the Imperial firman which has just been granted to the Greek Patriarch and clergy, and which contains the confirmation of their spiritual privileges, ought to be looked upon as a fresh proof of these noble sentiments, and as, besides, the proclamation of this firman, which affords all security, ought to dispel for ever every apprehension in regard to the rite which is the religion of his Majesty the Emperor, I am happy to be charged with the duty of making the present notification."

The note thus trimmed was, in its first stage, transmitted to St. Petersburg, and at once assented to by the Emperor. Subsequently it was again transmitted, with some verbal amendments suggested by France and England,¹ more in favour of Turkey. Still the Emperor expressed his readiness to adhere to it. In the form sent to both St. Petersburg and Constantinople, Lord Westmorland (No. 45, July 31st, 1853, Part II. p. 39) tells us that Count Buol "submitted this despatch," to accompany the "note" for the approval of the members of the Conference, *which we all unanimously gave!*" In Nos. 54—56, pp. 43, 44, &c. we find Seymour, Westmorland, Manteuffel, and Nesselrode, all joyfully announcing the acceptance by Russia of this note, and calculating, as they had good reason to do, upon immediate and complete success. In No. 54, August 6th, 1853, p. 46, we find Count Nesselrode telling Count Mayendorff at Vienna thus:—"Russia fully understands that we are not to have or discuss fresh modifications and new drafts drawn up at Constantinople, under the bellicose inspirations which at this moment seem to influence the Sultan and a majority of his ministers." In No. 60, August 12th, 1853, Part II. p. 49, we find Sir H. Seymour telling Lord Stratford that in course of his gratuitous Turkish official propensities, he had assailed Count Nesselrode in the language of complaint about something connected with this branch of the subject, when he received the very pertinent and cutting reply, "You reproach us with our conduct in the Principalities, and you suspect that our object is to gain time." "Now, about the delays which we are supposed to be desirous of interposing. The note which is intended to settle affairs reaches us on a Tuesday; on the following day our acceptance of it, *without the slightest alteration*, is sent off by telegraph as far as Warsaw, and from thence

¹ "As that treaty had respect only to the general principle of toleration towards the Christian faith, this was an assurance which might, indeed, be superfluous, but could not be open to any other objection. The English Government had suggested a *verbal alteration* in the original draft of the note, the object of which was to disconnect the promise given as to the future, and as to the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church in particular, from the previous assurance with respect to the treaty of Kainardji. This had been agreed to, and the wording of the note, in this matter of argument, specially excluded the Russian plea, that that treaty had entitled the Emperor to make any further demand whatever." — *Edinburgh Review*, No. 203, p. 28, (*Defence of our Government*.)

by a *field Jager* to Vienna, where it arrives on Saturday; we subscribe without hesitation to the slight changes made in the note in London and Paris, and the acknowledgment of our acquiescence reaches us again on the following Tuesday—a rapidity of communication of which there has hitherto been no example. This does not look like a desire to protract affairs:” adding, “I entreat you to believe that, on our side, we are just as desirous of leaving the Principalities as you are to withdraw your ships from Besika.”

The note in question was returned from Constantinople refused, without the modifications subsequently adverted to. In No. 65,¹ “those modifications,” says Lord Westmorland, “have been received by Count Buol with *great regret*, because they do not appear to have been sufficiently necessary to have imposed upon the Turkish Government the *obligation of insisting upon them*, in opposition to the advice of the Governments, its allies, with the certainty of occasioning delay in the arrangement of the question at issue, and the risk of re-opening a discussion which, by the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia, might have been considered as nearly closed.” And in No. 77,² Count Buol again expresses himself thus: “He *greatly laments* the modifications which the Porte had thought it right to introduce in the Vienna note,”—“but that he strongly recommended their adoption, as a means, without any loss of dignity to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, of bringing these unfortunate differences to a close.” In No. 80,³ Lord Cowley states that M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed to him “the disappointment with which the Emperor had learned the little attention paid by the Sultan’s ministers to the advice of his Majesty’s allies, and to prescribe to M. de la Cour to use all his efforts to induce the Porte to rescind its present decision.” The Prussian Government also expressed their great regret at the unexpected result; and Lord Clarendon, on the part of the British Government, took, as we shall presently see, wider and more determined ground to express his disappointment. Lord Stratford and Sir H. Seymour only appear to have felt no regret; on the contrary, the latter coolly observes, No. 71, p. 75, that he recommends the Turkish refusal “*to the serious and candid appreciation of her Majesty’s Government!*”

The resolution of the Turkish Government to reject every proposi-

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, August 28th, 1853, Part II, p. 52.

² Westmorland to Clarendon, August 28th, 1853, Part II, p. 85. In the hope that the Vienna note would have been accepted, Count Buol tells us (p. 106), “that the Russian order had already been prepared for commencing the evacuation of the Principalities.” And Lord Clarendon tells us (No. 84, p. 89) that Russia “never required that the squadrons should quit their position *before* the Russian troops quitted theirs.”

³ Cowley to Clarendon, August 30th, 1853, p. 85.

tion, however reasonable, and from whatever quarter it might come, had previously been taken. In No. 68,¹ Lord Stratford tells us, "that the majority of the Turkish council *declared it to be their firm intention to reject the new proposal* (the Vienna note), *even if amendments were introduced* ; and this, too, although the Minister of Foreign Affairs assured them that the "*note was founded, in some measure, on the draft which he had himself prepared for Prince Menchikoff!*" To work with such people was labour thrown away. Yet every extenuation and justification of their conduct that could be devised or thought of, was always ready at hand, especially by Sir H. Seymour and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Page 81, Inclosure 2, No. 71.—Copy of the Vienna Projet de Note, as modified by the Sublime Porte.

"If the emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman empire, the sultans have never refused again to confirm them² by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects.

"His Majesty, the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, now reigning, inspired with the same dispositions, and being desirous of giving to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, has been solely influenced by his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into serious consideration the representations which his Highness Prince Menchikoff conveyed to the Sublime Porte.

"The undersigned has, in consequence, received orders to declare by the present note, that the Government of his Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion ;³ and that his Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by his Majesty's august ancestors to the Orthodox Eastern Church, which are maintained and confirmed by him ; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted piety, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by Convention or special arrangement.⁴

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, August 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 71.

² "*The religion and Orthodox Greek Church, the sultans have never ceased to provide for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities which, at different times, they have spontaneously granted to that religion and to that Church in the Ottoman empire, and to confirm them.*"

³ "*To the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection, by the Sublime Porte, of the Christian religion, and he is moreover charged to make known.*"

⁴ "*Granted, or which might be granted to the other Christian communities, Ottoman subjects.*"

The effect of these Turkish alterations, had they been acceded to, would have been to annul and render waste paper all the previous treaties with Russia for more than 100 years; to have left all the Christians of the Greek Church in the Ottoman dominions at the mercy of a Mohammedan Government, to the same extent as they ever had been under that sceptre for 400 years. "What the Turks never cease to insist upon," says Lord Stratford (No. 308, Part II. p. 291), "is a clear and *unquestionable deliverance from Russian interference* applied to spiritual matters." It at once also obliterated, as unjust and unnecessary, every complaint that Russia may have previously made for redress of their grievances. It did more—it left the Turkish Government full liberty to grant to the *Latin Church* privileges and immunities which the Eastern Christian population, though enormously superior in numbers, were neither entitled to seek, to expect, or to enjoy, and in this way to gain the support of the Latin Church, and of France, its protector. This was the secret object all along aimed at. To gain this it precipitated the war, and, consequently, gained the war parties the support of the Pope, and of France, and all the Roman Catholic votaries, and the heterogeneous combination and array of supporters, each for some peculiar, and selfish purpose, that rose up throughout Europe, and arrayed themselves under the banners of the unholy and dangerous alliance above-mentioned. Count Nesselrode, so far as Russia was concerned, fully understood and properly valued this manœuvre. Let us now attend to Lord Clarendon's letter.

No. 88, pp. 91—96.—*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

"Foreign Office, September 10th, 1853.

"MY LORD,—Her Majesty's Government have had under their serious consideration the note addressed by Reschid Pasha to the representatives of the four powers at Constantinople on the 19th of August, explaining the modifications proposed by the Porte to the project of note sent from Vienna, p. 91." * * *

"Upon this suggestion being made known to your Excellency, and to your colleagues of France and Prussia, by Reschid Pasha, and also by the Internuncio, you assembled the representatives of the four powers at your house, and they concurred in agreeing to suggest to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to frame a draft of note, which should combine Prince Menchikoff's draft and that of Reschid Pasha, in the hope that a note might be drawn up, which should be at once acceptable to Russia, and should, at the same time, not trench upon the principle which the Porte considered essential for the maintenance of its sovereign rights.

"This suggestion was laid before the Sultan, and, as stated in your Excellency's despatch of the 9th of July, after an unexplained delay of several days, returned to Reschid Pasha with his Majesty's sanction; but no

subsequent communication was made either to your Excellency, or, as far as you know, to your colleagues on the subject.

“ Her Majesty’s Government thought it most unfortunate, as well as ungracious towards the Austrian Government, that this opportunity for effecting an arrangement should thus, and without even a reason for it being assigned, have been neglected ; but it was not unnatural for the Austrian Government to suppose that a repetition of the request would be useless, and considering that the occupation of the Principalities was fraught with danger, not to Turkey alone, but to the peace of Europe, Count Buol thought it advisable to call together the representatives of England, France, and Prussia, and with their concurrence to prepare a note that might prove acceptable both to Russia and the Porte.

“ With this object they took the note which had been drawn up by the French Government, and which having been, at one time, communicated by the French minister at St. Petersburg to Count Nesselrode, had been favourably received ; and her Majesty’s Government and the French Government then consulted as to adopting this note, with certain modifications that it seemed to require ; and both Governments replied that, without seeing the modifications, they could give no assent ; but upon their being transmitted and carefully considered, they appeared to be *unobjectionable*, and were approved, although, afterwards, an alteration was made by her Majesty’s Government more effectually to guard the interests of Turkey. And it is hardly necessary to add, that if the English and French Governments had not concurred in thinking that those interests were protected, and that the principle for which we had all along been contending was maintained, neither Government would have assented to the note.

“ When things had thus far advanced, the Turkish project arrived at Vienna. It consisted of the protest against the occupation of the Principalities, enclosed in a note from Reschid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, *and to be followed by another note less definite in its meaning than that which he had been ready to address to Prince Menchikoff.* Such a proposal could not have led to the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries—it was sure to be declined by Russia ; the forwarding it to St. Petersburg could only have been productive of further loss of time—a consideration of the utmost importance ; and a preference was therefore unanimously given to the note which, in substance, had been well received at St. Petersburg, and which there was every reason to expect would meet the views of the Turkish Government. This project was received at Constantinople on the 9th ultimo ; but it was not until the 19th that the note was accepted with modifications.

“ Her Majesty’s Government are far from denying that these modifications are, in themselves, unobjectionable ; but they do not consider them of that vital importance, nor that they offer such additional security to Turkey, as to counterbalance the risks to which the Ottoman empire is exposed, by further postponing the settlement of this unfortunate question.

“ The first objection taken by the Porte is to the following paragraph :—
‘ If the emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude

for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman empire, the sultans have never refused again to confirm them by solemn acts.'

"Now, it appears to be natural that the emperors of Russia should exhibit solicitude for those who profess their religion, and are living under Mohammedan rule ; but her Majesty's Government cannot consider that, by the paragraph in question, this solicitude shown in times past can be taken to have imposed any obligation, or to imply that the acts of the sultans in favour of the Greek Church were not voluntary and spontaneous, and upon no construction of this passage could Russia found any future claim to require of the Sultan to perform such acts. The passage is simply historical, and may be true or false, but Russia establishes no right, and Turkey takes no engagement by the recital. The great powers of Europe have, at different times, manifested their active solicitude for the Christian subjects of the Porte ; none more frequently or energetically than England. They have done so in behalf of suffering humanity and outraged religion, and their just remonstrances have met with more or less success. But the power of the Sultan not to listen to them has never been questioned ; and the right of Christian powers thus to interfere may again and again be exercised without prejudice to his independence. Can there be any doubt that the firmans which the Sultan, of his own free will, lately issued, were in consequence of the anxiety for his Christian subjects felt by his Christian allies, or that those Christian subjects will not obtain some alleviation of the sufferings and injustice to which they are exposed, by the powerful protests which your Excellency, a short time ago, felt yourself compelled to address to the Porte ? In listening to such remonstrances, and in acting upon them, the Porte acquires respect and esteem, but it parts with no right, and contracts no engagement.

"Reschid Pasha says, with reference to the paragraph, that no one would consent to draw down upon himself the reproaches and the blame of his contemporaries, as well as posterity, by admitting the establishment of a state of things as injurious for the present as the future ; or to put in writing words that could detract from the glory of institutions that the Ottoman emperors have founded, by a spontaneous movement of their personal generosity and innate clemency. But the paragraph neither warrants any such interpretation, nor calls for any such censure ; *and if it did, it would be as applicable to Great Britain, to France, and to Austria, as to Russia.*

"In considering the original draft of the note, the special attention of her Majesty's Government was directed to the treaty of Kainardji, for the purpose of securing that the Porte should be called upon to do no more with respect to religious privileges than that to which Reschid Pasha says it is ready to consent, namely, to express 'assurances calculated to disperse the doubts brought forward by the Russian Government, and which have formed the subject of the discussions.'

"But the paragraph states that 'the Government of his Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the treaties of

Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion.'

"To this there can be no objection, because Reschid Pasha says : 'As no one can deny that this treaty exists, and that it is confirmed by that of Adrianople, it is quite apparent that the precise dispositions of it will be faithfully observed.'

"The second part of the paragraph, however, is in no way dependent upon the first, but, on the contrary, is disconnected from it. It does not say that, as a consequence of the treaty, the Sultan 'will regard,' &c., but the word 'and' is expressly introduced to guard against such a consequence being assumed. The true reading, therefore, is, 'the Sultan will remain faithful to the treaties;' his Majesty also 'considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by his Majesty's august ancestors to the Orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by her.'

"Now, if any part of this paragraph can justify the fears entertained by Reschid Pasha, of giving 'to the Government of Russia grounds for claiming to exercise a right of superintendence and interference in such matters,' it assuredly is not the first passage, nor its supposed connexion with the second, but it is the second itself, by which the Sultan makes no ordinary engagement, but pledges his honour to maintain for ever inviolate all the privileges enjoyed by the Greek Church ; and this second passage is taken from the note which Reschid Pasha was prepared to address to Prince Menchikoff.

"With respect to the third paragraph objected to by the Porte, the view of her Majesty's Government was precisely that which is taken in the note of Reschid Pasha : 'It cannot be doubted that the Imperial Government will not hesitate to cause the Greek rite to participate, not only in the advantages which, of its own will, it has granted to the other communions of the Christian religion professed by the communities its subjects, but in those also which it might grant to them for the future.' The passage which follows the words 'moreover,' was meant to have a prospective sense, and the words 'Christian rites' were understood to apply to subjects of the Porte." (Pp. 92, 93.)

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"Such being the opinion of her Majesty's Government, they cannot but regret the course that has been pursued at Constantinople. They do not question the right or the propriety, on the part of the Turkish Government, to examine closely that which was proposed for their adoption ; but if it had been signed subject to any reservations that the Porte thought necessary, or if the judicious proposal of your Excellency, as reported in your despatch of the 18th of August, had been acted upon, great delay would have been avoided, and some important advantages might have been gained.

"Such a mode of proceeding would at once have removed the doubts which now generally prevail respecting the desire or intention of the Porte

to effect a peaceful settlement ; and, as the modifications proposed by the Turkish Government merely *interpret the note in the sense intended by the four powers*, they could not have hesitated to accept them, and thus give the Sultan a security for the future. In fact, they would have constituted themselves referees as to the true interpretation of the note, in the event of any difference arising hereafter upon it between the Porte and Russia. Not only were these modifications considered unimportant, and as not altering the sense of the note, by the Austrian Government, but by the Russian minister at Vienna ; and it might reasonably, therefore, have been expected, that if the note had been signed, *Russia would have joined the four powers in agreeing to its right interpretation.*

“ Your Excellency will understand that the modifications, although in the opinion of her Majesty’s Government unnecessary, are not objected to as unreasonable, but that the mode of proposing them is likely to be productive of embarrassment, and to retard the solution of a question which Turkey is so deeply interested in settling ; and they do not disguise from themselves that the Emperor of Russia, with reference to the condition upon which he reluctantly adhered to the note, may now decline to agree to the changes, notwithstanding that they have been strongly recommended by the four powers to his acceptance.

“ Reschid Pasha, in his note, says, that in the event of the modifications being adopted, the Porte will immediately send an ambassador extraordinary, upon condition of the evacuation of the Principalities ; and he adds, that a solid guarantee will be expected from the powers, ‘ against all interference in future,’ and against the occupation from time to time of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

“ With respect to the first, it has always been considered, not only by her Majesty’s Government, but by the four powers, that the evacuation of the provinces was the *sine quâ non* of any arrangement being concluded on the part of the Porte ; and they have no reason to doubt, but on the contrary they have cause to believe, that if the note had been accepted by the Porte, the orders for the withdrawal of the Russian troops would long before this time have been given.

“ As regards the *solid guarantee* expected by the Porte, Reschid Pasha *must well know that it is utterly impossible for the four powers to enter into any such engagement.* The term ‘interference’ by itself is most vague, and might be held to the legitimate reclamations and remonstrances that, according to international law and usage, every Government is entitled to address to another ; nor could the four powers make such a proposal to Russia, and still less give any guarantee upon the subject, without reciprocally imposing upon themselves similar conditions, and thus leaving the Turkish Government at perfect liberty to deal as it pleased with the religious, the social, and the commercial interests of their respective subjects throughout the Ottoman empire. In short, it would be as impossible to promise that, for the future, there shall be no ‘interference’ on the part of Russia, as it would be to undertake that, towards that power, there shall *never be a just cause of complaint given by Turkey* ; and, if any such

engagement were entered into by the four powers, it might be justly considered by Turkey as an insult to her honour, and a disregard for her independence, which she would not endure.

"Equally difficult would it be to give a solid guarantee *against any future occupation of the Principalities*, with reference to the peculiar treaty which exists between the two powers respecting those provinces, and which, under certain circumstances (of which the powers could not always constitute themselves judges), *gives to Russia, as well as to Turkey, the right of sending troops there*. That treaty, it is true, has now been grossly violated; but it is to be hoped that there will be no renewal of an act against which the opinion of Europe has been unequivocally pronounced."—Pp. 93—95.

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"In conclusion, I have to observe that these *last conditions* were not made in the note sent to Vienna, and which, without them, the Porte was prepared to sign as a final settlement of the question. *There is consequently some reason to apprehend that they have since been brought forward, under the conviction that they could not be complied with*; and, should this unfortunately be the case, it will verify the prediction of your Excellency, made as long ago as the 10th of July, that there would soon be more to apprehend from the rashness than from the timidity of the Turkish ministers; and it will confirm the opinion lately communicated to her Majesty's Government, and which they gather also from the tone of your Excellency's despatches, namely, *that the feeling of the Turkish Government is a desire for war, founded on the conviction that France and England must still perforce side with Turkey*, and that the war will, therefore, be a successful one for the Sultan, and maintain for him guarantees for the future which will materially strengthen HIS TOTTERING POWER.

"England and France will shrink from no obligation that their honour and duty clearly prescribe, let the sacrifice be what it may of fulfilling that obligation. *Although bound by no treaty stipulations*, they look upon the maintenance of the Ottoman empire as a great feature of European policy, and they desire to uphold the dignity and independence of the Sultan. But other interests besides those of Turkey are committed to their charge, and before they expose these to the danger and the injury that war would inevitably entail, they are bound to take care that no effort for the preservation of peace has been omitted; and it is, therefore, in the most friendly spirit, and with a sincere regard for the best interests of Turkey, that her Majesty's Government advise the Porte not to be dazzled by the military preparations which, with laudable zeal for their own defence, they have lately made; not to yield to the religious fanaticism, for which such just provocation has been given, nor to think *that war under the present circumstances of the Ottoman empire can fail to be attended with consequences most disastrous*; but, on the contrary, that they should exhibit a cordial readiness to adopt, and not a desire to evade, such an adjustment of their present unfortunate differences with Russia as they may think safe and honourable.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

"CLARENDON."

No. 93, Part II. pp. 99—101.—*Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff (communicated to the Earl of Clarendon, by Baron Brunnow, September 16th).*

August 26th,
St. Petersburg, September 7th, 1853.

"I will not in this place examine the alterations which have been made at Constantinople; I have done so in a separate despatch. I will for the present confine myself to demanding whether the Emperor, *after having denied himself the power of changing even a single word*, in a draft of note drawn up without his participation, *can allow* the Ottoman Porte to retain that power for itself, and permit Russia to be thus placed in a position of *inferiority* as regards Turkey. We conceive that the dignity of the Emperor precludes this. Let the course of events be called to mind. In the place of the 'Menchikoff note,' the adoption of which without alteration we had put forward as the condition of the re-establishment of our relations with the Porte, a different note was proposed to us. For this reason alone we might have declined to discuss it. We might, whilst acceding to it, have had more than one objection to offer to it, more than one alteration of its terms to insert in it. You are well aware, M. le Baron, that from the time that we consented to modify the ultimatum which we had presented at Constantinople, the form of a note is not that which could have suited us. You are acquainted with the plan and form of arrangement which we should have preferred. Nevertheless, we did not insist on that plan. We set it completely aside as soon as other proposals were made to us. Wherefore? Because, by opposing to these a counter project, or any counter propositions whatever, which, nevertheless, we had a full and perfect right to do, we might have incurred the reproach of seeking to protract the matter, and gratuitously to prolong a crisis which occasions anxiety to Europe. Wishing, on the contrary, to bring that crisis as soon as possible to an end, and acquiescing with this view in the wishes which were expressed to us, we sacrificed our objections of substance and of form. On the mere receipt of the first draft of note agreed upon at Vienna, and even before we knew if it would be approved at London and at Paris, we announced by telegraph our adhesion to it.

"The draft, as finally agreed upon, was sent to us at a later period, *and although it had been modified in a sense which we could not mistake*, nevertheless we did not, on that account, retract our adhesion or raise the slightest difficulty. Was it possible, we ask, to manifest greater readiness and more conciliatory dispositions? But when we acted in this manner, it was well understood that it was on condition that the draft of note, which the Emperor had accepted without discussion, should be accepted in the same manner by the Porte. It was under the conviction that Austria would regard it as an ultimatum in which no change was to be made, as a last effort of its friendly intervention, which, if the effort were to fail by reason of the obstinacy of the Divan, would cease *ipso facto*. We regret to perceive that such is not the case. But the cabinet of Vienna will, on its side, admit that if it is a question not of ultimatum, but of a new draft of note which each of the two parties is at liberty to modify, we then resume

the right which we had voluntarily renounced of proposing, in our turn, our own alterations—of again considering the draft of arrangement—and of altering not only its terms but its form.

“ Would this result enter into the views of Austria? Would it suit the powers, who, by modifying and adopting her draft of note, made it their own work? It is for them to consider the delays which will necessarily result from such a course, or to examine whether it is for the interest of Europe to cut these delays short. We see only one way of putting an end to them. It is that Austria and the powers should frankly and firmly declare to the Porte that, having opened to it in vain the only way which can lead to the immediate re-establishment of its relations with us, they thenceforth abandon to it the task. We conceive, that if they hold this language unanimously to them, the Turks, yielding to the advice of Europe, instead of reckoning upon its assistance in a contest against Russia, will accept the note such as it is, and will cease to prejudice their position in so serious a manner in order to afford themselves the childish satisfaction of having modified certain expressions of the document, which we had accepted without discussion. For one of two things—either the modifications required by the Porte are important, and then it is very obvious we should refuse to assent to them; or they are insignificant, and in that case, why should the Porte continue, without necessity, to make its acceptance dependent on them.

“ In conclusion, M. le Baron, the ultimatum agreed upon at Vienna is not ours. It is that of Austria and the powers, who having in the first instance devised, discussed, and modified it in its original terms, have considered that it might be accepted by the Porte without prejudice to its interest and to its honour. It is for them, therefore, and not for us, forthwith to bring to an end the uncertainties of the present crisis. We, on our sides, have done all that depended upon us to abridge useless delays, by renouncing, when the arrangement was proposed to us, all kinds of counter propositions whatever: no one can refuse this testimony to the sincerity of the Emperor. *Having for a long time exhausted the measure of concessions without the Porte having hitherto made a single one, his Majesty cannot go further without prejudice to his position, and without exposing himself to the risk of renewing his political relations with Turkey under unfavourable circumstances, which would deprive them of all stability for the future, and would inevitably bring on a fresh and more decided rupture.* At the present moment, indeed, fresh concessions in regard to the terms of the note would serve no purpose; for we perceive, by your despatches, that the Ottoman Government is only waiting for our acquiescence in the alterations made in the Vienna note, in order to make its signature of it, as well as the mission of the ambassador who is to convey it here, dependent on fresh conditions and inadmissible propositions, which it has already put forward on the subject of the evacuation of the Principalities. On this last point, M. le Baron, we can only refer to the assurances and explanations contained in our despatch of the 10th of August; and repeat that the arrival at St. Petersburg of a Turkish ambassador, bearer of the

Austrian note without alterations, will be sufficient to ensure our troops being immediately ordered to repass our frontier. Receive, &c.

(Signed)

"NESSELRODE."

No. 94, pp. 103—105.—*Russian Analysis of the three Modifications introduced by the Ottoman Porte into the Vienna Note.*

"1. In the Vienna draft it is said, 'If the emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman empire,' &c.

"This passage has been thus modified: 'If the emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the religion and Orthodox Greek Church.'

"The words, 'in the Ottoman empire,' as well as those, 'the maintenance of the immunities and privileges,' have been struck out, in order to be transposed to a subsequent passage, and applied to the sultans alone. This omission deprives the mutilated passage of all its meaning and sense; for no one assuredly disputes the active solicitude of the sovereigns of Russia for the religion which they profess themselves, and which is that of their subjects. What it was designed to recognise is, that there has ever existed, on the part of Russia, active solicitude for her co-religionists in Turkey, as also for the maintenance of their religious immunities, and that the Ottoman Government is disposed to take account of that solicitude, and also to leave those immunities untouched.

"The present expression is the more unacceptable since, by the terms which follow it, more than solicitude for the Orthodox religion is attributed to the sultans. It is affirmed that they have never ceased to watch over the maintenance of its immunities and privileges, and to confirm them by solemn acts. However, it is precisely the reverse of what is thus stated, which, having more than once occurred in times past, and specifically in the affair of the Holy Places, has compelled us to apply a remedy to it, by demanding a more express guarantee for the future. If we lend ourselves to the admission that the Ottoman Government has never ceased to watch over the maintenance of the privileges of the Greek Church, what becomes of the complaints which we have brought against it? By doing so, we admit that we had no legitimate grounds of complaint; that Prince Menchikoff's mission was without motive; that, in a word, even the note which it has addressed to us was wholly superfluous.

"2. The suppressions and additions of words introduced into this passage, with marked affectation, are evidently intended to invalidate the treaty of Kainardji, while having the appearance of confirming it.

"It was said in the note originally drawn up at Vienna, that 'faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the stipulations of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion, the Sultan considered himself bound in honour . . . to preserve from all

prejudice . . . the immunities and privileges granted to the Orthodox Greek Church.' These terms, which made the maintenance of the immunities to be derived from the very spirit of the treaty—that is to say, from the general principle laid down in the Seventh Article—were in conformity with the doctrine which we have maintained and still maintain. For, according to us, the promise to protect a religion and its churches, implies, of necessity, the maintenance of the immunities enjoyed by them. They are two inseparable things. These terms, originally agreed upon at Vienna, were *subsequently first modified at Paris and at London*, and if we did not object to this at the time, as we should have been entitled to do, *it is not that we misunderstand the purport of that alteration*. We clearly perceived the distinction made between two points, which, in our estimation, are indissolubly connected with each other ; but this distinction was, however, marked with sufficient delicacy to admit of our accepting, from a spirit of conciliation, and from a desire of speedily arriving at a definitive solution, the terms of the note as they were presented to us, which we thenceforth looked upon as unalterable. These motives of deference no longer apply to the fresh modification of the same passage, which has been made at Constantinople. The line of demarcation between the two subjects is there too plainly drawn to admit of our accepting it, without falsifying all that we have said and written. The mention of the treaty of Kainardji is superfluous, and its confirmation without object, from the time that its general principle is no longer applied to the maintenance of the religious immunities of the religion. It is for this object that the words, 'the letter and the spirit,' have been suppressed. The fact that the protection of the Christian religion is exercised 'by the Sublime Porte' is needlessly insisted on, as if we pretended ourselves to exercise that protection in the Sultan's dominions ; and as it is, at the same time, omitted to notice that, according to the terms of the treaty, the protection is a promise made, and an engagement undertaken by the Sultan, there is an appearance of throwing a doubt upon the right which we possess of watching over the strict fulfilment of that promise.

"3. The alteration proposed in this passage of the Austrian note is altogether inadmissible.

"The Ottoman Government would merely engage to allow the Orthodox Church to share in the advantages which it might grant to other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte. But if those communities, whether Catholics or others, were not composed of native rayahs, but of foreign monks or laymen (and such is the case with nearly the whole of the convents, hospitals, seminaries, and bishoprics of the Latin rite in Turkey), and if, let us say, it should be the good pleasure of the Porte to grant to those establishments fresh religious advantages and privileges, the Orthodox communities, in their character of Ottoman subjects, would not, *under the terms which it is desired to introduce into the note, have the right of obtaining the same favours, nor would Russia have the right of interceding for them*.

"The malevolent intention of the ministers of the Porte will become still more evident, if we cite an instance, a possible contingency. Let us sup-

pose the very probable case of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, recently extolled, obtaining from the Porte prerogatives not enjoyed by the Greek Patriarch. Any claim on the part of the latter would be rejected, in consideration of his character of 'subject of the Porte.'

"The same objection would be made by the Ottoman ministry with reference to the Catholic establishments of Palestine, in case any fresh advantage or right, not specified in the last firmans, should hereafter be granted to them, to the prejudice of the native communities."

Of this able despatch we find (in No. 121¹) Lord Westmorland stating to Lord Clarendon that it gave Count Nesselrode (then at Olmutz) "pleasure to be able at once to say, that the despatch that I had read to him, addressed by your Lordship to Lord Stratford on the 10th instant, was satisfactory to him;" and further on, that "his Majesty the Emperor had expressed his satisfaction with the views and reasoning so ably put forward by your Lordship in the despatch addressed to Lord Stratford (Sept. 10th, 1853, quoted p. 91); but that he had been annoyed and hurt at the doubts which seemed to be expressed in the one addressed to me, as to whether he intended to adhere to the policy he had so distinctly and so unreservedly declared to be the one by which he would be ruled." In that despatch "the policy of suspicion" had raised its head.

It might in justice have been supposed, that, after propositions so clear and so plain, drawn up by the collective, or, at least what is believed to be the collective, wisdom of Europe, that in case of refusal of their propositions and advice, the blame of failure would have been left to remain on the heads of the power that had declined advice, namely Turkey, and that we should not have found a British minister standing foremost to proclaim his own ignorance and rashness, and to defend the Turks: but the case was different. Lord Stratford had been again at work, and had his fresh plan to terminate the quarrel which he had done so much to produce. It is as follows, and though not then acted upon, proved the guiding star of further schemes as irrelevant as it was to the real point in dispute.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, (received August 3d).
(Plan to be addressed to Russia.)*

"Therapia, July 23d, 1853.

"MY LORD,—Aware of the deep interest taken by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and by the vast majority of his people, in all that concerns the religion which they profess, and fully appreciating the motives of that interest, I had much pleasure in making known to your Excellency

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, Sept. 28th, 1853, Part II. p. 138.

the firmans which the Sultan, my gracious sovereign, promulgated at the end of Shaban in this year; and, for the removal of all doubts, I now assure you, on behalf of the Sublime Porte, that it is the sincere intention of his Imperial Majesty, reserving the sacred rights of sovereignty towards his own subjects, to secure to the Greek or Orthodox Church, by means of those firmans duly enforced, the enjoyment of the privileges thereby confirmed, and also of such other privileges and immunities as may hereafter be granted by his Majesty to any other sect whatever of his Christian subjects.

“The Sublime Porte entertains no doubt that the assurance grounded on the above-mentioned firmans, which have inspired confidence everywhere, will also give satisfaction to Russia.”

Inclosure 2 in No. 39.—Project of Convention.

“Malta Lima, le 23^e Juillet, 1853.

“The representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, having met together in conference with the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his Highness’s invitation, Reschid Pasha stated as follows :—

“I am directed by his Majesty the Sultan to communicate to your Excellencies, with a translation in the French language, this document, which is a draft of note which, dictated by real sentiments of conciliation, appears to the Imperial Government calculated to meet the wish of Russia in regard to the question of religious privileges.

“I declare, officially, that the Porte is resolved not to go beyond the terms of a note strictly conformable to this draft, any other arrangement appearing to it to be prejudicial to the sacred rights of its sovereignty and of its independence.

“It is well understood that, so soon as the Court of Russia shall have announced its acceptance of this draft, the Porte will not hesitate to send an ambassador to St. Petersburg, charged to deliver the aforesaid note.

“In return for these formal assurances, the Porte expects that the Court of Russia will not delay giving orders for the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities.

“Finally, I declare, in the name of his Majesty the Sultan, that if, notwithstanding all these efforts to arrive at a peaceful and honourable arrangement, he should be compelled to take other measures for the independence of his empire and the integrity of his rights, the war which might ensue would only be looked upon by him as a contest for the maintenance of his independence.”

“His Highness concluded this communication by requesting the representatives to have the goodness to undertake to convey the foregoing declaration, as well as the draft of note, to their colleagues at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, as supplementary to the previous communication relating to the same matter, and to obtain, with as little delay as possible, a reply from the Russian Cabinet, to be forwarded forthwith to Constantinople.”

Acting upon Lord Stratford's advice (No. 73¹) that the Turks had acted fairly, and could not have acted differently, the moment that Lord Clarendon saw the Turkish modifications he announced, with no ordinary satisfaction, that the Turks were right, and that England would support them in their views and resolutions! He at once changes his tune and his tone, and calls upon Russia, the party originally and sorely grieved, and acknowledged by all to have been so, without receiving full and adequate redress, to give way or abide the consequences, and also calls upon all the other powers to insist upon her doing so! He declined the first advice of France to reiterate the acceptance of the Vienna note by the Turks, receiving at the same time a clear acknowledgment that it did bear, in his mind, the interpretation that the Porte put upon it. Finding England resolute in her forward course, France readily consented to follow, caring little how her work was done so that it was done. He turned a deaf ear to the urgent and repeated solicitations of Austria and Prussia, but especially the former, to adopt this reasonable course, while he at the same moment knew that the Turks had decided upon war, which war he knew he was ready to support. This resolution and this opinion on the part of Great Britain impelled the Turks onward in their warlike course, and rendered all further reasonable and rational negotiations with them hopeless. Let us attend for a moment to the letter and the spirit of his declarations. In No. 128² he informed Baron Brunnov, who seems to have been abashed at his manner, "in the meanwhile I should not hesitate to inform him that, under no circumstances, would her Majesty's Government recommend the Turkish Government now to *accept* the Vienna note." In No. 135,³ repudiating the words, "letter and spirit of the treaty of Kainardji," and insisting, in the face of his former deliberate opinions, and of the strongest evidence to the contrary, that a new right is sought by Russia, his Lordship concludes a despatch founded wholly upon his "*policy of suspicion*," thus:—"If Europe is, for such causes, to be exposed to the calamities of war, they will be without parallel in history; and I again express the earnest hope of her Majesty's Government, that the Austrian Government *will not attempt to obtain the concessions contained in the Vienna note, which the Porte cannot grant*, but that it will spare no effort to persuade the cabinet of St. Petersburg frankly and at once to give effect to the *reiterated declarations* of the Emperor." In No. 101⁴ the Austrian

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, August 20th, 1853, Part II. p. 82.

² Clarendon to Seymour, Oct. 6th, 1853, Part II. p. 137.

³ Clarendon to Westmorland, Oct. 9th, 1853, Part II. p. 143.

⁴ Clarendon to Westmorland, Sept. 21st, 1853, Part II. p. 111.

Government expressed itself in the strongest manner on this point. "The Austrian Government felt sure that they would now all agree in urging the Porte no longer to refuse accepting the note as it stood. At all events, if her counsels were again disregarded, Austria, while deploring the fatal consequences which must ensue from a fresh refusal on the part of the Porte to defer to the wishes of the powers, could only consider her efforts to *effect a reconciliation at an end*." In No. 124¹ Austria again uses strong and proper language, thus:—"If the Porte is made to understand that, should it remain deaf to the representations of its allies, it will lose all title to their support. Nothing would have more effect, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, in making the admirers of the Porte aware of the dangers to which the Ottoman empire is exposed, than language held by the maritime powers proportionate to the gravity of the occasion. If the Porte should push their blindness so far as to desire to take the initiative in hostilities, then the Austrian Government considers it time to declare openly to the Porte that it will be reduced to *complete isolation*, of which it can easily foresee the consequences."

The annals of diplomacy, however crooked and ignorant, do not afford a case in any way to compare or to contrast with the present. Here we have, if Lord Clarendon's words were strictly correct, an acknowledgment that four of the greatest cabinets in Europe were either inconceivable political simpletons, or intended knaves. We are unblushingly told, that they either did not understand what they wrote, or that they clothed their views in such language that it might not be understood; and, in short, that their intentions were different from the meaning they conveyed—in short, that with the Turks they intended to deceive Russia. In No. 213, Part II. p. 217, Nov. 17th, his Lordship tells us that the Turks interpret the note, or read it, as he then did! No doubt they would agree to this new interpretation! The note, we have seen, was recommended and urged in its plain bearing upon the Ottoman Government, as the unanimous opinion and decision of the four great powers. Lord Clarendon turns round and states that the Turkish alterations were right (No. 100²), that the Russian interpretation of the note "was at variance with the *intentions* of the four powers," and that all the other powers agree with him in opinion that they were so. Now we find (No. 126³) that Count Buol could not "entirely agree to the proposition." In No. 115,⁴ we find Lord

¹ Clarendon to Westmorland, Oct. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 133.

² Clarendon to Westmorland, Sept. 20th, 1853, Part II. p. 110.

³ Clarendon to Westmorland, Oct. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 132.

⁴ Loftus to Clarendon, Sept. 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 121.

Loftus telling us that when he communicated Lord Clarendon's changed tone to Baron Manteuffel, "his Excellency seemed *much surprised* at this intelligence," and heard a long despatch read in explanation of it, "without expressing any decided opinion." The French Government, at the first communication of the resolve to them, stated that they should re-urge upon the Porte to accept the note as it had been drawn up. Yet, with all this before him, Lord Clarendon (No. 125¹) instructs Lord Loftus to tell the Prussian Government that "it is quite impossible for her Majesty's Government now, under *any circumstances* or conditions whatever, to recommend the adoption of the Vienna note to the Porte, nor," as he stated (No. 106²) to Lord Cowley, "to offer the *British interpretation* of it as an inducement to the Turkish Government to adopt it!" But this was not all. In a separate despatch to Lord Cowley of the same date, Lord Clarendon adds, that even "if active hostilities" should have "commenced," he would take no measures to oppose them; or in other, and his own words, "they will certainly offer no advice to the Turkish Government contrary to the interests of the Porte."

Lord Stratford's prescriptions, especially the strong dose in No. 38 (July 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 31), had already taken full effect. He tells Lord Clarendon—whining about suffering Turkey—"it is evidently most desirable to shorten it by *all available means*, and to make it, in case of failure, the passage to a more determined and progressive state of things." "With no *pretensions to foresight*, I cannot conceal my apprehensions that if the last reasonable prospect of bringing Russia to terms by negotiation were allowed to close in despair, the responsibility would rest with those who are *deterred from the performance of duty by the sacrifices* it necessarily involves!" Yes, war by all means, let who will pay for it, in order that Lord Stratford's speculations, crotchets, and resentments, may be carried out! How dangerous it is to trust such servants with power, by placing fleets at their disposal!

The decision of the four powers, in the framing and recommending the Vienna note, was clearly unanimous. Russia, in her manifesto against the Porte, dwelt, as she was entitled to do, upon the fact, and states thus: "To no purpose, even, have the principal powers of Europe sought, by their exhortations, to shake the blind obstinacy of the Ottoman Government." Surely this is correct. (See p. 116.) Yet Lord Clarendon (No. 242³) indignantly denies the fact. "Facts," says he, "do not bear out the statement that the principal powers of Europe had

¹ Clarendon to Loftus, Oct. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 132.

² Clarendon to Cowley, Sept. 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 114.

³ Clarendon to Seymour, Nov. 16th, 1853, Part II. p. 240.

in vain endeavoured to shake the blind obstinacy of the Porte !” The honour and feeling, or “honour and independence” of the obstinate Turk, was here uppermost in Lord Clarendon’s mind, and as more deserving of consideration, than his own or that of his country. How could he forget the note that he had aided in drawing up, that he commanded Lord Stratford to call upon the Turkish Government to sign, and that he ably wrote six folio printed pages to prove was all fair, just, and reasonable, but which he knows the Turks refused, though urged thereto by the four greatest powers in Europe ? These facts stand undeniable. The whole proceedings were characterised by great inconsideration and suspicion, and inferences as contrary to “the intentions of the four powers,” but which intentions no one could know till they made them known, but which they (England and France) kept locked up in their own bosoms. In No. 117,¹ Lord Clarendon makes some very startling statements, which, unless these had been published, could never have been believed to have been made by a British statesman. Amongst others, he states that the Russian complaint about the Holy Places “has been satisfactorily settled !” Now, this is contrary to the fact. The guarantee or “solemn engagement,” required by Russia as the most important part of that settlement, and which all acknowledged she ought to receive, was decidedly refused by Turkey. “But,” says his Lordship, “the Vienna note contains a guarantee against which Russia raises no objections.” Admitted, but then Turkey decidedly refused to sign that note, and Lord Clarendon himself says she ought not to sign it ; consequently, no guarantee was given, and the original question and cause of the dispute remained unsettled. There is no denying this truth, nor evading its force.

Lord Clarendon proceeds with some most dangerous and extraordinary views, such as when he tells us that “the intentions of the Conference” were not that the Sultan should “concede to the Greek Church all such advantages as might be granted to other Christian denominations, but only those advantages which were conceded to communities who, like the Greeks, were Ottoman subjects.” He adds, “that if the Sultan concluded a concordat with THE POPE, conferring privileges on *Roman Catholics*, not subjects of the Porte,” his Greek subjects were not to enjoy anything of the kind ! Well, leave THE POPE unshackled. That is the secret aim ; and would the placing Roman Catholics, not subjects of the Porte, above and before 14,000,000 of Greek Christians, be pleasing to the latter, and preserve peace and union in Turkey ? Certainly not. What would the Protestants in Great Britain say, if their Government were to grant foreign Roman Catholics and Mohammedans privileges

¹ Clarendon to Seymour, Sept. 30th, 1853, p. 123.

in the United Kingdom which none other of our population enjoyed? Let Lord Clarendon try this Stratford-Turkish scheme in this country, and see if he will stand the result.

It is painful to have to wade through such errors and inconsistencies, and to censure the conduct and proceedings of our rulers; but it is necessary to do so, in order to show how clumsily their whole negotiations were conducted, on the part of this country, and to endeavour to elucidate, from their dark declarations, the truth which they sought to conceal, namely, predetermined hostility towards Russia.

The lynx-eye of Nesselrode (No. 94¹) quickly detected the dishonesty concealed under the suppression of the words, "spirit and letter of the treaty of Kainardji," &c., in the Turkish modification which went to annul, and were intended to annul, all the existing treaties between Russia and Turkey; and he rightly concluded that to proceed on such unstable grounds, would be "to renew political relations with Turkey under unfavourable auspices, which would deprive them of all solidity for the future, and inevitably bring about a fresh and more decided rupture." Moreover, Sir H. Seymour (No. 119²) tells us, the rejection by Russia of the Turkish note was not intended to close the door against further negotiations that might bring about a peaceable solution of the dispute, but merely as "declining to concede to the Sultan a faculty which he had not himself exercised, as considering his (the Emperor of Russia's) assent to the Vienna note cancelled so soon as the Sultan's refusal to agree to it became decided, and in this manner as reserving to himself perfect freedom as to the future course of diplomatic action." And, notwithstanding these peremptory and warlike declarations, we shortly afterwards find the British Government, while carrying the sword in its right hand, pressing all and sundry to join to preserve peace, but with the essential difference, that they clung to Turkey as in the right, and decreed Russia to be in the wrong. The wits of statesmen, especially at Vienna, were set to work to devise some new plan of accommodation. The first of these that made its appearance was a scheme emanating from conferences held at Olmutz between the Emperors of Russia and Austria, and an English minister. In No. 122³, Lord Westmorland gives the scheme and the view of it thus:—

"The representatives of the four powers, upon the promise being given by the Porte, that it will sign, in its original form, the Vienna note, are ready to deliver to the Turkish Government a declaration founded upon

¹ Nesselrode's Analysis, August 28th, 1853, Part II. p. 103.

² Seymour to Clarendon, Sept. 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 127.

³ Westmorland to Clarendon, Sept. 28th, 1853, Part II. p. 129.

the assurances given by his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to the effect that his Majesty asks only for a general guarantee of the immunities already granted to the Greek Church, and for nothing which could in any way prejudice the independence or rights of the Sultan, or which would imply a desire to interfere (*ingérer*) with the internal affairs of the Porte: that what the Emperor desires, is the strict maintenance of the *status quo* in all matters appertaining to the Orthodox Greek Church, and the promise to make that Church participate in any future advantages which, at a time subsequent to the present, the Sultan may be disposed to grant to any other denomination of Christians."

"This claim, as your Lordship will observe," says Lord Westmorland, "is very different from that implied in the interpretation which has been given to the paragraph in the Vienna note objected to by Reschid Pasha." "It is, therefore, *prospective* in its operations, and as such, it is not believed that it ought to be in any way a condition onerous to the Porte, or unfitting for it to grant." Lord Clarendon's letter preparatory to it, and the note itself, are here produced. Let them speak for themselves:—

No. 126.—The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

“Foreign Office, October 5, 1853.

“MY LORD,—Count Colloredo has placed in my hands a despatch from Count Buol, in which he refers to the effect produced on the cabinets of London and Paris by the confidential communication made by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, in support of its rejection of the modifications required by the Porte in the Vienna note, and to the explanations which the British and French Governments have considered indispensable, in consequence of the interpretation given to that note by the Government of Russia.

“Baron de Bourqueney, at the moment of Count Buol's departure for Olmutz, received instructions to invite Count Buol to declare, in conjunction with the representatives of the three powers, the true sense of the Vienna note to be opposed to the interpretation put upon it by Count Nesselrode; and although Count Buol could not entirely agree to this proposition, he availed himself of the occasion afforded to him in his interview with Count Nesselrode, to devise some means of giving renewed action to the conferences, which had been for the moment paralysed.

“The explanations of Count Nesselrode have confirmed Count Buol in the conviction that Russia does not aim at any interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire, and that the demands of the Emperor of Russia do not involve anything derogatory to the sovereign rights of the Sultan. And Count Buol regards the declaration of this conviction, as it is embodied in the enclosed *projet de note*, to be the exact and authentic expression of the meaning of the Emperor of Russia, the more especially as his Imperial Majesty has seen and approved this note, as expressing his

real intentions ; and Count Buol is of opinion that the proper method of offering a guarantee against any false interpretation being put on the Vienna note, and of overcoming the scruples of the Porte, would be to make known these intentions by a simultaneous declaration of the representatives of the four powers.

"The Austrian Government is ready to authorize the Internuncio at Constantinople to make the declaration contained in the annexed *projet de note* as soon as his colleagues shall have received a similar authority from their Governments, and shall have been assured that the presentation of this note will be followed by the immediate signature of the Vienna note, and its transmission by an ambassador to St. Petersburg.

"Count Buol hopes that this *projet de note* is calculated to efface the impression produced on the English and French Governments by the last communication from the Russian Government ; and is of opinion, that as the Cabinet of Russia disavows all intention of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, and gives a more satisfactory definition of the rights which it wishes to see guaranteed, as well as an unconditional adherence to the *projet de note*, the objections to the Vienna note appear groundless. It appears to Count Buol to be of great importance to adhere to the Vienna note, notwithstanding the difficulty of getting it accepted at Constantinople ; and he hopes that the resistance of the Ottoman Government will give way before the united and energetic representations of the four powers. Should it be otherwise, and should the Porte obey the dictates of impulse rather than the advice of its friends, such conduct would lead the Austrian Government to suppose that the Porte has decided to adopt a course which Austria is not inclined to follow.

"But the Austrian Government does not anticipate the occurrence of such an extremity, if the Porte is made to understand that should it remain deaf to the representations of its allies, it will lose all title to their support. Nothing would have more effect, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, in making the advisers of the Porte aware of the dangers to which the Ottoman empire is exposed, than language held by the maritime powers proportioned to the gravity of the occasion. If the Porte should push their blindness so far as to desire to take the initiative in hostilities, then the Austrian Government considers it time to declare openly to the Porte, that it will be reduced to the complete isolation, of which it can easily foresee the consequences.

"I am, &c.

(Signed)

"CLARENDON."

Page 134.—Inclosure in No. 126.—Draft of Note.

"In recommending unanimously to the Porte to adopt the draft of note drawn up at Vienna, the Courts of Austria, France, England, and Prussia, are convinced that that document by no means prejudices the sovereign rights and dignity of his Majesty the Sultan.

"That conviction is founded on the positive assurances which the

Cabinet of St. Petersburg has given in regard to the instructions by which his Majesty the Emperor of Russia is animated, in requiring a general guarantee of the religious immunities granted by the sultans to the Greek Church within their empire.

"It results from these assurances, that in requiring, in virtue of the principle laid down in the treaty of Kainardji, that the Greek religion and clergy should continue to enjoy their spiritual privileges under the protection of their sovereign the Sultan, the Emperor demands nothing contrary to the independence and the rights of the Sultan—nothing which implies an intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman empire.

"What the Emperor of Russia desires, is the strict maintenance of the religious *status quo* of his religion—that is to say, an entire equality of rights and immunities between the Greek Church and the other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte, consequently the enjoyment by the Greek Church of the advantages already granted to those communities. He has no intention of resuscitating the privileges of the Greek Church which have fallen into disuse by the effect of time or administrative changes, but he requires that the Sultan should allow it to share in all the advantages which he shall hereafter grant to other Christian rites.

"The Imperial Cabinet of Austria would, consequently, fain not doubt that the Sublime Porte, considering anew, with all the serious attention which the gravity of the state of affairs requires, the explanations given by Russia with the view of defining exactly the nature and extent of her demands, will decide upon adopting, in its integrity, the Vienna note. The adoption of it, while it gives to the Ottoman Government fresh claims to the sympathy and support of the powers which have recommended it, offers it, at the same time, means as ready as they are honourable for effecting its frank reconciliation with the Emperor of Russia, a reconciliation so imperiously required by so many vast interests."

This note, and those declarations on the part of Russia, met the approbation of the French Government. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed Lord Cowley (No. 124¹) "that the Emperor was inclined to view the proposed declaration favourably; that his Majesty thought that it guarded the points on which the French and English Governments had the most insisted; viz. the non-interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, or any assumed right of Russia to obtain privileges for the Greeks, other than those enjoyed, or to be conceded to, other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte." Lord Cowley, in the name of his Government, threw cold water on all this,—started a column of suspicions, fears, and objections,—and terminated the sitting by himself and M. Drouyn de Lhuys coming to the decision that their Governments would "not abandon the Porte to his fate," let that pet favourite do what he would! On the part of Turkey,

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, Oct. 4th, 1853, Part II. p. 130.

Lord Cowley characterised such a course of proceeding as "the right to have an *independent opinion*,"—in other words, the opinion of none but himself was independent. In No. 103¹ this noble Lord had gone so far, then, as to state that LORD ABERDEEN AND LORD CLARENDON had gone so far as to say, that "*any further proceedings at Vienna would be useless*, for that it would not be fair to urge the Porte to sign a document which would give Russia such advantage as it was now clear the Russian Government expected from it."

Under such circumstances and encouragement, it was no wonder that the Turks proceeded to action. They had got both Governments so completely hooked, that they could not disentangle themselves from the question, let the results be what they might. As early as Sept. 11th, reports were rife at Constantinople that the Mahommedan population meditated the massacre of the Christian population, and an attack upon the Sultan himself (No. 108²). "*The want of union in the ministry*, and the threats directed against themselves, led to fears of most ruinous results." This led the ambassadors to call up four steam-frigates from the fleets to protect the capital. There is some reason to believe that this was a got-up affair, in order to get a naval force of some strength through the Dardanelles, in order to encourage the Turks to war, in the certainty of European support. No disturbance at this time took place; but, assuming the report to be serious, Lord Clarendon (No. 109³) directed Lord Stratford to bring up the fleets to Constantinople. But this Lord Stratford did not do at that moment, as the Turkish minister (No. 114⁴) gave him "a strong assurance that the revolutionary movement" (if ever there was any) "was checked for the moment." Affairs were now coming to a crisis. On the 1st of October (No. 148⁵) the Porte determined on going to war with Russia, and, on the 4th of the same month (No. 149⁶), issued their manifesto, or declaration of war, with instructions to Omer Pasha on the Danube, and to their generals in Asia, to commence hostilities within fifteen days of the date that they supposed that the Russian generals who were opposed to them had received the notice. A formal demand was also made by the Turkish Government to the British and French ambassadors, to summon the fleets to Constantinople. In communicating this intelligence to his Government, Lord Stratford, as might have been

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, Sept. 20th, 1853, p. 113, Part II.

² La Cour to Drouyn de Lhuys, Sept. 11th, 1853, p. 115.

³ Clarendon to Stratford, Sept. 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 114.

⁴ Stratford to Clarendon, Sept. 15th, 1853, Part II. p. 121.

⁵ Reschid Pasha to M. Musurus, Oct. 1st, 1853, Part II. p. 153.

⁶ Stratford to Redcliffe, Oct. 4th, 1853, p. 153, with Inclosures, Part II.

expected (No. 157¹) excuses, to the utmost of his power, this dangerous act, and informs us that the Porte had “appealed *with perfect success* to the zeal of the Mahommedan, and to the loyalty of his Christian subjects” (if this latter was true, Lord Stratford has told as many lies on other occasions, about the state of Turkey, as were sufficient to sink a navy); that their spirit and national will was so great, that “no Government can afford to throw away, or to chill by unseasonable disappointment.” He concedes the point that there were “some appearances respecting them to justify a suspicion that the Porte has looked, at times, rather to the camp than to the cabinet for a solution of its differences with Russia;” but great allowances should be made for “the difficulties and complications of the matter on hand,” and from “the peculiarities which still prevail here in the habits of thinking, the modes of transacting business, and the process of communication;” adding that “there is much, no doubt, to disapprove and even to complain of, in the Porte’s habitual relations with Christendom,” but concluding in the following remarkable words: “The Sultan and his ministers cannot be blind to a truth which is obvious to every one—they must perceive that their hold upon the sympathies of *any auxiliary power is one which has its origin in the sense entertained by that power of its own interests.* Temporary circumstances may produce an exceptional effect; but, in their very natural and reasonable anxiety to elude the grasp of Russia, they can hardly be blamed for looking with hope to the *adverse interests and corresponding policy of England and France!*” Here is the whole truth told, and the secret of the cause of the war on the part of England and France against Russia laid open, namely, *their own interests* and corresponding policy, as *adverse* to Russia. This is, truly, “a Daniel come to judgment.” It will not be forgotten. What a confession! It is not the cause of truth and justice, or regard for the poor Turk, but the *interests and policy* of those two nations in whose hands Turkey is only a weapon to be used to attack her neighbour, and then to be squeezed, shivered, and thrown away!! Lord Stratford seems to have been in high spirits on the occasion. “There is,” says he, properly telegraphing in French, English being unworthy, and unsuited to the great occasion (No. 161²), “every appearance that hostilities will commence in eight or ten days, if not sooner. The Sultan has *required* the entrance of the squadrons, and I agreed with the French ambassador in this request. They will pass the straits in a body. No formal proposition has come here

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, Oct. 5th, 1853, Part II p. 145.

² Stratford to Clarendon, Oct. 15th, 1853, Part II. p. 168.

from Vienna, subsequently to the meeting at Olmutz. The draft, confidentially announced by M. Bruck, is looked upon by the Porte as *inadmissible*. Reschid Pasha, and perhaps his colleagues, would be favourable to the notion of a draft of the Vienna note, free equally from the modifications and *from the* passages to which they apply ; but the acceptance of such a note by the council-general must be looked upon as *impossible*, under existing circumstances." The Sultan knew that he could require the presence and assistance of the fleets at his pleasure, otherwise neither he nor "his ministers" would have acted as they did. Stratford and La Cour had quietly, though, perhaps, "*hypothetically*," taught them all, that such a movement and assistance was secured to them !

In Part II. p. 291, Lord Stratford lets us more into the views of Turkey. "What they never cease to insist upon, is a clear and unquestionable deliverance from Russian interference applied to spiritual matters."—"They would gladly put forward claims to a new disposition of the provinces, to the recognition of Circassian *independence*," &c. "I have," says he, "striven to impress the truth in every form of language upon their minds, *that however natural* such sentiments may be, their indulgence on the present occasion *is neither just, nor wise, nor humane*, seeing that the original difference can now be settled on safe and honourable grounds, with every moral and political advantage on the Sultan's side ; while an *unnecessary* continuance of hostilities would involve the *most perilous hazards, the most exhausting sacrifices*, a vast effusion of blood, and, more than possibly, the *horrors of a general war*."

CHAPTER V.

DECLARATION OF WAR BY TURKEY—IMPORTANT CONCESSION, AND DECLARATIONS BY RUSSIA, FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND TURKEY—MOVEMENT OF FLEETS—PROTOCOL OF 5TH DECEMBER—SEVERAL OTHER NOTES AND PROTOCOLS—ALL REFUSED BY TURKEY, ETC. ETC.

THE declaration of war, on the part of Turkey, took a considerable portion of Europe by surprise. The spirit in which it was made is shown by the fact stated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys (No. 127¹), namely, it took place *before* the Divan was “acquainted with the new interpretation which Count Nesselrode had given to the note,” and persisted, for the second time, in its resolution, and declared that this note in its original form was “*for ever inadmissible*.” This declaration of war, however, put Europe on its mettle, and set their wits to work—some sincerely, others insincerely—to devise means to arrest hostilities. Count Buol, on the part of Austria, expressed a hope (No. 154²), that the support which the Governments of France and England would give to the Sultan “would not in any way interfere with their character as mediators.” Baron Manteuffel, on the part of Prussia, tells us, amidst his surprise,³ that he “abstains from reverting to the grounds of the *new attitude* thus taken up by the Cabinet of London. I look upon it as one of those facts into which a merely retrospective examination is not calculated to render the ways of conciliation and peace more even, but which it is necessary to take into account, in order to devise new forms of arrangement.”—“For this purpose I appeal with confidence to the calm and enlightened judgment of the British Government, which assuredly will not, any more than ourselves, deceive itself in regard to the serious character of the present state of affairs, and the immense responsibility connected with the present crisis ;” but, “in

¹ Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, Oct. 4th, 1853, p. 135.

² Westmorland to Clarendon, Oct. 13th, 1853, Part II. p. 164.

³ Page 170, Manteuffel to Brunnow, Oct. 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 170.

order that we may flatter ourselves with some chance of success in this matter, we must, in the first place, endeavour to prevent any *warlike precipitation* on the part of the Sublime Porte; and we have enjoined the King's Envoy at Constantinople to express himself in this sense, on every opportunity that shall offer itself."

Lord Clarendon, dropping for a moment his uplifted sword, and taking up his pen (No. 164¹), sends Lord Stratford another note, and urges him, if possible, to bring about an arrangement, "*otherwise than by a new treaty between the Porte and Russia.*"—"It is, however, my duty to inform your Excellency, that her Majesty's Government observe with regret that *due attention* has not been paid by the Turkish Government to the advice tendered by your Excellency, with a sincere regard to the Sultan's own interests."—"You desired that the declaration of war and the commencement of hostilities should be *delayed* until all attempts at negotiation should have finally proved unsuccessful."—"Your Excellency is instructed *firmly*, but in the most friendly spirit, to convey this caution to Reschid Pasha; and you will not conceal from him how great will be the disappointment of her Majesty's Government, if he should now reject the note which has been framed with due regard to the Sultan's honour, and if, moreover, the rejection of the note should rest on no better grounds than popular excitement or military enthusiasm, inducing the Porte to *prefer war to peace*, and to incur the risk of all the evils and dangers which such a decision must necessarily bring with it."—"The *traditional* policy of this country will be *rigidly adhered to*. The highest political interests, not alone of England, but of Europe, are involved in the maintenance of the Ottoman empire; and these interests demand that any act of aggression by Russia against Turkey should be vigorously resisted. But a desire for war on the part of the Porte, in disregard of its consequences either to Turkey herself or to her allies, while there is yet a possibility that the legitimate objects which the Porte has in view may be attained by negotiation, would be viewed *with great displeasure by this country*, and would necessarily influence the policy towards the Sultan that it might be the duty of her Majesty's Government to pursue."

The note alluded to is here adduced (No. 164²), curtailed of those passages more immediately connected with the Holy Places, and stripped of the unmeaning rubbish of diplomatic preambles, which consist of promises, firmans, &c. &c.—words without meaning, and

¹ Clarendon to Stratford, Oct. 24th, 1853, Part II. p. 173.

² Clarendon to Stratford, Oct. 24th, 1853, Part II. p. 173, Inclosure.

intended to be so, and totally irrelevant to the point at issue, viz. "a national engagement having the force of a treaty," which was the Russian object sought:—

PROJET DE NOTE.

"His Majesty the Sultan, having nothing more at heart than to re-establish between himself and his Majesty the Emperor of Russia the relations of good neighbourhood and of perfect understanding which have unfortunately been impaired by recent and painful complications, has anxiously endeavoured to discover the means of obliterating the traces of that difference.

"With this view the undersigned is ordered to declare, with reference to the stipulations of the treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, that the Sublime Porte is firmly resolved to observe the promise contained therein, by continuing constantly to protect the Christian religion and all its churches.

"As regards the religious privileges of the Greek rite, it is a point of honour with his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, to maintain in force, and in security from all prejudice, for the present as well as for the future, the spiritual privileges granted to the Greek Church by his Majesty's august predecessors, and confirmed by himself; and, in a spirit of benevolence and of equity, conformable to the principles which direct the Ottoman Government, to cause that Church to partake of the spiritual privileges granted, or which may be granted, to any Christian community subject to the Ottoman Government.

"The undersigned has the honour to enclose a copy of the Imperial firman, confirmatory of the privileges of the Greek clergy, which has lately been delivered to the Patriarch of that rite.

"This firman is a fresh proof of the generous intentions, and of the sovereign will of his Majesty the Sultan in this respect, which has in all quarters inspired confidence that the promulgation of this firman will suffice to dispel all doubt or apprehension on the subject of the religion professed by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia."

* * * *

"His Imperial Majesty the Sultan regards it as a point of honour to watch over the maintenance of the spiritual privileges granted to the Greek Church by his illustrious ancestors. If, in the exercise of his rights of sovereignty, he is ambitious of being the author of the prosperity of his people, and the object of their benedictions, he attaches an equal importance not only to the scrupulous observance of the existing treaties between the Sublime Porte and Russia, but also to the fulfilment of every desire expressed by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his august ally, the accomplishment of which would contribute to draw more closely the bonds of friendship which unite the two sovereigns.

"In communicating what precedes to your Excellency, by order of his Imperial Majesty, my gracious sovereign, I avail," &c.

It is necessary here to observe that this note, together with all, or nearly all, the others, were drawn up about Vienna, London, and Paris, without either Turkey or Russia knowing anything about them. The Turk, however, who still retained a glimmering of reason, notwithstanding his "weakness, errors, and prejudices," and several other little peccadillos excusable in him but in no one else, saw this, and revolted against and justly complained of such proceedings. In No. 71,¹ Reschid Pasha tells us, that "the Government of Russia, also, was not consulted in regard to the drawing up of that draft." The idea seems to have been that the Turk would accept whatever they dictated, and that if Russia did not agree to it, they would compel her. In all this they were wrong, and consequently, says Lord Clarendon (No. 169²), we must adopt a *wiser course*, "in order to avoid the *error committed on a former occasion*, which the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Sultan, has a right to expect shall not *again be repeated*, that no proposal shall be made to his Imperial Majesty that has not previously been agreed to by the Porte."

It may not be uninteresting to turn for a moment to consider, from the papers before us, some of the more material causes which, with the impulses from without, encouraged the Turks to proceed to hostilities. As early as the 2d August,³ Lord Clarendon, "with the approval of more than one of his colleagues," told Count Walewski that he had informed Lord Stratford thus:—"In the event of any further act of aggression by Russia, or *undue delay on her part in accepting the terms for an amicable arrangement that may be proposed to her*, her Majesty's Government, *in conjunction with that of France*, will be prepared to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey against a power of whose hostile designs there will then exist no reasonable doubt"—England and France being thus the sole judges!! In page 35,⁴ that *impartial* diplomatist, Lord Stratford, states that the Porte, *at his advice*, was producing a note which would accomplish "the *relinquishment of any pretension* to a counter declaration from Russia," in other words, whatever the Turk said, the Russian would be compelled to yield to! In No. 83,⁵ Clarendon informs Cowley, "that any movements of the fleets that should have the character of a retreat, or of abandoning the policy which France and England had been engaged in upholding, *was not for a moment to be thought of*."

¹ Reschid Pasha to the Four Representatives, Inclosure, No. 1, August 19th, 1853, p. 73.

² Clarendon to Loftus, Oct. 25th, 1853, p. 179.

³ Clarendon to Cowley, August 2d, 1853, p. 22.

⁴ Stratford to Westmorland, July 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 35.

⁵ Clarendon to Cowley, Sept. 6th, 1853, Part II. p. 88.

In No. 101,¹ Lord Clarendon states, that "her Majesty's Government would consider it nothing short of dishonesty to persuade the Turkish Government to sign the note, now that they were made aware *that their interpretation of it* was not that of the Emperor of Russia." In other words, it has been discovered, either that we did not know what we were saying or doing, or that we have been detected in attempting to deceive Russia! In No. 106,² his Lordship says, "Her Majesty's Government do not think it expedient further to press THE NOTE on the acceptance of the Porte, nor to offer the British interpretation of it as an inducement to the Turkish Government to accept it." Thus Turkey was left to defy Russia, certain of British support, whether right or wrong! In No. 119,³ Seymour informs us:—"Unfortunately the warlike disposition manifested by the Turks, together *with the idea which has been encouraged by the public press*, of the Emperor's consent *having been extorted from him under pressure*, are certain to increase the difficulty of obtaining concessions on the side of Russia." In No. 133,⁴ Lord Clarendon, adverting to "the enthusiasm of the Turkish army, and the excitement of the people," says to Lord Stratford, "I have to instruct you, after concerting with M. DE LA COUR, whose instructions will be to a similar effect, to request that Admiral Dundas will bring the British fleet to Constantinople, *whether war has been declared by the Sultan or not!*" In No. 148,⁵ Reschid Pasha commands the Turkish ambassadors at the different European Courts, to inform them that "the Imperial Government, *under existing circumstances*, reckons upon the *moral and material* support of England and France, and it is to that object that the language which you will have to hold at London should be directed." Reschid Pasha had been previously well tutored to require and to expect this. In No. 157,⁶ Lord Stratford tells us, that "the popular spirit and national will" was such "as few Governments can entirely control, and which no Government can afford to throw away or *to chill* by unseasonable disappointment." In No. 353, Part I,⁷ Lord Stratford, after enumerating the numerous dangers surrounding Turkey, tells us, "I can hardly doubt that the *notion* of Reschid Pasha and his friends, if *fully supported from without*, is, in failure of negotiation, to settle accounts once for all with Russia,"—"and to place the Turkish empire on a footing of

¹ Clarendon to Westmorland, Sept. 24th, 1853, Part II. p. 111.

² Clarendon to Cowley, Sept. 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 114.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, Sept. 23d, 1853, Part II. p. 127.

⁴ Clarendon to Stratford, Oct. 8th, 1853, Part II. p. 142.

⁵ Reschid Pasha to Musurus, Oct. 1st, 1853, Part II. p. 153.

⁶ Stratford to Clarendon, Oct. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 165.

⁷ Stratford to Clarendon, July 4th, 1853, Part I. p. 371, &c.

close connexion with the leading, and *particularly with the* WESTERN, POWERS OF EUROPE," &c. He must be blind, indeed, who cannot see the quarter from which such advice proceeded, and the objects had in view by the Turks, or rather their ministers, in conjunction with their interested allies. "That is your course," says Stratford to them. The interests of France and England—or the *Western Powers*—are "*adverse* to those of Russia, and therefore you are sure of their support if you beard her." Besides, he gives us another reason, and, perhaps, not the least important one, namely this:—"The Moham-medans feel no hesitation in expressing a desire for hostilities, for, according to them, *continual war in Turkey is requisite to keep alive the spirit of Islamism!*"

Much stronger passages than these might be culled out from pages of the official documents under review, but sufficient, it is considered, has been adduced to show that France and England abetted this spirit for their own purposes. They left the Turks liberty to do as they pleased: Only oppose Russia, and we are with you. The effects of such conduct and proceedings produced a painful effect at St. Petersburg. In No. 171,¹ Sir H. Seymour is obliged to tell us, that, in an official interview with Count Nesselrode, "The latter," said he, "wished that he could feel certain that the existence of *unjust suspicions* had not been betrayed of late;" and added, that "although grieved to say so, he would not conceal from me his apprehension, *that it was the settled purpose* of her Majesty's Government to humiliate Russia."—"I might be assured that, under no possible circumstances, would humiliation be submitted to by the Emperor." Continuing—"The Chancellor wished that it were in his power to set his mind at ease; but observed, that the feeling which he attributed to her Majesty's Government was common to all England. How, he would ask, was it possible, that such hostility should be felt throughout all classes against Russia?" These truths cannot be denied. Her Government, her counsellors, her press, and her people, misled and misinformed, called for the most deadly hostility against, and humiliation of Russia. The officious imprudence of Sir H. Seymour could not deny this, while he knew well that the cause thereof arose from reasons quite different from those which he stated—causes, too, which he more than others wished to impress on his Government. As an instance of the one-sided Mahommedan feeling which ruled the mind of this diplomatist, the same despatch gives us a most remarkable elucidation: "The weight of personal character," says he, "*may well be allowed to that of the*

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, Oct. 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 180.

Emperor,"¹ but "in the affairs of state it is the *character of the agreement*, and not of the person, which is to be considered." But if so, then this applies equally to England that it does to Russia; and the latter has no more reason, in any arrangement which she had to make with Turkey, to rely upon the character of Sultan Abdul-Medjid, or his word (all that has ever been adduced), in the arrangements proposed between Russia and Turkey, than Russia had in arrangements with England.

The declaration of war changed the face of diplomatic proceedings. It stopped the manufacture, to a certain extent, of notes, but gave birth to the creation of protocols and conferences, as the bases of treaties which, like their predecessors, the Turk looked upon with the most stoical indifference. The declaration of war took place on the 6th October, and was despatched to the armies from Constantinople on the 5th. It reached Omar Pasha late on the 8th, or very early on the 9th. He immediately, and in all haste, executed his commission. His summons was (No. 190, p. 204) received by Prince Gortchakoff at 3 A.M. on the 9th. His reply, and refusal to its demand, is dated Bucharest, Sept. 10th. From the 9th, then, the fifteen days for the commencement of hostilities are to be dated, which will bring the expiry of that period to the 24th of October. In No. 246, p. 242 (Inclosure), Consul Yeames informs us (Odessa, October 28th), "*that hostilities commenced on the Danube early on the morning of last Sunday, the 23d instant*," by an attack on some Russian vessels passing up the Danube, when they were within their own territory; and on the night of the same day, by a Turkish force crossing into Tehetal, one of the islands of the Delta, opposite Ismael, and opening a fire upon the pontoon bridge at that place. This took place one day, at least, before the expiry of the time prescribed by the Turkish general. "This step," says Lord Clarendon (No. 213²), "her Majesty's Government could not but regret had been taken by the Porte whilst attempts at negotiation were not yet wholly abandoned, but his allies were still endeavouring to bring her differences with Russia to a peaceful and honourable termination." The ambassadors at Constantinople, and especially Lord Stratford, were instructed to require from the Turkish Government a prolongation of the time for the commencement of hostilities. This, with much reluctance on the part of the Divan, he, on the 21st of October, gained for ten days longer. This extension was to be sent to the armies immediately; but Omar Pasha, secretly instructed by his

¹ How can this man excuse his subsequent calumnies against this very Emperor? He—England—ought to blush at such duplicity and double-dealing!

² Official Circular, dated Nov. 7th, and in p. 218.

Government (for instructions he must have had, or he would have been reprimanded for his conduct, which he never was), took good care to render this concession null by commencing hostilities previous even to the day of the expiry of his first notice. This precipitation, Lord Clarendon sagely concluded, proved that the order for postponement "either had not been received, or seems not to have been obeyed" (No. 219¹). Some stir was made about this scurvy treatment of the allies by demanding explanation, but we cannot find that any was ever given or received, while the British Consul at Batoum tells us (No. 232²), that the Turkish messenger who brought the order for delay to that quarter actually joined in the Turkish attack on Fort St. Nicholas, which was taken, and where cruel barbarities, on the Turkish frontier, were committed upon the unfortunate inhabitants.

This delay of ten days gave Lord Stratford much pain. "It is impossible *not to view* with regret," says he (No. 252, p. 251), "and anxiety, this prolonged state of anxiety between peace and war;" and hopes that the Porte, being thus obliged to "continue in such a state of dangerous *indecision*, may be viewed with friendly indulgence!"

The effect of the declaration of war, when it reached Vienna, is well and strongly expressed by Count Buol (No. 236³) thus: "The Imperial Government has seen with concern . . . that the Government of his Majesty the Sultan had abandoned the hopes of settling peaceably its differences with the Emperor of Russia. The regrets of the Court of Austria were the more warranted, since, *at the very moment* when the Sublime Porte was appealing to the fate of arms, the Emperor of Russia was repeating at Olmutz assurances which, in the estimation of the Cabinet of Vienna, were calculated to augment the chances of a pacific solution."—"All that Russia desires to obtain is an assurance of the strict maintenance of the religious *status quo* of the Greek religion, that is to say, entire equality of rights and immunities between the Greek Church and the other Christian communities, *subjects of the Porte*; consequently, enjoyment in favour of the Greek Church of the advantages already granted to those communities, as well as a participation in those which the Sultan might hereafter concede to other Christian sects. On this basis the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is ready to enter immediately and directly with the Ottoman Government into negotiations for peace, the seat of which, according to it, might be established at Bucharest."

Nothing could be clearer and plainer than this, while it is merely a

¹ Clarendon to Westmorland, Nov. 9th, 1853, Part II. p. 221.

² Stratford to Clarendon, Nov. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 250.

³ Westmorland to Clarendon, Nov. 10th, 1853, (Inclosure, dated Nov. 10th, p. 236, Part II.)

repetition of the declarations and intentions of Russia. But it was disregarded. Before entering upon new bases for treaties, we may shortly notice the fate of some of the old. In No. 304,¹ Lord Stratford tells us that the proposition conveyed in Lord Clarendon's despatch, urged by him as directed, without reference to the aid of the Austrian and Russian ambassadors, "*had met with no success*"²—"to both of us the language of the Ottoman secretary was *unfavourable*." The Turks were so elated with the favourable accounts from the Danube, that they disdained all propositions, counsels, or advice. "The terms proposed could not be accepted without an appeal to the general council, and Reschid Pasha could hold out no prospect of *their acquiescence*, even if his colleagues were favourably disposed, which they evidently were not. . . . the leading men of whom constitute what is called the war party."—"I took my leave with evident marks of disappointment and dissatisfaction, expressing in strong terms my apprehension that the Pasha would one day have reason to look back with painful regret at the issue of our interview; and this I did not do till after I had *vainly tried* to reconcile him to my advice, by changing its form, and suggesting the adoption of its principle, in some way more suited to the state of actual hostilities." At pages 284 and 285, we find his Lordship returns to the charge and states: "The proposition at present submitted to the Porte is, substantially, nothing else but what that power has always shown herself disposed to accept."—"It cannot even be denied that the difficulty of amicably settling the differences which have led to the existing contest are visibly increased by the recourse which has been had to arms, and by the hostilities which have ensued."—"Public opinion in Europe approves the resistance of the Porte, *and the squadrons of England and France are anchored in the Bosphorus* for the protection of the Ottoman territory. But the most sincere allies of the Porte cannot sacrifice the interests of their own subjects to its desire, however natural it may be, to obtain the advantages unlooked for at the commencement of its quarrel with Russia, and the most civilized nations are precisely those which would be the first to feel horror at a war, *pushed, for any motive whatever*, beyond the limits of reason and necessity." All this advice went for nothing. "The council," says he (Inclosure No. 3, p. 286), "is unwilling to accept it under present circumstances." At this point the Turks should have been left to their own counsels and resources; and so they would have been, had France and England been honest and sincere in the matter. There was no chance of

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, Nov. 19th, 1853, Part II. pp. 280, 281, with Inclosures.

² Stratford to Clarendon, No. 354, Nov. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 253.

obtaining the acceptance of the propositions, "even in a modified shape,"¹ and the further answer is purely Turkish, "that if the draft in question had been received two months sooner, he (Reschid Pasha) was persuaded that the Porte would have received it with satisfaction!" The cause of failure is quite plain. In No. 189, p. 186, May 26th, Lord Clarendon tells us that "the co-operation of the ambassadors of France and England, at this important crisis of Eastern affairs, cannot fail to *give confidence to the Porte*, and is in conformity with the desire of their Governments." This the Turks knew well, and that their new allies would never desert them. "Her Majesty's Government," says Sir H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode, October 11th, p. 181, "*care very little whether the storm breaks now or a little later.*"

We next come to that great document "THE COLLECTIVE NOTE," the offspring of the brains of the English and French Cabinets. In No. 273,² we find that this note was drawn up by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, submitted to and approved by Lord Clarendon, and despatched to Vienna, for the Conference to doctor up and transmit to Constantinople and St. Petersburg as they considered advisable. The following is the note in question, with the observation that it retains *in full force* the words, the "letter and spirit" of the Russian interpretation of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, soon after to be disputed and denied :—

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.—No. 282.

" Foreign Office, November 29th, 1853.

" MY LORD,

" Collective Note to be signed at Vienna.

" The undersigned, representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, assembled in conference at Vienna, have received instructions to declare that their respective Governments view with deep regret the commencement of hostilities between Russia and the Porte; and anxiously desire, by mediating between the belligerent powers, to stop the further effusion of blood, and to terminate a state of things which seriously endangers the peace of Europe.

" Assurances have been received that Russia is willing to treat; and the undersigned, not doubting that the Porte is animated by a similar spirit, request, in the name of their respective Governments, to be informed upon what conditions the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate a treaty of peace."

The note adverted to, and which accompanied this despatch (Inclosure 2, in No. 282), being word for word the same as that confirmed

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, Nov. 19th, 1853, Part II. p. 270.

² Cowley to Clarendon, Nov. 25th, 1853, Part II. p. 261.

at Vienna, dated the 5th of December, 1853, with the protocol prepared and transmitted to Constantinople, is here omitted as unnecessary. The most urgent orders were sent to all the ambassadors of the four powers at that capital to press its acceptance on the Porte.

Note addressed by the Vienna Conference to Reschid Pasha.

“ Vienne, le 5 Décembre, 1853.

“ The undersigned, representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, assembled in conference at Vienna, have received instructions to declare that their respective Governments view with deep regret the commencement of hostilities between Russia and the Porte ; and anxiously desire, by mediating between the belligerent powers, to stop the further effusion of blood, and to terminate a state of things which seriously endangers the peace of Europe.

“ Russia having given an assurance that she is willing to treat, and the undersigned not doubting that the Porte is animated by a similar spirit, they request, in the name of their respective Governments, to be informed upon what conditions the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate a treaty of peace.”

*Protocol of a Conference of the Four Representatives, held at Vienna,
December 5, 1853.*

“ The undersigned, representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, in conformity with the instructions of their Courts, have met together in conference, in order to devise the means of reconciling the difference which has arisen between Russia and the Sublime Porte.

“ The dimensions which that difference has assumed, and the war which has broken out between the two empires, notwithstanding the efforts of their allies, have become the object of most serious solicitude for Europe. Accordingly, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of Prussia, being equally impressed with the necessity of exerting themselves in order to put an end to hostilities which would not be protracted without affecting the interests of their own states, have resolved to offer their good offices to the two high belligerent parties, in the hope that they will be unwilling themselves to incur the responsibility of a conflagration, when, by an exchange of frank explanations, they may still be able to avert it, by replacing their relations on a footing of peace and good understanding.

“ The assurances given at different times by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia exclude, on the part of that august sovereign, the notion of assailing the integrity of the Ottoman empire. In fact, the existence of Turkey, in the limits assigned to her by treaty, is one of the necessary conditions of the balance of power in Europe ; and the undersigned Plenipotentiaries record, with satisfaction, that the existing war cannot, in any case, lead to

modifications in the territorial boundaries of the two empires, which would be calculated to alter the state of possession in the East established for a length of time, and which is equally necessary for the tranquillity of all the other powers.

"His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, moreover, has not confined himself to these assurances; he has declared that it never was his intention to impose upon the Porte *any new obligations*, or any which might not *be in conformity with the treaties of Routchouk, Kainardji, and Adrianople, according to the stipulations of which the Sublime Porte has promised to protect, throughout the whole extent of its dominions, the Christian religion and its churches.* The Court of Russia has added, that in requiring from the Ottoman government a proof of its faithful adherence to former engagements, it by no means had the intention of diminishing the authority of the Sultan over his Christian subjects, and that its sole object had been to ask for explanations calculated to prevent any misapprehension and any cause of misunderstanding with a neighbouring and friendly power.

"The sentiments manifested by the Sublime Porte during the recent negotiations prove, on the other hand, that it was prepared to recognise all its treaty engagements, and to take into account, as far as its sovereign rights would allow, the interest felt by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia in a religion which is his own, and that of the majority of his people.

"In this state of things, the undersigned are convinced that the readiest and surest means of attaining the object desired by their Courts, will be to make a joint communication to the Sublime Porte, in order to set before it the wish of the powers to contribute, by their friendly intervention, to the re-establishment of peace, and to enable it to make known the conditions on which it would be disposed to treat.

"This is the object of the annexed collective note, addressed to the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the instructions likewise annexed, transmitted to the representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, at Constantinople.

(Signed)

"BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN,
BOURQUENEY,

WESTMORLAND,
ARNHEIM."

In No. 301,¹ Lord Westmorland informs us that the representatives of the four powers agreed to this note, after some verbal corrections, and to transmit it to Constantinople; instructing, at the same time, the ambassadors to state to the Porte "the anxious desire of the four Governments that the Porte should favourably receive and act upon their suggestions, and the *deep regret* with which any *appearance* of disinclination on her part to do so would be viewed by them." Out of this, or with this, appeared a celebrated and important protocol, which we shall presently adduce; which protocol the wise men of the

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, Dec. 3d, 1853, Part II. p. 277.

East thought should be a *confidential* document, of which no copy should be given, but that the contents of it might, after the departure of the messenger for Constantinople, be communicated *confidentially* to Baron Meyendorff and to Aniff Effendi, in the same mode as had been adopted with regard to the note. In No. 302,¹ we find Lord Clarendon telling us how readily he agrees to, and how highly he approves of, all these proceedings.

In No. 284,² we find in Lord Clarendon's instructions to Lord Stratford regarding this note the following rather singular directions : " With this expectation, the four powers feel that the answer to their inquiry should be left entirely to the *wisdom and experience* of the Turkish Government ; but in the event of your Excellency and your colleagues being consulted upon the subject, it would be desirable to advise the Porte to declare that the *four powers have done justice to its conciliatory intentions* by assuming that it is still desirous, upon honourable conditions, to terminate its differences with Russia, and to come to an understanding with that power ; and that with reference to the assurances that Russia has on various occasions given, that *she asks for no new concessions, nor for any right derogatory to the sovereignty of the Sultan*, the Porte is prepared to renew its offers, and to discuss the form in which peace shall be re-established and the religious question settled, *upon condition of not being asked to accede to any demand that it has already refused*, and of an arrangement being concluded for the evacuation of the Principalities."

The amount and meaning of this instruction, telling the Turks what they should do, is somewhat novel, and appears to mean,—Stand still as you are, do as you please, act as foolishly and arrogantly as you please, only let *us* appear to be wise and honest men ! From instructions such as the above, and to such a quarter, how could the British Cabinet expect success under any circumstances, but particularly the circumstances under which the question had then been placed ?

In the meantime, and by way of keeping active the character of the tragedy, we have the sayings and doings of Sir H. Seymour to fill up any void that might be found. This gentleman appears to have been in his proper element, and to have been well instructed by the Foreign department, that in all his transactions with the Russian Government he should carefully keep Turkey foremost ; and in whatever communication he had to make at St. Petersburg, he should make it in a style and manner as acrimonious as possible, and humiliating to Russia and her Government. In this he failed not. 'Take an example. In No.

¹ Clarendon to Westmorland, Dec. 9th, 1853, Part II. p. 279.

² Clarendon to Stratford, November 29th, 1853, Part II. p. 269.

278,¹ we find him officially proposing to Count Nesselrode, that "in order to give the *English representatives a fair chance* of being listened to favourably at Constantinople," he should withdraw all the Russian troops behind the Pruth, when the "Turkish force *might be induced* simultaneously to fall back behind the Danube,"—while he "would venture to remark that *in London*, Russian interests would be entrusted to the management of a negotiator second in ability to none of the diplomatists of Russia!" The Chancellor, after requesting him to repeat the propositions to him, observed that he was really surprised that such a proposition should be made to him on the part of her Majesty's Government; that the position assigned to Russia was too disadvantageous and humiliating to be accepted; that for 150 years no such proposition could have been thought of for Russia in her *démêlés* with the Porte; that upon entering the Principalities, the Emperor had declared that he should only withdraw his troops when he had obtained satisfaction; and that to do so now would be to lower himself in the eyes of the world. He, Count Nesselrode, had done much in the way of conciliation; he had been blamed by many for having gone too far; "but to this point he could not proceed. He could not possibly advise the Emperor to listen to such proposals,"—and "that he must say the idea of causing a conference to be attended by a Turkish plenipotentiary, appeared to be to sit in judgment upon Russia, and to summon her before the European tribunal." In No. 292,² we find him lecturing Count Nesselrode in a way that justly surprised him, regarding a proclamation ascribed to Prince Gortchakoff, and deducing from it the intention of Russia to incorporate the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia with her other dominions. Both were instantly and indignantly denied, while it is well known that the proclamation alluded to was a Parisian forgery, and which no sane person, nor indeed any person, would have credited or attended to for a moment—Seymour himself, perhaps, excepted.

Nor did he stop here. In No. 293,³ we find Count Nesselrode complaining bitterly and justly, upon an occasion of Seymour's attack, thus: "Russia had been assailed in the most virulent manner from every quarter, and when her voice was heard in reply, a shout was raised against her." It came really to this: all that was done by Russia was wrong—all that was done by the Porte was right. This, it must be confessed, was a very strange way of showing impartiality, and certainly it was not by pursuing such a course that the "diffi-

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, November 19th, 1853, Part II. p. 263.

² Seymour to Clarendon, November 26th, 1853, Part II. p. 274.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, November 26th, 1853, Part II. p. 275.

culty of which all complained would be solved in a peaceable manner." Russia said Seymour "was exclusively to blame in this affair, inasmuch as demands had been made and violent measures adopted, for which *no grounds had ever been adduced* ; having been wrong, too, I ADDED, AT THE OUTSET, every step you have taken in that direction made you more so. Then, of course, the Chancellor would not submit." Certainly not.

One additional reference is here given. In No. 230, p. 232, Part I,¹ we find Lord Clarendon telling him that the Russian Government had more than once informed her Majesty's Government, that "the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission was the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, and *some binding agreement that should prevent any future disturbance of that settlement by the Turkish Government.*" Now, this is just the whole question. That "*binding agreement*" was, at the first and from the "*outset*," required but never granted, and by the Turks peremptorily refused. In No. 245,² Sir H. Seymour tells us that the positive declaration of the Russian Government to the Austrian ambassador was, that the demands by Prince Menchikoff "were of a very simple nature ; that they went only to the point of obtaining a solemn confirmation of the rights already in the possession of Russia . . . this purpose never varied ; and that Prince Menchikoff's note demands nothing but the sanction of rights possessed by Russia in virtue of the treaty of Kainardji." This "solemn engagement," or guarantee, was not only not given, but pointedly and decidedly refused ; and the plain meaning of the treaty of Kainardji, was denied and repudiated by France, England, and Turkey, after having been repeatedly acknowledged by them all.

In No. 314,³ we find the British ambassador again bearding Count Nesselrode on his keen and proper observation, that he had heard that France and England were engaged in drawing up a treaty for Russia. Not exactly, says Seymour, but her Majesty's Government were engaged in drawing up "the preliminaries and basis of a treaty." At the same time, he taunted the Count about Russia making the contest a religious war, which was not true ; while, at the same time, he eulogises Lord Stratford for not following his example, he having prevented the Turks from not making it a religious contest. But this latter statement, false as it is, will more properly come to be considered in another place, together with some *strange and dangerous doctrines* at the same time advanced.

¹ Clarendon to Seymour, June 8th, 1853, Part I. p. 232.

² Seymour to Clarendon, June 4th, 1853, Part I. p. 262.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, Dec. 5th, 1853, Part II. pp. 264, 265.

But to return to the Vienna collective note for a moment. It had the fate of all the other movements and proceedings connected with these ill-starred negotiations. It was *never delivered nor submitted* to the Government of Constantinople. Lord Stratford, as was customary with him, had forestalled it, and presented one of his own to the Turkish cabinet, no doubt more agreeable to their views and interests. His other colleagues, he says, agreed with him about it, and also that the Vienna note should not be presented to the Turkish ministers, lest it might occasion delay, and produce fresh difficulties with the Porte. Russia in this respect was never thought of. The collective wisdom, or folly, of Western Europe was set aside on this occasion. This proceeding left "a painful impression" upon the conference at Vienna (No. 362¹). The respective ambassadors composing the conference resolved to seek the permission of their Governments to order the delivery of the note and protocol. This the French Government seemed at first sight inclined to do; but Lord Clarendon, on the part of the British Government, (No. 363,²) even before he had heard from Lord Stratford, or seen the new propositions till presented to him in copy by Count Walewski, set his face against it, because it might give some additional trouble to his Turkish *protégées*; but especially, and from a strange mode of reasoning, because as it pleased them, so it would place the Emperor of Russia "*more than ever in the wrong*," if he refused to accept it! In No. 370,³ Lord Stratford gives much the same reason for the non-delivery of the note, stating, however, that he should keep it as the means of re-opening the question, "should his present propositions be declined;" and adding, "the terms of the note are, doubtless, *most considerate and flattering to the Turkish Government*, but they afford, at the same time, so much encouragement to the pretensions of the war party, that the communication of them could hardly fail to strengthen that interest, and to render a successful negotiation more remote."

In No. 369,⁴ Lord Stratford tells us that he took up his new scheme in order to form a plan of proceeding which, in its issue, "might secure every reasonable advantage to Turkey, without *injustice or palpable humiliation to Russia*." "The principal difficulties to be encountered were, the *illusions* of frontier successes—the national enthusiasm in favour of war—the fears of leading statesmen *unwilling to oppose* the current of *popular sentiment*—and, above all, the necessity of applying

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, Dec. 29th, 1853, Part II. p. 331.

² Clarendon to Cowley, Dec. 30th, 1853, Part II. p. 332.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, Dec. 17th, 1853, p. 339.

⁴ Stratford to Clarendon, Dec. 17th, 1853, p. 334.

to the general council for permission to entertain *any plan of pacification with Russia*. *The Sultan, his ministers, and the council, all stood in fear of each other, and though perhaps at heart desirous of peace, were reluctant to forfeit their share of popularity enjoyed by the votaries of war.*" Such were the heterogeneous and inflammable materials that France and England encouraged, counselled, and precipitated into a state of war.

Here follows Lord Stratford's new panacea, and for which all others were set aside. The reader will observe how different this is from all that preceded it. The rights of Russia under all preceding treaties were thrown overboard. This was what Stratford was always aiming at. Russia was henceforward to be bound hand and foot to the will and the command of the other four great powers, providing such an absurd combination could possibly exist for any length of time, and under which, while it did exist, the independence of both Russia and Turkey was alike to be destroyed! No independent nation, nor nation worthy of independence, could possibly submit to such degradation as this. Yet it is this state that Russia is branded with all that is ambitious, base, and odious for not succumbing to, and regarding which Lord Clarendon has had the blindness and temerity to say that Russia will place herself "*more than ever in the wrong*" if she does not submit to! Is it British statesmen who would thus tear national obligations and friendships to pieces, and who can counsel thus simply because they fear to oppose "the national enthusiasm for war," and to lose their share "of the popularity enjoyed" by its votaries!

Inclosure 2, in No. 369.—Identic Note addressed by the Four Representatives to the Porte.

"The undersigned, her Britannic Majesty's ambassador, in concert with the representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, has the honour to make known to the Sublime Porte, that their Governments having still reason to believe that his Majesty the Emperor of Russia does not consider the thread of the negotiations as broken off by the declaration of war and the circumstances which have ensued from it; and knowing, moreover, from the actual declaration of his Imperial Majesty, that he is only desirous of obtaining an assurance of perfect equality as regards the rights and the immunities granted by his Majesty the Sultan and his glorious ancestors to the Christian communities subjects of the Porte:

"And the Sublime Porte, on its side, responding to this declaration by the declaration that it considers itself bound in honour to continue to uphold the aforesaid rights and immunities, and that it is still disposed to put an end to the difference which has arisen between the two empires:

"The negotiation to be pursued would be based—

"1. On the evacuation as soon as possible of the Principalities.

" 2. On the renewal of the ancient treaties.

" 3. On the communication of the firmans relative to the spiritual privileges granted by the Sublime Porte to all its non-Mussulman subjects ; a communication which, being made to all the powers, would be accompanied with suitable assurances given to each of them.

" The arrangement already made, for the completion of the agreement relative to the Holy Places and religious establishments at Jerusalem, would be definitively adopted.

" The Porte would declare to the representatives of the four powers that it is ready to name a plenipotentiary, to establish an armistice, and to negotiate on the bases above specified, with the concurrence of the powers, and in a neutral town on which they might agree.

" The declarations made by the powers in the preamble of the treaty of July 13th, 1841, would be solemnly confirmed by those same powers, with a view to the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, and to European concert.

" And the Porte, on its side, would declare, with the same view, its firm resolution more effectually to develop its system of administration and the internal improvements, which should satisfy the wants and the just expectation of its subjects of all classes.

" Pera, December 13, 1853."

The propositions here made were, as might readily be supposed, agreed to by Turkey, as appears from No. 372¹, where Pisani reports : "The general council, which met to day (the 18th) for the second time, has come to the decision that peace should be concluded with Russia on the following bases—namely, immediate evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops ; preservation of the sovereign rights unimpaired ; and a guarantee from the *four powers* for the future. Having asked for explanation as to the guarantee expected by the council, Reschid Pasha replied that the note given in lately by the *four* representatives provides for that contingency."

With an air of open triumph and ill-concealed hostility to Russia, Lord Stratford (No. 396²) furnishes the Turkish ultimatum, as quietly advised and corrected by himself, and which he considered, rashly considered, was the climax and triumph of his Turkish policy. "The answer," says he, "is addressed not only to me, but to each of my three colleagues respectively." "The hope which it encourages may not, indeed, be realized," but "the injured, and by no means unsuccessful party, was the first to give proof of its pacific views." "The Porte takes a just view of what is required alike by her interests and

¹ Pisani to Stratford, Dec. 18th, 1853, Part II. p. 343.

² Stratford to Clarendon, Dec. 31st, 1853, Part II. p. 361.

her duties," and "I verily believe has reached the utmost verge of concession with respect to spiritual privileges." And he adds, "I am further of opinion that, with a view to the condition of the non-Mussulman communities of this empire, and the development of those resources on which the Porte's independence must ever mainly rest, it would not be safe to hedge round the Ottoman empire with *European guarantees*, unless the Porte engaged at the same time to realize and extend *her system* of *improved* administration, in good earnest." In short, guarantee nothing in a country so unsafe and unstable. To save ourselves trouble, give them as little trouble as possible in reference to promises which they cannot, and which they really never intend to fulfil. If the proposals made were jesuitical, deceitful, and unmeaning, as these really were, but worthy of the aim and the occasion, the reply of the Ottoman Government was, if possible, still more so ; but it is so far clear that it denied Russia redress for a great wrong committed, and threw overboard all its previous engagements with Russia at "*the suggestion of its European allies*," satisfied these would support them in their dishonourable course. Here is the Turkish reply :—

Inclosure in No. 396.—Reschid Pasha to the Four Representatives.

"Rebiul-akhir, 1270 (le 31 Décembre, 1853).

"His Majesty the Sultan has seen the note dated the 12th of December, n.s., relative to peace, which your Excellency has sent us, and which is identical with that of the ambassador of France and the ministers of Austria and Prussia, your colleagues.

"As it appears from these collective communications that the intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia are pacific; that if the Sublime Porte has been forced to undertake the war, it is solely for the maintenance of its sovereign rights ; that there is nothing in the proposed plan of arrangement prejudicial to the sacred rights of the Ottoman empire ; and that his Majesty the Sultan's very special regard for, and entire confidence in, the four powers, his exalted allies, require his acquiescence in their wishes for the work of peace, the Sublime Porte has found the plan of arrangement which has been proposed to it to be such as it can accept.

"It is requisite, then, that the evacuation of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, to take effect as quickly as possible, should be the first point of the negotiations. And as, in order not to deviate from its system of moderation, and not to separate itself from the counsels of its allies, the Sublime Porte will consent to the renewal of the treaties, that should be the second point of the conferences.

"With regard to the spiritual privileges of the communities, consisting of all classes of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Ottoman empire, as

these privileges have already for a long time been granted by the august ancestors of his Majesty the Sultan ; as it is only a short time since his Highness has confirmed them by a firman decorated with his *hatti-humayoun* (imperial autograph) ; and as the Government of his Highness considers it a point of dignity always to maintain them ; the Sublime Porte will make no difficulty in announcing to all the powers, as it has done heretofore, and again lately, and as it declared to the whole of Europe when it established the Tanzimat, that it is its firm and sincere intention to uphold for ever the spiritual privileges of the communities consisting of its own subjects : and that if one of those communities should possess, as regards spiritual privileges, something more than the others, it will grant to the latter, if they desire to enjoy them in the same manner, the favour to be put in this respect also on a footing of equality. That being the case, there will not be the slightest hesitation in delivering to the Russian cabinet also, as there will be given to each of the four powers, a copy of the orders of the Porte in this respect, accompanied by an identical note drawn up in this sense.

“The mode of arrangement as regards the Holy Places, and for carrying into execution what has been decided with regard to the construction of certain religious buildings at Jerusalem, shall be completely adopted.

“Thus the Porte is prepared to conclude a peace in the manner pointed out to it by its allies ; and if intelligence is received that the cabinet of St. Petersburg likewise accepts these bases, the Porte will name and send a plenipotentiary to a congress to be held in a neutral city which shall be specified by the four powers, and at which delegates of the four powers shall assist, for the arrangement of affairs with the plenipotentiary of the court of Russia ; and thereupon, as is natural, a temporary armistice for a fixed period will be concluded.

“Considering the great relations of this empire with the governments of Europe, the Sublime Porte is fully entitled to be included within the limits of collective security, and to be admitted into the European union ; and for this purpose it will be necessary to confirm and complete in this sense the treaty of 1841. Accordingly the Porte is persuaded that the allied courts will be pleased to exert their good offices in this respect.

“As it is calculated that forty days are sufficient to convey this decision to St. Petersburg, and to receive an answer, the powers are requested to provide for this likewise.

“His Majesty the Sultan has particularly at heart that every class of his subjects should enjoy that security and that justice which the Tanzimat, really and completely carried into execution, hold out to it ; and, in a word, that by making the necessary reforms in the administrative system, great force may thereby be given to the principles of justice and equity in favour of all.

“His Majesty the Sultan having directed that the greatest care should be taken to carry into effect these sublime maxims, I likewise hasten to announce it, as such commands cannot fail to give pleasure to the powers.”

In reference to the document quoted, Lord Clarendon (No. 399¹) tells us: "Her Majesty's Government consider the answer of the Porte to the identic note of the four representatives, to be quite satisfactory. It presents the basis of a just and honourable peace, and of a guarantee of the Sultan's rights, together with a *formal pledge*, on the part of the Porte, to carry on the measures of *internal reform* upon which mainly depend the future welfare and prosperity of Turkey." His Lordship is here so delighted at approaching what he considered as the termination of his warlike labours, that he altogether forgets, or omits to state, by what right any foreign state has to call upon or to dictate to any other power what internal reforms that power should make in its dominions, or why England and France should be entitled to demand as just that which is denied to Russia, who most certainly has the prior claim.

This Turkish reply (Stratford replying to Stratford) was soon embodied into a protocol at the famous manufactory established at Vienna, and in which, statesmen-like, they take up nearly altogether new ground, in order that they might forward their work to St. Petersburg. It runs thus:—

Inclosure 2 in No. 403.—Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, January 13th, 1854. (Present: the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.)

"The representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, being assembled in conference, the representative of Austria read a note addressed by Reschid Pasha to the internuncio, in reply to that which he had delivered to him under date of the 12th of December last, and which was identical with the communication made at the same time to the Porte by the representatives of the three other courts at Constantinople. Reschid Pasha's answer being the result of a step taken by the four representatives, *before* the arrival at Constantinople of the collective note signed in the conference of the 5th of December, the representative of Austria invited the conference to examine with him whether the contents of that document were in accordance with the views and intentions expressed in the protocol of the same date.

"After full deliberation, the undersigned were unanimously of opinion that the conditions on which the Porte declared its readiness to treat for the reestablishment of peace with Russia, were in conformity with the wishes of their Governments, and proper for communication to the cabinet of St. Petersburg.

"Impressed more and more with the serious character of the existing state of things, and with the urgency for putting an end to it, the under-

¹ Clarendon to Stratford, Jan. 17th, 1854, Part II. p. 366.

signed express their confidence that Russia will accept the resumption of negotiations on the bases which, in their opinion, offer an assurance of their success, and afford to the two belligerent parties an opportunity for coming to an understanding in a suitable and honourable manner, without Europe being any longer grieved by the spectacle of war.

* "The representatives of Great Britain, France, and Prussia, entrust to the representative of Austria the task of making known to the cabinet of St. Petersburg the opinion recorded in the present protocol, to which is annexed a copy of the note addressed in an identical form by Reschid Pasha to the four representatives at Constantinople.

(Signed)

"BUOL, WESTMORLAND,
BOURQUENEY, ARNIM."

Austria and the Vienna conference complained loudly that their crowning work, the note and protocol of the 5th December, was not presented at Constantinople. But these complaints were soon quieted. Hitherto Austria and Prussia, but especially the former, had acted the part of faithful mediators. But from this period forward a complete change came over the counsels of both, especially of Austria; she became decidedly anti-Russian. The reasons are not unknown. France and England promised her that they would oppose all attempts at insurrections against her authority in Hungary, or Italy, or Poland, with probably a slice of Turkey as "a material guarantee" for good behaviour, if Austria would assist them in their object to humble and to crush Russia; but that if she would not do so, they would attack her in Italy, and encourage insurrections in Poland, Hungary, and Italy, while Prussia would be attacked by France on the side of the Rhine. Thus, as the important and forcible Russian manifesto or memorandum of the 3d March, scarcely known in this country, tells us, they by "*threats and caresses*" accomplished their primary object. All these secret proceedings were, as far as possible, withheld from the eyes of the public. They were too arbitrary, and dangerous, and unjust, to be laid before it then; but they will not be less so when they become publicly known, as before long they must be.

The Vienna conference, having thus been circumsised and made Islamites at the command of England and France, departed from their first faith, and, like all other renegadoes, stood forward to defend that which they had previously opposed. England was the chief operator in the present case, for we are informed by Earl Westmorland (No. 398¹), that the Turkish propositions "perfectly satisfactory to M. DE BOURQUENEY and MYSELF," were transmitted to St. Petersburg,

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, Jan. 12th, 1854, p. 365.

but without daring to disclose to the Russian Government the fact that the protocol they had previously penned and sent to Constantinople for acceptance had never been presented, because it had been forestalled by another proposed and "suggested to the Porte by her allies," that is, by Lord Stratford and Baraguay d'Hilliers, and which had produced the Turkish proposals or accession, which (in No. 403¹) Lord Westmorland tells us "was *most highly* approved of by the members of the conference ; that it was considered as doing full justice to the anxiety with which the four powers had *laboured to obtain* from the Government of the Sultan such proposals for the reestablishment of peace as, while honourable to themselves, would equally be so to the Emperor Nicholas." Our labour and anxiety, therefore, cannot be thrown away. Therefore, as the honour and power of our respective countries are pledged to support Turkey in whatever she may do as connected with Russia, so we now in their names decide and decree, and expect "that in pursuance of the respect for the maintenance of the tranquillity and the independence of the states of Europe *by which his* (the Emperor Nicholas's) *policy has been distinguished*, he will seize this opportunity of putting an end to a state of things which, by being prolonged, might compromise all those interests *which he has hitherto so eminently* COOPERATED IN MAINTAINING." No stronger evidence can be adduced to disprove all the lies and falsehoods which had been launched against Russia for her insincerity and relentless ambition, than the confession here made, though it does appear strange, and betrays a great lack of reason and justice, that the party who had been originally wronged, and so causelessly abused, should thus be unceremoniously commanded to do what the original wrongdoer and the *interests* of her supporters choose to dictate. It might have been supposed, and would reasonably have been expected by any one but, perhaps, Earl Westmorland and M. de Bourqueney, and the powers whose organs they were, that Russia, as one European state, would have, and ought to have had, something to say in the matter ; and this more especially when she saw such might, and on the part of some states, so ungenerously, so unnecessarily, and so unjustly, arrayed against her. The declaration of war by Turkey had, indeed, in political parlance and morality, abrogated the treaties that had existed between the two countries, Russia and Turkey, but not certainly, as yet, those between Russia and England ; and, therefore, it was cunningly and secretly advised by her allies, to obtain the ground that they now occupied, and without which they had not a leg to stand upon for their *interested* interference. On this ground, by first getting the Turkish declaration of war, and next, by

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, Jan. 13th, 1854, p. 368.

artfully making, or rather getting it made, an European question, they calculated that they would be able to curb and to humiliate Russia, and thus to secure their own *interests* (thanks to Lord Stratford for this true statement of the case) and extend their power over Turkey and her dominions, and to catch as much of her territory as each might be able to obtain, in the future quarrels which were sure to arise among them.

The Islamitic proposals above alluded to having been transmitted to St. Petersburg, were answered, and, as from the chief party in the cause, not unreasonably answered, by the following propositions on the part of Russia :—

Inclosure in No. 32, Part VII. p. 19.—Annex to the Protocol of the Conference held at Vienna, February 2d, 1854.

“ In answer to the propositions of the Porte, transmitted to St. Petersburg subsequently to the protocol of the 13th January, Russia has informed us that, faithful to the declarations which she made at the commencement of the contest, she desires neither to aggravate the dangers to which Turkey has exposed herself, nor to impose upon her a peace incompatible with her integrity and her independence.

“ Russia is persuaded that there never will have been a treaty less difficult to negotiate, and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, than the one which the Porte should now propose, with a sincere desire to replace its relations with Russia on their former footing, and to remove for ever the grounds of dissension which have arisen, by coming to a frank understanding upon the meaning and the bearing of its previous engagements, and of their present mutual intentions.

“ Russia maintains that there is a distinction to be made between the substance—that is the conditions—of the peace, and the form—that is the mode—of the negotiation.”

* * * *

“ The Imperial cabinet attaches to them the essential and irrevocable condition, that the definitive negotiation for the signature of the treaty of peace should be carried on directly between Russia and the Porte, either at head quarters or at St. Petersburg, by means of a plenipotentiary whom the Porte should send to one or other of those places.

“ The Russian cabinet observes that, in the event of negotiations being set on foot at St. Petersburg, the representatives of the four powers might be furnished with the requisite instructions for directing, assisting, and supporting by their counsels, the Turkish plenipotentiary, without there being any necessity for an ostensible conference ; and that form once set aside, it may be relied upon that the attitude of Russia will be all the more conciliatory.

“ As regards the substance of the negotiations, the Emperor, faithful to his disinterested sentiments, proposes as bases of the pacification, so far as

it is possible to define them in the midst of circumstances which vary every day, and in the event of direct negotiations between Russia and the Porte being shortly opened :

"1. The full and entire confirmation of former treaties concluded between Russia and the Porte, dating from that of Kainardji, and of the special conventions of Adrianople relative to the Danubian Principalities and to Servia.

"2. Explanations, to be recorded by the respective plenipotentiaries charged with the negotiation of peace in a separate act in the form of a protocol, or of an additional article, the draft of which is hereunto annexed, concerning the signification and practical application of the former and latter firmans of the sultans relative to religious liberty, and to the immunities accorded to the churches of the Orthodox Eastern rite.

"3. The evacuation, with the least possible delay, of the Danubian provinces, and of the other territories and towns forming part of the Sultan's dominions, which may, in consequence of the events of the war, be occupied by the Russian armies, so soon as the arrangement shall be concluded.

"4. The reestablishment of the order of things, and of the governments of the Principalities, such as they were settled by the stipulations of Adrianople."

* * * *

"As concerns the treaty of July 13, 1841, Russia considers it as never having ceased to be in force, since it was concluded both for the time of peace as well as for that of war ; consequently, there would be no occasion for its renewal or completion by a guarantee."

Inclosure 3 in No. 32.—Draft of Protocol.

"After having signed the articles of the treaty intended to reestablish peace between the two empires, and to substitute for a transitory disagreement the relations of friendship which have hitherto been maintained by their two sovereigns, in accordance with their mutual interests, the plenipotentiaries have applied themselves to consider more particularly the original cause of that disagreement ; and with the view of obliterating, for the future, every trace of it, they have severally recorded in the present protocol the following declarations and provisions :—

"The Ottoman plenipotentiary, in the first place, asserted in the Sultan's name, the constant solicitude with which that sovereign is animated for the security in his states of the clergy, the churches, and the religious establishments of the Orthodox Eastern faith, expressing sincere regret that there could have existed, for a moment, any doubts on this subject in the mind of his Imperial Majesty. He declared that his Majesty the Sultan had not, for a moment, thought of contravening the general principles laid down in the treaty of Kainardji, as well as in the treaties which confirm it, and that it was his firm intention to continue invariably faithful to it. In corroboration of that intention, and in proof of the Sultan's resolution to

secure to the Orthodox Eastern rite in his dominions, the rights, immunities, privileges, and spiritual advantages, which have been accorded to the said rite and to its churches by his Majesty's august predecessors, and even to extend in their favour the effects of his imperial benevolence, the Ottoman plenipotentiary was charged to communicate officially to the court of Russia the supreme Iradé which the Sultan of his own accord granted on the of to the Greek Patriarch and clergy. The formal delivery of that document into the hands of the Imperial cabinet, and further, the proclamation which had been publicly made of it, would demonstrate to the world that the Sultan considers it a point of honour to enforce for ever, and to preserve from all infringement, both now and for the future, the privileges confirmed or latterly accorded by his Majesty. His Majesty further promised, in a spirit of perfect equity, to allow the Greek Church to participate in the advantages which he might hereafter accord to the other Christian Churches.

"In return for these assurances, the plenipotentiary of Russia declared that if divers acts of the Porte, and especially with regard to the Holy Places, having appeared to the Emperor to indicate intentions little favourable to the faith which he professes, had induced his Majesty to require, at the same time, with the settlement of the more special question of the Holy Places, a general guarantee of the rights, privileges, and religious immunities accorded to the Orthodox Church ; on the other hand, it never entered his Majesty's mind to ascribe to that guarantee a character different from that which naturally results from the principle laid down in the treaty of Kainardji, and confirmed in subsequent acts—consequently, anything contrary to the Sultan's rights and independence ; and that, in requiring that the Greek Church and clergy should continue to enjoy those rights and privileges under the protection of their sovereign the Sultan, the Emperor had sufficiently explained the nature of that guarantee.

"In receiving from the hands of the Ottoman plenipotentiary the aforesaid supreme Iradé, the Russian plenipotentiary declared, in the name of his august master, that he accepted that manifestation as a further pledge of the cordial and sincere friendship so much to be desired for the two empires, and in a spirit of the most perfect confidence.

"These preliminaries once settled, and the general question thus solved, the undersigned proceeded to place on record, by a definitive arrangement, the results of the former negotiation at Constantinople.

"Consequently, the sovereign firman, issued by his Majesty the Sultan on the , in order to explain and corroborate that of January 1852, as well as another firman, dated , relating to the repairs of the great dome of the Temple of the Holy Sepulchre, were brought officially to the knowledge of the Imperial court of Russia by the Ottoman plenipotentiary ; and it was agreed that those sovereign ordinances, designed, when strictly carried out, to guarantee the *status quo* of the sanctuaries in possession of the Orthodox Greeks, either exclusively or in common with other sects, are considered by the two cabinets to be mutually satisfactory, and that they cannot, for the future

give rise to further discussion. Furthermore, the Sublime Porte promised that if any unforeseen circumstances should render necessary any modification of the actual state of things, she would take care to inform the court of Russia thereof beforehand, reserving to herself to make a similar declaration to those European courts to whom she may be bound by special stipulations.

“Moreover, as the subjects of the empire of Russia, secular as well as ecclesiastic, who are permitted by the treaties to visit the Holy City of Jerusalem and other places of devotion, ought to be considered on an equality with the subjects of the most favoured nations, and as those nations, Catholic and Protestant, have their own prelates and special ecclesiastical establishments, it has been determined that, in the event of the Imperial court of Russia demanding it, a suitable locality should be granted in the city of Jerusalem, or in the neighbourhood, for the construction of a church, appropriated to the celebration of Divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of an hospital for sick or needy pilgrims, which pious establishments shall be under the special superintendence of the Russian Consulate-General in Syria and in Palestine.

“The present act having thus settled the points which remained in discussion, and definitively confirmed the results already obtained, the plenipotentiaries have signed it, and have affixed to it the seal of their arms.”

A great stir was about this time made at Constantinople. An insurrection of the Mussulman population was organized against the Government on account, as it was said, of its pacific policy. A number of the fanatic Ulemas were accused of conspiracy, seized after the customary Turkish fashion, imprisoned, and subsequently banished to Candia ; but, as they were afterwards liberated and allowed to return to Constantinople, and as not an individual was tried or punished, there is good reason to believe that the whole was a Turkish Anglo-ministerial plot, devised to get the allied squadrons up to Constantinople, as bringing war nearer, and actual retreat from it more difficult. In this, to a certain extent, they succeeded ; but, admitting that the cause assigned for this move was correct, it merely establishes the fact that we have been led into war to support the warlike propensities and views of the Mahommedans.

While these things were going on, important movements took place with the combined fleets, together with the, to the Turks, fatal naval battle of Sinope. To render this portion of the subject clearer, we must go at some length into the objects which these fleets had in view, as those appear in the various and voluminous despatches. It is hard labour to dig out from that correspondence the real and ultimate intentions of the allied courts—that is, of France, Turkey, and England—with reference to their naval objects.

Their earliest movements testify their object. In No. 225, Part I. p. 229, M. Drouyn de Lhuys tells us that the French fleet was, on the 22d March, ordered from Toulon to Salamis, the moment they heard of Prince Menchikoff's arrival at Constantinople, in order to support Turkey. In No. 220, Part I. p. 226, Lord Cowley tells us that the French fleet was ordered from Salamis to the Dardanelles, and there placed at the command or requisition of the Sultan. But Lord Cowley and Lord Clarendon leave us no room for doubt upon this subject. In No. 332,¹ Lord Cowley tells us that the object, as communicated to him by Drouyn de Lhuys, was that "France and England were determined to hold possession of the Black Sea as an *equivalent* for the occupation of the Danubian Provinces by Russia," and to control "her action in the Black Sea by sweeping that sea of the Russian flag!" In No. 339,² Lord Clarendon follows this up by declaring that "her Majesty's Government approve also of the whole of the combined fleets being ordered on this service ; as, in fact, it is only *by obtaining the complete command of the Black Sea that the policy* of the English and French Governments can be carried out!" This cannot be mistaken, though, at that time, it is doubtful if they were really aware of the end to which this policy would lead them. In No. 345,³ his Lordship is, if possible, still more explicit. He says : "The *intentions* of the English and French Governments, which WERE LONG SINCE *announced to the Porte*, must be firmly and faithfully executed. For this purpose, although with no *hostile design* against Russia, it is essential that the combined fleets should have the *command of the Black Sea* ; and the necessary instructions have accordingly been addressed to the ambassadors and admirals of England and France." Plain common-sense is puzzled to find out, in this diplomatic rubbish, how Turkey, being at war with Russia, such a proceeding in the Black Sea could not be considered as an act of defiance and hostility to Russia. Yet so Seymour would persuade us, that the movement was "not with the intention of attacking Russia, but certainly of *defending Turkey*," then at war with Russia! (No. 412, Part II. p. 374.) Lord Cowley, who seems to be no great headpiece in diplomacy, and who is constantly making blunders, makes the matter worse by attempting the justification of the proceeding thus : "That the Russian Government, having declared that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces by the Russian troops was a set-off against the presence of the British and French fleets in the waters of the Bosphorus, England and France

¹ Cowley to Clarendon, Dec. 16th, 1853, Part II. p. 306.

² Clarendon to Stratford, Dec. 20th, 1853, Part II. p. 319.

³ Clarendon to Seymour, Dec. 27th, 1853, Part II. p. 322.

might have, in the occupation of the Black Sea, an *equivalent to them* for the occupation of the Principalities." So far, then, both rogues, if rogues they both were, would have stood on equal ground, if they—England and France—had had the same just cause of quarrel with Russia that Russia had with Turkey, but which they certainly had not.

Diplomatists as well as doctors differ. In No. 29,¹ Sir H. Seymour, in an interview with Count Nesselrode, could "not accede" to the point urged, that the position of the English and French fleets outside of the Dardanelles was not "a threatening attitude" against Russia. Now, numerous authorities are compelled to admit that it was. The *Times*, which at that time spoke by the command of our Government,² declares that it was a hostile and warlike demonstration against Russia; and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in urging his Government to send them into the Dardanelles (No. 81³), says, "We should undertake to withdraw *immediately* that the order to evacuate the Danubian Provinces should have been given." Baron Brunnow, in the name of his Government (No. 110⁴), complains that all the movements of the fleets disclosed hostile feelings against Russia, their movements having been openly declared to be to support Turkey in her negotiations with Russia. In No. 127,⁵ in reference to their policy to support Turkey, Drouyn de Lhuys tells us, "All the *traditions* of our policy impose upon us the duty of not neglecting it;" and the dispatch of the French squadron, first to Salamis, and *subsequently to Besika Bay*, sufficiently proves the vigilance of the Emperor's Government. Lord Clarendon (No. 130⁶) tells us, that "he hoped that the combined fleets are now at Constantinople, *prepared to act in the defence of the Sultan!*" and also, "at whatever place they may think necessary." But the strongest proof that such movements of the fleets were viewed in a hostile light by reasonable and disinterested men, is found in the complaints of Count Buol, about these movements taking

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, July 24th, 1853, p. 23.

² "For the purpose of a demonstration, their presence at the Dardanelles is sufficient. For the protection of Constantinople itself they are near enough to give effectual assistance, if the capital be threatened. Should the fleet be compelled to enter the Black Sea, it can only be in the character of armed mediatory powers, as the allies of Turkey for the purposes of war."—*Times*, July 8th, 1853. "The one," Besika Bay, "was an act of strict defence and observation, which has all along been regulated by the utmost forbearance, and is still contrasted by the respect for the Convention of 1841."—*Times*, July 16th, 1853. Subsequently the journal in question told us, that it was the movement of the fleets that alarmed Russia, and made her agree to the Vienna note in the ready manner that she did.

³ Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, Sept. 1st, 1853, p. 87.

⁴ Brunnow to Clarendon, Sept. 25th, 1853, p. 116.

⁵ Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski, Oct. 4th, 1853, p. 134.

Clarendon to Cowley, Oct. 7th, 1853, p. 140.

place without the Austrian Government being made acquainted with them, especially while it was engaged in endeavouring to negotiate a peace. In No. 389,¹ Lord Westmorland tells us, that "Count Buol expressed his surprise at these strong declarations, and stated that he was not prepared to expect that they would be directed to use coercion against the Russian ships of war, while navigating upon their own coasts, in the manner described." To this Lord Westmorland made the remarkable reply, that "it was occasioned by the attack upon the Turkish squadron in Sinope—an offence which they were called upon to resent." Lord Clarendon (No. 404²) comes more proudly to the point, thus:—"Further inaction would have been dishonourable to England and France, *who alone* were the competent judges of the duty that their honour prescribed; and who, upon such a question, *could certainly not be expected* to take counsel *with any other* power." And yet they tell every other power that they must all do as they bid them!!

The Turks, according to Lord Stratford, would hear of no notes but their own; and latterly no notes nor acknowledgments of any kind. Their illustrious allies, the two great Western Powers, as they term themselves, were above taking counsel or advice from any quarter but the Turks and the Koran; and according to its doctrines, they came to the resolution to propagate their opinions and views by the sword. While talking of peace they were meditating war. Their conduct with the fleets in the Baltic and Black Sea was puerile and undecided in the extreme. They sent these fleets there, in their unmeaning slang, not to *make war* on Russia, but to *defend* Turkey; the latter power being at that moment at war with Russia, and consequently whatever they did in any way to defend her, whether by menace or active aid, was war against Russia! So far they were willing to wound, but then a little afraid to strike; and with that magnanimity and those *disinterested* principles that moved them, they came to the resolution that as Russia had honestly and fairly got a navy, it should be destroyed, in order, as it would appear, that no other powers, themselves excepted, should have any; when all other powers that had sea coasts would be, as they conceived, placed at their mercy. How kind, and how *just*!

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, January 4th, 1854, Part II. p. 357.

² Clarendon to Westmorland, January 17th, 1854, Part II. p. 370.

CHAPTER VI.

SINOPE—FLEETS ENTER THE BLACK SEA—CONFERENCE AT VIENNA—LABOURS—FRESH PROTOCOLS—CORRESPONDENCE AND DECLARATIONS ABOUT THEM BY THE DIFFERENT POWERS—HOSTILE MESSAGE TO RUSSIA—RECAL OF AMBASSADORS—WAR ANNOUNCED—SECRET CORRESPONDENCE—RUSSIAN IMPORTANT MEMORANDUM—CORRESPONDENCE WITH THIS COUNTRY ABOUT TURKEY, 1844, ETC. ETC.

BEFORE going further, it is advisable to consider the naval engagement which took place at Sinope—the time, the circumstances, and results attendant upon it—and about which so much misrepresentation, and falsehoods, and concealments, and so much dangerous declamation and hostile vituperation have taken place, to irritate and to inflame the public mind. It has formed the stock-in-trade of the war factions since the middle of December last—with what justice a short statement, and attention to facts and dates, will show. In No. 251,¹ Lord Stratford, with that arbitrary dictation which he is ever ready to use, when he has his own views to carry out, informs us that, after consulting with the admirals and French ambassadors, *M. Pisani* should go to the Porte, and “make it clearly understood that the Porte could not be allowed, under present circumstances, to follow out its own NOTIONS, without a suitable and constant attention to the voice of its allies.” And further, in Inclosure No. 1, that the British and French ambassadors are entitled to receive from the Porte an unreserved explanation of its intentions; and a knowledge of the intended operations, whether naval or military, is absolutely necessary, for them to determine, in concert with their respective admirals, in what manner their instructions may be most efficiently and prudently carried out.” The reply was (Inclosure, No. 2), that “Omar Pasha and Selim Pasha were instructed to act only on the *defensive*, and that the latter, especially, should not *venture too much*. The Turkish squadron, with

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, Nov. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 248.

the *exception of the three-deckers*, is to proceed to the Black Sea, and will probably be ready by Sunday. *It is intended* to cruise along the *Asiatic shore*, returning round by the Crimea and the European coast. *Should it fall in with the enemy's squadron, an attack is contemplated.*" In No. 252,¹ Lord Stratford says he had prevented the Turkish fleet from going into the Black Sea ; but, on the same date, he warns *Pisani* to be sure of it, "because," says he, "we must be careful on our side that we are neither drawn into operations contrary to our better judgment, nor confounded with those who, against calculation and experience, incur hazards which are out of proportion with the results in view. We do not pretend to lay our commands upon the Porte, or to deprive her in any degree of her liberty of action ; but we claim for ourselves the right of not partaking in measures which we do not approve, *and of keeping aloof*—and marking to the public that we do keep aloof—when attempts are made to carry them into effect *against our declared opinion*. Thus it is that, in the present instance, we suspend the orders for bringing up the remainder of the squadrons, until we know the Porte's final decision with respect to the proposed expedition into the Black Sea." In Inclosure No. 2, of the same date, and dated Saturday, 12 o'clock, his Lordship proceeds : "I have just learned that orders are come up for sending four line-of-battle ships, and ten sailing frigates, into the Black Sea, *to-morrow*. In consequence of this, I shall not order up the remainder of the squadrons, till I hear from Reschid Pasha that the intended enterprise, *in so far as sailing vessels are concerned, is abandoned*. You must tell his Highness, *once for all*, that we will NOT BE DRAWN IN THE WAKE OF THE PORTE ; and that, if they want our support, they *must be content to respect our opinions*."

Still this Turkish fleet did sail on 6th November, and traversed the Black Sea ; and we hear no more of them *officially*, at Constantinople, till the 3d of December, shortly announcing the results of the disastrous battle of Sinope. Into the full details of that action I do not mean to enter. It is foreign to my present purpose, which is merely to arrange facts and dates, and to point out how occurrences took place, and succeeded each other ; in short, to show how the war was produced, not how it was carried on or conducted. The battle was bravely fought on both sides, but the result was the total destruction of the Turkish fleet, or rather that portion thereof there assembled. The fleet, when it sailed, was under the chief command of Mustapha Pasha, or the renegade Englishman, Captain Slade. Renegade or hypocrite he must be, because he got a command which none but a

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, Nov. 5th, 1853, p. 250.

true Mussulman could then hold, as the law, since passed, to permit foreigners not Mussulmans to hold offices, had not then been promulgated. The Russian authorities and officers assert, that the fleet destroyed formed a squadron intended to raise up commotions in Circassia. Of this there is, I believe, no doubt, whatever may be said, or has been said, to the contrary. And not only so, but we shall presently see that not only was it intended for this purpose, but that it had actually landed military stores on the coast of Circassia, to aid rebellion. For a whole month we have no official accounts of the proceedings of the fleet, which went to sea directly contrary to the command of the British ambassador. Why this ominous official silence? The first thing we hear officially about it is in No. 335,¹ when Lord Stratford brings forth despatches from the Turkish commander at Sinope, dated Nov. 29th, stating that after the departure of *Mustapha Pasha* several Russian men-of-war had appeared off the harbour, in a warlike attitude, and calling for reinforcements, "which if not sent to us, and our position continues the same for some time—may God preserve us from them!—it may well happen that the Imperial fleet may sustain some loss." The honest Turk here announces that he may be attacked, and, in short, that he deserves to be attacked by his open and recognised enemy. He does not complain of this, but leaves complaint to be made by his hypocritical and tender-hearted allies.

It is of considerable importance that we should ascertain, as correctly as possible, what this fleet was about in the Black Sea, for nearly a whole month; and as official authority, for its secret purposes, has chosen to remain silent, we must have recourse to the next best—and probably to the best and most honest—namely, those public vehicles of intelligence which so fully tell everything that goes on in this world. But before I do this, it is advisable to notice a few official references to it.

In No. 331,² we learn that "the Turks were the first to fire"—they had previously refused to surrender. They refused to await the arrival of the flag of truce sent to summon them to do so. In No. 371,³ Lord Stratford, in lamenting the destruction of these Turkish ships, proceeds: "Not that I would throw the blame of that disaster *anywhere* but on the Porte and its officers. They alone, or their professional counsellors, were cognizant of the miserable state of the land defences of Sinope. They alone are answerable for the obvious impru-

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, December 4th, 1853, p. 311, Inclosure Nos. 2 and 3, Part II. pp. 313, 314.

² Stratford to Clarendon, Dec. 9th, 1853, Part II. p. 305.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, Dec. 17th, 1853, Part II. p. 339.

dence of leaving so long, in helpless danger, a squadron exposed to attack from hostile ships of far superior force." In No. 25,¹ Lord Stratford, on the authority of the British consul at Samsoun, says, that "the loss of life at Sinope was not so great as the first reports stated." To the date of December 12th, about 300 Turkish sailors, survivors, had reached that place, and more were expected. The country around was overspread with fugitives, who were committing great ravages amongst the ill-fated population. In No. 11,² by order of Lord Clarendon, Lord Stratford demanded of the Turkish Government that they should institute a strict inquiry into the affair of Sinope, and to inform him officially how the court of inquiry was constituted, and also the result of their inquiries. The following directions were most conspicuous :—

"1st. To what or to whom is attributable the defective state of the fortifications of Sinope ?

"2d. By whose orders, and for what object, the flotilla destroyed at Sinope was sent out ?

"3d. By whose orders the vessels composing that flotilla anchored in the port of Sinope ?"

No reply, however, has been given or published regarding the results of that promised investigation—a proof that the Turks could not give an honest account of it, and also that the private accounts received of its objects and operations were in general correct. To these I now proceed.

The Turkish fleet proceeded to sea on the 6th of November. The main body, under Mustapha Pasha, returned to Constantinople on the 25th or 26th, having, as appears from the official account, left a part of the force under Osman Pasha at Sinope. From two public journals, generally believed to be well informed on such subjects, the following extracts are taken. The *Morning Herald*, December 18th, quoting from a German paper, says, that "three Turkish frigates had landed arms and other articles at Gelendjik, on the coast of Circassia." The same paper, December 17th, under date Constantinople, December 2d, says, "Three Turkish steamers, with arms and ammunition for Circassia, landed their cargoes at Verdan, near Anapa, and then returned to Constantinople." Again, the *Morning Herald*, December 30th, under date Constantinople, December 5th, states : "The Ottoman fleet some time previous had entered the Black Sea, with a convoy of arms and munitions of war, to land on the coast of Circassia. Part of the fleet was under the command of Slade, and part under Mustapha

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, Jan. 15th, 1854, Part VII. p. 16.

² Stratford to Clarendon, Jan. 4th, 1854, Part VII. p. 5, Inclosure No. 1.

Pasha. The former returned after having been some days out ; the latter accomplished his mission, and returned ; saw the Russian fleet, but did not attack it. Slade was to guard Mustapha Pasha, but lost sight of him on the first day."

The next authority is the *Times*, which paper is still more specific. In the *Times* of December 4th, we are told that "the Turkish squadron which had entered the Black Sea contrary to the advice of the British ambassador, had returned to the Bosphorus in safety, before the 26th of November." In the *Times* of December 9th, under date Constantinople, November 25th, we are informed, that "the Captain Pasha entertained the allied admirals on board his own ship, the *Mahmoud*. In the *Times*, November 19th, under date Constantinople, November 5th, we are told that the Turkish fleet destined to cruise in the Black Sea, consisted of four frigates, three steamers, and two corvettes and two brigs. In the *Times*, November 25th, under date Constantinople, November 10th, we are told that a fresh division of the Turkish fleet entered the Black Sea, where a Russian fleet had been seen. In the *Times* of November 26th, under date Constantinople, November 15th, we are told that a second division of the Turkish fleet had entered the Black Sea, to join Mustapha Pasha. Under date Paris, November 26th, we are told, in a communication from Marseilles, that Admiral Slade had entered the Black Sea to cruise, with one line-of-battle ship, five frigates, and one steamer, accompanied by Saffa Bey, a celebrated Circassian chief, liberated by the Sultan, to *drive off the* Russian cruisers from Anapa, and to *supply arms and ammunition* to the Lesghians, the Leghs, and Tcherkeses," &c. In the *Times* of December 13th, we are told that the Turkish ships destroyed at Sinope had each 800 soldiers, besides artillerymen, on board, and a large sum of money, bound to the *eastern coast* of the Black Sea. And in the *Times* of December 14th, we are told that the Sinope squadron was destined to attack Soukhoun Kale.

A consideration of all these details can leave no doubt upon any unprejudiced mind, of these the aggressive proceedings of the Turkish squadron ; nor were they wrong, being at war with Russia, in what they did, but in acting so they must have been aware that they took the consequences on themselves. The Russians could not fail to know correctly of circumstances that took place in their own territory, and they decidedly state that this squadron landed arms and ammunition in order to kindle up rebellion in their dominions. The silence of their opponents regarding the movements of the Turkish fleets at this time is conclusive that their account is the just one ; and, consequently, it is contrary to all reason to assert, as England and France have

asserted, that the battle of Sinope was an affront to, and (No. 357¹) "an act of defiance to England and France, which, assuredly, would not pass unnoticed." But it is put forward in justification of this charge, that Russia had declared, on the 27th of October, that she would take no aggressive measures against Turkey beyond the temporary occupation of the Principalities. Be it so; but then this declaration was made and assurance given, before she had heard of the declaration of war against her by Turkey, and also conditionally upon the Turks remaining quiet on the Danubian and Asiatic frontiers. Moreover, there is an important despatch from Count Nesselrode to Reschid Pasha, after Russia had received the Turkish declaration of war, stating that Russia would still remain as before, unless the active proceedings of Turkey should force her to have recourse to active hostilities. This very important despatch is not given with the other official documents, though Lord Stratford, no doubt, received a copy of it. It is inserted in the *Journal de Constantinople* of Dec. 5th, and is a document of great importance, as showing the real views of Russia, and consequently we hear nothing about it, and therefore, it is presumed, it is concealed from the British public. The short and the long of the matter is, that the naval battle of Sinope was made just so much profligate diplomatic capital as would tend to inflame and irritate the public mind, and drive it to acts of political injustice and reprisals.

It is considered that it would be a waste of time to enter upon the consideration of the extensive correspondence regulating the Black Sea, and the schemes, alike evasive and insincere, concocted by France and England, for preventing two hostile powers from fighting each other in that sea and its environs; or that one party should be allowed to fight, and the other, the strongest, to be restrained; or that both should fight when and where, and after the manner that should be prescribed to them by their volunteer masters,—a course forming a burlesque upon diplomacy and negotiations, and alike discreditable and dangerous on the part of two powers like France and England, who proposed it. Neither is it considered necessary to go more minutely into the details of the proceedings at Olmutz, the main facts and results of which have been given; nor of Count Orloff's mission to Vienna, which was to induce the Austrian Government to observe, in case of war between France and England against Russia, a strict neutrality. This Austria refused, although she had again and again stated that such would be the course she would adopt in the event of extended hostilities. In No. 156² Lord Westmorland tells us, on the

¹ Clarendon to Seymour, Dec. 28th, 1853, Part II. p. 329.

² Westmorland to Clarendon, Oct. 15th, 1853, Part II. p. 144.

positive authority of Count Buol, that "the position of Austria in the contest which has arisen was, and would continue to be, that of a strict neutrality." There are reasons for everything ; and there are reasons for this change of views on the part of Austria, which have already been noticed. The only point worthy of more particular notice arising out of Orloff's mission is, the suggestions offered to him by Count Buol, which he promised to lay before his master, the Emperor Nicholas. The principal one is here annexed.¹ Lord Clarendon, however, scouted them with precipitate scorn, as he conceived (No. 73²) "*they would entail a most inconvenient delay*," and that "her Majesty's Government would recognise no propositions but those which were transmitted to St. Petersburg on the 13th ult., and *could consent to no modification of terms* that had been declared by the conference to be just and reasonable ; and that, in the meanwhile, they would not relax in those preparations which were now actively making for bringing to a *speedy conclusion* the war in which Europe was to be involved by the Emperor of Russia." The reader will bear in mind that the propositions of the 13th January, here alluded to, were those proposed by the Turkish Government, and which M. Drouyn de Lhuys (No. 41³) tells us plainly ; "These propositions, it *must be* recollected, had been *suggested to the Porte by the representatives of the four powers*, and had been adopted by the Sultan and his ministers." A great, and independent, and high-spirited nation, who had been wronged and deceived by the Turks, is here told,—You must now bend to the will and pleasure of these Turks, or we will compel you, and speedily crush you by our united strength !

The suggestions offered to Count Orloff by Count Buol produced some fresh offers from St. Petersburg. These reached Vienna at the moment the messenger from England arrived there to receive the co-operative note from Austria, to summon the Russian Government to evacuate the Principalities. Count Buol, with some difficulty, got the messenger detained two days, till the Governments of France and England could be consulted about the nature of the offers made for pacification. These differed, as might have been expected, from the Turkish propositions, but which does not prove that they were either wrong, unjust, or unreasonable, under all the circumstances of the case. On the contrary, the more that France and England sought to extend their power and influence *in and over Turkey*, the more it became necessary for Russia to guard against that influence and that power

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, Oct. 15th, 1853, Part II. p. 164.

² Clarendon to Westmorland, Feb. 20th, 1854, Part VII. p. 47.

³ Cowley to Clarendon, Feb. 14th, 1853, Part VII. p. 40.

from being exercised over her next neighbour to her prejudice. In this there was certainly nothing that could be accounted unreasonable or improper, and nothing but what came fairly within the scope of honest and fair negotiation. The French ambassador lets us shortly know the sticking point, namely, the insertion in, for a treaty between Russia and Turkey, that which Reschid Pasha had promised to give to the five powers (four only) by a simple declaration ; in short, that the liberation and improvement of the Christian population in Turkey was to be left to depend wholly upon firmans and promises of the Turkish Government, which, made for the day and the occasion, are, as has been again and again witnessed, not worth a farthing—"so much waste paper." M. Bourqueney observes (p. 72), that with that and some other trifling difference or discrepancy, the Russian propositions "were *still the same story*;" forgetting by this admission that he established her consistency, and refuted the numerous and virulent accusations brought against her of tergiversation, chicanery, and insincerity.

Inclosure 2, in No. 32.—Annex to the Protocol of the Conference held at Vienna, February 2d, 1854.

"Russia is persuaded that there never will have been a treaty less difficult to negotiate and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, than the one which the Porte should now propose, with a sincere desire to replace its relations with Russia on their former footing, and to remove for ever the grounds of dissension which have arisen, by coming to a frank understanding upon the meaning and the bearing of its previous engagements, and of their present mutual intentions."

* * * *

"The Imperial cabinet attaches to them the essential and irrevocable condition, that the definitive negotiation for the signature of the treaty of peace should be carried on directly between Russia and the Porte, either at head quarters or at St. Petersburg, by means of a plenipotentiary whom the Porte should send to one or other of those places."

* * * *

"As regards the substance of the negotiations, the Emperor, faithful to his disinterested sentiments, proposes as bases of the pacification, so far as it is possible to define them in the midst of circumstances which vary every day, and in the event of direct negotiations between Russia and the Porte being shortly opened :

"1. The full and entire confirmation of former treaties concluded between Russia and the Porte, dating from that of Kainardji, and of the special conventions of Adrianople relative to the Danubian Principalities and to Servia.

"2. Explanations, to be recorded by the respective plenipotentiaries charged with the negotiation of peace, in a separate act, in the form of a protocol or of an additional article, the draft of which is hereunto annexed, concerning the signification and practical application of the former and

latter firmans of the sultans relative to religious liberty, and to the immunities accorded to the churches of the Orthodox Eastern rite.

"3. The evacuation, with the least possible delay, of the Danubian Provinces, and of the other territories and towns forming part of the Sultan's dominions, which may, in consequence of the events of the war, be occupied by the Russian armies, so soon as the arrangement shall be concluded.

"4. The re-establishment of the order of things, and of the governments of the Principalities, such as they were settled by the stipulations of Adrianople."

* * * *

"As concerns the treaty of July 13th, 1841, Russia considers it as never having ceased to be in force, since it was concluded both for the time of peace as well as for that of war, consequently there would be no occasion for its renewal or completion by a guarantee."

Inclosure 3 in No. 32.—Draft of Protocol.

"The Ottoman plenipotentiary, in the first place, asserted in the Sultan's name the constant solicitude with which that Sovereign is animated for the security in his states of the clergy, the churches, and the religious establishments of the Orthodox Eastern faith, expressing sincere regret that there could have existed for a moment any doubts on this subject in the mind of his Imperial Majesty. He declared that his Majesty the Sultan had not for a moment thought of contravening the general principles laid down in the treaty of Kainardji, as well as in the treaties which confirm it, and that it was his firm intention to continue invariably faithful to it. In corroboration of that intention, and in proof of the Sultan's resolution to secure to the Orthodox Eastern rite in his dominions the rights, immunities, privileges, and spiritual advantages, which have been accorded to the said rite and to its churches by his Majesty's august predecessors, and even to extend in their favour the effects of his Imperial benevolence, the Ottoman plenipotentiary was charged to communicate officially to the court of Russia the supreme Iradé which the Sultan, of his own accord, granted, on the of , to the Greek Patriarch and clergy. The formal delivery of that document into the hands of the Imperial cabinet, and, further, the proclamation which had been publicly made of it, would demonstrate to the world, that the Sultan considers it a point of honour to enforce for ever, and to preserve from all infringement, both now and for the future, the privileges confirmed or latterly accorded by his Majesty. His Majesty further promised, in a spirit of perfect equity, to allow the Greek Church to participate in the advantages which he might hereafter accord to the other Christian Churches.

"In return for these assurances, the plenipotentiary of Russia declared that if divers acts of the Porte, and especially with regard to the Holy Places, having appeared to the Emperor to indicate intentions little favourable to the faith which he professes, had induced his Majesty to require, at the same time with the settlement of the more special question of the

Holy Places, a general guarantee for the rights, privileges, and religious immunities accorded to the Orthodox Church, on the other hand, it never entered his Majesty's mind to ascribe to that guarantee a character different from that which naturally results from the principle laid down in the treaty of Kainardji, and confirmed in subsequent acts—consequently, anything contrary to the Sultan's rights and independence; and that, in requiring that the Greek Church and clergy should continue to enjoy those rights and privileges, under the protection of their sovereign the Sultan, the Emperor had sufficiently explained the nature of that guarantee.

"In receiving from the hands of the Ottoman plenipotentiary the aforesaid supreme Iradé, the Russian plenipotentiary declared, in the name of his august master, that he accepted that manifestation as a further pledge of the cordial and sincere friendship so much to be desired for the two empires, and in a spirit of the most perfect confidence."

Directed and advised chiefly by the ambassadors of France and England, the Vienna Conference (No. 133¹, Inclosure No. 1) decided "that it was impossible to proceed with those propositions;" but Lord Clarendon (of the same date, No. 126²) had already settled the business. "Those proposals, *so far as we* know them, do not justify the further delay of the messenger, Blackwood; and we desire that he should proceed at once to St. Petersburg." The decision of his Lordship and his allies had long been taken. Having *coerced* the Vienna Conference, his Lordship says (Part VII. No. 63, p. 41), "Her Majesty's Government can be *no party to a modification of the Turkish terms*, which have been declared by the Conference to be just and reasonable, and such as ought to be accepted by Russia." But Russia had a right to think on the subject. The messenger did proceed, and reached St. Petersburg on the morning of the 13th, and his message was immediately put into the hands of Count Nesselrode by Mr. Michele, the British consul at St. Petersburg, Sir H. Seymour having previously been relieved from his diplomatic duties, and, it is presumed, of his salary also, in that capital, by his recal, which reached him on the 14th February.

The message in question was a remarkable and memorable one; new in the annals of the diplomacy of civilized nations, and one which in its consequences will be felt most deeply throughout the world, and in no part thereof more severely than in the United Kingdom and the whole British empire. The French message was, we believe, of the same tenor; what the Austrian and Prussian communications were we are not told, nor is it of much consequence. The message, or summons, as it is otherwise called, is contained in No. 101.³

¹ Westmorland to Clarendon, March 6th, 1853, Part VII. pp. 78—80, &c.

² Clarendon to Westmorland, March 6th, 1854, Part VII. p. 72.

³ Clarendon to Nesselrode, February 27th, 1854, Part VII. p. 61.

After a preamble, stating that "the British Government has for many months anxiously laboured, in conjunction with its allies, to effect a reconciliation of differences between Russia and the Sublime Porte," and asserting that peace or war depended upon the resolve of Russia, his Lordship proceeds: "The British Government, having exhausted all the efforts of negotiation, is compelled to declare to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, that if Russia should *decline to restrict within merely diplomatic limits the discussion which she has for some time past been engaged in with the Sublime Porte*, and does not, by the return of the messenger who is the bearer of my present letter, announce her intention of causing the Russian troops under the orders of Prince Gortschakoff to commence their march, with the view to recross the Pruth, so that the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia shall be completely evacuated on the 30th of April next, the British Government must consider *the refusal or the silence* of the cabinet of St. Petersburg as equivalent to a declaration of war, and will take its measures accordingly. The messenger who is the bearer of this letter to your Excellency is directed *not to wait* more than six days at St. Petersburg for your reply; and I *earnestly trust* that he may convey to me an announcement, on the part of the Russian Government, that by the 30th of April next the Principalities will cease to be occupied by Russian forces."

The future and impartial statesman, when the folly, vanity, and irritation of the moment shall have passed away, will, when he has to record the consequences which resulted from that act, pen with sorrow and with shame the historical fact that there should have been any British statesman who, as the organ of a British cabinet, could under any circumstances, especially under the present circumstances, put his name (that name, too, the amiable and excellent nobleman, Lord Clarendon) to a document like this. Had Seymour signed it, no surprise could have been excited. Perhaps he drafted it or *pointed* it. In every word and line we perceive a deep contemptuous, nay, even personal feeling, directed against a party which certainly was not the first to provoke the quarrel. It bears the stamp of forced bravado, put forth as if intended to cover error and injustice, and has the appearance of being intended to supply as much political capital as would end in supporting a rickety ministry, or the stability of an Imperial French throne. It is not like, nor is it what ought to have been, the voice of this nation upon such a solemn occasion. It has torn up by the roots steady and sincere friendships, and confidence which it will be difficult ever to restore, and inflicted upon a great and friendly nation wounds which can never be healed or forgotten.

All this is aggravated by the hypocritical hope conveyed, that the imperious and imperative demand—command—would be readily, and in the time *prescribed*, obeyed. His Lordship could expect no answer to such a message; nay, further, he informs us that he expected none, because he tells Consul Michele thus: “If, previous to the expiration of that period, Count Nesselrode should *inform you that the messenger need not remain at St. Petersburg . . .* in either of these cases you will direct the messenger to return to England *with the utmost speed.*”

Consul Michele was directed to deliver his burden to Count Nesselrode, in conjunction with the French consul, whose message, by-the-bye, limited the time for evacuation to the 15th of April. This they did on the 14th of March, at twelve o'clock, the hour appointed to receive them (No. 137¹). In this remarkable embroilment and finale it is worthy of notice that, whether ambassadors or consuls, the French and English went in pairs, as if afraid or ashamed to go alone in the performance of their doubtful work. The Emperor being absent from St. Petersburg, the message could not be submitted to him for some days. He returned² on the 17th: on the 18th, Count Nesselrode summoned Michele to attend him at one o'clock next day. The result is soon told. “*The Emperor does not consider it proper or becoming to return any answer to the letter of Lord Clarendon*” (*L'Empereur ne juge pas convenable de donner aucune réponse à la lettre de Lord Clarendon*). The head of a great or independent nation could not act otherwise. The message sent conveyed, and was intended to convey, a direct insult to the Russian Government and Sovereign, and to provoke that war which had long been determined upon by Turkey and *her allies*. Having received his answer, Michele next thought of NUMBER ONE—his salary. “What about the consular arrangements between the two countries?” said he to Count Nesselrode. “That will entirely depend,” said the Count, calmly, “upon the course her Britannic Majesty’s Government may adopt: we shall not declare war.” You are their servant, and must obey them.

A declaration of war against Russia was shortly after put forth; but before I proceed to advert to it, it is proper to notice some circumstances that occurred at St. Petersburg previous to the recal of Sir H. Seymour; next, “THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE;” and afterwards advert to the present state of Turkey, and the statements made by our ambassadors under that head, in which the reader will learn to his surprise the remarkably gross impositions, deceptions, and chicanery that were carried on in reference to this part of the subject, and thence be able to estimate the value of such authorities.

¹ Michele to Clarendon, March 19th, 1854, Part VII. p. 82.

Of the muddy-headed confusion which guided the diplomatic opinions and proceedings of Sir H. Seymour, we have several striking specimens in the Official Correspondence. The two following may suffice in proof. In No. 207,¹ Sir H. Seymour says, in reference to the "reparation" required by Russia from Turkey, that "Russia had no more right to make war upon Turkey for withholding a political privilege, than England would have, if she went to war upon *being refused any commercial advantage* for which she might apply to a foreign Government." Now, if any foreign Government should refuse to grant to England the commercial privileges which that foreign Government had granted to another; and if, as with regard to the Holy Places, a foreign Government had given to another Government privileges which she had granted by treaty, and then taken away from England,—then England had a right, full redress being refused, to go to war with the power which had so acted. Again, if those privileges had been established under long subsisting treaties, as were the Russian rights to the Holy Places under special firmans and the treaty of Kainardji, and redress refused when demanded for a treaty thus violated,—then certainly England, like Russia, had a clear right to have recourse to hostilities to enforce her rights. Again, No. 376,² the same gentleman tells Count Nesselrode, when the latter put it to him what England would have felt had the great powers of Europe interfered to direct and control her proceedings and actions in her war with China, thus: "*The question was one in which no great European interests other than our own were engaged!*"—thus broadly advancing the monstrous doctrine that the extension of our wars and our territories to quarters of the world not European, did not increase our strength as opposed to other nations; and that consequently they had no business or right to interfere with our acts and proceedings. With such ambassadors employed, this country will never be out of trouble.

When this ambassador's services were dispensed with, and become no longer necessary at St. Petersburg, he affected to take great interest in the safety of the British residents there. In No. 98,³ he is compelled to tell Count Nesselrode and us, that our "countrymen" expressed "their *unlimited confidence* in the protection that they shall meet with from the Emperor, your gracious master, in conformity with the assurances which have been made to them." They sought and required no other—a sufficient refutation of the charges of despotism, barbarity,

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, October 29th, 1853, Part II. p. 213.

² Seymour to Clarendon, Dec. 26th, 1853, Part II. pp. 348, 349.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, Feb. 16th, 1854, Part VII.

and avarice, that have been so loudly and so widely brought against him, and much of it through the instrumentality of Sir H. Seymour himself.

Another instance of the want of truth and candour on the part of this gentleman, is his gratuitous positive statement (No. 76¹) of the general distress of the Russian commerce. "Business," says he, "as it may be well supposed, is nearly at a stand still at St. Petersburg." The best refutation to this misstatement, or rather untruth, is the return of the trade of Russia for 1853, showing the vast increase of *many millions* of roubles over that of 1852.²

The anti-Russian feeling of this gentleman breaks out on all occasions in the most unnecessary and uncalled-for manner, and unworthy of the character of a public servant, whose business it was to convey, within the strict sphere of his duty, correct information to his Government. Thus, in No. 4,³ in reference to the march of Russian reinforcements (one of 27,000 men) for the army in Asia, he says: "They appear to be received everywhere (*thanks to the arrangements which are made*) in a triumphal manner;" thus conveying the insinuation that the welcome was forced! How silly is such work and information as this!

The public are aware, and the correspondence, in numerous instances, shows us, the alarming accounts that this gentleman transmitted early last year about the movements of immense Russian armies in almost all parts of that empire, especially about Bessarabia. Now, in the Secret Correspondence, we find the Emperor telling him that, to the date of the 7th April, he had not moved a battalion or a ship; and Consul Yeames tells us (Part II. p. 183) that, as late as the 7th October, there were neither naval nor military movements going on at Odessa or its neighbourhood. It was the alarming and false accounts thus sent that alarmed and irritated this country, and greatly tended to induce her to rush into the war.

The name of Sir H. Seymour will long be remembered in St. Petersburg to the injury of the character of England. He told his gaping hearers at a lord mayor's dinner, after his return, that the Emperor sent to him "one fine winter's morning, saying that he would rather see his back than his face." No wonder, for if ever man abused confidence and hospitality, on the part of the Russian Sovereign and family, Sir H. Seymour did so at St. Petersburg. His own despatches convict him of this unamiable feature in the human character. He omits, however,

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, Feb. 10th, 1854, Part VII. p. 49.

² Petersburg Commercial Journal, 1854.

³ Seymour to Clarendon, Jan. 19th, 1854, Part VII p. 2.

to tell, that almost on the same winter's morning, at least within twenty-four hours thereof, he received from Lord Clarendon a most peremptory order to leave St. Petersburg and the Russian territory without one moment's delay! His story, told and spread in England, namely, that the Emperor Nicholas had seized his "*wardrobe*," can never be forgotten. Though publicly certified by the Lord Mayor of London, like those documents that require his civic proof, it is, nevertheless, altogether a baseless fiction; and any man who could make a charge like this, especially under such circumstances, is very unfit to represent England in anything. To Sir H. Seymour, more than any other living public servant, this country is indebted for the present war and all its terrible consequences.

THE SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.¹

This is not the least valuable and important portion of the official correspondence that has been given to the public; on the contrary, it is, notwithstanding the misrepresentations and falsifications that have been spread about it, and the ridicule that has been attempted to be thrown upon it by all whose object is to conceal truth, it nevertheless is the most important of the whole, and completely sets at rest the charges of duplicity, concealment, and aggressive ambition on the part of Russia against Turkey, and proves, not only that this country has no just cause of complaint against Russia, but that she actually came to a solemn and distinct arrangement with that power about the policy and line of conduct to be pursued by both in reference to Turkey.

Sir H. Seymour acknowledges, that all the proceedings which gave rise to the correspondence in question, were carried on in the most unserved, sincere, confidential, and friendly manner, and that he cordially agreed with the justice and propriety of all that was proposed. The different conversations that took place were carried on in the most homely and friendly way, as between private individuals concerning subjects of great public interest, as in a private circle.

In No. 1,² Sir H. Seymour tells us that the Emperor Nicholas, after discussing the critical state of Turkey, and under the homely phrase of "a sick—a very sick man," and his probable early dissolution, says, "that fate will be a *great misfortune*; and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding in those matters, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised. . . . I observed, in a few words, that I re-

¹ Eastern Papers, No. 5.

² Seymour to Russell, Jan. 11th, 1853, p. 2.

joined to hear that his Imperial Majesty held this language; that this was certainly the view that I took of the manner in which Turkish questions should be treated. . . . I am convinced that the Chancellor is invariably favourable to measures of moderation, and, as far as it is in his power, to *English views*. His desire, then, to act in harmony with her Majesty's Government, cannot but be strengthened by learning the cordial declarations which the Emperor has made to me upon the subject. . . . His Imperial Majesty's words appear to me to possess considerable value, and certainly they offer me, at this moment, an *advantage* of which I shall not be backward in availing myself." In No. 2,¹ and at a subsequent and more important interview, still more explicit and important declarations were made and accepted. Describing, in homely phraseology, the dangers and weakness of Turkey, the Emperor Nicholas said: "If the Turkish empire falls, it falls to rise no more; and I put it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to increase the chaos, the confusion, and the certainty of an European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched: this is the point to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your Government. . . . Now, I desire to speak plainly to you as a friend and a *gentleman*; if England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better, on these occasions, to speak plainly; for my part, I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there, as proprietor, that is to say,—for an occupier I do not say; it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople. . . . You will report what has passed between us to the Queen's Government, and you will say that I shall be ready to receive any communication which it may be their wish to make to me upon the subject."—"With regard to the extremely important overture to which this report relates, I will only observe, that it is my duty to record impressions as well as facts and statements; and I am bound to say, that if words, tone, and manner, offer any criterion by which intentions are to be judged, the Emperor is prepared to act with *perfect* fairness and openness towards her Majesty's Government. . . . I would now submit to your Lordship that this overture cannot, with

¹ Seymour to Russell, January 22d, 1853, Part V. p. 3.

propriety, pass *unnoticed* by her Majesty's Government." It may bring about a union which may lead "to measures to prop up the *falling* authority of the Sultan," while the offer to act cordially with her Majesty's Government *in precautions*, "may possibly prevent the fatal crisis being followed by a *scramble* for the rich inheritance which would remain to be disposed of. . . . A noble triumph," says Sir H. Seymour, elevated by his subject, and sincere in his expressions, "would be obtained by the civilization of the nineteenth century, *if the void left by the extinction of Mohammedan rule in Europe* could be filled up without an *interruption* of the general peace, in consequence of the *precautions* adopted by the two principal Governments the most interested in the destinies of Turkey!" No better justification of the conduct and views of the Emperor Nicholas can be put forward than is here done by one of his bitterest calumniators.

In No. 4,¹ Lord John Russell replies in a very able despatch, pointing out the dangers that might arise from any such as he imagined was wanted—a positive agreement or convention between the two countries. He observes: "Upon the whole, then, her Majesty's Government are persuaded, that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe, than that which his Imperial Majesty *has so long followed*, and which will *render his name more illustrious* than that of the most famous sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory." But his Lordship's other observations are valuable, clear, and important, in reference to the contest now going on. "The ultimate proprietor of Constantinople, whoever he might be, would hardly be satisfied with the inert, supine attitude of Mahommed the Second. A great *influence* in the affairs of Europe seems naturally to belong to the sovereign of Constantinople, holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. That influence might be used in favour of Russia; *it might be used to aid and to control her power*. His Imperial Majesty has justly and wisely said, 'Our great, perhaps our only danger, is that which would arise from an extension given to an empire already too large,' but a *vigorous and an ambitious powerful state*, replacing the Sublime Porte, might however render war, *on the part of Russia*, a *necessity* for the Emperor or *his successors*." This latter fact is quite clear, and should have been thought of by France and England before they embarked in their present senseless and dangerous crusade against Russia. His Lordship concludes his despatch with the following correct and remarkable words:—"The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less

¹ Russell to Seymour, Feb. 9th, 1853, Part V. p. 6.

will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection, which his Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, *though no doubt prescribed by duty, and SANCTIONED by treaty.*"¹ "In placing this despatch in the hands of Count Nesselrode, you will," adds his Lordship, "accompany its presentation with the assurances of *friendship and confidence* on the part of her Majesty the Queen, which the conduct of his Imperial Majesty was so sure to inspire."

In No. 6,² Sir H. Seymour gives us the report of a still more important communication, much of which brevity compels me to omit. The Emperor stated "that he was perhaps even more interested than England could be in preventing a Turkish catastrophe. . . . 'There are several things,' said the Emperor, 'that I never will tolerate: I will begin by ourselves. I will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians. Having said this, I will say that it never shall be held by the English or French, or by any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire, or *such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state*; still less, will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths, and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe: rather than submit to any of these arrangements, I would go to war, and as long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on.' . . . Little more than a month ago he had assured the Sultan that, if his assistance was required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan. . . . In a word, the Emperor went on to observe: 'As I before told you, all I want is a good understanding with England, and this, not as to what shall, but as to what *shall not be done*. . . . I and the English Government having entire confidence in one another's views, I care nothing about the rest.' I remarked," says Sir H. Seymour, "that I felt *confident* that her Majesty's Government could be as little disposed as his Imperial Majesty to *tolerate the presence of the French at Constantinople*;" and, as all those Eastern questions affect Austria very nearly, "she, of course, would expect to be consulted. 'Oh!' replied the Emperor, 'you must understand that when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well; what suits the one suits the other; our interests, as regards Turkey, are perfectly identical.'" Referring to the Emperor's casual allusion to the dispute going on with Turkey, Sir Hamilton says: "Your Majesty must be sensible that any fresh concessions which have been obtained by the Latins, are not referable

¹ How then can those rights under treaty, here acknowledged, be now denied?

² Seymour to Clarendon, Feb. 22d, 1853, Part V. p. 9.

to ill-will towards you, *but to the excessive apprehensions of the French entertained by the unfortunate Turks!*" In reference to Montenegro, so lately threatened by Omar Pasha, the Emperor observed: "It is impossible not to feel great interest in a population warmly attached to their religion, who have so long kept their ground against the Turks; and," the Emperor continued, "it may be fair to tell you, that if any attempts at exterminating these people should be made by Omar Pasha, and should a general rising of the Christians take place in consequence, the Sultan will in all probability in this case lose his throne. In this case he falls to rise no more. I wish to *support his authority*, but, if he loses it, it is gone for ever. The Turkish empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be *reconstructed*; in such a cause I protest to you I will not allow a pistol to be fired." His Majesty paid the highest compliments to the British Government for their good feelings expressed towards him.

It is proper to observe that the Russian Government, upon the appearance of this correspondence, charged Sir H. Seymour with reporting some of it incorrectly, which is by no means improbable, as the official memorandum drawn up from it differs, in some respects, to that which the Emperor is represented to have stated; and which memorandum was submitted to Sir Hamilton before it was despatched for his correction, should such be found necessary; but the charge is the more probable, as Sir Hamilton, who on many points has certainly a bad or weak memory, acknowledges that "he is conscious of having forgotten the precise terms employed by him (the Emperor) with respect to the *commercial* policy to be observed at Constantinople when no longer held by the Turks." Now this, as far as England is concerned, is the most important part of the subject; and it is more than strange that a British ambassador should have forgotten this portion of the subject. The true reason is withheld. The reason is obvious. If given, it would have told in England in the Emperor's favour, and in favour of his views and his policy. The remaining portion of this remarkable and interesting correspondence it is considered necessary to give at length. It consequently speaks for itself, and renders all commentary unnecessary. It establishes the reverse of bad faith on the part of the Russian Government, in her dealings with England on the affairs of the East. Not the least curious and interesting part of the history of this correspondence was, that, immediately upon its publication, it was sent out by the Foreign Office to the Governor of the Ionian Islands and our ambassador in Greece, with strict orders to have a portion of it printed and widely circulated amongst the Greek population everywhere, imagining that the part relating to the

announced opposition on the part of the Emperor of Russia to the extension of the kingdom of Greece and a Byzantine empire, would tell against him, and in favour of Turkey and her two great allies. The orders were obeyed, but Sir Henry Ward was obliged to inform Lord Clarendon that the bait would not take, and that the Greek population was not so stupid as to be caught with such chaff.

After all the compliments paid to the Russian Emperor in this correspondence, and the confidence expressed in his views and intentions by the British Government, it is impossible to account on any honest principles for their present animosity against him, and abuse heaped upon him. We proceed to notice this more at length in the following correspondence :—

Page 15.—Secret Correspondence.

“The Emperor has, with the liveliest interest and real satisfaction, made himself acquainted with the secret and confidential despatch which Sir Hamilton Seymour communicated to him. He duly appreciates the frankness which has dictated it. He has found therein a fresh proof of the friendly sentiments which her Majesty the Queen entertains for him.

“In conversing familiarly with the British envoy on the causes which, from one day to another, may bring on the fall of the Ottoman empire, it had by no means entered into the Emperor's thoughts to propose for this contingency a plan by which Russia and England should dispose beforehand of the provinces ruled by the Sultan—a system altogether arranged ; still less, a formal agreement to be concluded between the two cabinets. It was purely and simply the Emperor's notion that each party should confidentially state to the other, less what it wishes than what it does not wish ; what would be contrary to English interests, what would be contrary to Russian interests ; in order that, the case occurring, they might avoid acting in opposition to each other.

“There is in this neither plans of partition nor convention to be binding on the other courts. It is merely an interchange of opinions ; and the Emperor sees no necessity of talking about it before the time. It is precisely for that reason that he took especial care not to make it the object of an official communication from one cabinet to another. By confining himself to speaking of it himself, in the shape of familiar conversation, to the Queen's representative, he selected the most friendly and confidential form of opening himself with frankness to her Britannic Majesty, being desirous that the result, whatsoever it might be, of these communications should remain, as it ought to be, a secret between the two sovereigns.

“Consequently, the objections which Lord John Russell raises to any concealment as regards the other powers, in the event of a formal agreement being entered into, of which there is at present no question, fall to the ground ; and consequently, also, the inconveniences disappear, which he points out as calculated to contribute to hasten the occurrence of the

very event which Russia and England are desirous of averting, if the existence of such an agreement should become prematurely known to Europe and to the subjects of the Sultan.

“As regards the object of this wholly confidential interchange of opinions, the possible downfall of the Ottoman empire, doubtless that is but an uncertain and remote contingency. Unquestionably, the period of it cannot be fixed, and no real crisis has arisen to render the realization of it imminent. But, after all, it may happen; happen even unexpectedly. Without mentioning the ever-increasing causes of dissolution which are presented by the moral, financial, and administrative condition of the Porte, it may proceed gradually from one, at least, of the two questions mentioned by the English ministry in its secret despatch. In truth, it perceives in those questions only mere disputes, which would not differ in their bearing from difficulties which form the ordinary business of diplomacy. But that kind of dispute may, nevertheless, bring on war, and with war the consequences which the Emperor apprehends from it; if, for instance, in the affair of the Holy Places, the *amour-propre* and the menaces of France, continuing to press upon the Porte, should compel it to refuse us all satisfaction; and if, on the other hand, the religious sentiments of the Orthodox Greeks, offended by the concessions made to the Latins, should raise the immense majority of his subjects against the Sultan. As regards the affair of Montenegro, that, according to the late accounts, may happily be looked upon as settled. But, at the time that the Emperor had his interview with Sir Hamilton Seymour, it might be apprehended that the question would take a most serious turn. Neither ourselves nor Austria could have allowed the protracted devastation or forced submission of Montenegro; a country which, up to the present time, has continued actually independent of the Porte; a country over which our protection has been extended for more than a century. The horrors which are committed there,—those which, by Ottoman fanaticism, have a short time since been extended over Bulgaria, Bosnia, and the Herzegovine,—gave the other Christian provinces of the Porte only too much reason to anticipate that the same fate awaited them. They were calculated to provoke the general rising of the Christians who live under the sceptre of the Turkish empire, and to hasten its ruin. It is not then, by any means, an idle and imaginary question, a contingency too remote, to which the anxiety of the Emperor has called the attention of the Queen his ally.

“In the face of the uncertainty and decay of the existing state of things in Turkey, the English cabinet expresses the desire that the greatest forbearance should be shown towards the Porte. The Emperor is conscious of never having acted otherwise. The English cabinet itself admits it. It addresses to the Emperor, with reference to the numerous proofs of moderation which he has given up to the present time, praises which his Majesty will not accept, because in that he has only listened to his own overbearing conviction. But, in order that the Emperor may continue to concur in that system of forbearance, to abstain from any demonstrations—from any peremptory language—it would be necessary that this system

should be equally observed by all the powers at once. France has adopted another. By menace she obtained, in opposition to the letter of the treaties, the admission of a ship of the line into the Dardanelles. At the cannon's mouth she twice presented her claims and her demands for indemnity at Tripoli, and afterwards at Constantinople. Again, in the contest respecting the Holy Places, by menace she effected the abrogation of the firman, and that of the solemn promises which the Sultan had given the Emperor. With regard to all these acts of violence, England observed a complete silence. She neither offered support to the Porte, nor addressed remonstrances to the French Government. The consequence is very evident. The Porte necessarily concluded from this that from France alone it has everything to hope, as well as everything to fear, and that it can evade with impunity the demands of Austria and of Russia. It is thus that Austria and Russia, in order to obtain justice, have seen themselves compelled in their turn, against their will, to act by intimidation, since they have to do with a Government which only yields to a peremptory attitude; and it is thus that by its own fault, or rather by that of those who have weakened it in the first instance, the Porte is urged on in a course which enfeebles it still more. Let England, then, employ herself in making it listen to reason. Instead of uniting herself with France against the just demands of Russia, let her avoid supporting, or even appearing to support, the resistance of the Ottoman Government. Let her be the first to invite the latter, as she herself considers it essential, to treat its Christian subjects with more equity and humanity. That will be the surest means of relieving the Emperor from the obligation of availing himself in Turkey of those rights of traditional protection to which he never has recourse but against his will, and of postponing indefinitely the crisis which the Emperor and her Majesty the Queen are equally anxious to avert.

"In short, the Emperor cannot but congratulate himself at having given occasion for this intimate interchange of confidential communications between her Majesty and himself. He has found therein valuable assurances, of which he takes note with a lively satisfaction. The two sovereigns have frankly explained to each other what, in the extreme case of which they have been treating, their respective interests cannot endure. England understands that Russia cannot suffer the establishment at Constantinople of a Christian power sufficiently strong to control and disquiet her. She declares that, for herself, she renounces any intention or desire to possess Constantinople; the Emperor equally disclaims any wish or design of establishing himself there. England promises that she will enter into no arrangement for determining the measures to be taken in the event of the fall of the Turkish empire, without a previous understanding with the Emperor; the Emperor, on his side, willingly contracts the same engagement. As he is aware that in such a case he can equally reckon upon Austria, who is bound by her promises to concert with him, he regards with less apprehension the catastrophe which he still desires to prevent and avert, as much as it shall depend on him to do so.

"No less precious to him are the proofs of friendship and personal confidence, on the part of her Majesty the Queen, which Sir Hamilton Seymour has been directed on this occasion to impart to him. He sees in them the surest guarantee against the contingency which his foresight had deemed it right to point out to that of the English Government."

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.—Page 19.
(*Secret and confidential.*)

"Foreign Office, March 23d, 1853.

"SIR,—Your despatches of the 21st and 22d ultimo have been laid before the Queen, and I am commanded to express her Majesty's entire approval of the discretion and judgment displayed by you in the conversations which you had the honour to hold with the Emperor.

"I need not assure you that the opinions of his Imperial Majesty have received from her Majesty's Government the anxious and deliberate consideration that their importance demands; and although her Majesty's Government feel compelled to adhere to the principles and the policy laid down in Lord John Russell's despatch of the 9th of February, yet they gladly comply with the Emperor's wish that the subject should be further and frankly discussed. The generous confidence exhibited by the Emperor entitles his Imperial Majesty to the most cordial declaration of opinion on the part of her Majesty's Government, who are fully aware that, in the event of any understanding with reference to future contingencies being expedient, or indeed possible, the word of his Imperial Majesty would be preferable to any convention that could be framed.

"Her Majesty's Government persevere in the belief that Turkey still possesses the elements of existence; and they consider that recent events have proved the correctness of the opinion expressed in the despatch of my predecessor, that there was no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours.

"Her Majesty's Government have accordingly learnt, with sincere satisfaction, that the Emperor considers himself even more interested than England in preventing a Turkish catastrophe; because they are convinced that upon the policy pursued by his Imperial Majesty towards Turkey, will mainly depend the hastening or the indefinite postponement of an event which every power in Europe is concerned in averting. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that nothing is more calculated to precipitate that event than the constant prediction of its being near at hand; that nothing can be more fatal to the vitality of Turkey than the assumption of its rapid and inevitable decay; and that if the opinion of the Emperor, that the days of the Turkish empire were numbered, became notorious, its downfall must occur even sooner than his Imperial Majesty now appears to expect.

"But on the supposition that, from unavoidable causes, the catastrophe did take place, her Majesty's Government entirely share the opinion of the Emperor, that the occupation of Constantinople by either of the great

powers would be incompatible with the present balance of power and the maintenance of peace in Europe, and must at once be regarded as impossible ; that there are no elements for the reconstruction of a Byzantine empire ; that the systematic misgovernment of Greece offers no encouragement to extend its territorial dominion ; and that, as there are no materials for provincial or communal government, anarchy would be the result of leaving the provinces of Turkey to themselves, or permitting them to form separate republics.

" The Emperor has announced that, sooner than permit a settlement of the question by any one of these methods, he will be prepared for war at every hazard ; and, however much her Majesty's Government may be disposed to agree in the soundness of the views taken by his Imperial Majesty, yet they consider that the simple predetermination of what shall not be tolerated, does little towards solving the real difficulties, or settling in what manner it would be practicable, or even desirable, to deal with the heterogeneous materials of which the Turkish empire is composed.

" England desires no territorial aggrandizement, and could be no party to a previous arrangement from which she was to derive any such benefit. England could be no party to any understanding, however general, that was to be kept secret from other powers ; but her Majesty's Government believe that no arrangements could control events, and that no understanding could be kept secret. They would, in the opinion of her Majesty's Government, be the signal for preparation for intrigues of every description, and for revolts among the Christian subjects of the Porte. Each power and each party would endeavour to secure its future interests, and the dissolution of the Turkish empire would be preceded by a state of anarchy which must aggravate every difficulty, if it did not render a peaceful solution of the question impossible.

" The only mode by which such a solution could be attempted would be that of an European congress ; but that only affords an additional reason for desiring that the present order of things in Turkey should be maintained, as her Majesty's Government cannot without alarm reflect on the jealousies that would then be evoked, the impossibility of reconciling the different ambitions and the divergent interests that would be called into play, and the certainty that the treaties of 1815 must then be open to revision, when France might be prepared to risk the chances of an European war to get rid of the obligations which she considers injurious to her national honour, and which, having been imposed by victorious enemies, are a constant source of irritation to her.

" The main object of her Majesty's Government, that to which their efforts have been and always will be directed, is the preservation of peace ; and they desire to uphold the Turkish empire, from their conviction that no great question can be agitated in the East without becoming a source of discord in the West ; and that every great question in the West will assume a revolutionary character, and embrace a revision of the entire social system, for which the Continental Governments are certainly in no state of preparation.

"The Emperor is fully cognizant of the materials that are in constant fermentation beneath the surface of society, and their readiness to burst forth even in times of peace ; and his Imperial Majesty will probably, therefore, not dissent from the opinion that the first cannon-shot may be the signal for a state of things more disastrous even than those calamities that war inevitably brings in its train.

"But such a war would be *the result of the dissolution and dismemberment of the Turkish empire* ; and hence the anxiety of her Majesty's Government to avert the catastrophe. Nor can they admit that the signs of Turkish decay are now either more evident or more rapid than of late years ; there is still great energy and great wealth in Turkey ; a disposition to improve the system of Government is not wanting ; corruption, though unfortunately great, is still not of a character, nor carried to an extent, that threatens the existence of the state ; the treatment of Christians is not harsh ; and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects might serve as an example to some Governments, who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous power.

"Her Majesty's Government believe that Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its allies, and a determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence of the Sultan—that friendly support, in short, that, with states as with individuals, the weak are entitled to expect from the strong—in order not only to prolong its existence, but to remove all cause of alarm respecting its dissolution.

"It is in this work of benevolence and of sound European policy that her Majesty's Government are desirous of cooperating with the Emperor. They feel entire confidence in the rectitude of his Imperial Majesty's intentions ; and as they have the satisfaction of thinking that the interests of Russia and England in the East are completely identical, they entertain an earnest hope that a similar policy there will prevail, and tend to strengthen the alliance between the two countries, which it is alike the object of her Majesty and her Majesty's Government to promote.

"You will give a copy of this despatch to the Chancellor or to the Emperor, in the event of your again having the honour to be received by his Imperial Majesty.

"I am, &c.

(Signed)

"CLARENDON."

Page 26.

"The Emperor has, with lively satisfaction, made himself acquainted with Lord Clarendon's despatch of the 23d of March. His Majesty congratulates himself on perceiving that his views and those of the English cabinet entirely coincide on the subject of the political combinations which it would be chiefly necessary to avoid, in the extreme case of the contingency occurring in the East which Russia and England have equally at heart to prevent, or, at all events, to delay as long as possible. Sharing generally the opinions expressed by Lord Clarendon on the necessity of the prolonged maintenance of the existing state of things in Turkey, the Em-

peror, nevertheless, cannot abstain from adverting to a special point which leads him to suppose that the information received by the British Government is not altogether in accordance with ours. It refers to the humanity and the toleration to be shown by Turkey in her manner of treating her Christian subjects.

"Putting aside many other examples to the contrary of an old date, it is for all that notorious, that recently the cruelties committed by the Turks in Bosnia forced hundreds of Christian families to seek refuge in Austria. In other respects, without wishing on this occasion to enter upon a discussion as to the symptoms of decay, more or less evident, presented by the Ottoman power, or the greater or less degree of vitality which its internal constitution may retain, the Emperor will readily agree that the best means of upholding the duration of the Turkish Government is not to harass it by overbearing demands, supported in a manner humiliating to its independence and its dignity. His Majesty is disposed, as he has ever been, to act upon this system, with the clear understanding, however, that the same rule of conduct shall be observed, without distinction and unanimously, by each of the great powers; and that none of them shall take advantage of the weakness of the Porte to obtain from it concessions which might turn to the prejudice of the others. This principle being laid down, the Emperor declares that he is ready to labour, in concert with England, at the common work of prolonging the existence of the Turkish empire, setting aside all cause of alarm on the subject of its dissolution. He readily accepts the evidence offered by the British cabinet of entire confidence in the uprightness of his sentiments, and the hope that, on this basis, his alliance with England cannot fail to become stronger."

When these papers made their appearance they created a great sensation, and were everywhere made the subject of misrepresentation and attack. It was stated, by parties at Vienna and Berlin, that their contents were unknown to either Austria or Prussia. The Russian Government announced that they had been communicated to both. This was promised, as it was said from both places to be officially contradicted: no such contradiction, however, ever appeared. Seymour, who had helped to propagate accounts of concealment at the outset, forgot that he had stated (see page 3) that the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg told him that the Emperor had communicated to him the conversation he had held with Sir H. Seymour. The French Government took a bolder flight, and announced in the *Moniteur*, that Russia, when she had failed in her object with England, applied to France; and that M. Castelbajac would lay the application before the world. Fertile as they are at fabrications in Paris, it is hardly necessary to observe that no such communications ever appeared, because none such existed. In this way irritation, and misrepresentation, and falsehood were kept up for many weeks, till some fresh subject was taken up, and the other, intended for a time, was forgotten.

Connected with the correspondence in question is the paper, Part VI.,¹ containing the important memorandum drawn up by Count Nesselrode, and approved of by the British Government, regarding the views and opinions of the Emperor of Russia expressed to our Government, regarding Turkey and her prospects, when his Majesty was in England at that time. It is much to the same purport as the communications contained in the paper or Secret Correspondence already alluded to, and shows clearly the correct and just views of the Russian sovereign, in reference to that portion of Europe and Asia under the Ottoman Government, and what should be the course to be adopted in reference to it for the future.

The following extracts will place this in a clear and a proper light : "The Porte has a *constant tendency* to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon it by the treaties which it has concluded with other powers. It hopes to do so *with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousies of the cabinets*. It thinks, if it fails in its engagements towards one of them, *the rest will espouse its quarrel*, and will screen it from *all responsibility*. . . . In the present state of feeling in Europe, the cabinets cannot see with indifference the Christian populations in Turkey subjected to flagrant acts of oppression and religious intolerance. . . . It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman ministers sensible of this truth, and to *persuade them that they can only reckon on the friendship and on the support of the great powers, on the condition that they treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness*. While insisting on this truth, it will be the duty of the foreign representatives, on the other hand, to exert all their influence to maintain the Christian subjects of the Porte in submission to the sovereign authority. . . . If all the great powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-grounded expectation of *preserving the existence of Turkey*. . . . The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner :—1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman empire, *in its present state*, as long as that political combination shall be possible. 2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists ; and, in conjunction with each other, to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of the empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own states, or the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe." "For this purpose, thus

¹ Memorandum by Count Nesselrode, delivered to the British Government, 1841.

stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely 'united by the principle of perfect identity.' If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna. Conflict between the great powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped the peace of Europe will be maintained, even in the midst of such serious circumstances. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the Emperor agreed with her Britannic Majesty's ministers, during his residence in England, the previous understanding with Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed."

In all this there is nothing that is reprehensible, evasive, or unjust. It is curious that much of this memorandum is the very words of Lord Clarendon, in his voluminous Turkish correspondence, and is exactly the principle on which the allies are now acting in their support of Turkey, after she had sought to shake herself clear of all her previous engagements with Russia, especially those connected with the treatment of her Christian subjects. The policy and objects of Russia are clear, straightforward, and proper, and have never varied nor changed. And the Emperor requested Sir H. Seymour to inform his Government (No. 14¹), that what he had pledged himself to, "will be equally binding upon my successor. There now exists memorandums of my intentions; and *whatever I have promised, my son, if the changes alluded to should occur in his time, will be as ready to perform as his father would have been.*" This is plain language. If the East India House and the Board of Control would lay bare their archives, how often should we find them consulting, many years before, how they were to deal with this rajah, and that nabob, and the territories belonging to them, when they would become extinguished? And have not England and France been for many years consulting together what should be done with Cuba, when she must be separated from Spain? Russia has done no more with regard to Turkey, and, if anything, has paid too much deference to them in matters where her own immediate and most important interests and safety are so deeply and so closely concerned.

It is almost incredible, after such confidential, and friendly, and judicious communications and arrangements, that discord so fatal as that which has arisen between Great Britain and Russia could have taken place. Count Nesselrode's conclusion becomes just and irresistible (No. 207²), when he tells Sir H. Seymour, "that *after the admis-*

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, April 20th, 1853, Part V. p. 23.

² Seymour to Clarendon, Oct. 29th, 1853, Part II. p. 213.

sion by England of a reparation being due to us, it appeared as if that admission was now withdrawn ; that if England had insisted, as she ought to have done, at Constantinople, the Porte would long ago have given way ; and the Vienna note would have been signed ; that England, in fact, was solely to blame for the complications of the moment, and for those *disastrous consequences* to which they were likely to lead ; and that the conduct now pursued was an *unworthy return* for the proofs of friendship which had been given to England by his Imperial Majesty."

Amongst the delusions of the day is the clamour raised against Russia about the free navigation of the Danube—as if the navigation of that river was shut up by her, or shut up at all. The treaty of Adrianople laid open the navigation of that stream. This Russia secured. It is now free for every one, so far as Russia is concerned, who are connected with that river, upwards and downwards, for all commercial purposes ; with only such tolls or dues as are necessary to defray the expense of quarantine stations, and machines for clearing, or keeping clear, the mouth of that river. But this is not all that the *disinterested* allies want ; it is a free passage for ships or vessels of war—though how they are to gain this, when the Ottoman dominion is extended to both banks, they do not say, or probably are not able to discover, and Austria may try to find out, as the party most interested. But what interest has Germany, properly speaking, to do with the navigation of the Danube. Except Lower Austria and part of Hungary, the business of Germany goes—must and will go—to the rest of the world by the rivers that flow into the Baltic or the German Ocean. Much of the present commerce of Hungary and Austria goes by railroad and rivers to the seas mentioned, and more and more will go every day by the channels mentioned. What right, moreover, has Austria, or any other power, to *demand* the free passage of any river that runs through the very heart of a neighbouring state, though its sources may be within its own dominions, but which, as regards Austria and the Danube, is not the case. With equal right may Austria and Russia demand the freedom of the navigation of the Elbe and the Vistula, because the head waters of the land streams rise in their respective dominions. So also may Peru, and for the same reasons, claim from Brazil and New Granada the free navigation of the Marañon and the Orinoco. The whole clamour about the free navigation of the Danube is a delusion or claptrap—political capital wanted for mischievous purposes, by those disturbers of nations who have none of their own, nor any honest object in contemplation. What would be said by France if Switzerland demanded the free navigation,

even for ships of war, of the Rhone, to its mouth ; or by Austria, if Piedmont made a similar demand, and for the same reason, of the free navigation of the *Po* ? or Bavaria demanded the free navigation of the Danube, through the territories of Austria and Turkey, because it rises in the territories of the former power ?

In reference to the treaty of 1841, the strangest misrepresentations prevail, and falsehoods are propagated. The public are made to believe that it was Russia that shut up the Dardanelles. Now, it is clearly her interest to have the Dardanelles opened to her ships of war. These straits, by the last treaties between Russia and Turkey, are laid completely open to the commercial traffic of every country in the world ; and, by the exertions of Russia, some troublesome and expensive fiscal regulations imposed upon merchant ships passing through them were abolished. The whole commercial world are perfectly aware of these important facts, and yet the credulous public believe the contrary. It was not Russia, but the whole of the great powers of Europe, that shut up by solemn treaty the Dardanelles against all foreign ships of war. Here is the treaty itself in proof, in which, be it observed, there is not one word about guaranteeing the integrity or dominion of Turkey—as the public have been also falsely taught to believe—nor any document showing that we are bound to support them :—

“In the name of the most merciful God.

“Their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, being persuaded that their union and their agreement offer to Europe the most certain pledge for the preservation of the general peace, the constant object of their solicitude ; and their said Majesties being desirous of testifying this agreement, by giving to the Sultan a manifest proof of the respect which they entertain for the inviolability of his sovereign rights, resolve, as well as of their sincere desire to see consolidated the repose of his empire ; their said Majesties have resolved to comply with the invitation of his Highness the Sultan, in order to record in common, by a formal act, their unanimous determination to conform to the ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, according to which the passage of the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus is always to be closed to foreign ships of war, so long as the Porte is at peace.

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“ART. 1. His Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain for the future the principle invariably established *as the ancient rule of his empire*, and in virtue of which it has at all times been prohibited for the ships of war of foreign powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus ; and that so long as the Porte is at peace, his Highness will admit no foreign ship of war into the said straits.

"And their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared.

"ART 2. It is understood that, in recording the inviolability of the ancient rule of the Ottoman empire, mentioned in the preceding article, the Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under flag of war, which shall be employed, as is usual, in the service of the missions of foreign powers.

"ART 3. His Highness the Sultan reserves to himself to communicate the present Convention to all the powers with whom the Sublime Porte is in relations of friendship, inviting them to accede thereto.

"ART. 4. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at London, at the expiration of two months, or sooner, if possible.

"Done at London, the 13th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1841.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON.	(L.S.) NEUMANN.	(L.S.) BRUNNOW.
(L.S.) ESTERHAZY.	(L.S.) BOURQUENEY.	(L.S.) CHEKIB."
	(L.S.) BULOW.	

The customary workmen at Vienna produced, on the 9th April, a protocol widely different from any of their former works. They guarantee the Ottoman territory and their own. They propose to guarantee, under a treaty, "*the civil* and religious rights of the Christian subjects of *the Porte*," but seem to leave to "*policy*" and to "*interest*," to decide whether they should make Turks Christians, or Europe Mahomedans! The following are extracts from the protocol :—

"The territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire is and remains the *sine quâ non* condition of every transaction having for its object the reestablishment of peace between the belligerent powers; and the governments represented by the undersigned engage to endeavour, in common, to discover the guarantees most likely to attach the existence of that empire to the general equilibrium of Europe; as they also declare themselves ready to deliberate, and to come to an understanding, as to the employment of the means calculated to accomplish the object of their agreement."

* * * * *

"Whatever event may arise in consequence of this agreement, founded solely upon the general interests of Europe, and of which the object can only be attained by the return of a firm and lasting peace, the governments represented by the undersigned reciprocally engage not to enter into any definitive arrangement with the Imperial court of Russia, or with any other power which would be at variance with the principles above enumerated, without previously deliberating thereon in common.

(Signed)	"BUOL-SCHANENSTEIN.	BOURQUENEY.
	WESTMORLAND.	ARNIM."

CHAPTER VII.

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA—MISSTATEMENTS AND FALSE STATEMENTS MADE THEREIN—OFFICIAL AUTHORITIES FOR THIS—PROFESSED OBJECTS OF THE WAR—DESTRUCTION OF RUSSIAN TOWNS, HARBOURS, FLEETS AND COMMERCE—AUTHORITIES FOR THIS—STATEMENTS MADE THAT RUSSIA MADE IT A RELIGIOUS WAR—VARIOUS AUTHORITIES TO SHOW THAT THE TURKS AND FRENCH, AND OTHERS, MAKE IT DECIDEDLY A RELIGIOUS WAR.

ON the 28th March, 1854, a day that will be found memorable in the annals of Europe and of the United Kingdom, this country, in conjunction with France, declared war against Russia. No such document had ever before appeared in England, or bore the name of a British sovereign. But it is well known that in such cases it is the ministers not the sovereign, that speaks. The real enemies of England and of peace everywhere hailed the document with satisfaction. The following is the declaration in question :—

The Declaration of War.—From the Supplement to the London Gazette, of Tuesday, March 28.

“DECLARATION.

“It is with deep regret that her Majesty announces the failure of her anxious and protracted endeavours to preserve for her people and for Europe the blessings of peace.

“The unprovoked aggression of the Emperor of Russia against the Sublime Porte has been persisted in with such disregard of consequences, that *after the rejection by the Emperor of Russia of terms* which the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, and the King of Prussia, as well as her Majesty, considered just and equitable, her Majesty is compelled, by a sense of what is due to the honour of her crown, to the interests of her people, and to the independence of the states of Europe, to come forward in defence of an ally whose territory is invaded, and whose dignity and independence are assailed.

"Her Majesty, in justification of the course she is about to pursue, refers to the transactions in which her Majesty has been engaged.

"The Emperor of Russia had some cause of complaint against the Sultan with reference to the settlement, which his Highness had sanctioned, of the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches to a portion of the Holy Places of Jerusalem and its neighbourhood. To the complaint of the Emperor of Russia on this head justice was done ; and her Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople had the satisfaction of promoting an arrangement, to which no exception was taken by the Russian Government.

"But while the Russian Government repeatedly assured the Government of her Majesty, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople was exclusively directed to the settlement of the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, Prince Menchikoff himself pressed upon the Porte *other demands of a far more serious and important character*, the nature of which he in the first instance endeavoured, as far as possible, to conceal from her Majesty's ambassador. And these demands, thus studiously concealed, affected not the privileges of the Greek Church at Jerusalem, but the position of many millions of Turkish subjects in their relations to their sovereign the Sultan.

"These demands were rejected by the spontaneous decision of the Sublime Porte.

"Two assurances had been given to her Majesty—one, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff only regarded the Holy Places ; the other, that his mission would be of a conciliatory character.

"In both respects her Majesty's just expectations were disappointed.

"Demands were made which, in the opinion of the Sultan, extended to the substitution of the Emperor of Russia's authority for his own over a large portion of his subjects ; and those demands were enforced by a threat ; and when her Majesty learned that, on announcing the termination of his mission, Prince Menchikoff declared that the refusal of his demands would impose upon the Imperial Government *the necessity of seeking a guarantee by its own power, her Majesty thought proper that her fleet should leave Malta*, and, in cooperation with that of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, take up its station in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

"So long as the negotiation bore an amicable character, her Majesty refrained from any demonstration of force. But when, in addition to the assemblage of large military forces on the frontier of Turkey, the ambassador of Russia intimated that serious consequences would ensue from the refusal of the Sultan to comply with unwarrantable demands, her Majesty deemed it right, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, to give an unquestionable proof of her determination to support the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

"The Russian Government has maintained that the determination of the Emperor to occupy the Principalities was taken in consequence of the advance of the fleets of England and France. But the menace of invasion of the Turkish territory was conveyed in Count Nesselrode's note to Reschid Pasha, of the 19th (31st) May, and re-stated in his despatch to

Baron Brunnow, of the 20th May (1st June), which announced the determination of the Emperor of Russia to order his troops to occupy the Principalities, if the Porte did not within a week comply with the demands of Russia.

"The despatch to her Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, authorizing him in certain specified contingencies to send for the British fleet, was dated the 31st May, and the order sent direct from England to her Majesty's admiral to proceed to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, was dated the 2d of June.

"The determination to occupy the Principalities was, therefore, taken before the orders for the advance of the combined squadrons were given.

"The Sultan's minister was informed that unless he signed within a week, and without the change of a word, the note proposed to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff, on the eve of his departure from Constantinople the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia would be occupied by Russian troops. The Sultan could not accede to so insulting a demand; but when the actual occupation of the Principalities took place, the Sultan did not, as he might have done in the exercise of his undoubted right, declare war, but addressed a protest to his allies.

"Her Majesty, in conjunction with the sovereigns of Austria, France, and Prussia, has made various attempts to meet any just demands of the Emperor of Russia, without affecting the dignity and independence of the Sultan; and had it been the sole object of Russia to obtain security for the enjoyment by the Christian subjects of the Porte of their privileges and immunities, she would have found it in the offers that have been made by the Sultan. But as that security was not offered in the shape of *a special and separate stipulation* with Russia, it was rejected. Twice has this offer been made by the Sultan, and recommended by the four powers; *once by a note originally prepared at Vienna*, and subsequently modified by the Porte; once by the proposal of bases of negotiation agreed upon at Constantinople on the 31st of December, and approved at Vienna on the 13th of January, as offering to the two parties the means of arriving at an understanding in a becoming and honourable manner.

"It is thus manifest that a right for Russia to interfere in the ordinary relations of Turkish subjects to their sovereign, and not the happiness of Christian communities in Turkey, was the object sought for by the Russian Government. To such a demand the Sultan would not submit, and his Highness, in self-defence, declared war upon Russia; but her Majesty nevertheless, in conjunction with her allies, has not ceased her endeavours to restore peace between the contending parties.

"The time has, however, now arrived when the advice and remonstrances of the four powers having proved wholly ineffectual, and the military preparations of Russia becoming daily more extended, it is but too obvious that the Emperor of Russia has entered upon a course of policy which, if unchecked, must lead to the destruction of the Ottoman empire.

"In this conjuncture her Majesty feels called upon by regard for an ally, the integrity and independence of whose empire have been recognised as

essential to the peace of Europe, by the sympathies of her people with right against wrong, by a desire to avert from her dominions most injurious consequences, *and to save Europe from the preponderance of a power which has violated the faith of treaties*, and defies the opinion of the civilised world, to take up arms, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, for the defence of the Sultan.

"Her Majesty is persuaded that in so acting, she will have the cordial support of her people; and that the pretext of zeal for the Christian religion will be used in vain to cover an aggression undertaken in disregard of its holy precepts, and of its pure and beneficent spirit.

"Her Majesty humbly trusts that her efforts may be successful, and that, by the blessing of Providence, peace may be re-established on safe and solid foundations.

"Westminster, March 28, 1854."

It is most remarkable that, throughout the whole of this declaration, there is not a single complaint or accusation brought against Russia for any outrage or injury done, or proposed to be done by her, to any real or immediate British interest whatever. It relates entirely to Turkey, and the injuries that she was asserted to have sustained from Russia in consequence of the dispute which had arisen between those two countries. From the date of this declaration, and under it, Great Britain assumes a different character and principles different from those which previously guided her, and made her great and respected. The examination of the official papers has shown us who was the first aggressor in this case, namely Turkey, "coerced" by France. Things must be called by their right names, however high the authority is or appears to be. It is not TRUE that the Emperor of Russia refused to accept the terms made out for and recommended to him by France, England, Austria, and Prussia. He accepted these within twenty-four hours after receiving them; but he did decline to accept the terms as altered by the Turkish Government, and afterwards tried to be forced upon him without reservation by the powers mentioned, simply because they might, otherwise, have received trouble. But it is true that all the powers mentioned did draw up, recommend to, and insist upon the Ottoman Government accepting this Vienna note. "When I delivered it to the Turkish minister," says Lord Stratford (Part II. p. 69), "I called his attention to the *strong and earnest* recommendation to the Porte, *not only* by her Majesty's Government, *but also* by the cabinets of Austria, France, and Prussia," &c. What are we to say to, and what is the value of, such authority as denies this fact, and in their public declaration suppresses it? It is *not true* that Prince Menchikoff concealed any

demands he made on the Ottoman Government from the British ambassador: on the contrary, he told him about everything, and counselled him always, and listened to his advice more than he ought to have done. In the very first proposition that he submitted to the Turkish Government, it appears from the documents, as these have come to us, but through the garbling and suspicious hands of the Turks, that (Part I. p. 165) the intervention claimed was only to be exercised "*the same as before*" by the Russian ambassador. It is *not true* "that justice was done" to the complaint of the Emperor of Russia regarding the Holy Places. The point of difference as between the Latin and Greek Churches, France and Russia, was settled, but the point between Russia and Turkey, on account of the deceitful conduct of the latter, never was settled,—has always been refused, though it formed part of the whole. It was the former part for which Prince Menchikoff thanked our ambassador; but it is a base falsification of facts, and a suppression of truth, to say that he was thanked for the whole, or that the Prince brought forward anything *new*, or more extravagant and dangerous to Turkey, in his negotiations, than that which he at first produced, or afterwards amended.

In reference to the occupation and required évacuation of the Principalities, we find from Lord Westmorland (Part II. p. 106) that in the full expectation that matters were arranged at Constantinople, orders were actually prepared at St. Petersburg for their évacuation. In No. 84 Lord Clarendon tells us, that "the renewed pledge given by Russia to évacuate the Principalities *was satisfactory*." And, in another place, Lord Westmorland (Part II. p. 106) tells us, that the prospect then was that the Principalities would be wholly évacuated by the month of October.

It is not true that the fleets were ordered to Besika Bay, on its becoming known that Russia had decided to occupy the Principalities. The fleets reached Besika Bay on the 13th June, one day before they heard in London from Seymour that Russia would decide on no step to be taken until the return of the messenger to St. Petersburg who bore the second message to Constantinople, which did not take place till the 27th June, a month, it may be said, *after* the orders were given in London for the British fleet to advance! Moreover, it is forgotten to state that the French fleet was ordered from Toulon, contrary to our advice, on the 22d March; and we learn from Lord Clarendon (Part I. p. 234) that the French ambassador at Constantinople, M. De la Cour, of that date, received instructions to call up at his pleasure the French fleet, not only to Besika Bay, but to the Dardanelles! Why are such important facts and proceedings concealed?

It is true that the celebrated protocol of the 5th December, 1853, the combined work of the four great Governments in Europe and their customary workmen—recommended to Turkey, and to be recommended to Russia—never was presented to the Turkish Government, having been superseded by one of the true Turkish school, concocted at Constantinople between Stratford and Reschid Pasha, and as such declined by Russia, without amendment and modification. And Lord Stratford is compelled to state, that the Turks had determined that they would agree to no note but such as they would themselves frame.

It is *not true* that Russia required “*a special and separate stipulation*” or “*exclusive*” power in her favour, in reference to the protection, as it is erroneously designated, of the Greek Christians in the Ottoman dominions. She only asked to retain that which she had long enjoyed, and to which, by treaty, she was entitled. She sought no NEW POWER, and still less an “*exclusive*” power, under this head, and for this purpose; and which right was well known and sanctioned by all Europe. Those false statements were advanced by France and England at the eleventh hour, in order to justify their violent and predetermined proceedings. There is not, throughout the whole correspondence, one word to prove or to justify such an assertion and conclusion as the “*allies*” proclaim to the world. They imagine, distort, and advance the whole, and then erect their forts upon their own fabrications and speculations.

It is not true that Russia “*violated the faith of treaties,*” as is here stated. Turkey not only first violated, but next denied the validity of the treaties long existing between her and Russia; and when she did so, and refused redress, legitimately and plainly sought, Russia had an undoubted right to seek redress by all the means in her power, while those means or measures did not trench upon her treaties with other nations. She is therefore accused unjustly. But it is true that, by their recent proceedings and open inimical course pursued, France and England have trampled upon and violated the existing treaties between them and Russia. And the consideration of the declaration of war before us, and of all the official documents connected with it, must force the conclusion come to by Count Nesselrode (No. 171¹), “*that if for any motives known to him war should be declared against Russia by England, it would be the most unintelligible and the least justifiable war ever undertaken.*” Moreover, the same authority (No. 293²) tells us, and tells us truly: “*You know very well that the existence of Turkey has never been in danger. Had Russia and Turkey been left to themselves,*

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, Oct. 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 181.

² Seymour to Clarendon, Nov. 24th, 1853, Part II. p. 275.

the quarrel would have been ended long ago ;" and he might have added, that no "*injurious consequences*" could befall "her Majesty's dominions," or were meditated against them by Russia. The declaration of war, therefore, on the part of this country against Russia, is grounded upon premises wholly untrue and utterly untenable, and is the first instance in British history where war has been undertaken against another power which could not be charged with violence or insult having been offered to any real British interest or national honour. If we make rash engagements to jeopardize that honour unnecessarily, we alone are to blame, and must abide the consequences. Moreover, there is not a syllable of truth in all the stories told about Prince Menchikoff's threatening and menacing proceedings. On the contrary, months after he left Constantinople, the Sultan sent a message by Fuad Effendi to thank him for the courtesy and moderation he had shown during his mission.

War having been decided upon and commenced, the utmost confidence was expressed by its votaries for continued and complete success. There could, they said, be no doubt about the matter. The French Government journals, as in the days of old, boasted of fate, destiny, and victory being chained to the chariot-wheels of France, just as under Napoleon the First, when they told the world, "France and Napoleon can never change : victory belongs to him, war to his age." And English journals predicted that in this Holy War, undertaken to support Islamism, and to gain Paradise thereby, France and Napoleon the Third "*must conquer*." Sir Charles Napier addressed his fleet thus : "Lads ! war is declared ! We are to meet a bold and numerous enemy. Should they offer us battle, *you know* how to dispose of them ! Should they remain in port, we must try to get at them ! Success depends upon the quickness and precision of your fire ! *Lads ! sharpen your cutlasses, and the day is your own !*"

On April 4th the *Times*, after a dissertation warning us that we may expect a long war, adds, but "of final victory *WE* will allow no doubt." In one of his addresses to his army, the French Emperor tells us, "The past we are told is the clue to the future, and the wisest prophet is he that best reads the page of history. . . . Yet everything harmonises. . . . With the example before us, we need despair of no reconciliation ; we need fear no overweening ambition of empire, however so far unchecked. We no more believe that it is in the power of any one power or any one empire to conquer the world, than that the ocean should be permitted to overrun the land." If one can attach any meaning to this speech, it is that not even France and England can conquer the world ; and as France tried—" *the example before us*"—and failed, so that ought

to be a beacon for neither her nor, we presume, any other, to make the attempt. Then why tell the world that Russia meditates what she really does not, and what she cannot perform? Why simply, in French phraseology, by imputing the design to her against some nations, to enable France to try the thing herself!

In those appeals Sir C. Napier appeals to and relies on the cutlass and the human arm alone; and well he may, when he is told and taught to believe by the *Times*, that he is possessed of a power that is irresistible, and that "*commands the ocean, the winds, and the waves.*" Those bravadoes, however, remind us of the haughty boasts of the proud Assyrian king, who tells us, "I have digged and drunk strange waters, and with the sole of my foot have I dried up all the rivers of besieged places;" and the impious boast, "Who is Jehovah, that he should deliver Jerusalem out of my hand?" All such rash boasts have, and ever have had, but one termination. "He who holdeth the ocean in the hollow of his hand" hath told such men for all ages, "I will put my hook in thy nose, and my bridle in thy lips, and bring thee back by the way by which thou camest," covered with defeat, shame, and disgrace.

For a moment let us consider the objects for which this war has been undertaken, as those have been disclosed to us by the headlong, headstrong, and loud boasting votaries thereof. They seek only as much blood and destruction for their money as they can obtain; and go forth, as they frequently do, to propagate religion, industry, and civilization, by the cannon, the sword, and destruction. These are their avowed objects, and even their avowed intentions. Let them speak here for themselves.

The articles taken from the *Times* are especially deserving of notice, as there can be little doubt that the most material and important, if not the whole of them, are either written by the Government, or by their immediate instructions. It is remarkable, and ought to be instructive, to perceive the glee with which the organs of Government on both sides of the Channel, especially on the southern side thereof, speak of the work of destruction as being the work and the proper road to advance industry, prosperity, and civilization. Our neighbours have indeed had much experience in the former part of the work, as every part of Europe can abundantly testify; but it does not follow that they should again renew the system; or command England to follow them in such a course.

"Camp at Vineraux, July 12, 1854.

"This morning the Emperor reviewed the army of the camp of Boulogne, when his Majesty addressed the troops as follows:—

“Soldiers,—Russia having obliged us to go to war, France has sent 50,000 of her children. England has also sent considerable forces. Now our fleets and our armies are united for the same *cause, to maintain dominion in the Baltic as well as in the Black Sea*, I have chosen you to be the first to carry our eagles in the regions of the North. English vessels will transport them there—the only fact in history which proves the intimate alliance of two great nations, and the firm resolution of the two Governments not to withdraw from any sacrifice in defending the weakest rights, the liberty of Europe, and the national honour. Go, my children; Europe, attentive, will declare openly, or in secret pray for, your triumph. The country, proud of a struggle where she only threatens the aggressor, accompanies you in her ardent solicitude for your welfare; and myself, whom imperious duty keeps far from those events, I shall have my eyes upon you; and soon, in seeing you again, I shall say you are sons worthy of the conquerors of Austerlitz, of Freidland, of Eylau, and of Moscow. Go: God protect you.

“‘NAPOLEON.’”

General Count de Salles, in his address to the 8th Light Infantry, Marseilles, June 24th, on their embarking for the East, says,—

“They go to take part in the great struggle between civilization and barbarism. March, then; carry the eagles of France to the banks of the Bosphorus; add, by your victories, to the inheritance of your ancestors, accumulated for many centuries, for you are the sons of the conquerors of Austerlitz and Moskowa. Soldiers, never forget that wherever a French soldier is to be found, there anarchy must disappear for ever; that, at all times and on all occasions, you are the *emblems of virtue and civilization*,” &c.

In the *Times*, of March 16th, 1854, we are told, that—

“Sir C. Napier is sent out to do all the mischief he can to the Russians, and a dozen or two of ships of the line and a few fortresses battered to pieces, and several thousands killed and wounded, will be the probable end—indeed, the *wished-for result*; fortunate shall we be if we have not at least our share of the calamity, but Russia’s share is taken for granted. . . The public are hoping and trusting that Sir C. Napier on the one side, and Admiral Dundas on the other, are battering her fortresses to pieces, burying their defenders under their ruins, and sweeping whole fleets with their crews to the bottom!” &c.

“The Czar,” says the *Constitutionnel*, ‘does not combat for religion,—he combats for aggrandizement, immediate possession of Constantinople—the calamities of war—now France and England are constrained by him to *destroy his forts and vessels*. France and England are soon to be seconded by Austria and Prussia. Before the naval campaign which is now commencing shall have terminated, Russia will have lost, in a *few weeks*, the fruits of more than centuries of pecuniary efforts, gigantic labour, and immense sacrifices. The fortresses, which she has raised at such great expense on the coasts of the Baltic and Black Sea, will fall to the

ground—set on fire, and demolished; and the fleets which she has formed by dint of patience, time, money, tyranny, and *skill*, will vanish, burst, and be annihilated by the fire of the allied squadrons of France and England. No doubt, the spectacle of towns in flames, of armies routed and in disorder, and of countries in ruins, is a most afflicting matter, calculated to produce melancholy feelings in every mind. The calamities of war are so contrary to the ideas and habits of our age of peace, industry, labour, and civilization, that all elevated minds, all Christian hearts, will be grieved by those terrible necessities which are the terror of combats. But whose fault is it that we have been reduced to have recourse to cannon—that expressive reason of kings? Who more than we regret that France and England are constrained, by the hard-heartedness of Russia, to destroy her ports and vessels?"

"The capture of Sebastopol, and the occupation of the Crimea by the allied forces, is only a question of money and time; and when it is once done, Russia will be as powerless in the Black Sea as in the English Channel . . . we may not keep Sebastopol, but raze it and carry off everything. Then may Asia Minor, Syria, the Isles of the Archipelago, &c. be peopled and cultivated by rich English merchants, and Russia sent back to cultivate her own interior, &c. All this is matter of the simplest and surest calculation, though it is possible other results may mix themselves with those *directly aimed at*. The present generation will see the downfall that Russia has insured for herself. We put greater trust in Providence and the moral laws of the world than in *one conspiracy* against the liberties of mankind; and therefore think that we may safely put our hand to the work, and deprive Russia of the means of doing more mischief for a generation to come."—*Times*, July 22d, 1854.

"In the Black Sea, all the aggressive designs of Russia are symbolized and exposed. Sebastopol is the material expression of that very policy which, after keeping the powers of Europe so long in alarm, has at length driven them to war. The main object of this war, as now plainly stated, is security for the future. Security for the future can only be obtained by the reduction of Russian power within its proper limits; and it is in the Black Sea, most especially, that these proper limits have been exceeded. Sebastopol is the type as well as the instrument of Russian aggression. The capture of this fortress would put the Ottoman empire, the Asiatic coasts, and the Mediterranean Sea, out of all danger for many years to come, perhaps for ever. Its results would be almost instantaneous. As soon as Sebastopol and its fleets had fallen into the power of the allies, the whole Black Sea squadron would be disposable for other operations. The Turkish capital, the Circassian shore, and the mouths of the Danube, would all then be safe without any further protection. The Principalities would become the battle-field, and the Czar might be deprived of his 'material guarantee,' without much risk of his renewing the seizure. Such a success, too, besides conducing directly to the termination of the war, would in itself secure one of its principal objects. Nobody has ever asserted that the retirement of the Russians

from St. Petersburg is a necessary condition of European tranquillity. But the demolition of Sebastopol is plainly indispensable; and, even if the Czar were at this moment to offer the evacuation of the Principalities, and the withdrawal of his demands upon the Porte, the peace concluded on such terms would be illusory and insufficient, as long as the stronghold of the Crimea remained intact. We cannot say that the capture of Sebastopol would at once terminate the war; but it would be more likely than any other operation to produce this effect. And, apart from such an achievement, there can be no prospect of any true peace."—*Times*, August 1st, 1854.

"Let us, in the first place, consider the articles themselves in the sense which they must obviously bear, in order to give full effect to the intentions of the British and French Governments. By the fact of war between Russia and Turkey, the former treaties between those powers are already abrogated; and the first proposition is, that the protectorate of Russia over the Principalities should in no case be restored, but that the privileges granted by the Sultan to those provinces should be placed under the collective guarantee of the powers, by means of an arrangement to be hereafter concluded. The Porte, it must be observed, has already proclaimed its resolution to maintain and respect the privileges of the Provinces, by acts wholly distinct from the Russian treaties. Those privileges confer on them an independent internal government by Christian princes, subject only to investiture by the Sultan, and to an annual provincial tribute. The object of the allied powers will naturally be to strengthen these governments, to make them the bulwark of the Ottoman empire towards the north, and to render them as entirely independent of Russia as they have hitherto been dependent on her will. The second article provides for the liberty of the navigation of the Danube, under those general principles which were laid down by the 16th act of the Congress of Vienna; but this object would certainly not be accomplished without the abrogation of the 3d article of the treaty of Adrianople, by which Russia acquired the whole of the islands forming the delta of the river, leaving the Turkish frontier to commence on the right bank of the southern branch (that of St. George), which is not navigable for ships. The allied forces are already in possession, we believe, of the Isle of Moische, on which the Sulina batteries were built. The Isle of Leti ought also to be cleared of the enemy; and the free navigation of the several channels of the river imperatively requires that the intermediate territory should be abandoned by Russia, her former engagement not to erect any establishment or fortification there having been grossly violated. The importance of this question would, however, be diminished, and the navigation of the Danube greatly improved, by the construction of a ship canal from Tchernavoda to Kostendje, through the Turkish territory. This is a measure we have frequently advocated on commercial grounds, but it would likewise be of the utmost political and military importance as a barrier against invasion, and it ought to have the positive sanction of Europe in any treaty which is to settle this question.¹

¹ "The third proposition is that of a revision of the Convention of the Straits, in the sense, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Clarendon stated in their despatches, of a limitation of the

"From these observations on the general terms proposed by the allied governments, it is evident that the two most important of them depend for their execution on certain successful operations of war. Before we can exact of Russia the surrender of the mouths of the Danube, we must have cleared them of her troops ; before we can obtain her assent to the *effective limitation of her naval power in the Black Sea*, the force of hostilities must have settled that question. For this reason, although it is possible that the vigorous and successful conduct of the war may help the negotiation, it is certain that the negotiation cannot suspend the operations of war."—*Times*, August 26th, 1854.

"The ministerial journal, *Le Pays*, has a very spirited article on the war with Russia, and which I have some reason to believe conveys the ideas of the Government.

" 'Yes,' it says, 'the war which commences to-day is a most serious one, and all the more that its object is noble as it is important. It is not, and we are proud of it for our country and our epoch, the conflict of personal ambition, the shock of rival claims. Our soldiers are not going to fight for the caprice or the interests of one man, nor for those of a dynasty. They are not going to conquer, at the cost of violence, and often of iniquity, new territory. They are not going to invade inoffensive provinces, and to shed their blood to satisfy the passions or the vengeance of a sovereign. No !

power of Russia in the Black Sea, or, as the notes subsequently exchanged have it, 'in the interest of the equilibrium of Europe.' We presume the same thing is meant, though the latter expression is more obscure ; for it is evident, upon the slightest consideration, that it cannot be intended to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to ships of war, and, consequently, to give them a right of passing under the walls of Constantinople, without first taking care that this concession is not to be to the advantage of Russia, by enabling her to throw a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean, or to blockade the Sultan in his own palace. In short, while Russia has the naval force she now possesses in Sebastopol and the Black Sea, no freedom of that sea can exist, except as long as the other maritime powers keep a powerful squadron in those waters. The Russian fleet is a weapon constantly hanging over the Sultan's head. It is needed, and can be used for no other purpose, than to threaten Constantinople, to strike a blow at Trebizond or Sinope, or to blockade the Circassian coast. It is a permanent menace to the weak, but, as we have seen, useless for purposes of maritime defence against an equal force of foreign ships. And we are more than ever convinced that, before the true meaning and effect of the allied powers can be given to the third proposition, they must be well assured that the fleet prepared and used by Russia for these purposes *has ceased to exist in her harbours*. Sebastopol and this fleet are not to be reduced by negotiation, and 'the limitation of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea ;' or what the Austrians call 'the equilibrium of Europe,' is to be accomplished only by the destruction of the material conditions on which that power rests. Would any court in Europe now be satisfied with a mere treaty engagement of the Emperor of Russia not to obstruct the navigation of the Danube, and not to use his naval forces against the Ottoman empire ? Such a treaty would not, as Lord Lyndhurst powerfully said, be worth the paper on which it is written, and the allied powers have accomplished nothing until they have secured material guarantees for the fulfilment of all the conditions they have thought it necessary to demand. When these securities are obtained, *the last proposition, which relates to the Christian protectorate, may fairly become the subject of negotiation* ; for the point is one of a negative character, and, the treaties on which the Russian claims were based having been abrogated, it will be sufficient to take care that no similar stipulations are ever revived" !

they are the soldiers of civilization against a new invasion of barbarians ; the champions of public law against unjustifiable aggression ; the crusaders of the liberty of Europe against the suzerainté which would destroy it.'

"Alluding to the guarantees that must be demanded for the future, it says :—

"‘Those guarantees must, in order to be entitled to consideration, be still more *material* than moral. The letter of a treaty is no doubt a consideration, but what is it for a sovereign who impudently violates treaties when they are a check on his ambitious policy? Were there not formal treaties between Russia and the Porte? Have they prevented the Russian army from passing the Pruth and invading the Ottoman territory? Treaties have for their guarantee only the loyalty of those who sign them, and blind ambition tramples them under foot the moment interest or passion requires it. With such precedents as those which we find in the policy of Russia, Europe *must have other guarantees* than simple declarations drawn up on a sheet of paper. It must have material pledges against the return of the crisis under which it labours at this moment. We have often said that it is by striking at the very heart of the *maritime power of Russia* ; it is by driving her back within those limits which will not permit her to aspire any more to the empire of the seas ; it is by repressing the gigantic extension that she has attained at the expense of her neighbours—that is, by *constraining her to the limits of a Continental power*—that we shall turn aside for ever from Europe the sword which the policy of the Czar holds incessantly suspended over civilized states, and that it will be freed from the invading influence of the northern races. But to attain that object we must make great efforts, and those decisive blows which the war alone can inflict. In these solemn circumstances, what importance can the comments, more or less hypothetical, have which are hazarded on all sides as to the answer of the Czar? His answer cannot be, and it is not, satisfactory ; and in proof that it is not so, we see the whole of Europe preparing for the struggle against the aggressor who has endangered its security and its repose. What we must do then is, as the prophet says, “to gird up our loins like a strong man.” The solution of the question is now entrusted to the sword. Let us maintain throughout the trial, the courage and the confidence imparted by the consciousness of a just cause, and the enormous force which Europe can dispose of against the Emperor of Russia. The God of battles, who is still the God of justice, will not permit the triumph of iniquity, and will surely protect the champions of the rights of nations and of civilization.’”—*Times*, July 17th, 1854.

"The war will be carried on until the objects for which it was undertaken are fully attained and firmly secured. The Western Powers believe that the complete enforcement of the four principles in question will ensure the integrity of the Turkish empire ; and it will, therefore, be their steady aim to compel the enemy to give them practical effect. We do not suppose that either of the statesmen in whose despatches these principles were enunciated, felt any confidence that they would be accepted at St.

Petersburg. The conditions were carefully framed, so as to include everything necessary for sweeping away the whole web of treaties in which Russia had involved the Porte, and for placing the two powers on exactly the same simple and equal footing as that on which all the great European states stand towards each other. It was, in fact, intended to destroy the entire machinery which, throughout a long course of years, had been contrived by the court of St. Petersburg for the gradual appropriation of the territories and prerogatives of the Sultan, and to render impossible any future attempt to reconstruct the old system of aggression. As this, however, would be completely undoing all that had been done by Russia during many generations, it was exceedingly improbable that she would acquiesce, without a desperate resistance, in the reversal of her cherished and so long successful policy. Yet it is strictly true that, by acceding to these conditions, and by giving security for her adherence to them, she would have paved the way for a definitive treaty of peace; and there can be no doubt that, when they laid down the four principles specified in their notes to the Austrian Government, the Western Powers had a clear intention of treating on the basis thus indicated, in case an opportunity should occur. But this offer, having been altogether rejected by the enemy, is no longer binding upon those who made it; and England and France are henceforth only committed to the declaration, that they will not accept less favourable terms than those which they recently proposed—their right to large additional demands remaining untouched by what has taken place.”—*Times*, Sept. 6th, 1854.

Numerous and sarcastic have been the accusations brought against Russia for making the war a religious war. None have been so forward in this warfare as Sir H. Seymour, while his sneers and accusations have been directed more against religion than the particular creed he laid hold of to load with his scorn. This man does not reflect, or does not know, that there is not and cannot be any war in the East between Mahomedans and Christians without its being carried on as a religious contest, at least to a very great degree. Nay, such is the state of the world, with 100,000,000 Protestants, 250,000,000 Roman Catholics, 100,000,000 Mahomedans, and nearly 500,000,000 Pagans, contiguous to and connected with each other, that every war must henceforward more than ever be mixed up with religious feelings. He commits a sad mistake, however, when he asserts that Russia has made, if she really has made, this a religious war, and that Turkey has not done so also. In No. 314,¹ Sir H. Seymour says: “Lord Stratford de Redcliffe pursued uninterruptedly the wise and conciliatory course which he had followed throughout the negotiations; and I would take the opportunity of remarking, if I might do so without giving offence,

¹ Seymour to Clarendon, Dec. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 295.

that if the Turks had been restrained from following the example set by Russia in giving a religious character to the war, it might be inferred that it was to the *prudence of Lord Stratford's advice that this result was attributable.*" On turning to No. 152, Part I,¹ we find Lord Stratford stating to Lord Clarendon thus: "It appears that the protectorate which his (Russia) Government wish to exercise with so little control or limitation, is of a strictly exclusive character; and it has reached me, from more quarters than one, that among the *motives* for increasing their influence in this country, is the desire of *repressing Protestantism wherever it appears!*" If this is not rousing and proclaiming religious feeling, I know not what that is. This claptrap, for claptrap it was, and made to catch the sympathy of the unwary for the moment, was destitute of the slightest foundation in fact. It was the Emperor of Russia that at the outset, in the disputes about the Holy Places, suggested that the Protestants should be placed on the same footing at Jerusalem as that on which other sects of Christians stood. Now, let us see what Stratford himself admits in this case. He says (Part II. p. 290): "Among the Mahommedans, as your Lordship knows, a *patriotic* is always, more or less, a religious sentiment; and the Porte could hardly be expected to restrain the fanaticism of its adherents, without directing their zeal to some distinct object of national desire."

So far Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who certainly did restrain, as far as he could, the appearance of Turkish ire against the Christian religion, and from boasting too much of their own. But he could not altogether succeed. In his address to his army at Schumla (Part II. p. 194), Omar Pasha says: "We will be avenged, and will sacrifice our heads and our lives! It is in the Koran! We have sworn it on the Koran! You are Moslems! and I am sure you will sacrifice your heads and your lives for your *religion* and Government! . . . All of you know that the object of this life is to serve worthily God and the Sultan, and thus *to gain heaven!*" In another address to the troops at Kalafât, he says: "We shall overcome that implacable enemy, with the assistance of the Almighty and the help of the Prophet. . . . Soldiers! if you fall, supreme happiness awaits you above!" In his *hatti-scheriffe*, October 31st, the Sultan says: "May the Most High, out of regard for *his holy Prophet* our LORD, vouchsafe ever to grant success to my Sublime Porte, and abundantly to bestow happiness in this world and the next *upon all those who shall have evinced zeal in this sacred cause.*"

Well, if this is not dubbing the contest a religious war, I cannot tell

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, April 9th, 1853, Part I. p. 129.

what could do so. It is, I believe, true that, in the present day, nearly all the Turks of higher rank are complete infidels, and care nothing about Mahommedanism or any other religion, but use only that which they outwardly profess to suit and to advance their worldly interests, pleasures, and lusts; but that, instead of making them better, constitutes them greater rogues. However, they are good enough to be made catspaws of by England and France, the statesmen of which countries, much like themselves, look upon every religion or creed as equal!

Next let us examine how far other countries, not Russian, consider the present war a religious war.

In April last, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dublin, in a pastoral address, states: "Prayers for the war to be taken from the MISSAL in *Tempore Belli*, as laid down in the Roman Missal. We may add, that it must appear to the *children of Mary* a good omen of the prosperous issue of the war, that the fleets of our ally have been placed under the protection of THE MOTHER OF GOD, and that her image, sent by the Emperor of the French, has been inaugurated with great religious pomp on board the admiral's vessel. This solemn profession of Catholic faith, this act of tender devotion to the MOTHER OF GOD, cannot fail to be the source of inestimable blessings to the French. They will also contribute, in some measure, to make reparation to the offended dignity of THE QUEEN OF HEAVEN for the outrages and insults that have been offered within *the last few years* to her name and images elsewhere."—(*Standard*, April 25th, 1854.)

The Archbishop of Paris, in his pastoral letter, orders prayers to be offered up for the army of the East, "the protection of political, religious, and *national interests*. It is necessary to oppose Russian designs in Turkey, and he declares that the war may be said to be *brought about by the intervention of God, and consequently he will give it his blessing and insure success*."—(*Morning Chronicle*, April 3d, 1854. *From a Paris Paper*.)

The *Daily News* of May 4th, 1854, states, from the *Deutsch Volkshale*, a German journal: "It has been assured that the Pope has declared his desire that Austria should join the Western powers on the Eastern question."

At a meeting of the Roman Catholic laity held at the Catholic Institute, London, Bishopsgate-street, Mr. Wharton said: "If moral means would not do, we must resort to physical force; and abused Prince Albert for his speech at the dinner to the Sons of the Clergy, for praising the Reformation. They must look for help from the Emperor of the French," &c. (*Standard*, May 17th, 1854.)

"Austria," says the *Vienna Wanderer*, "must act as becomes a great power. By her conduct as a European, German, and *Catholic state*, she must show that she is deserving of the confidence which is reposed in her by Europe, Germany, and *the Catholic Church*."—(*Times*, May 19th; *Vienna*, May 14th, 1854.)

In France a war medal was struck last spring by the order of the Emperor, which represents Napoleon III. giving his right hand to Queen Victoria, and over his head the word "*Protestanisme*;" his left hand to Sultan Abdul-Medjid, and over his head the word "*Islamisme*;" and himself in the centre, with the word over his head "*Catholicisme*!" Over all, in large letters, the words, "*Dieu les protège*," and below the figures, "*Civilisation*;" and the reverse, Union of France and Great Britain, "*Pour assurer la paix du monde*."—(*Morning Chronicle*, May 31st, 1854.)

In the *Daily News* of March 13th, 1854, we are told, under date Constantinople, Feb. 27th, that Omar Pasha's army contained from 8,000 to 10,000 Turkish Roman Catholics, who fought against both Russians and Greeks; and that from 2,000 to 3,000 *Maronites* more were expected from Lebanon. In the daily journals of March 8th, we find extracts from the great Roman Catholic oracle, the "*Univers*," of Paris, advocating the total destruction of the Greek Church everywhere, because it is heretical!

When a story was set abroad throughout Europe by the periodical press to prejudice Russia, namely, that she was negotiating with, and had brought over, the Pope to her interest, the Pontiff, through the *Moniteur*, July 2d, indignantly denied the false accusation thus:—

"Some Russian journals, doubtless desirous of deceiving the country as to the opinion of Europe on the policy of their Government, have stated that Pope Pius IX. has openly expressed his wishes for the success of the arms of the Emperor Nicholas. We shall confine ourselves to stating that his Holiness having had occasion, about two months ago, to speak of the Government in connexion *with the affairs* of the United Armenians of Constantinople, expressed himself in the most flattering terms of the Sultan. In a more recent circumstance, on the day of the anniversary of his accession to the pontifical throne, and while receiving the homage of the ambassador of the Emperor, the Pope renewed to him the assurance of the interest with which he followed all the acts of French policy, and the expression of his hope *for the successful issue of the war in the East*. The feeling of the court of Rome *could not be doubtful* in a question where *morality and policy* are so completely in accord; and when the Russian press thinks proper to misrepresent facts in order to support its cause, it should at least give them an air of probability."

"The Minister of Marine has received the following from Vice-Admiral Parseval-Deschênes, commander-in-chief of the French fleet in the Baltic :—

"Baro Sound, June 19.

"Monsieur le Ministre,—In the course of my navigation since my departure from Brest, several vessels did not join my flag, and the principal chaplain was absent. I have consequently been obliged to wait till this day for a favourable opportunity for the consecration and solemn inauguration of the beautiful picture of the Virgin, given by his Majesty the Emperor to the squadron which I have the honour to command. My first anchorage off the coast of Finland having at length almost completely united us, this ceremony took place yesterday (Sunday) morning. The weather being magnificent, we were able to celebrate it on the deck of the *Inflexible*. The altar, being placed at the foot of the mainmast, was ornamented by our sailors with leaves and foliage gathered in the small islands which surround us. The picture was placed above the altar. I was surrounded on the quarter-deck, in addition to Rear-Admiral Penaud, by all the commanders and officers of the fleet; detachments from each vessel were stationed on the poop; the crew occupied the gangways; the guard under arms was formed by the expeditionary troops; and the vessel was decked out with flags. At eleven o'clock the Abbé Carron, the principal chaplain, attended by twelve other clergymen, took his place at the altar. In language as elevated as it was touching, the Abbé dwelt on this Catholic *fête* off an enemy's coast, and becomingly expressed the gratitude of the Baltic fleet to his Imperial Majesty, whose Christian solicitude has placed it, like that of the Black Sea, under the special protection of the Holy Patroness of sailors. The address being terminated, the hymn, "Ave Maria Stella," was chanted; then the guard presented arms, the drums beat, and the *Inflexible* fired a salute of twenty-one guns at the solemn moment when the voice of the priest called down the blessing of Mary on the Emperor, on France, and on our arms. I will not endeavour, Monsieur le Ministre, to describe to you the impression produced by such a ceremony, in such a place, and at such a moment; it may be imagined, but not expressed. Your Excellency will therefore permit me to confine myself to this simple recital. The mass terminated by the singing of the "Magnificat" and the "Domine Salvum." All punishments were then taken off; our brave sailors passed the day in going from vessel to vessel to visit each other; and we kept up our rejoicings till the evening."

"ABD-EL-KADER AND OMAR PASHA.—We read in a letter from Schumla, that Omar Pasha has lately received the following peculiarly Oriental letter from Abd-el-Kader, dated Broussa, the 18th :—

"My very dear Brother,—The gates of Paradise opened themselves for me, when I had a conversation with the holy Prophet in a dream, on the eve of the first Ramadan. I heard all the great and holy souls who repose in Abraham's bosom proclaim your name with shouts of joy; and I saw a large rainbow extend across the striking ranks of the holy souls when they called you by name. God is with you, my brother. Wherever you go,

glory and victory will attend you. I envy you. Carry off the camps of your enemy by your troops. May my blessing accompany you! The enemies will fly before you like jackals, and our children's children will glorify your name. Do not draw back, but march your troops forward. The Prophet wills it. The day of expiation is arrived for the ghaours of Moscow. Blessings on you, my brother!

‘ABD-EL-KADER.’

“On the 18th, at Adrianople, the French army there assembled celebrated a military mass with great pomp; all the army was present; ceremony in the open air. A priest of high rank officiated. Austrian consul and his wife were present, General Pim, &c. Picture representing the cross suspended from a tree, with the inscription ‘*In signo vincit.*’ At the elevation of the host a salute of five guns was fired, and the imperial eagles were dipped, and all the troops presented their arms with loudest huzzas. When the mass was ended, ‘*Domine salvum fac Imperatorum Napoleones*’ was chanted. A gun announced the end of the ceremony. The sight appeared to affect the Turks greatly and favourably.”—*Morning Post*, July 11th; *Scutari*, June 24th, 1854.

POPISH VIEW OF THE WAR IN FRANCE.

“This view of the subject is curiously developed in some of the pastorals issued by the French bishops on the occasion of the war. ‘Go forth in the name of the Lord,’ exclaims the Bishop of Vergy; ‘ye new crusaders, fly to the holy war. Others have said to you: “French soldiers, go and inaugurate the new reign by triumphs worthy of the giant of battles, whose blood flows, as is well perceived, in the veins of your Emperor.” For ourselves, as a pontiff of religion, we will say to you: Successors of the God-freys, the Raymonds, the Eustaces, the Baldwins, you have the courage, the intrepidity, the bravery of those noble heroes; have also their faith, their piety, their sentiments of religion. Spare the country on which your heavy sword shall be wielded the greatest part of the misfortunes which too often accompany war. Show to your new brethren in arms, to the disciples of Mahomet, to the modern Greeks, to all the children of error, the moral superiority which Catholicism gives to those who have remained faithful to it.’

“In perfect keeping with this fanatical view of the object and character of the war, the Archbishop of Tours breaks forth into a strain of Mariolatrous rapture: ‘In seeing France,’ he says, ‘march gloriously at the head of this Eastern expedition to cause right and justice to triumph, we ought to think that God will be with us; that the holy angels will protect our intrepid soldiers; that the holy Virgin, patroness of France, will cover them with her tutelary ægis; and that since the Emperor has chosen, from a feeling of pious solicitude worthy of his heart and of his faith, that *the image of Mary* should become, as it were, the standard of the fleet, this venerated sign will be for all the combatants the sign of salvation, and the gauge of victory.’

“ In commenting on the pastorals of the French bishops, from which it gives copious extracts, the *Tablet* observes: ‘ With Catholic France, and with an Emperor seated on his throne by Catholic interests, and for the very purpose and mission of preserving Catholic society, a general war must of necessity be a religious war. The preservation of the Turkish empire has already assumed its real character of only a secondary cause, or at most of a means to an end. The real question is to repress and place within due limits an aggressive, schismatical empire. Russia seeks to make her religion, miscalled “Orthodox,” supplant that which is at once Catholic and Orthodox. That is the grand consequence which would flow from the restoration of the Byzantine empire, and that is the consequence which all the blood and treasure of France will be well spent in obstructing and annihilating. Happy it is for us, and praised be Almighty God for the fact, that the material interests of England, which she dare not sacrifice, coincide with the great and holy purpose. Happy it is that that justice, that political right, which the Emperor of Russia has violated, demonstrate, even to those outside of the Catholic Church who are desirous of the preservation of Europe, that they cannot secure their true interests without at the same time assisting ours.’ ”—From the *John Bull*, April 27th.

CHAPTER VIII.

STATE OF THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION IN TURKEY—FALSEHOODS TOLD BY
 AMBASSADORS AND STATESMEN ABOUT IT—CONSULS' REPORTS—LORD CLA-
 RENDON'S OFFICIAL LETTERS ABOUT THEIR DEGRADED AND HOPELESS STATE
 —LAYARD'S ACCOUNTS OF THEIR CRUEL TREATMENT—NEALE'S DO., ETC. ETC.

WE come now to consider the condition of the Greek Christians in Turkey, and the state of that empire in general. The picture that must be exhibited will be a most appalling one, and the misrepresentations and falsehoods of diplomatists and statesmen fairly exposed, from a bare statement of unquestionable facts. It would be tedious to adduce extracts from the published despatches to show, from the statements made in them, that Great Britain considers it her interest and her duty to defend and maintain what is termed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire. I do not intend here to examine the necessity, the policy, and the urgency of this plea, but simply to show that it is so considered. In Part I. p. 98, we find Lord Clarendon telling Lord Cowley, "that the French Government are well aware that it always had been and would be the policy of this country to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire." In Part II. p. 174, we find his Lordship informing Lord Stratford thus: "To your Excellency I need hardly state, that the *traditional* policy of this country in the East will be rigidly adhered to." In Part II. p. 218, his Lordship, in his official circular, states that England and France "look upon the maintenance of the Ottoman empire as a great feature of European policy," &c.

Well, this being a settled point, it becomes necessary to consider the character and condition of the people whose cause we have taken in hand, and which we are called upon by our statesmen to support at all hazards. Are they worth the toil, labour, blood, and expense that we must go to, for the purpose proclaimed as absolutely necessary, or does

any immediate British interest demand of us at this time the great sacrifices that must be made before the object sought can be attained? Let us take, first and foremost, the statements made about the state and condition of the Christian population of Turkey.

Colonel Rose, who could see only with the eye of a Turk, tells us (Part I. p. 88) that the Greek population had shown "no disaffected feeling" previous to Menchikoff's mission. In No. 234,¹ in his Mahomedan phraseology, he insinuates that there were "symptoms of indifference amongst the Greeks themselves to an increase of Russian intervention." In No. 240² Lord Stratford says, "there is even some reason to think, that the Greek Synod, and the more *enlightened* portion of the Greek laity, have less of sympathy than usual with their northern protectors." In No. 37³ we are told "that it has been clearly established in previous statements, that, however the pretensions of Russia may relate to the religious privileges of the Greeks, *neither the Greek people nor any of their chiefs have any knowledge or participation therein.*" In No. 149⁴ the Turkish ministry audaciously asks: "Have there occurred within the Ottoman empire, in disregard of the promise explicitly recorded in the treaty of Kainardji, such acts as the *demolition of Christian churches*, or have any obstacles been offered to the obstruction of the Christian religion?" In No. 157⁵ Lord Stratford tells us, that the Ottoman Government had "*appealed with perfect success* to the zeal of his Mussulman, and to the *loyalty of his Christian subjects!*" In No. 250⁶ Lord Stratford makes the *Greek nation* (Greek nation! where is it?) address the Porte, and state, amongst other things, thus:—

"It is *notorious* to everybody, and an incontestable truth, that, not only from the position which Providence has awarded to us under the benevolent authority of the august sovereigns of the Ottoman dynasty, but also as the result of boundless *gratitude*, and of our national attachment to the land of our birth, it is the constant and sacred duty of our nation faithfully to serve the noble views and the glory of his Imperial Majesty our gracious sovereign and *master*, who is the only refuge of our prosperity and security."

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, May 22d, 1853, Part I. p. 235.

² Stratford to Clarendon, May 25th, 1853, Part I. p. 254; Inclosure Letter to Sir H. Seymour, May 23d.

³ Stratford to Clarendon, July 20th, 1853; Inclosure, Turkish Proclamation, p. 30. This document was concocted by Stratford, not by a Turk.

⁴ Stratford to Clarendon, Oct. 4th, 1853, Part II.; Inclosure No. 3, p. 159, Turkish Manifesto.

⁵ Stratford to Clarendon, Oct. 5th, 1853, Part II. p. 165.

⁶ Stratford to Clarendon, Oct. 31st, 1853, Part II.; Inclosure, Address of the Greek Nation to the Porte, p. 247, &c.

Again :—

“ It is easy to conceive what immense satisfaction the worthy and generous determination which the Imperial Government has arrived at, under the present circumstances, to preserve the sacred rights of sovereignty of his Imperial Majesty and the independence of the empire, has afforded us, and how *bold* it has made us, and to what an extent this firm and fearless attitude of the Imperial Government has stimulated our zeal and our readiness to fulfil our duties. And though it be notorious that the inhabitants of Roumelia, for the most part Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, our coreligionists as well as those who are in Anatolia, faithful and grateful subjects of the imperial throne, and animated by the same feelings of interest and enthusiasm as the Mussulman subjects of the empire, their compatriots, their neighbours, and their companions *in fate* and duty, continue to manifest a sincere devotion by the services which they render to the imperial armies as far as the power of each admits,” &c.

This, as promised, they will continue faithfully to do. And,

“ In conclusion, *the Greek nation*, impossible as they find it to express completely by words their sentiments of profound gratitude for the vast benefits for which they are indebted to his Imperial Majesty and to *his enlightened Government*, confine themselves to addressing ardent prayers to the Supreme Being, that he would grant his Majesty his Divine assistance to bring to a happy and glorious issue his exalted resolutions and undertakings, as well as the *wise counsels* of his illustrious ministers !”

In No. 234¹ Lord Clarendon writes Lord Loftus thus :—

“ With reference to your Lordship’s despatch of the 7th inst., reporting the substance of a conversation which your Lordship had held with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the manifesto which had been issued by the Russian Government on the Eastern question, I have to inform you that her Majesty’s Government approve your language on this occasion ; and I have to instruct your Lordship to observe to Baron Manteuffel that this manifesto is not founded on truth. It declares that Turkey has violated treaties between her and Russia ; but not a single instance of this has been advanced by Russia throughout the whole of the discussions, *nor has a single instance been adduced of the ill treatment of Christians*, which should call forth the solicitude of the Emperor of Russia.

“ The sole cause of complaint urged against the Porte was that concerning the Holy Places, which was at once satisfactorily settled ; since which the territory of the Sultan has been occupied, and Europe is exposed to the calamities of war, because the Sultan would not concede to the Emperor rights over his own subjects that would have been utterly destructive of his independence ; and Count Nesselrode, in his analysis of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note, has taken care that the world should labour under no mistake as to what the rights were which the Emperor required, and the Sultan most properly refused.”

¹ Clarendon to Loftus, Nov. 14th, 1853, Part II. p. 233.

In No. 384¹ M. Drouyn de Lhuys asserts, that "the cabinet of St. Petersburg did not prove by any *particular fact* that those privileges had been violated." In Part V.² Lord Clarendon states, that "the treatment of Christians is not harsh" in Turkey. In No. 331³ Part I. Lord Clarendon conceives the Russian manifesto, as appealing to "the Russian people in behalf of their Church (in Turkey), *which is not in danger, and of their religion, which has not been assailed,*" was not warranted. And, in Part III.,⁴ "No injury to the Christian subjects of the Porte afforded even a pretext for such acts. On the contrary, with the introduction of new laws for their protection, their own gradual progress in wealth and intelligence, and by general advance in the arts of peace, the condition of the Christians was manifestly *improving.*" In No. 89⁵ Lord Cowley takes a bolder flight, and tells us "that it was *nonsense* to say that the Greek nation was '*entraînée,*' as was pretended, in this war. There was no '*entraînement,*' but what was fostered by the King and Queen, and encouraged by the Greek Government. Not a soul in the Peloponnesus—not a soul in any of the islands, had stirred; a few brigands from the interior of the northern provinces were the only *culprits!*" Lastly, in this ignoble work, we have Mr. Layard, the Turkish Bazi-Bouzock of the unholy alliance, and champion of Turkish intolerance. In the House of Commons, July 25th, 1854, this gentleman (there is more to be adduced about him under another head) told the House, referring, most unfortunately, to ill-fated Samos: "The fact was, we could never alter the condition of the Greeks until we altered their character; and he firmly believed that at present the *best way* to serve the Greeks would be to put them *under the protection* of the Turks. (*Laughter, and cries of oh! oh!*) Honourable gentlemen might laugh, but, in doing so, let them not forget to do Turkey the justice to acknowledge, what all who knew anything of her position were ready to bear witness to, that no country *in the world* had more improved during the last few years, and was more improving every day, than Turkey!"

In this way nations are misled, deceived, and maddened, by deceitful, ambitious, interested, and wrong-headed politicians and statesmen. The task is irksome, laborious, and painful, to follow out and to refute such detestable fabrications and falsehoods; but truth, and the cause of the deplorable contest into which this and other countries have been

¹ Circular Despatch, Drouyn de Lhuys, Dec. 30th, 1853, Part II. p. 356.

² Eastern Papers, Clarendon to Seymour, March 23d, 1854.

³ Clarendon to Seymour, July 9th, 1853, p. 351.

⁴ Clarendon to Seymour, Jan. 31st, 1854, Eastern Papers, p. 6.

⁵ Cowley to Clarendon, Feb. 22d, 1854, Part VII. p. 56.

plunged by such conduct, demand it. Even the same papers and parties have furnished us with ample materials to do so. The reader will probably feel some surprise at the array that is to be produced. A full and complete refutation of the preceding statements may be made by referring to the simple fact that three of the greatest powers in Europe, naval and military, have a large portion of their forces employed in keeping down and repressing insurrection, and meditated insurrection, in almost every province and portion of Turkey, especially Turkey in Europe; but more minute details and references may be considered necessary.

In No. 66¹ Count Nesselrode, amongst many other facts, tells us, in reference to complaints made to Turkey by Russian ambassadors, and "the manner in which the Ottoman Porte had received the counsels of the Imperial Government in the questions of Montenegro and of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and of the different acts of injustice committed against the Christian rayahs," proceeds: "In fact, it cannot be otherwise in a state where Christians, in their character of rayahs, are exposed to a thousand exactions and vexations on the part of the people or the pashas, frequently even threatened in their *properties, their religion, and their existence*, as has so very recently been proved by the massacres at Aleppo, by the persecutions, the pecuniary exactions, the *destruction of churches*, and the forced conversions and the cruelties of *all kinds* exercised in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and the Herzegovine." There is no mistaking this communication, nor denying that it was made to the Turkish Government.

The public will remember the dashing, popularity-courting accounts that Lord Stratford transmitted last year about the liberal concessions of the Turkish Government in regard to religious toleration made by it, but *after* Prince Menchikoff had quitted Constantinople. In No. 278² Lord Stratford exultingly tells us: "The imperial firmans, renewing and confirming the rights and privileges of the Churches and clergy of the several Christian communities in Turkey, have received the Sultan's formal sanction, and are to be delivered to the respective heads of each in the course of the day. It is gratifying to observe that the Jewish community is included in the benefits of so solemn an act; and I have taken care that on *this decisive* occasion the PROTESTANTS *should also be* placed on terms of equality with the more ancient establishments." These firmans were stated to have been delivered to the *five* great Christian powers. Well, let us see how this clap-trap

¹ Nesselrode to Brunnow and Kisseloff; Inclosures No. 1, Aug. 13th, 1853, Part II. pp. 59—61.

² Stratford to Clarendon, June 7th, 1853, Part I. p. 202; received June 23d.

worked. In the important paper produced to the House of Lords, entitled "PROTESTANTS IN TURKEY," we find (No. 5¹) Lord Stratford stating: "Although the firman which was granted *some time ago*, AT MY REQUEST, to the Sultan's Protestant subjects, placing them on the same footing with other religious communities, not Mussulman, in the empire, contained every privilege that it was reasonable for them to enjoy, *I had long endeavoured in vain to obtain its official transmission, to the pashas commanding in the provinces.* I have now to state, that the Porte has *at length* acceded to my earnest and repeated solicitations. The firman in question has been promulgated by its official transmission to all governors of places wherever a Protestant society is known to exist." Well, let us try to find out what has taken place in consequence. In not one of "*the Greek papers*," coming down to May 28th, this year, do we find one word about this firman or its application. Under date Constantinople, May 22d, 1854, the Bishop of Gibraltar tells us that "*the want of a proper church for British residents has long been seriously felt; and the religion of the English nation has been so completely cast into the shade, that doubts have been expressed by the Turks whether we have any religion at all.*" What religion did all our ambassadors follow at Constantinople previously? It could not have been Christianity! "This is a state of things which ought not to exist any longer. The time has come when it ought to be remedied. And the *presence* of THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCES seems to afford the most favourable opportunity that has ever occurred for putting the Church of England into its proper position . . . setting up a Church which shall be a beacon in the capital of the Mahomedan world. *Hitherto no such thing has been permitted, Christian churches being usually thrust into by-ways and corners, but now it cannot be refused!!*"

At the close of the session of Parliament, in 1853, Lord Clarendon informed the Lords that he had just received a despatch from Lord Stratford, announcing that the Sultan, by a firman, had put all his subjects upon equality with regard to civil rights. Well, let us examine how this concession proceeded. In No. 7² Lord Stratford tells us: "When the firman was originally granted to me" (four years ago) "for the regulations of the proceedings in the *mixed criminal courts* of Alexandria and Cairo,³ I obtained a promise that it should be extended,

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, Dec. 6th, 1853, p. 3.

² Stratford to Clarendon, Feb. 15th, 1854; Paper, "PROTESTANTS IN TURKEY," p. 4.

³ It was upon this ground, which, in fact, had no reference to the rayahs in Turkey, but to the foreign Christians residing in those *two places*, that Lord Palmerston told the House of Commons, in 1853, that the Sultan had placed all his Christian subjects on an equal footing in the eye of the law. His Lordship was thus grossly imposed upon by some uncircumcised Turk in disguise.

after a time, to the rayahs of the whole empire. Hitherto my *repeated efforts* to secure the performance of *this promise failed*, and the present *appearance* of success is owing to a strong appeal in writing, which I addressed to Reschid Pasha several weeks ago. It is altogether painful to observe with what unreasonable tenacity the professors of Islamism still adhere to their misapplication of religious principles. In the present instance, however, I trust that the prejudice is practically surmounted, and that the firman, calculated as it is to remove the most CRYING INJUSTICE under which the rayahs of the empire HAVE LABOURED FOR CENTURIES, will *shortly* receive the Sultan's sanction, in addition to the approval of the council by which it has been submitted to his Majesty." Well, on the 26th of February, Lord Stratford announces the appearance of the firman dated the 24th; but it comes forth *without either date or signature*, and addressed only to the Pasha of Salonica, around which place the Greek insurrection was beginning to spread. But in none of the Greek papers, down to the date already mentioned, do we find a word about it. How far it has been intimated to the provinces does not appear. In a public journal lately, we find it announced, under date Damascus, 8th July, that they had then begun to form a mixed tribunal in obedience to this firman, which tribunal was to be composed of thirteen members, viz. *one* Christian, one Jew, and the remaining *eleven* Mahommedans! An impartial court this will make to try rayahs!! The fact is, the whole, as far as the Turks and their champion Stratford is concerned, is merely a piece of humbug to stave off the evil day, and is a part of the Mahommedan Turkish policy, to gain their ultimate aim, and preserve their predominant power, by acting as their Koran teaches them; namely, to deceive the Christians by yielding when in danger, all promises then made being lawfully cancelled whenever danger is over!

By an old law in Turkey, yet, I believe, unrepealed, it is death to a Mahommedan to become a Christian. This positive law was enacted during the reign of Soliman I. (Cantemir, Book III. p. 181). In the year 1527, one Cabyzi Ajem, a man of great learning and piety, maintained and taught that the Christian religion was superior to Islamism, and, in fact, the only true religion. No threats could induce him to desist or change his opinion. He was beheaded, and a law enacted "that whoever *should, even by way of dispute*, prefer the doctrine of *Christ* before Mahomet's, should undergo "the same penalty." In the House of Commons, June 16th, 1854, the Hon. A. Kinnaird said "he wished to ask the noble lord, the President of the Council, whether or not her Majesty's Government had made any efforts to induce the Sultan to adopt a more enlightened policy than heretofore towards

those of his subjects that desire to change their religion ? He had heard recently of a young Mussulman having been beheaded for having changed his religion. He would therefore ask whether the Government had had any correspondence with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe with reference to the law which still existed in Turkey, that if any Mussulman (not a renegade Christian) embraces Christianity, he would be liable to the penalty of death ; and if so, whether he would object to a copy of such correspondence being laid on the table of the house ? LORD JOHN RUSSELL, speaking in a very low tone of voice, was understood to say, no *correspondence* of that kind has taken place." (Rep. speech, *Morning Herald*, June 17th.) The more minute particulars of this case are given in a very able letter, signed "ANGLUS," in the *Morning Advertiser* of June 13th, addressed to Lord John, from which the following extracts are made :—

"Some time last November, just when the English and French fleets were in the Bosphorus to defend the integrity of the Turkish empire, and while England was resounding with praises of Turkish liberality, a young Mussulman, of the village of Eski-Zaghara, near Adrianople, was brought to that city under charge of apostacy, and thrown into prison. He had declared that Mahommed was a false prophet, that the true prophet was Christ, and that after him there was no prophet. In the highest court of the pasha he now persisted in this confession of Christian belief, and added, 'So long as we have Christ, we have no need of Mahommed.' They threw him into prison again, and cruelly tortured him ; but no suffering could extort a recantation, and he was brought out to the most public place of Adrianople, and exhibited to the multitude as a blasphemer. There he audibly pronounced these words : '*I profess Jesus Christ, and for him I die.*' On this he was beheaded. It is the custom of Turkish executioners to put the head of a decapitated Mussulman under one of his arms, but they laid the head of this man between his legs, to show that he was a Christian ; and thus the corpse lay exposed until the next day, and was seen by hundreds and thousands of people. The martyrdom—for such it was—was forthwith made known in England. I first read of it in the *Christian Times*, of December 16th, and have assured myself of the truth of the statement there published by reference to Constantinople."

"Even at this moment," continues the writer, "unless the executioner has finished his work, there is a Jew imprisoned at Mosul, lying under sentence of death for blasphemy. The British consul, Mr. Rossam, interposed his good offices ; but there lies the Jew, either in the dungeon or the grave, and here lies the Sultan's gracious promise that no man should suffer on account of religion in his dominions."

The murders and massacres of Christians in Turkey are numerous and never-ending. When Greece revolted, an edict was issued by the

Sultan to massacre them without mercy. Above 60,000 perished at Scio. At Kilmarnock, October 20th, 1853, Mr. Bouverie stated to his constituents, that "40,000 were massacred (the number was even greater) at Constantinople. The Greek Patriarch was dragged before a merciless tribunal, and hung before the door of his own house. A Greek officer, who defended Thermopylæ against the Turks, was captured, and, refusing to join the Turkish army, was publicly impaled and roasted alive before a slow fire." The cruelties committed on the Russian frontiers of Asia last year were horrible. In the *Times* of December 17th, 1853, we find a letter from a correspondent which states that, at the capture of Fort St. Nicholas, the Turks fell upon it during the dead of night, and before war had been declared to the Russian authorities. The customs' officer was taken, crucified, and then made a target of. The priest belonging to the establishment had his head sawn off, and his wife *paunched*. The *Morning Chronicle* of December 26th gives us still more terrific details. It says—

"In the synopsis given by our local papers of the events which have occurred at the seat of war in Asia, we read that the Turks, at the taking of Fort St. Nicholas, committed the most cruel barbarities. Among others, a customs' officer was crucified, and the different parts of his body afterwards used as targets. A priest had his head sawn off; and a physician was put to torture to make him confess where he had concealed his gold. Women and children were massacred in cold blood; and it is stated that a child was torn from its mother's breast, and hewn to pieces before her eyes. The Armenians who inhabited the village of Bayander and the surrounding country were unable to flee, and likewise fell a sacrifice to the cruelty of the Turks. The Kurds fell upon the defenceless villages, and indiscriminately murdered women, children, and priests. The husbands and fathers died with weapons in their hands, while defending their families."

In Armenia it is the custom to deposit a sum of money in the graves of young women who die unmarried. The Turkish Bazi-Bouzoeks dig open the graves in search of the treasure, dig up and throw the bodies on the surface of the ground around, and there leave them to be devoured by the beasts and the birds of prey!

In the *Times* of July 21st, 1853, we are told, thus:—

"In the eyes of a Mussulman, a Christian friend is but one step removed from a Christian foe; and the aggressions of Russia are scarcely more offensive to the true believer than the *protection* of England and France." The "Turks conceive, perhaps not without reason, that their existence as a nation is inseparably connected with the ferocity and intolerance of their race . . . The Porte itself is without power to execute its own decrees

of toleration, and it labours in vain to impress upon its inferior officers the spirit of its concessions."

The same journal, October 5th, 1853, referring to the Greek revolution, proceeds :—

"The Christian was allowed to govern himself only because their masters were too idle to attend to them. Whenever the matter lay between Turk and Christian, all laws gave way. Instances were numerous. In the level country, where there was no defence against the oppressor, as much as from a fifth to *four-fifths* of the produce was sometimes exacted from the peasant, besides the present expected by each incoming pasha, or the endless extortions of his satellites. It is well known that at the present day the oath of a Christian is not to be taken against a Turk, and we may hence form a judgment as to what prevailed forty years ago. Neither life, honour, nor property had had a moment's security for 600 years. The Turk has ruled in all that time ; no approach has been made to a milder sway. The life of a Greek in his own country was a burden, and there was not a ray of hope but in voluntary exile. Existence itself was a disgrace, if it was not devoted to the attainment of what alone could render it supportable."

"Turkey," says the same journal, "wants discipline, subordination, official honesty, regular skill—all, in fact, that constitutes the difference between civilized and uncivilized nations." (*Times*, July 26th, 1853.)

But let us come to the official narratives of the greatest Ottoman supporters. In Part I. No. 354,¹ we have above eleven pages of consular despatches, addressed to Lord Stratford, regarding the state of things in various Turkish provinces. Each tells the same deplorable and distressing tale of disorder, distress, and insecurity in that unfortunate country. Space will only permit the selection of a few extracts from them.

Consul Calvert, under date Beyrout, writes Lord Stratford, that in the pashalics of Sidon and Lebanon—

"The Mahommedans feel no hesitation in expressing a desire for hostilities, for according to them a *continual war* in Turkey is requisite to *keep alive the spirit of Islamism*."

The Christian inhabitants in all those districts were in the greatest alarm. Consul Wood writes from Damascus, June 7th, 1853 :—

"The worst feature, under present circumstances, is the highly agitated state of the population of this city. All the classes of the Mahommedans are most anxious to see the embarrassments of the Porte *increase*, and herself *involved in a disastrous war*. They wish to see her *humbled*, in the hope that her officers in Syria will cease to persevere in a system of

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, July 4th, 1853, p. 372.

administration prejudicial to the interests of the effendis and grantees, whose property has been sequestered under various pretexts, and has been so heavily taxed as to have reduced their incomes to one-half; and to the citizens and tradesmen, who find themselves at the mercy of rapacious tribunals and officers."

Consul Saunders writes, under date June 2d, from Prevesa, thus:—

"The rural population of which, oppressed by fiscal exactions, and subjected to intolerable acts of violence and injustice, cannot be expected to entertain any but the most rancorous feelings towards their persecutors. The inhabitants of the greater part of the villages are Christians, and constantly thronging the consular offices seeking protection."

Vice-consul Bonatti writes, under date Scutari, June 1st, 1853:—

"All the desperate characters have raised their heads again, and acts of *rapine and robbery* are again very frequent, at the *expense of the Christians*. OSMAN PASHA, the governor of this province, is a Mussulman, and *sees with perfect indifference all these excesses*."

Under date June 22d, he writes:—

"A Turk of Podgoritra killed lately a Montenegrin of Piperi, in a spirit of pure fanaticism. Under the present misrule, this feeling may lead to fatal consequences . . . Murder and plunder are of *daily occurrence*, and the *Government enriches itself* by mulcting the parties," &c.

Consul Neale, under date Schumla, June 6th, speaks of the probability of revolt in that province, where the Bulgarian Christians, "subdued and humbled by a long course of local oppression," may—

"Be driven to outbreak and remonstrance only by some sudden and notable act of injustice. . . . Were it not," says he, "for those *cold-blooded murders*, and the consequent *total insecurity to life*," he believes the Bulgarians would solicit arms to oppose an invader.

And under date Turnova, July 1st, Consul Neale adverts to—

"The menacing attitude which the Turks have assumed towards the Christians in certain districts of this province," &c.

In No. 355,¹ Lord Stratford speaks of—

"The number of crimes committed, particularly in the province of Bulgaria, by Turks suspected of indulging a spirit of fanatical hatred towards the Christians."

In his instructions to M. Pisani, dated June 22d, given to place before the Porte, he conveys his most urgent request for immediate attention to these evils and disorders:—

"It is," says he, "with extreme disappointment and pain, that I observe

¹ Stratford to Clarendon, July 7th, 1853, Part I. p. 382.

the continuance of evils which affect so deeply the welfare of the empire ; and which assume a deeper character of importance in the present critical state of the Porte's relations with Russia. You will read this instruction to his Highness ; you will communicate fully the contents of the accompanying extracts ; and you will press upon his mind the urgency of adopting adequate measures for the repression of crime, and the protection of the Sultan's loyal and peaceable subjects, without further delay . . . It cannot be denied that the matters now brought into notice have an immediate bearing on the same great interest, and *cannot be neglected with safety* more than with justice."

It is worthy of remark that all these statements were made, and information given, several weeks after Prince Menchikoff had left Constantinople, and four months before Lord Clarendon informed Lord Loftus that Russia had not advanced a single instance of the ill treatment of Christians in Turkey ! He needed not to produce a *single* instance, when he furnished them in camel loads ! We have heard much about the homely though not inapt phrase of "*the sick man* ;" but in reference to this man we shall see, upon further and closer attention to the subject, that those who knew well, and said they were more righteous than their fellows, were pointing to his state as not only sick—extremely sick—but infected with most dangerous and incurable disorders. There were few of the numerous despatches that were written that did not contain emphatic and specific notices of the excessive demoralization and decay and rottenness of the Ottoman empire ; and still more strongly expressed, though in what may be considered as more courtly language, than the figure used to express his opinions by the Emperor Nicholas. Let us begin with great authorities : take the following, the first from probably the best authority of the whole :—

"The *hapless and helpless Mussulman*" (*Times*, July 8th, 1853). "Internal weakness of the empire."—"The increasing tendency to weakness and disorder in the Turkish empire."—"The *accumulated* grievances of foreign nations, which the Porte is *unable or unwilling to redress*" (Clarendon, Part I. p. 80). "The weakness of the Ottoman empire" (Stratford, p. 176). "Entitled to respect and forbearance, notwithstanding its numerous errors and prejudices" (Stratford, p. 255, Part I). "Offended, not from unfriendly feelings, *but from weakness*" (Seymour, Part I. p. 278). "Her *weakness and decrepitude*, of which so much had been said, form but additional motives for the support of her friends" (Seymour, Part II. p. 349).

Page 293, No. 282.—*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

"Foreign Office, June 24th, 1853.

"MY LORD,—Her Majesty's Government consider that every FAIR ADVANTAGE should be taken of the present position of the Turkish empire, to press upon the Sultan and his ministers the importance of *removing all civil distinctions* between the Christian and Mahommedan subjects of the Sultan, and of giving the former an equal degree of assurance with the latter, as to the impartial administration of justice by the Turkish tribunals.

"Your Excellency has long and zealously laboured to obtain for the Christians in Turkey, that their evidence should be received in the courts of justice with the same consideration and respect as that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects; and that *the barbarous distinction* which fanaticism has long interposed between Turks and rayahs, in this respect, should no longer be allowed to prevail.

"The firman, which in 1850 your Excellency obtained from the Porte, for regulating the mixed jurisdiction in Egypt, *gave a limited sanction* to the principle for which her Majesty's Government have so earnestly contended, that the oath of a Christian witness should be regarded in the same light as that of a Mahommedan witness; and that a Mussulman should no longer enjoy impunity for crime, on the ground that Christian testimony, frequently the only one that could be adduced, was inadmissible against a Mussulman.

"Your Excellency is instructed to state to the Porte that it is the deliberate opinion of her Majesty's Government, that the only real security for the continued existence of Turkey as an independent power, is to be sought by enlisting the feelings of its Christian subjects in its preservation; that *although Turkey may get over her present difficulties by the aid of her allies*, she must not reckon upon external assistance as a permanent resource; but that she must create for herself a surer defence in the affections of the most intelligent, active, and enterprising class of her subjects; and that it is impossible to suppose that any true sympathy for their rulers will be felt by the Christians, so long as they are *made to experience, in all their daily transactions, the inferiority of their position as compared with that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects—so long as they are aware that they will seek in vain for justice for wrongs done either to their persons or their properties, because they are deemed a degraded race, unworthy to be put into comparison with the followers of Mahomet!*

"Your Excellency will PLAINLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY state to the Porte, that this state of things cannot be *longer tolerated* by Christian powers. The Porte must decide between the maintenance of an erroneous religious principle and *the loss of the sympathy and support of its allies*. You will point out to the Porte the immense importance of the election which it has to make; and her Majesty's Government conceive that very little reflection will suffice to satisfy the Turkish ministers, that the Porte can

no longer reckon upon its Mussulman subjects alone as a safeguard against external danger ; and *that without the hearty assistance of its Christian dependents*, and the powerful *sympathy and support* of its Christian allies, the Turkish empire *must soon cease to exist*.

“ I am, &c.

(Signed)

“ CLARENDON.”

Page 383, Inclosure 2 in No. 355.—Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

“Therapia, July 4th, 1853.

“SIR,—I have frequently had occasion of late, and, indeed, for some years back, to bring to the knowledge of the Porte *such atrocious instances of cruelty, rapine, and murder*, as I have found, with extreme concern, in the consular reports, exhibiting generally the disturbed and misgoverned condition of many parts of Roumelia, and calling loudly for redress from the Imperial Government. The character of these disorderly and brutal outrages may be said with truth to be, in general, that of Mussulman fanaticism excited *by cupidity and hatred* against the Sultan’s Christian subjects. I will not say that my friendly and earnest representations have been entirely disregarded ; on the contrary, I have sometimes had the satisfaction of being instrumental towards the repression of crime, the alleviation of individual suffering, and the recal of incapable magistrates. But the evil, nevertheless, has not been permanently removed, and the effect of every partial check has been of short duration.

“It is evident that the present political circumstances of the empire must tend directly to increase the temptations to crime, and to bring a much wider extent of country within the range of disorderly and outrageous passions. The Mussulmans are excited by the prospect of war. The rayahs, from their numbers, especially in the European provinces of Turkey, are objects of fear, no less than of hatred and cupidity. The movement of troops, the calling out the rediff, the concentration of regulars on the frontier, the demand of supplies, the scarcity of money, the pressure for payment of arrears, the anticipation of future taxes, concur to spread alarm amongst the peaceable, and to hold out a clearer prospect of impunity to the violent. The pashas and subordinate governors are perplexed ; individuals possessing local wealth acquire a licentious influence ; and unless some powerful remedies be applied without further delay, it is to be feared that the authority of the central Government *will be completely overpowered in some of the provinces*, and that the people, despairing of protection, will augment the disorder by resorting to lawless means of self-preservation.

“For the sake of the empire itself, no less than from motives of humanity, I am inexpressibly anxious to engage the Porte’s attention, ere it be too late, to this abundant source of evil and danger. I am well aware of the difficulties under which the Government labours, and that it is far more easy to describe any mischief, and to trace it to its causes, than to find an efficient remedy. Yet such is the magnitude of the evil, and such the danger of its extension under present circumstances, that the necessity of

checking its progress, and restoring some degree of confidence among the tributary classes, is scarcely subordinate to the duty of preparing the means of resistance against an invading foreign army.

"In addition to the numerous extracts of my consular correspondence, which I have furnished to the office of Foreign Affairs with reference to this subject, I now enclose, for special consideration, the intelligence which has reached me from an official source in Bulgaria. [Where is this communication?] Reschid Pasha will learn from its contents, how crying is the evil—how urgent the peril, even in a province where a very considerable portion of the regular army is being at this moment collected.

"The more pressing and obvious wants are these: the correction, by means of explanation and control, of that fanatical and licentious spirit which now inflames the Mussulman population; some special means for the protection of the loyal and peaceably disposed, whether Mussulman or Rayah; an efficient responsibility, on the part of the local governors and magistrates, towards the supreme Government; a more regular and judicious exercise of authority in the collection of supplies; and the direction of persons acting in concert with the army; relief for the labouring and the rural classes, by means of extraordinary aids obtained by the Porte from other sources, and applied to the payment of the forces, and other immediate wants of the state.

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"You will leave a copy of this instruction with Reschid Pasha, after reading and fully explaining its contents to his Highness; and you will request that it may be brought, without delay, before his Majesty the Sultan and the council of state, to the end that it may be taken into serious consideration, and that the Porte's decision may be communicated to me for the information of her Majesty's Government.

"Yours, &c.

(Signed)

"STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE."

Page 399, No. 370.—The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Foreign Office, July 28th, 1853.

"MY LORD,—Your Excellency's important despatch of the 4th instant has been laid before the Queen, and has received from her Majesty's Government the most serious attention.

"Your Excellency is aware that her Majesty's Government have approved of the course pursued by the Sultan, and recommended by your Excellency, in not exercising his unquestionable right of declaring war against Russia, upon the occupation of the Principalities; and they also entirely agree with your Excellency that his Highness has acted wisely in preparing himself to repel any further aggression on the part of Russia. But it was in order to save the Sultan from the dilemma contemplated by your Excellency, of having to comply with the Russian ultimatum, or to accept an indefinite occupation of the Principalities, that her Majesty's Government have ardently desired to effect an arrangement by negotiation.

"The urgent necessity of extricating Turkey from her present position by peaceful means, is now more strongly than ever impressed upon her Majesty's Government, by the numerous reports from her Majesty's consuls in different parts of the empire, which your Excellency has transmitted, upon the alarming state of the country; and by your Excellency's opinion respecting the dangers which threaten the authority of the Sultan in Bulgaria and Servia, from the disaffection of the people, and in European Turkey from the absence of regular troops; while it appears that the Montenegrins are preparing to make an incursion into Turkey; and that the Shah of Persia, instigated by Russia, is collecting an army at Sul-tanieh; and your Excellency considers that a spirit of fanaticism, dangerous alike to the Rayahs and to the authorities, is rising in various parts of the country; and that the Greeks have taken up a position which indicates views unrestrained by principles or by treaties. But, at the same time, the Turkish Government is so little mindful of its interest not to offend Christian powers at this moment, or so powerless to enforce its own orders, that your Excellency was compelled, on the 22d ultimo, and again on the 4th instant, to address to the Porte an energetic remonstrance *against the rapine, the exactions, and the cruelties, to which its Christian subjects were exposed.*

"It is evident, then, that imminent and daily increasing perils menace, not alone the authority of the Sultan, but the very existence of the Turkish empire; and there is too much reason to fear that the number and the intensity of these perils must be increased by delay in putting an end to the state of things which your Excellency has so powerfully described. But it is from England and France alone that Turkey can look for active sympathy and support. In the event of a struggle, all other powers would be found neutral, or would become hostile: and if England and France were now prepared to run the risks of an European war, and to disregard the commercial, the social, and the political disasters it would entail; if they were prepared, in short, as your Excellency says, to stop at no sacrifice for the object they have on view, there is little doubt that they would *cripple the resources of Russia*, and that, on the signature of peace, it is more than probable that the exclusion of that power from the Greek Protectorate and from the Principalities would be secured. *Russia would be effectually repelled, but Turkey in the meanwhile might be irretrievably ruined, and we might then find it impossible to restore her integrity, or to maintain her independence.*

"To protect Turkey against foreign aggression is the interest of England and France; nor would the task present any insurmountable difficulty, but both might find themselves powerless to guard Turkey *against those elements of internal dissolution which now appear to constitute her greatest danger.* There is no doubt that Russia, while she pretends to wish for the maintenance of the Turkish empire, has, in her late measures, calculated on these causes of internal dissolution, and, perhaps, hastened their operation.

"Her Majesty's Government are well aware that the resources of Turkey are great, and that hitherto they have been but partially explored; but

they fear that their further development, or the adoption of those reforms which your Excellency has so long and so judiciously recommended, would be improbable during a time that the Sultan was engaged in war with a foreign power, and his European provinces were reduced to a state bordering on anarchy ; and which, even now, compels your Excellency to contemplate, as stated in your despatch of the 7th instant, the necessity of calling up the British fleet, not for the purpose of repelling a Russian attack upon Constantinople, but in order to protect the Christians from an intended rising of the Mahommedans against them.

"It is not, then, because we have any doubt that the policy of Russia has been unjust and ungenerous, and is indefensible ; it is not alone because we think that war is a calamity ; but it is because we believe that war would be an additional danger to Turkey, that her Majesty's Government are determined to preserve peace by every means consistent with the national honour, and the maintenance of that principle for which we have been contending in Turkey. And, in this respect, their opinions are strengthened by of your Excellency, upon whose judgment, experience, and accurate information, her Majesty's Government place the fullest reliance.

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"Her Majesty's Government have entirely approved the course pursued by your Excellency in resisting the unjust claims of Russia, and maintaining the principle of Turkish independence ; and, in the event of any further act of aggression by Russia, or of undue delay on her part in accepting the terms for an amicable arrangement that may be proposed to her, her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of France, will be prepared to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey against a power of whose hostile designs there will then exist no reasonable doubt.

"I am, &c.

(Signed)

"CLARENDON."

The next authority for the demoralized and decayed state of Turkey is that of the Sultan himself. It will scarcely be disputed.

"Constantinople, Sept. 7th.

"This afternoon all the civil and military authorities, the chiefs of the Christian and other communities, were invited to rendezvous at the Porte, to be present at the reading of an imperial *hatti-kumayoun*. About 400 persons were admitted to the grand hall, where the Minister for Foreign Affairs solemnly and distinctly read the Sultan's order, of which the following is a literal translation :—

"MY ESTEEMED GRAND VIZIR,—It is unnecessary for me to impress upon you the advantages of the welfare of our populations and the prosperity of our states. Indeed, the institution of the glorious Gulhané Charta was for this purpose ; but I regret to state, that, notwithstanding the soundness of the enunciated principles, *the general rules of the Tanzimat have not been put into execution. The administration of our states is impure, and*

evidently ill-managed ; consequently, contrary to my expectations. It has now reached its climax, and to ameliorate this state of things is an imperious necessity. It is well to know that the reason our intentions are not enforced is owing to a nefarious system of bribery ; and this continuing, whatever efforts are attempted, however useful and requisite they may be, will never be of utility. 1st. To obviate this it is necessary to establish a new code, such as can not be modified according to the will of influential persons, which will completely destroy the past ill system of administration. This must be brought on regularly, and with due regard to the true principles of justice. 2d. The articles of this projected code must be strictly enforced, so as to give power, and increase the authority of local governors. 3d. Internal prosperity, and the security of the property of our subjects, must be looked into. 4th. Justice and equity must be enforced. 5th. Our financial resources must be concentrated and cared for. 6th. The amelioration of the political and social state of all our subjects, no matter what creed they belong to, must be effected.

“ ‘ These reforms are most necessary, and the greatest attention must be most scrupulously paid, in order that no flaws should exist,’ ” &c.

The next authority to be referred to is Mr. Layard. His accounts are so important that they are quoted, and in his own words, at greater length than the limits of this work can well afford. In vain he can try to escape, as he has tried to do, by saying that his worst case was not the act of his Turkish friends, but by a Kurdish refractory chief. The horrid acts were perpetrated within the Turkish dominions, while Osman Pasha was after much delay sent to punish the chief, who, after defeating him, suffered him, and for reasons well known to himself, to capitulate and retire to whatever place he might choose that was satisfactory to the Sultan. With his family and wealth he was sent to Candia. Again, we have from Mr. Layard an account of the state of things in that part of Asiatic Turkey, which shows the ferocity and cunning of the Turkish character, and of which he was an eye-witness. It was an attack made upon the poor Yesides, by the pasha of Mosul. During the attack the cadî stood with the Koran in his hand, but at a safe distance, urging the troops to destroy the enemies of the true faith. After repeated assaults, and when they could not dislodge them from their mountain fastnesses, he counselled the pasha to get them to capitulate, and that when once in his power, he might, according to the laws of the Koran, lawfully put them to death ; because, by acting so, he only adopted the most prudent course to get the enemies of their faith into his power ; and, from their being unbelievers, no agreement that had previously been made with them for safety was in any way binding.¹

¹ Layard's Nineveh, page 194.

It may be observed, that it might have been supposed that a gentleman who had rendered himself so justly celebrated, and so well known, by digging up the monuments of Divine vengeance, and proofs of the certainty of his threatenings and punishment of guilty nations, amidst the ruins of Nineveh, would have been the last to have overlooked or forgotten to consider, in his references to Mahomedan Turkey, the terrible and certain fate of an empire, which, like the cruel and despotic and military Assyrian empire, had so long blasphemed his name, and oppressed and tyrannised over helpless millions of men who bore the Christian name, and acknowledged and worshipped the Redeemer of the world. In the fortune and end of the proud Assyrian empire, we read the pronounced, and determined, and certain doom of the decayed Turkish power, and the great Mahomedan delusion and blasphemy; but a brief period of legislative and party warfare, and Foreign Office tuition—into the recesses of which considerations of the kind never enter—has made Mr. Layard forget the judgments, and the effects of those judgments, which he has so graphically described, in the wreck of mighty and guilty empires. Still, that cannot turn aside the outstretched arm of Omnipotence, when he arises to judgment.

“It may be remembered that Beder Khan Bey, in 1843, invaded the Tiyari districts, massacred in cold blood nearly 10,000 of their inhabitants, and carried away as slaves a large number of women and children. But it is, perhaps, not generally known that the release of the greater part of the captives was obtained through the humane interference and generosity of Sir Stratford Canning, who prevailed upon the Porte to send a commissioner into Kurdistan, for the purpose of inducing Beder Khan Bey, and other Kurdish chiefs, to give up the slaves they had taken, and advance himself a considerable sum towards their liberation. Mr. Rassam also obtained the release of many slaves, and maintained and clothed, at his own expense, and for several months, not only the Nestorian Patriarch, who had taken refuge in Mosul, but many hundred Chaldeans, who had escaped from the mountains.”—*Page 175.*

“On the morning following our arrival, I went with Yakoub Rais to visit the village. The trees and luxuriant crops had concealed the desolation of the place, and had given to Ashutha from without a flourishing appearance. As I wandered, however, through the lanes, I found little but ruins. A few houses were rising from the charred heaps; still, the greater part of the sites were without owners, the whole family having perished. Yakoub pointed out, as we went along, the former dwellings of wealthy inhabitants, and told me how and when they had been murdered. A solitary church had been built since the massacre; the foundations of others were seen through the ruins. The pathways were still blocked up by

trunks of trees cut down by the Kurds. Water-courses, once carrying fertility to many gardens, were now empty and dry, and the lands which they had irrigated were left naked and unsown."—*Page 177.*

"Dr. Grant, who published an account of his visit to the mountains, fell a victim to his humane zeal for the Chaldeans, in 1844. After the massacre, his house in Mosul was filled with fugitives, whom he supported and clothed. Their sufferings, and the want of common necessities before they reached the town, had brought on a malignant typhus fever, of which many died, and which Dr. Grant caught whilst attending the sick in his house. Mosul holds the remains of most of those who were engaged in the American Missions to the Chaldeans.

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"Yakoub Rais, who was naturally of a lively and jovial disposition, could not restrain his tears as he related to me the particulars of the massacre. He had been amongst the first seized by Beder Khan Bey, and having been kept by the chief as a kind of hostage, he had been continually with him, during the attack on the Tiyyari, and had witnessed all the scenes of bloodshed which he so graphically described. The descent upon Ashutha was sudden and unexpected. The greater part of the inhabitants fell victims to the fury of the Kurds, who endeavoured to destroy every trace of the village. We walked to the church, which had been newly constructed by the united exertions and labour of the people. The door was so low that a person, on entering, had to perform the feat of bringing his back on the level of his knees. The entrances of Christian churches in the East are generally so constructed, that horses and beasts of burden may not be lodged there by the Mahomedans. A few rituals, a book of prayer, and the Scriptures, all in manuscript, were lying upon the rude altar; but the greater part of the leaves were wanting, and those which remained were either torn into shreds, or disfigured by damp and water. The manuscripts of the churches were hid in the mountains, or buried in some secure place, at the time of the massacre, and, as the priests who had concealed them were mostly killed, the books have not been restored. A few English prints and handkerchiefs were hanging about the walls; a bottle and a glass, with a tin plate, for the sacrament, stood upon a table; a curtain of coarse cloth hung before the inner recess, the holy of holies; and these were all the ornaments and furniture of the place."—*Page 182.*

"Everywhere, except Zawertha, the churches had been destroyed to their foundations, and the priests put to death. Some of the holy edifices had been rudely rebuilt, but the people were unwilling to use them until they had been consecrated by the Patriarch."—*Page 185.*

"Yakoub pointed out a spot where above 300 persons had been murdered in cold blood, and all our party had some tale of horror to relate. Muzghie was not less desolate than Miniyanish, and eight houses alone had

been resought by their owners. We found an old priest, blind and grey, bowed down by age and grief, the solitary survivor of six or eight of his order. He was seated under the shade of a walnut-tree, near a small stream. Some children of the village were feeding him with grapes, and on our approach his daughter ran into the half-ruined cottage, and brought out a basket of fruit and a loaf of garas bread. I endeavoured to glean some information from the old man as to the state of his flock, but his mind wandered to the cruelties of the Kurds, or dwelt upon the misfortunes of his Patriarch. None of our party being able to console him, I gave some handkerchiefs to his daughter, and we resumed our journey."—*Page 188.*

"Lezan stands on the river Zab, which is crossed by a rude bridge. I need not weary or distress the reader by a description of desolation and misery, hardly concealed by the most luxuriant vegetation. We rode to the graveyard of a roofless church, slowly rising from its ruins, the first edifice in the village to be rebuilt. We spread our carpets amongst the tombs, for as yet there were no inhabitable houses. The Melek, with the few who had survived the massacre, was living during the day under the trees, and sleeping at night on stages of grass and boughs, raised on high poles, fixed in the very bed of the Zab.

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"It was near Lizan that occurred one of the most terrible incidents of the massacre. Crossing the gullies to secure a footing, or carried down by the stones which we put in motion as we advanced, we soon saw evidences of the slaughter. At first a solitary skull rolling down the rubbish, then heaps of blanched bones, further up fragments of rotten garments. As we advanced, these remains became more frequent; skeletons, almost entire, still hung to the dwarf shrubs. I was soon compelled to renounce my attempt to count them. As we approached the wall of rock, the declivity became covered with bones mingled with the long plaited tresses of the women, shreds of discoloured linen, and well-worn shoes. There were skulls of all ages, from the child unborn to the toothless old man. We could not avoid treading on the bones as we advanced, and rolling them with the loose stones into the valley below. 'This is nothing,' exclaimed my guide, who observed me gazing with wonder on those miserable heaps; 'they are but the remains of those who were thrown from above, or sought to escape the sword by jumping from the rock. Follow me.' He sprang upon a ledge running along the precipice that rose before us.

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"When the fugitives who had escaped from Ashutha spread the news of the massacre through the valley of Lizari, the inhabitants of the villages around collected such part of their property as they could carry, and took refuge on the platform I have just described on the rock above, hoping thus to escape the notice of the Kurds, or to be able to defend against any numbers a place almost inaccessible. Women and children concealed themselves in a spot which the mountain goat could scarcely reach, as well as men.

Beder Khan Bey was not long in discovering their retreat ; but being unable to force it, he surrounded it with his men, and waited until they should be compelled to yield. The weather was hot and sultry, and the Christians had brought but small supplies of water and provisions ; after three days the first began to fail them, and they offered to capitulate. The terms proposed by Beder Khan Bey, and *ratified by an oath on the Koran*, were the surrender of their arms and property. The Kurds were then admitted to the platform. After they had taken the arms from their prisoners, they commenced an indiscriminate slaughter, until, weary of raising their weapons, they hurled the few survivors into the Zab below. Out of nearly 1,000 souls who are said to have congregated here, only one escaped.

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" But, before leaving Lizari, I must mention the heroic devotion of the Tiyari girls, from the village of Lersputho, who, as they were led across the bridge by the Kurds on their return from the great massacre, preferring death to captivity and conversion, threw themselves into the Zab, and were drowned in its waters."—*Page 194.*

"The following day being Sunday, we were roused at dawn to attend the service of the church. The two priests officiated in white surplices. The ceremonies were short and simple. A portion of Scripture was read, and then interpreted by Kasha Hormuzd in the dialect in use in the mountains, few understanding the Chaldean of the books. His companion chanted the prayers, the congregation kneeling or standing, and joining in the responses. There were no idle forms or salutations ; the people used the sign of the cross when entering, and bowed when the name of Christ occurred in the prayers. The sacrament was administered to all present, men, women, and children, partaking of the bread and wine, and my companion receiving it amongst the rest. They were disposed to feel hurt at my declining to join them, until I explained that I did not refuse from any religious prejudice. When the service was ended, the congregation embraced one another as a symbol of brotherly love and concord, and left the church. I could not but contrast these simple and primitive rites with the senseless mimicry and degrading forms of worship adopted by the converted Chaldeans at the plains—the unadorned and imageless walls, with the hideous pictures and monstrous deformities which encumber the churches of Mosul."—*Page 202.*

"Mr. Ainsworth, writing of Kasha Kana, of Lizari, observes that he resembles, in manners and appearance, an English clergyman."—*Page 212.*

"We stopped to breakfast at Gunduzktha, and saw the Meleks at Ikhome Gowaia. The people of this village had felt much anxiety on our account, as the Mutesellim had passed the night there, and had used violent threats against us. I heard that he was going to Chal to settle some differences which had arisen between the Kurds of that district and of Hakkari, and that

Bircham had been sent to Ikhoma by Mur-Allah Bey, to withdraw his family and friends; 'for this time,' said the chief, 'Beder Khan Bey intends to finish with the Christians, and will not make slaves for consuls and Turks to liberate.'—*Page 215.*

"An hour's rapid descent brought us to the Tiyari village of Be-Alatha, a heap of ruins, on the opposite sides of the valley. The few surviving inhabitants were in extreme poverty, and the small-pox was raging amongst them. The water-courses destroyed by the Kurds had not been repaired, and the fields were mostly uncultivated. Even the church had not yet been rebuilt; and as the trees which were cut down were still lying across the road, and the charred timber still encumbered the gardens, the place had a most desolate appearance. We were hospitably received by a shanasha or deacon, whose children, suffering from the prevailing disease, and covered with discoloured blains, crowded into the only small room of the wretched cottage. Women and children, disfigured by the malignant fever, came to me for medicines, but it was beyond my power to relieve them. Our host, as well as the rest of the inhabitants, was in extreme poverty. Even a little garas and rancid butter could with difficulty be collected by contributions from all the houses, and I was at a loss to discover how the people of Be-Alatha lived. Yet the deacon was cheerful and contented, dwelling with resignation upon the misfortunes that had befallen his village, and the misery of his family."—*Page 217.*

"The villages in the valley of the Zab had suffered more from the Kurds than any other part of Tiyari. Chouba was almost deserted, its houses and churches a mass of ruins, and its gardens and orchards uncultivated and neglected. There was no roof under which we could pass the night, and we were obliged to spread our carpets under a cluster of walnut-trees, near a clear and abundant spring. Under these trees was pitched the tent of Beder Khan Bey after the great massacre, and here he received Melek Ismail, when delivered a prisoner into his hands. Yakoub, who had been present at the murder of the unfortunate chief of Tiyari, thus described the event. After performing prodigies of valour, and heading his people in their defence of the pass which led into the upper districts, Melek Ismail, his thigh broken by a musket-ball, was carried by a few followers to a cavern in a secluded ravine, where he might have escaped the search of his enemies, had not a woman, to save her life, betrayed his retreat. He was dragged down the mountain with savage exultation, and brought before Beder Khan Bey. Here he fell upon the ground. 'Wherefore does the infidel sit before me?' exclaimed the ferocious chief, who had seen his broken limb; 'and what dog is this that has dared to shed the blood of true believers?' 'Ah, Mir,' replied Melek Ismail, still undaunted, and trying to raise himself, 'this arm has taken the lives of nearly twenty Kurds, and had God spared me, as many more would have fallen by it.' Beder Khan Bey arose and walked to the Zab, making a sign to his attendants that they should bring the Melek to him. By his direction they held the Christian

chief over the river, and severing his head from his body with a dagger, cast them into a stream.

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"The reader may desire to learn the fate of Ikhoma. A few days after my return to Mosul, notwithstanding the attempts of Taliyari Pasha to avert the calamity, Beder Khan Bey marched through the Tiyyari mountains, levying contributions on the tribes, and plundering the villages on his way to the unfortunate district. The inhabitants of Ikhoma, headed by their Meleks, made some resistance, but were soon overpowered by numbers. An indiscriminate massacre took place. The women were brought before the chief, and murdered in cold blood. Those who attempted to escape were cut off. Three hundred women and children, who were flying to Baz, were killed in the pass I have described. The principal villages, with their gardens, were destroyed, and the churches were pulled down. Nearly half the population fell victims to the fanatical fury of the Kurdish chief; amongst these were one of the Meleks and Kasha Bodara. With this good priest, and Kasha Auraham, perished the most learned of the Nestorian clergy; and Kasha Kana is the last who has inherited any part of the knowledge and zeal which once so eminently distinguished the Chaldean priesthood.

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After Beder Khan Bey had retired from Ikhoma, a few of the surviving inhabitants returned to their ruined villages, but Mur-Allah Bey, suspecting that they knew of concealed property, fell suddenly upon them. Many died under the tortures to which they were exposed, and the rest, as soon as they were released, fled into Persia. This flourishing district was thus destroyed, and it will be long ere its cottages again rise from their ruins, and the fruits of patient toil again clothe the sides of its valleys."—*Page 240.*

The next authority to be quoted is one that will, in the details it gives, scarcely be discredited, namely, F. A. Neale, Esq., formerly belonging to the consular establishment in Turkey. His feelings are anti-Russian in the extreme, and those too by no means expressed in a proper style on the part of any one, but still less by one who had been an accredited public servant. Can anything be worse than his description of the present state of that distracted, degraded, and blinded country? The limits allotted to this work compel me to be content with the following extracts from his small work, entitled "*TURKEY REDEEMED.*"

"The knife, the sack, the cord, and poison; these were watchwords amongst the Turks; these were the means that were resorted to for the accomplishment and gratification of even the smallest desires; these the instruments to satisfy jealousy or revenge, to remove stumbling-blocks to

acquire wealth or power, no matter what amount of life was sacrificed for their attainment."—*Page 10.*

"A taxation which is terrible to them all falls all the heavier upon the Christians, because, in addition to the taxes levied upon all Ottoman subjects, they are, after the age of fourteen, subjected to a capitation tax, besides being very mercilessly exposed to the impositions and cruelties of a set of ravenous wolves, hangers-on of the Mulzellem, who, receiving neither stipend nor board, are permitted, in consideration of their services, to prey upon the Christians of the surrounding villages; pouncing down upon them like vultures at all seasons of the year, carrying off their poultry, their donkeys, their grain, their silk, and, if they have any, their money; sometimes adding the grossest insults to the injuries inflicted, and meeting the slightest resistance with blows and even imprisonment. They have no hope of redress. The Mulzellem will listen to no complaint against his people, unless that complaint be supported by a consul, and then the testimony of Christians is rejected. If a peasant therefore complains, all he gets for his trouble is the bastinado or imprisonment, and their only hope for security is the privilege, enjoyed by a few, of being protected by European consuls, or the minor privilege of being employed upon the grounds of some wealthy Turkish effendi or ayau, who, though he fleeces his own peasantry unmercifully, takes good care that no one else shall with impunity interfere with them.

"The result of all this is, that the Rayah population are reduced to the most abject serfdom. They can hardly call their souls their own; and though their wives and children are never put up to auction and sold, they are virtually at the power of the landholder; for, being stripped by taxation, by imposts upon the products of the earth, and by vile rogues and understrappers, the peasant and his wife are reduced to the necessity of working hard all the days of their life; toiling day and night, rearing splendid crops of silk and wheat, and yet in the East, when settling day comes, finding himself under the dreadful necessity of augmenting an already oppressive debt by a fresh loan from his master, at such exorbitant rates as range from 30 to 40 per cent. per annum. Yearly this debt increases, and when spent with toil, and worn out prematurely, the peasant is buried away out of sight; he dies under the conviction that his son and his son's successors, through many generations after his demise, will yet remain firmly enchained in the thralldom of debts, slaves of the same iniquitous landholder and his successors.

"This has been the position of the Christian peasantry in Turkey through centuries; this is their present miserable position, notwithstanding many worthy efforts at reform on the part of the Sultan; and this will be their doom to the end of the chapter, until the aspirations of Russia be silenced, and the only hope for Turkey be realised. What plans that hope is based upon we shall hereafter fully describe."—*Page 14, &c.*

"In cases pending between Turks and Christians they repudiate the

testimony of the latter, and they are invariably privy to the most infamous transactions between landholders and peasants, and between the Government and their much-oppressed serfs. Transfers of valuable property, at strictly nominal prices, are recorded in the archives of their offices, and legalized by their seals; false witnesses and false signatures duly registered; and, as a matter of course, for these convenient and obliging offices they are richly bribed by those who reap the benefit of their villany. These, then, are another source of persecution to the poorer inhabitants of Turkey; and even the wealthier Christians are deterred from speculating in commerce or the cultivation of land, from the iniquitous proceeding of these officials, and from the certainty, that so sure as prosperity beams upon them, success crowns their undertaking in commerce, or a rich harvest their painstaking in agriculture, so surely will the powerful arm of the oppressor descend weightily upon them, and expose them to every persecution that a cruel despotism could impose. But even pashas, cadis, &c., are a trivial evil when compared with the nobles and gentry of the land."—*Page 17.*

"These rebels possessed themselves of some of the most fertile tracts in Syria. Many of these tracts were then a barren waste, some few of them were in a high state of cultivation; the latter were respectively the properties of various landholders—Turks, Christians, and Ansarii, amongst whom it was divided; the former virtually the property of the crown. The dealings of these rebel chiefs with regard to the latter were summarily executed. Unhappy landlords were arrested on fictitious charges, fabricated and supported by hired perjurers. The chief held the administration of justice in his own hands, and appeal there was none. The victim had therefore only the option of being executed as a felon, and then having the whole of his property confiscated, or else to make a virtue of necessity, and offer gratuitously to make over his lands by regular deeds to the oppressor; in which case he at least had life and the means of earning a scanty livelihood afforded him, serving upon his own property as the slave of an iniquitous landlord. In carrying out this system of infamous extortion, every conceivable device was framed and resorted to; amongst others, the digging up of freshly interred bodies and mutilating them, so that, they being found upon the grounds of some unhappy planter, suspicion might be brought to bear upon him. But if dead bodies were scarce, living ones were plentiful, and murder was a deed familiar to the perjured wretches, who executed and plotted for their despotic chiefs deeds of infamy unparalleled in any other history, save that only of the Inquisition of frightful memory. By this plan of systematic plunder, the wealthiest proprietors of silk-gardens and corn-fields were the first reduced to needy want; the downfall of the others soon followed. The whole province became virtually the property of the iniquitous chiefs; and these chiefs dying left them to be divided amongst their sons and daughters, who, in coming of age, acknowledged nominally the Sultan's authority."—*Page 18, &c.*

"It is a dangerous and very perilous affair, indeed, to have any misunderstanding or disputes with these powerful and rascally *ayaus*. A better proof of their power and infamy I cannot adduce than the murder, two years ago, of my humble friend, Padre Bazilio, the Roman Catholic priest at Antioch, where I had resided as neighbour to both murderer and murdered, through a period of eight months. The priest was a most inoffensive man, and the *ayau*, at whose instigation the dark deed was perpetrated, notoriously a wealthy but most covetous monster. Apart from his fanatical hate for the poor priest's garb—and the greatest fanatics are usually the greatest ruffians amongst the Turks—I say, apart from this, his avarice had been tempted by hearsay."—*Page 21.*

"So he set his men to work, and they effectually accomplished the deed; on this occasion, however, bringing down a storm upon his head, such as no *ayau* had ever before experienced, because the victim was a European, and protected by the French consulate, and the French consul at Aleppo happened to be a most determined man, who never rested until he had sifted the matter to the bottom. Had it been a native Christian, or fellah, the affair would have been hushed up immediately, as thousands of such affairs have been, before now, hushed up in Turkey. These are the *beys* and *ayaus* that hold supreme sway over the oppressed natives in every *pashalik* belonging to the Ottoman empire, except, perhaps, those which from their vicinity are under immediate influence of the reforms introduced by Abdul-Medjid at Constantinople."—*Page 22.*

"At the Bab Bolus, or St. Paul's Gate, the only exit or entrance for travellers from Antioch to Alexandretta and Suedia, guards are stationed at all these points; and the poor peasant, who has already been subjected to the payment of *disme* upon his silk, besides fees to government officers who certify the weight, &c., is again forced to pay a most iniquitous impost levied upon raw material reared in the Sultan's dominions, and being transported only from one town to another in the Ottoman dominions. These imposts are so frequent and exorbitant, that no peasant ever ventures, at his own risk or cost, to transport the produce of one town to another when the market price might favour him, and where he would sell his silk for nearly double the valuation he is forced to accept in his own town or village; the duties are so heavy, the expenses of journeyings to and fro, and the labour and the loss of time, place such an effort to benefit himself out of the poor man's reach."—*Page 27.*

"Of grain, only in later years any has been exported, saving from the Black Sea. In Syria, all the cultivated corn-fields are the property of the *ayaus*, who are possessed of immense granaries and warehouses, where they heap up the annual crops to be retailed to the inhabitants, or sent inland on camels' backs; but, even at the dearest of seasons, bread is always a cheap article, excepting only in seasons of downright drought; and then the misery entailed is beyond conception terrible. Of course, the *beys* and *ayaus* are not the men likely to be moved to pity by the abject misery and starvation that surrounds them. These are a pleasant theme to their sordid

and avaricious souls, and they turn every ache in the wearied limbs of the starving to some good account to themselves. So long as gold is to be had, they will have ; then money of any denomination ; then the trinkets of wives and daughters ; then horses, mules, and poultry ; then documents guaranteeing the fruit of all land for half-a-dozen years to come ; and when all these resources have failed, you may starve, you may die in a ditch, and be left to the dogs or jackals, for all they care.”—*Pages 31, 32.*

We come next to the volume technically called the “Greek Papers.” These afford us equally gloomy, if not even more appalling pictures:—

Page 61, Inclosure No. 60.—Proclamation.

[TRANSLATION.]

“To all Greeks and Philhellenists, believers in Christ, throughout the world. In the name of Almighty God.

“The cruel bondage under which we, the population of Grecian Epirus, have laboured for upwards of four centuries, is not unknown to the sovereigns and people of Christendom. Tyrannical fury has spared neither life nor property, nor left us any kind of liberty. God created us men in his own image and similitude, whereas we are treated as beasts. The temples of our ancestral faith have been a thousand times impiously polluted and despoiled, the graves of our fathers opened, and their bones frequently cast into the fire ; the honour of our wives and children continually outraged, so that our breath alone remains to us, and that but to augment our sufferings. Our voice and language only avail us to appeal and protest against such impious acts of the infidels ; latterly, since the differences on the Russo-Turkish question, the oppressions towards us Christians have been multiplied. Cumulated oppressions, insults, and dishonour, sacrifice of life without end, spoliation upon spoliation, and all the direful woes of Hades itself, are written in our book of life.

“For these and other like reasons, which words cannot describe, we have resolved to peril all for the common weal, and either bury ourselves under the ruins of our country, or live for the future as men breathing in freedom the sweet air of liberty ; wherefore we consider it our first duty to proclaim this our resolve to the whole world, and to invoke the aid and the succour of all retainers of the Gospel and liberty without exception. Hasten, sons of Christianity ! hasten friends of freedom ! embrace our cause, assist our struggle, which, with the divine aid terminating successfully, will be regarded as a triumph of Christianity over unbelievers. Hasten, first of all, ye our Grecian brothers ! Remember, remember, that the free land ye now tread, we formerly bathed and consecrated with our blood. Feel, moreover, especially, ye sons of Epirus, and of other parts of enslaved Greece, that our country suffers, and summons you to her aid. Hasten, sons of liberty and glory, hasten ! our voice is the voice of our whole country. Do not permit history to proclaim hereafter that you hesitate to join in the glorious struggle. Ye Turks, likewise, living in Epirus and

elsewhere, unite with us in the cause of freedom, and we guarantee you security of life, honour, and property. Our struggle is not to avenge the oppressions which we and our unhappy ancestors have suffered from your progenitors and yourselves, but for liberty and equality. Unite, then, with us, that you may not be deprived of all that your brethren have lost in free Greece. Our struggle is for liberty and equality. Your faith shall be unmolested and inviolate, your lives and honour secure, your property safe. Unite, then, with us.

“From the Epirate Camp,

“THE PEOPLE OF EPIRUS.

“January 1st, 1854.”

Page 80, No. 74.—*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

“Foreign Office, March 3d, 1854.

“MY LORD,—It appears from a despatch, dated the 6th of February, which I have received from Mr. Consul Saunders, that the insurrectionary movement in Albania has been not a little favoured by the culpable conduct of the Dervend Aga of Radovitzi, Suleiman Bey, in allowing a band of brigands to frequent the district, in the expectation, as it would seem, of deriving pecuniary advantage from the increased military force which the existence of disturbances in his district gave him a pretext for maintaining. The brigands thus connived at soon increased in numbers, and gained entire possession of the district, compelling the Turkish authorities to withdraw, resisting an armed force sent against them, and ultimately firmly establishing themselves in a strong position not far from Arta.

“To the encouragement thus given to a band of brigands, the insurrection which now prevails in the neighbouring districts seems, in a great measure, to be attributable; and I have to instruct your Excellency, with reference to this matter, to observe to Reschid Pasha that it is useless to call upon the Greek Government not to promote insurrection in Turkey, if that insurrection is caused by the corruption and neglect of Turkish authorities.

“Your Excellency will further point out to Reschid Pasha, that it is essential that some regular troops should be sent to the Greek frontier.

“I am, &c.

(Signed)

“CLARENDON.”

Page 83, No. 78.—*Consul Saunders to the Earl of Clarendon (received March 6th).*

“Prevesa, Feb. 23, 1854.

“Notwithstanding the intimation received from Arta, that the population of the Christian villages of the plains had hitherto taken no part with the insurgents, and the judicious counsel given that, under these circumstances, they should not be molested by the Arnauts on their march, nothing could serve to restrain the ferocity of the latter, the villages being completely devastated, and the inhabitants forced to seek safety in flight.

"The natural consequence of these outrages has been to compel all who had hitherto held back, in the hope of avoiding persecution by their peaceable demeanour, to take up arms to repel any further advance of the remaining body of Arnaouts, whose progress was likely to be marked with similar ravages."

Page 84.

"The reports received from the British consular agent at Artá describe the ravages committed there by the newly arrived Arnaout force, and the perilous position of the Christian population. These Arnaouts, having volunteered to serve for one month without pay, have no hesitation in avowing that plunder is their principal object, nor does it seem very certain whether they will be induced to remain any longer, when there may appear but little prospect of securing further booty. Meanwhile, alarming threats are continually uttered, of a general massacre of the Greeks in the principal towns.

(Signed) "SYDNEY SMITH SAUNDERS."

Page 92, Inclosure in No. 87.

"Intelligence has been received that, in consequence of the devastations committed by the first body of Arnaouts in the villages along the line of march, which had not hitherto taken any part with the insurgents, the population had risen in arms to resist the advance of the remaining body, which had been compelled to fall back at Louro, after encountering a vigorous resistance at Canza. The villages of Luka are supposed to have taken part in this affair."

*Page 102, No. 99.—Consul Saunders to the Earl of Clarendon,
(received March 20th).*

"Prevesa, March 9th, 1854.

"Your Lordship must be so fully aware of the prevailing distrust of all Turkish declarations, that I need hardly observe that the most important element towards assuring the Christian subjects of the Porte of the benevolent intentions manifested on their behalf, would be the early announcement of some definite arrangement with the Porte establishing the basis of future concessions; the more especially as a very general impression prevails that, while the circumstances of the moment may be urged as a reasonable pretext for present delay, such concessions may possibly never be assented to at all, if left for discussion hereafter, when the Porte shall find itself relieved from the pressure of existing embarrassments."

*Page 127, No. 126.—Consul Saunders to the Earl of Clarendon
(received March 28th).*

"Prevesa, March 18th, 1854.

"Fuad Effendi having signified his concurrence in these views, I went, in company with Haereddin Bey, to Filiates in the first instance, where

hostilities had commenced between the Mussulman population of the town and a large number of Christian villages around, three of which had been entirely laid waste by the former, in conjunction with their associates from the neighbouring parts, and many unoffending victims being sacrificed, whose heads were displayed as trophies, appended to a tree in the market-place."

Page 152, Inclosure 3 in No. 141.—Consul Saunders to Sir Henry Ward.

"Prevesa, March 30th, 1854.

"From the details so obtained I learn that the town of Paramithia, and a considerable number of Christian villages of that and the adjacent districts, have been plundered, and in many instances burnt to the ground, by the Mussulman Albanians, under the command of certain chiefs whose names are known; that churches and monasteries had been pillaged and laid waste; women and children carried away captive; a vast amount of cattle and other property conveyed to distant parts; and many individuals, particularly old men, helpless infants, and females, tortured and slain in a manner too brutal to describe.

"Haereddin Bey appears to have done all in his power to put a stop to these outrages; and succeeded in liberating several of the captives aforesaid, at Paramithia and Margariti. His exertions, however, to this effect, excited so much enmity against him, that he is said to have been fired at by the Arnauts of Cuzzi and Massarachi; so that, unable to exercise any further control, he had found himself compelled to return hither to report to Fuad Effendi the scandalous proceedings he had witnessed."

Page 153.

"Your Excellency may well conceive that the natural result of these proceedings has been, to counteract all the efforts making to induce the Christians to rely upon the promises of protection and security held out to them,—the most peaceful being selected in preference for pillage; and the villagers, deprived of a home, being driven to seek shelter in the ranks of the insurgents."

Page 154, No. 142.—Mr. Wyse to the Earl of Clarendon (received April 11th).

"Athens, March 31st, 1854.

"A far more dangerous principle of disaster, is the conduct of the Turkish troops themselves. Both in Epirus and Thessaly the irregulars have committed, wherever employed, great excesses; they avenge on the peaceable the loss they suffer from the insurgent Greeks. The soldiers turbulent, the chiefs divided, all greedy after plunder of friend or foe, they are less likely to suppress insurrection in progress, than to provoke it where it has not appeared, or to justify it where it has. Mr. Vice-Consul Suter found Arta, on his arrival there lately, in a most deplorable state; town and inhabitants had been almost entirely ruined by the ravages and

outrages of all descriptions of their supposed defenders, and the people were in constant fear of their lives, until Fuad Effendi sent these Albanians away, and had them replaced by the regular troops just arrived from Constantinople. On reaching Parga they committed still greater atrocities in that neighbourhood. Four Christian villages were plundered and destroyed, and the inhabitants (who had not revolted), with great circumstances of cruelty, were put to the sword. A similar state of things exists in Thessaly. The Turkish, as well as the Christian inhabitants, between the two evils of the attacking insurgent and defending irregular forces, know not what to choose. The Turkish landed proprietors say, that if the Sultan and his allies cannot protect their lives, families, and property, they must fly to those who can, and accept terms from the Greeks, who proclaim that they do not come for plunder, or to trample on their religion, but to liberate them, as well as the Christians, from an unjust and oppressive rule. Regular troops have, it is true, been latterly substituted by the Turkish Government, and more (4,000 men) are promised from Constantinople. But these troops labour at the outset under disadvantages ; they are unacquainted with the country, are regarded with jealousy by the irregulars as interlopers, and adopt a system the reverse of that of the insurgents ; they fight in the plain, whilst the latter take advantage of the shelter of bushes and rocks, in this desultory guerilla warfare—points all in favour of the insurgents.”

Page 163, No. 148, Inclosure 1.—Consul Blunt to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

“ Larissa, March 18th, 1854.

“ The conduct of the irregulars is loudly complained of. At Volos, one of them beat the captain of the Turkish brig of war upon that station ; the man was demanded by the Kaimacam ; the rest took to their arms, threatening to shoot any one who approached them. At a village near Gurdiza, they cut a poor old woman of sixty years of age to pieces. At the same place, or near it, one of them shot a baker through the arm, because he would not change a false five-piastre piece. The acts of these men are enough to drive any people to desperation ; but I must add, that it is principally the Gegga Albanians who give the most cause of complaint. I have not heard a word against those in the service of the Lallai chief, Abbas Aga, who has taken up money at interest to pay his men.”

Page 164, Inclosure 2 in No. 148.—Consul Blunt to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

“ Larissa, March 21st, 1854.

“ Begging leave to refer you to what I stated in my despatch of the 18th instant, respecting the conduct of the irregular troops, I must now add, that, if the Porte does not immediately send to Thessaly a sufficient force of regular troops to both disarm and relieve the country of these wild Albanians, both Turks and Christians, but particularly the former, will seek the protection of the insurgents, who have made public declara-

tions that they respect both property and religions, and that they are acting by the advice, and with the aid, of the British and French Governments, to liberate all the inhabitants from the bad and cruel administration of the Ottoman authorities.

* * * *

"We believe what you say, for we have known you so many years; but if the Porte does not immediately send regular troops for our protection against the irregulars, we shall be forced to call upon the insurgents to drive them out of the country. We pay our taxes, and have a right to protection; but if neither the Sultan nor his allies can give us security for our lives, our families, or our property, we must seek it from those who are both at hand and ready to do so.

* * * *

"I am happy to say there have been no more brutal acts committed by the irregulars in this town since my arrival; but the poor people suffer in the interior, for any one here may start a beyrack, and most of those who form it are without arms when they start, but they subsequently supply themselves from the produce of the plunder taken from the villages. I must also mention that these men, when they meet horses loaded with grain or other produce, take the horses, leaving the grain, &c. to rot in the ground."

Page 165.

"The Turkish inhabitants generally of Larissa show no bad feeling towards the Christians; but there are expectations, and I must mention the mufti as the individual who would ever be most ready to join in any project, however barbarous, against them.

* * * *

"Shortly after my arrival at Larissa, I was informed that a Christian named Sappalithe, of Gurdiza, who was a commission agent, had been arrested and put in prison, because his brother was in Greece. I called upon the pasha, and inquired if there was any proof, however slight, of Sappalithe being in any way connected with the insurgents. His Excellency replied, none whatever, but that he was urged to arrest the man by the mufti and some of the beys.

"I told the pasha that this shameful act of injustice had alarmed the Christians, and was a proceeding totally at variance with both the will and policy of the Porte; and requested that he would order the man's immediate liberation. His Excellency acceded to my request; and I took Sappalithe with me to my lodgings, where I learned from him that he had been led to believe by the guards at the kouack, that he was to have been decapitated when the new pasha arrived."

Page 168, Inclosure 2 in No. 152.—Vice-Consul Bonatti to Consul Saunders.

"Scutari in Albania, March 28th, 1854.

"We accordingly proceeded to Alessio, and from thence to the village of Diblenisti, the residence of the Archbishop of Durazzo, and chief place

of the district of that diocese, where for some time past there had arisen serious dissensions between Turks and Christians, and which were then on the point of giving rise to acts of bloodshed. The principal cause of these disagreements was the conduct of the Turks ; who to show their contempt and hatred, had fired at the cross of the church, and committed other acts demonstrative of their scorn for the Christian religion—acts which gave most serious offence, and for which they were at the moment about to take vengeance.

“ It is equally well known that the Turks, as a principle of faith, when their fanaticism exceeds the bounds of reason, consider that they acquire a title to Paradise by putting to death an unbelieving enemy. This fanaticism and these principles prevail among the Turks in Central Albania ; and their hatred towards the Christians has become general, particularly since the commencement of the war with Russia, and the late outbreak of the Greeks in Epirus ; and more especially on occasions of any public manifestation of sympathy by the Christians, which they cannot conceal, when reports are unfavourable to their rulers. For this reason, their position has become critical, and liable hereafter to produce serious results, should the authorities cease to act with proper vigilance and energy.”

*Page 170, No. 153.—Consul Saunders to the Earl of Clarendon
(received April 17th).*

EXTRACT.

“ Prevesa, April 8th, 1854.

“ I am informed by Sir Henry Ward, who had conceived there might be some exaggeration in the accounts transmitted by Vice-Consul Zarb, that ‘there is no exaggeration whatsoever in the statements first made.’ and Captain Peel assures me that, on the contrary, the report of what has been committed ‘falls far short of the truth ;’ and that if he did not pursue his inquiries further, ‘it was only because he was too disgusted and indignant’ at that which he had already ‘seen with his own eyes.’

“ Thus thirty-six peaceful villages of the plains, exclusively tenanted by Christians, and attacked, as it would seem, in the dead of night, have been utterly stripped and burnt ; monasteries and churches destroyed ; priests (among whom was one Ionian subject) tortured, and finally put to death ; numbers of helpless victims ruthlessly sacrificed, without regard to age or sex, accompanied, in many instances, by acts of the most brutal atrocity ; and a district, so lately smiling in comparative affluence, has now become a desolate waste.

“ An immense amount of cattle and other plunder has been carried off by these savage marauders, together with many women and children taken into captivity, thereby only avoiding a worse fate ; while the remainder of the population who escaped the massacre have fled to the mountains, or joined the ranks of the insurgents, thus giving a new impetus to the movement, which, during the previous fortnight, had shown symptoms of subsiding in various quarters.

“ The high roads from Janina to Filiates and Paramithia, which had

been open of late, have now again been closed by insurgent bands; and all the efforts making to induce the Christians to rely upon the promises of protection and security held out to them, cannot but be neutralised and impaired to a considerable extent by acts of this description.

"As regards the actors in this dreadful tragedy, a Mussulman functionary, who happened to be on the spot, and who, from his position and authority, had ample means of forming a correct opinion in the matter, has declared that he can only point out six among all the agas of Margariti, and one person, the mufti alone, at Paramithia, who were not concerned in these sanguinary outrages; and it would be highly desirable that some of the principal personages should be held accountable for this ferocious demonstration, and the disastrous effects thereby occasioned, in order to encourage the population to believe that such atrocities are not countenanced by the Government, nor allowed to pass with impunity.

* * * *

"I have, however, strongly impressed upon Fuad Effendi the importance of placing at once under arrest the principal miscreant and instigator of this carnage—a certain Metli Pronio, the richest aga in Paramithia, who, on returning thither from Arta, in command of the Arnaouts, dismissed from thence for their reckless conduct in the town, is known to have decapitated six of the most respectable inhabitants of the village of Pangradi, sent to compliment him on the occasion.

"I should add, that, as a means of obtaining accurate information as to the reparation, however partial, which may be made to the distressed population, and with a view of encouraging, as far as may be practicable, the return of parties to reclaim their property, if not to seek a home, where no longer a tenement exists to shelter them, and where the fearful havoc of the past fortnight must be too vividly depicted before their eyes, I have instructed the vice-consul at Sayada to proceed against Paramithia, and watch the proceedings of the authorities charged with making such restitution of property; more especially in order to guard against any fallacious representations in the matter, to which the name of the Bishop, acting under inevitable moral coercion as commonly practised, has already been lent.

"I have, &c.

(Signed)

"SIDNEY SMITH SAUNDERS."

Page 184, Inclosure 1 in No. 161.—Vice-Consul Blunt to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

EXTRACT.

"Larissa, March 28th, 1854.

"I hear of no enormities, but they decapitate all their own men who are killed, that the heads may not be taken by the Turks, and exposed, as they suppose they may be.

"The beys of Larissa, many of whom are wealthy men, will not under present circumstances come forward to give the least assistance to the Porte, although they well know that most of the irregular troops are in a state of insubordination, from having nine months' pay to receive."

Page 213, Inclosure in No. 197.—Sir Henry Ward to the Duke of Newcastle.

EXTRACT.

"Corfu, April 8th, 1854.

"1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's despatch of the 23d ultimo, and of the Parliamentary papers which accompanied it.

"2. Those papers, on first becoming known here, created a very strong impression, the Greeks generally evincing the greatest surprise and mortification at the tone in which the Emperor of Russia announced his opposition, both to the reconstruction of the Byzantine empire, and to any such augmentation of the territories of Greece as might render that country a powerful state. That impression, however, is rapidly disappearing—partly from the suggestions made by Russian partisans, that the Emperor was too good a diplomatist to confide his real intentions to an English minister, and partly from the general feeling that whatever these intentions may have been, the court of Greece, in all its recent acts, must have calculated, and does most implicitly rely, upon Russian support and sympathies.

"3. The conviction that the King and Queen of Greece would not have risked their throne, and braved the resentment of England and France, by stimulating the present movement amongst the Greek people, without the most positive assurance of aid from Russia, is natural, and I may say universal; while such is the instinctive enmity between the Greek and Turkish races, that no proofs of political immorality on the part of Russia, no fear of her ambition, no consciousness of their own certain degradation, if placed as a dependent state in contact with so formidable a neighbour, will counterbalance, for one moment, in Greece, the advantage of securing Russian cooperation against Turkey, as they confidently anticipate that they shall do.

"4. I believe this to be an accurate description of the state of public feeling, both here and in Greece, at the present moment. I have had a translation of the whole of the Secret Correspondence into Greek and Italian prepared, and it will be largely circulated; but I should deceive your Grace, if I were to say I anticipate from it any beneficial results. The Greeks generally do not appreciate disinterestedness as a public virtue, and, instead of admiring the feeling that induced her Majesty to scout the proposal of appropriating Egypt and Candia, they are rather inclined to treat as folly the rejection of so handsome an offer. With regard to Turkey, the one thing to which they look is its downfall, no matter by what means, or by what power it may be effected. They might prefer England to Russia as the instrument, because England would have no claims or pretensions afterwards; but it would be as their instrument only. And your Grace may rely upon it, that however reluctant her Majesty's Government may be to come to this conclusion, nothing short of the most decided policy on the part of the allied powers, accompanied by a considerable amount of coercion, will allay the present ferment in Greece, or prevent the Greek population generally from precipitating themselves upon the Turkish provinces."

Page 244, Inclosure 1 in No. 222.—Sir Henry Ward to the Duke of Newcastle.

EXTRACT.

“Corfu, April 15th, 1854.

“The Albanians appear to have completed what the insurgents began, and two-thirds of Mezzovo are now in ruins. But the inhabitants provoked their fate by joining in the attack upon Abdi Pasha's force, on its approach to the town; and Abdi Pasha himself is admitted to have made great efforts to check the ravages of his troops, and to preserve the place from their fury.

“I have, &c.

(Signed)

“H. G. WARD.”

*Page 287, No. 256.—Consul Saunders to the Earl of Clarendon,
(received May 24th.)*

EXTRACT.

“Arta, May 4th, 1854.

“During all this interval, the extensive marshes of the Louro river have been the resort of a multitude of women and children, who, flying from impending dangers, had sought refuge on certain muddy islets, difficult of access in the depths of those noxious recesses, under the shelter of temporary huts, where I took the opportunity of visiting them.

“Several hundred families, also, fugitives from the devastated villages in the plains of Paramithia, were dispersed among the neighbouring mountains of Zalonga and Podhogora, in an utterly destitute condition, subsisting on herbs and roots, with an occasional donation of milk from the shepherds around. These wretched victims of Arnaout ferocity, despoiled of all they possess, their villages destroyed, and themselves without either shelter or support, must necessarily perish ere long, as their lawless inheritors would desire, unless immediate relief be afforded them.”

This dark roll might be vastly extended, but sufficient it is conceived has been stated to show the concealment of facts, the deliberate misrepresentations and intended falsehoods which official diplomatists and other public servants have made regarding these subjects, for the dangerous and dishonourable object of misleading in order to irritate the public, so far as to induce that public to support their erroneous and anti-national policy and proceedings, and to screen their deplorable errors. Thus, instead of the man being simply “*sick*,” we find him, according to the testimony of his best friends, dying of an incurable disease, brought on by a life spent in violence, cruelty, and injustice!

CHAPTER IX.

RUSSIA—SUFFERINGS CAMPAIGN 1812—BECOME STRONGER THAN BEFORE—
POPULATION, ARMY, NAVY, AND RESOURCES—TRADE AND COMMERCE—
GREAT IMPROVEMENT—EMPIRE UNDER NICHOLAS I.—REFORMATION LAWS
—STATE OF SOCIETY—NATIVE INDUSTRY PROTECTED—RELIGIOUS TOLERA-
TION—REFINED SOCIETY IN SIBERIA—FREEDOM OF SERFS—JUDICIOUS
STEPS TO EFFECT IT—DON COSSACKS—CHARACTER—CHRISTIANS.

THE invasion by Napoleon, with the nations of Europe at his back, and with an army, including followers, of 690,000 persons, (of all this vast number only 30,000 miserable wretches, and the remains of the Austrian contingent of 30,000, and the Prussian contingent of 20,000 recrossed the Russian boundary. The remainder remained prisoners, or "*food for the dogs and the crows*,"—the dreadful work of ONLY SIX MONTHS!) inflicted upon Russia severe misfortunes: but her Government and people bore all without a murmur. The destruction of Moscow, Bonaparte told us, consumed "several millions" of property. "The fire of Moscow, says the enemy, consumed the labours and cares of four generations."¹ "*Four thousand villages and fifty towns, in the finest parts of the Russian empire, were reduced to ashes.*"² None of these towns contained fewer than 10,000, and many of them 20,000 inhabitants. For a distance of nearly 700 miles, from the Niemen to Moscow, and along that distance, in breadth from 70 to 100 miles, scarcely a house was left standing. The inhabitants lost nearly everything they had, and with their families lived in the woods for months, amidst the greatest privations; yet no complaints escaped them; vengeance on the ruthless invader was the feeling that animated all. The enemy, by all this terrible mass of destruction and suffering, did not, says the Emperor Alexander, draw from "*the bosom of Russia one sigh.*" The loss of life on the field of battle, and the immediate effects of war, was about 400,000 in the year 1812; yet Russia rose superior to all this, and rose from all this greater and more powerful than ever. This shows what any great nation can do, when their energies are put to the test, and fairly called forth.

There is something so solemn and touching in the feelings which

¹ Speech, Bonaparte, Senate, Feb. 7th, 1813.

² Ibid. Feb. 14th, 1813.

animated sovereigns and peoples at these terrible epochs, that I cannot omit adverting to them for a moment, at this time, when religious feeling and devotion are, amidst similar scenes, jeered at and thrown aside. Referring to the terrible events of 1812, the Emperor Alexander says, "What proofs of courage, of bravery, of piety, of patience, and of fortitude, has not Russia shown! . . . The scene of the destruction of his armies surpasses all belief. One almost imagines that our eyes deceive us. Who has been able to effect this? Without derogating from the merited glory of the commander-in-chief of our armies, that distinguished general, who has rendered to his country services for ever memorable; without detracting from the merits of other valiant and able commanders, who have distinguished themselves by their zeal and ardour; nor from the general bravery of the troops; we must confess that what they have accomplished *surpasses all human power*. Acknowledge, then, divine Providence in this wonderful event. Let us prostrate ourselves before his sacred throne; and evidently seeing his hand chastising impiety, instead of boasting or glorying in our victories, learn from this great and terrible example to be modest and peaceable executors of his will."¹

On a similar memorable occasion—the decisive battle of Leipsic—Lord Cathcart, an eye-witness, speaking of the engagement, and on the field, says: "This is the eighth general action, seven of them commanded by the Ruler of France, in which I have seen the Emperor Alexander in the field, at the head of his army, as usual unmindful of personal danger. He approached every column, animating the officers and men by his presence and example, and, by a few energetic words, touching the chords which produce the strongest effects upon the minds of the Russian soldiers, *confidence in the Supreme Being*, resignation to his will, and attachment to their sovereign." And on the same field, when Prince Schwartzberg, the commander-in-chief, rode up to his sovereign, the Emperor of Austria, to tell him that the field was won, that sovereign immediately alighted from his horse, and with his head uncovered fell on his knees, and, in a solemn manner, returned thanks to the KING OF KINGS for this glorious victory. He was instantly followed by the other sovereigns, by the commander-in-chief, Prince Schwartzberg, and by all the officers of their staff, and the whole of their attendants—the whole forming one of the most solemn and impressive scenes ever seen in any age or country." Our present premier, Lord Aberdeen, will remember this well, as he was one of the party. Nor did they forget it with the day. On the anniversary of the battle in the following year, at Vienna, where all were assembled,

¹ Alexander's Proclamation, Wilna, 6th January, 1813.

and amidst the population of that metropolis, and upwards of 200,000 troops in grand military array, the sovereigns, their families and attendants, approached. "All eyes," says an eye-witness, "were turned in their direction, expecting to behold them advancing in full pomp of military parade. But how deeply were we struck at seeing them coming on the ground, on foot, without attendants, and without uttering a word, solemnly walking up to the altar, and there kneel before it to offer up thanks and praise to the KING or KINGS and the GOD of VICTORY ! They were joined by the empresses, queens, and princesses, who were followed by all the royal blood in Vienna. At the raising of the host, the whole army fell on their knees ; and then, at the same instant, did I behold, as it were, all Europe in thanksgiving—a most awfully sublime sight, which to my latest day I shall remember."

In those days, be it remembered, the United Kingdom had no Seymour nor Stratford ambassadors to browbeat allies, or sneer at the solemn and sincere religious devotions of nations, when humbly acknowledging their dependence upon Omnipotence.

The population of Russia in 1812 was, in round numbers, 49,000,000 ; in 1852 it was nearly 70,000,000 ; and is now, from the regular yearly increase, fully 73,000,000, exclusive of some wandering aboriginal tribes on the extreme north and north-east parts of Siberia. Those native tribes, as well as the unsettled parts on her southern frontier, from the Caspian to the sea of Okhotsk, are yearly getting into settled habits, and find peace and security under her sway, and are adding to her vast population. It is a curious fact, that while aboriginal tribes regularly and rapidly melt away and disappear before France, England, and the United States, they increase and prosper in connexion with Russia.

Considering the composition of the population of Russia, even if we may consider this, we believe that scarcely any country in the world is making greater progress than Russia in all that tends to the comfort and civilization of man. Everywhere the traveller over Russia sees, as in the United States, neat thriving towns arising, in places which were formerly waste, extended and extending on all hands. The imports and exports of St. Petersburg, in 1853, amounted to 21,000,000*l*. The agricultural productions of Russia are very great. Last year she exported from her Baltic and Black Sea ports to different countries, 7,000,000 quarters of wheat, the market value of which for that time exceeded 21,000,000*l*. exclusive of large quantities that passed through Prussian ports. Her internal and external commerce is very large, and yearly and greatly increasing. At the annual fair of Novogorod, the articles imported and exported, or exchanged, amount in value to 22,000,000*l*. yearly. The different articles come from, and are sent to, the distant provinces

of Russia, Turkey, Persia, India, Central Asia, and China, the exports being all, or nearly all, Russian produce and manufactures. Her iron is abundant, inexhaustible, and of the finest quality. The large iron factory belonging to the Countess of Stroganoff, near Kerhgheshans-Raia, employs a vast number of hands; near it is a broad stream, and about 400 vessels of considerable tonnage, some of them 200 tons, in the trade, between that place and Novogorod on the Wolga. About 6,000,000*l.* worth of gold is yearly got in different parts of Siberia, besides much silver; flax and hemp are produced to an immense amount. Her forests are most extensive and valuable. The trade in tea from China, by way of Kiakhta, exceeds 1,500,000*l.* yearly. There is one man, still a serf, who has raised himself by his industry and energy to be the proprietor of a large establishment, and who now manufactures, in the neighbourhood of Kazan, hardware and cutlery to the value of 127,000*l.* yearly. In the North Caspian, the fisheries give employment to nearly 500,000 men, and the inland traffic on the Wolga gives active employment to about 1,500,000 individuals. The trade of Archangel in ships and tonnage, and, it may also be said, in value, is equal to the whole British trade of our West India colonies. Her cotton manufactures are, as we shall see, numerous and valuable, and the cotton goods of Poland bear away the palm in quality in the Persian and Central Asian markets. Her consumption of cotton now exceeds 400,000 bales, about one-third of which passes through Great Britain. As a proof of its magnitude and importance, the following, from the authentic commercial list of Archangel, is the trade of that place for 1853:—

707 Foreign Ships (265 of London) arrived in 1853.

87 Coasters.

EXPORTS.

115,521	chetwals	Linseed.	300,863	poods	Rye & Flour.
383,965	do.	Oats.	20,020	do.	Groats.
28,798	do.	Wheat.	2,600	do.	Wheat-flour.
231,002	do.	Rye.	1,333	do.	Grease & Butter.
9,117	do.	Barley.	73,152	barrels	Tar.
533,310	poods	Flax.	4,071	do.	Pitch.
386,700	do.	Tow & Codilla.	711,744	pieces	Mats.
14,052	do.	Tallow.	51,317	Hides.	
40,539	do.	Linseed.	37,697	hhds.	Battens.
9,380	do.	Cordage.	2,067	do.	Battens.
12,580	do.	Iron.	1,665	do.	Ends.
3,165	do.	Feathers & half ds.			

The population of the Russian empire is very large, and yearly increasing largely, as the climate, though severe, is, at the same time,

generally healthy. The population in the Asiatic part is, to some extent, uncertain; that which may be considered under regular government is known with considerable accuracy. The wandering tribes are numerous, but the number of the population is uncertain. The whole may be stated thus:—

In 1852, In European Russia	63,012,146
In Asia—Caucasus	2,850,000
Siberia	4,048,000
	<hr/>
	69,910,146
Add 2 per cent. yearly increase	2,794,404
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Total, 1854	72,704,550

Or say 73,000,000! Of these 51,000,000 are true Russians. Nearly 60,000,000 are of the Greek Church.

If reliance could be placed on the statements made by Sir H. Seymour, the following was the number of the Russian army, and its strength, Oct. 27th, 1853, and January 9th, 1854¹:—

1st Corps	60,000	Baltic, Lithuania.
2d do.	60,000	Poland.
3d do.	60,000	Gortchakoff's reserves.
4th do.	60,000	Moldavia, &c.
5th do.	60,000	Odessa & Bessarabia.
6th do.	60,000	about Moscow.
Corps de Guard	40,000	Petersburg & Novogorod.
„ de Grenadiers	40,000	do. do.
Guards & Grenadiers (increased)	40,000	
All the Cavalry	60,000	
Asia	180,000	Caucasus & Georgia.
All the Cossacks	60,000	
Two corps of Cavalry	40,000	{ Reserves in colonies about Knemenstdik & Kharkoff.
Increased, (each corps 12,000) }	72,000	to war footing.
Total	<hr/> 892,000	

Exclusive of artillery, the troops in the extreme parts of Asia, and garrisons of various places in the interior. The Cossacks are, also, probably, more than the number here stated. Sir Hamilton Seymour, who is never very clear-headed in anything that requires being correct, has left the number of Cossacks uncertain. Consequently I have been

¹ Part II. No. 205, p. 212, and No. 409, p. 372.

compelled to collect, or rather estimate, the number of these from other sources of information.

This army last year had 1,184 pieces of cannon. The new levies called out since that period probably exceed 500,000 men.

Her navy in the Baltic and Black Seas amounts to fifty sail of the line, besides smaller vessels, and exclusive of the naval force in the Caspian, probably upwards of twenty sail of vessels of considerable size and force. Her army, in all its branches, probably numbers 1,000,000 of men, well organised and disciplined. If any reliance could be placed on Sir H. Seymour's communications, the number early last year was 890,000 men, and since that period three levies, of perhaps 200,000 men each, have been made.

Such is the empire and the people, brave, active, obedient, and devoted to their country and their sovereign, against which, and in aid of a set of turbulent and lazy Turks, England and France, with a portion of central Europe, intimidated and coerced by them, are rushing with impetuous anger into deadly hostilities—against a sovereign and people who set the highest value on our friendship and alliance, and who were most anxious to continue both. In the Secret Correspondence Sir H. Seymour informs us (No. 1, p. 3, Part V.), that the Emperor “said that the new ministry appears to me to be strong, and I am anxious for its duration—although, to say the truth, as regards England, I have learned *that it is the country with which we must be allied. We must not lean to this or that party.*” And, in No. 6, p. 12, he says, “the Emperor expressed *his warm attachment* to the Queen, our gracious Sovereign, and his respect for her Majesty's present advisers.”

How different was the course pursued and feeling shown towards him and his people in this country! From the senate to the crowded mart, in the debating club and the pulpit, in the organs which guide, and demand to guide, and are allowed to guide, public opinion, (and, strange to say, those especially that assume to be the champions of Christianity and Christian principles,) him and his people were denounced, and proclaimed as tyrants and barbarians of the most ferocious description. The sovereign was especially marked out as a man without judgment or feeling; as justly liable to the indignation and vengeance of mankind. It was endeavoured to separate him from his people, and the most violent marked him out in no unmistakeable manner and language as a proper object for the Turkish bow-string and the assassin's dagger, with the hope expressed that such a fate would await him, as the means of terminating the contest in our favour. The character of Great Britain has, by those who thus assume to represent her, been exhibited in a light the most unamiable,

and never before exhibited to the world; and, for the moment, it appears to have destroyed all those fine feelings which, in 1812 and 1813, were shown to the same nation and her sovereign,—feelings and gratitude which Lord Cathcart, in his despatch, Kalisch, March 6th, 1813, written, I may say, on the battle-field, tells us, “had made an impression on the minds of Alexander and his people that never could be effaced.”

But we have effaced it: the consequences must prove most injurious to us. In dealing with nations, even with the weakest, in any difference of opinion that may arise between them on national affairs, the language of prudence and respect ought never to be departed from. A few sarcastic words about American stars and stripes thrown into a public despatch by the great Mr. Canning, produced the American war of 1812. We burnt their Capitol—we united every American against us at a moment when those States were about to separate; and by the war showing them their wants, we made them, under protective laws, a nation of manufacturers to supply their own wants. It will prove in the sequel with Russia the same as with America. Deep resentment; “a policy of suspicion” against us in all our future actions; and Russia be compelled, for her own preservation and profit, to extend the manufacture of those materials, the productions of her soil, which, as raw produce, go so very largely into the material of several of our own. What is remarkable also—if anything could be considered remarkable in these singular times—is, that those who are so loud in denouncing the Russian Government and sovereign as “*the incarnate principle of Despotic Government*,” (*Times*, Sept. 19th, 1854,) applaud to the skies, court the alliance, and *fraternise* (we must use French phraseology while under French dictation) with other governments and sovereigns who are at least equally so; nay, more so. Is not the Government of Austria not merely despotic, but the despotism of the sword? Is not the Government of France not merely despotism, but that despotism supported by military power—by the sword; and the more dangerous to the rest of the world, because the great majority of the French nation joyfully rushed forward to place their necks under the yoke, in order to save themselves from more appalling horrors? But this very union and resort may compel their Government to employ them in foreign aggression, to avoid the recurrence of evils amongst themselves which they had so much reason to dread. Is not Turkey, our present hobby, a despotism of the most barbarous and fanatic kind? Is it and has it not been since it ever existed, the government of the sword, and from under which, the moment that is withdrawn, it must cease to exist? Certainly. But I allude to those points not to censure or to blame, but simply to show

that we condemn in Russia what we eulogise and court in other countries, proving that our conduct is not honest, and cannot be sincere, and that it is wholly guided by our own material interests, or supposed interests.

Now, let us consider a few things in reference to Russia in proof of what has been stated, and in disproof of her reckless assailants. In doing this we shall not have recourse to the publications of the day, too often the effusions of ignorance, prejudice, and error—goods made for the market, and for the profit of the producer and seller—but to impartial authorities, and travellers, who tell us simply what they saw, and leave us to judge for ourselves the value of the information that they convey. It is worthy of remark, that the most accurate and valuable practical accounts of the state of Russia are to be found in American publications, and from American republican pens. On all such subjects their travellers are most acute and judicious observers; and they have, and can have, no object but to state the truth. But let us first take the character of the reigning Emperor, as drawn by one of the ablest literary men in Great Britain, Sir Archibald Alison, in his great historical work; thus:—

THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

“Sir Archibald Alison, in his ‘History of Europe,’ has the following, on the subject of the personal character of the Emperor Nicholas:—

“Nicholas I., who, under such brilliant circumstances, and after the display of such invincible resolution, thus ascended the throne of Russia, and whom subsequent events have, in a manner, raised up to become an arbiter of Eastern Europe, is the greatest sovereign that that country has known since Peter the Great; in some respects he is greater than Peter himself. Not less energetic in character and ardent in improvement than his illustrious predecessor, he is more thoroughly national, and he has brought the nation forward more completely in the path which nature had pointed out for it. Peter was a Russian only in his despotism; his violence, his cruelty, his beneficence, his ardour for improvement, his patriotic ambition, were all borrowed from the states of Western Europe.

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“Nicholas, on the other hand, is essentially Russian in all his ideas. He is heart and soul patriotic, not merely in wish, but in spirit and in thought. He wishes to improve and elevate his country, and he has done much to effect that noble object; but he desires to do so by developing, not changing, the national spirit; by making it become a first Russia, not a second France or England. He has adopted the maxim of Montesquieu, that no nation ever attained to real greatness but by institutions in conformity with its spirit. He is neither led away by the thirst for sudden, mechanical improvement like Peter, nor the praises of philosophers like Catherine, nor the visions of inexperienced philanthropy like Alexander. He has not attempted to erect a capital in a pestilential marsh, and done so at the

expense of a hundred thousand lives ; nor has he dreamt of mystical regeneration with a visionary sibyl, and made sovereigns put their hands to a holy alliance from her influence. He neither corresponds with French atheists nor English democrats ; he despises the praises of the first, he braves the hostility of the last. His maxim is to take men as they are, and neither suppose them better nor worse. He is content to let Russia grow up in a Russian garb, animated with a Russian spirit, and moulded by Russian institutions, without the aid of Prussian communism or British liberalism. The improvements he has effected in the government of his dominions have been vast, the triumphs with which his external policy have been attended unbounded ; but they have all been achieved, not in imitation of, but in opposition to, the ideas of Western Europe. They bespeak, not less than his internal government, the national character of his policy. But if success is the test of worldly wisdom, he has not been far wrong in his system ; for he has passed the Balkan, heretofore impervious to his predecessors ; he has conquered Poland, converted the Euxine into a Russian lake, planted the cross on the bastions of the Erivan, and opened through subdued Hungary a path to Constantinople. Nature has given to him all the qualities fitted for such an elevated destiny. A lofty stature and princely air give additional influence to a majestic countenance, in which the prevailing character is resolution, yet not unmixed with sweetness. Like Wellington, Cæsar, and many other of the greatest men recorded in history, his expression has become more intellectual as he advanced in years, and became exercised in the duties of sovereignty, instead of the stern routine of military discipline. Exemplary in all the relations of private life, a faithful husband, an affectionate father, he has exhibited in a brilliant court, and when surrounded by every temptation which life can offer, the simplicity and affections of patriarchal life. Yet is he not a perfect character. His virtues often border upon vices. His excellencies are akin to defects. Deeply impressed with the responsibility of his situation, his firmness has sometimes become sternness, his sense of justice degenerated into severity. He knows how to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, and has often evinced a noble and magnanimous spirit in separating the one from the other, and showing oblivion of injury, even kindness, to the relatives of those who had conspired against his throne and life. But towards the guilty themselves he has not been equally compassionate : he has not always let the passions of the contest pass away with its termination. He is an Alexander the Great in resolution, but not in magnanimity. He wants the last grace in the heroic character—he does not know how to forgive.’”

The next most important reference is from one of the ablest literary pens in Russia, Professor Ustrialoff, and forms one chapter of a great history of Russia, not yet published, which chapter was brought to this country by the translator, Mr. Roberts, nearly five years ago, and published by Mr. Markden last summer. It is therefore doubly valuable, having no reference to events now taking place ; the portion

relative to the union of the Polish and Russian Churches is of vital importance.

From the Reign of Nicolai, page 99.

"In a historical review of ages long past, we explained in detail by what means Russia, the inhabitants of which were of one family and one religion, extending from the western districts of the Bug to the banks of the Volga, from the White to the Black Sea, was divided, in the old time of disorder under the yoke of the Tartars, into two principal parts,—into the two Russian states of Moscow and Lithuania; how the former, aggrandized by the minds of native sovereigns, saved her nationality and independence, and was transformed into the powerful and self-supported tzardom of Russia; how the latter also, in her turn, attained an eminent degree of political power, sacredly and for a long time preserved the statutes of the country, gave kings to Poland, and, contrary to all expectation, on the dissolution of the dynasty of Jagellon, succumbed to the domination of the Polish magnates, experienced all the miseries of anarchy, was shaken in its fundamental principles, and took the form of a Polish province. In those troublesome conjunctures, persons clothed in the dignity of pastors of the Orthodox Greek Church in the duchy of Lithuania, a metropolitan and several bishops, from worldly and interested motives, in opposition to the Pope of Rome at the end of the sixteenth century, and being protected by their king, a zealous Catholic, introduced into the west of Russia the union, *i.e.* disavowed the oecumenical patriarchs, and acknowledged over themselves the supreme authority of the Roman pontiff, retaining, however, the doctrines and ceremonies of the ancient Orthodox faith.

"Being received with the universal murmurs of the Russian nation as a criminal act, the Union, at its commencement, had but few partisans. The Polish Government took its measures for a more rapid propagation of it: the Jesuits overcame the mind and conscience of the Lithuano-Russian nobility, established schools for the education of well-born youth, and insinuated themselves into the very families of the great, under pretext of being Uniate monks; so that in one century (the seventeenth) all the nobility in Western Russia (amongst whom were many descendants of St. Vladimir) were converted to the Union, although the greater part of them subsequently went over to the Roman Catholic religion. In the remaining classes, the clergy, and the inhabitants of the towns and villages, one-half preserved the faith of their ancestors, whilst the other joined the schism, and the nation was divided into two parties, the Orthodox and the Uniate; each party had its metropolitan, and continued to have one down to our time. Inimical to each other, both parties were equally persecuted and hunted by the Roman Catholics, were deprived of civil rights, and were already about to sink in a harassing struggle with implacable fanaticism, the Orthodox adopting the Union, the Uniates introducing the Catholic ceremonies into the Church service, when the Empress Catherine II. put an end to their outrageous violence, and to the propagation of the heresy.

" Its ancient provinces, all the western region which had been wrested from the mother country by men of other races during the calamitous period of our history, now reverting to Russia, her Majesty granted the protection of the law to all its inhabitants, without distinction of religious faith, but, at the same time, severely interdicted the conversion of her new subjects to the Union, or their passing over to the Roman Catholic faith, and permitted the Uniates fearlessly to return to the bosom of the Orthodox Greek Church. Very many of them availed themselves of that permission, particularly in Volleynia and Podolia.

" Yet still about two millions remained in the Union, and in a stranger and more unnatural position than before. Russians by extraction, Russians according to the doctrines of their faith, and subject to the Russian sovereign, they at the same time acknowledged the Pope of Rome as the chief of the Church, to the prejudice of the unity and concord of the state. Being looked upon by their Russian brethren as no better than apostates, they were rudely separated from them ; nor did they cling to the Catholics who, as formerly, continued to designate their religion the religion of bondsmen, not considering that the Uniate Church, through two centuries of violence, had receded from its first principles, and, in the ceremonies of Divine service, in the form of the temples, in the usage of the sacred books, had imitated the Church of Rome. The administration of the affairs of the one and the other by a spiritual college—Roman Catholic—established at the end of the previous century, sustained the existence of the Union down to our time.

" In the very beginning of his reign the Emperor, directing his provident attention to the fate of his subjects who, by the force of compulsory circumstances, cunning snares, and cruel violence, had been torn from the Orthodox Greek Church, by a supreme ukaz of the 22d April, 1828, ordered : that for the Greco-Uniate Churches in Russia, there should be established, under the presidency of their metropolitan, Josaphat Buljak, a separate Greco-Uniate college, which, having jurisdiction over all the affairs of the Church, should be obliged to carefully guard its institutions, the rite of Divine service, and all the order of Church government, from the influence of any kind of strange innovation contrary to the spirit of the Greek ceremonies, on the precise basis of the decree of 1595, which laid down the principles of the Union. The direct administration of the affairs of the Greco-Uniate Churches was left, under the supreme influence of the college, to the two diocesan governments of White Russia and Lithuania. In both dioceses were established cathedral chapters, consistories, seminaries, and primary schools, but at Polotsk an ecclesiastical academy was founded. For the maintenance and education of the clergy abundant funds were assigned.

" Returning, through such means, to its first principles, and being secured from foreign influence, the Greco-Uniate Church, in the space of ten years, made its appearance in a new and splendidly metamorphosed form. The bishops and other clerical authorities frankly acknowledging the number of innovations which, in the progress of time, had crept into

it, firmly resolved to everywhere restore the original form of the temples, and supply them with all the attributes of the ancient service. In consequence of this, instead of the erroneous Church books of different impressions, in which the sacred language was mutilated, uniform books of a new and carefully revised edition were universally introduced, the altars obtained the correct form, organs were abolished, and Divine service, according to the corrected books, was performed in the magnificent Sclavonic, by priests in proper vestments, with an observance of the ceremonies commemorative of the Church in its primitive state. The people listened with joy in the temples of God to their native tongue, and, without difficulty, entered the pale of the Orthodox Greek Church.

“Meanwhile the Greco-Uniate clergy, with the exception of a few monks who had passed over to the Union from the Roman Church, with exemplary unanimity cooperated with the zeal of their bishops and the spiritual authorities: the rising generation educated in the Polotsk ecclesiastical academy, in the two seminaries, and in the twenty inferior schools, received the truly Orthodox direction.

“At this conjuncture the high office of Greco-Uniate Metropolitan became vacant by the death of Josaphat Buljak; the place of president of the college was filled by his senior member, Joseph (Siemashko), bishop of Lithuania; the chief administration in the affairs of the Greco-Uniate Church was confided by the sovereign, on the 1st January, 1838, to Count Protasoff, chief procurator of the Most Holy Synod; and the undertaking, blessed in the protection of heaven, was speedily brought to a happy termination.

“In the week of Orthodoxy (the first Sunday of the great fast), the 12th February, 1839, were assembled at Polotsk all the Greco-Uniate bishops in Russia, who, with the principal clergy, composed a council act, in which, explaining in detail the true state of their Church, they decreed, in accordance with a proposition of the whole Greco-Uniate clergy, in which they were justified by more than 1,300 signatures, to present to the Emperor the following most humble petition:—‘By the wresting from Russia, in troublous times, of her western provinces of Lithuania, and, by successive machinations, their annexation to Poland, the Russian Orthodox inhabitants were subjected to severe persecution through the unwearied efforts of the Polish Government and the court of Rome, to separate them from the Orthodox Catholic Eastern Church, and to unite them to the Western. Persons of the highest station, their rites being in every way circumscribed, were forced to embrace the Roman faith, which was novel to them, and forgot even their own extraction and nationality. Citizen and peasant were alike forced from communion with the Eastern Church, by means of the Union which was introduced at the close of the sixteenth century. From that time this people has been separated from its mother Russia; to effect which, indefatigable artifices were directed in order to alienate it from its ancient country, and the Uniates experienced, in its full sense, all the bitterness of a foreign yoke.

“On the restoration to Russia of her ancient heritage, the greater half

of the Uniates were annexed to their ancestral Greco-Russian Church, and the remainder found support and protection from the overbearing influence of the Romish priesthood. In the blessed reign of your Imperial Majesty, under your beneficent auspices, most gracious sovereign, the greater part of them are now restored to the ancient pure rites and ordinances of the Greco-Eastern Church ; the sons of their clergy receive an education responsive to their calling—an education which entitles them not only to be, but to feel themselves Russians.’”

Page 105.

“‘These reasons, and more especially anxieties for the eternal welfare of the flock confided to us, urge us, firmly convinced of the truth of the sacred apostolic doctrines of the Orthodox Catholic Eastern Church, to fall at the feet of your Imperial Majesty, and most humbly to pray you, O most powerful monarch ! to consolidate the future destiny of the Uniates, by permitting them to be re-united to their ancestral Orthodox Church—the Church of all the Russias. In assurance of our conjoint agreement on this subject, we have the happiness of presenting a council act, composed by us, the bishops and ruling clergy of the Greco-Uniate Church, in the city of Polotsk, together with the autographical declarations of 1,305 persons of the Greco-Uniate clergy not present.’”

* * * *

“The Most Holy Synod decreed, according to the regulations of the holy fathers, to receive the bishops, priests, and all the flock of the Greco-Uniate Church, into a full and perfect participation of the Holy Orthodox Catholic Eastern Church, and into the indivisible constitution of the Church of all the Russias ; and on this subject to present to the Emperor a most humble report.

“On the 25th day of March, the festival of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin, and the eve of the greatest of solemnities—the Resurrection of Christ, the report of the Synod was followed by the consent of his Majesty in these words : ‘I thank God, and accept.’”

“After hearing the supreme consent read in a full assembly of the Synod, on the 30th of March, the chief procurator conducted the Lithuanian bishop, Joseph, into the assembly. The metropolitan of Novgorod and St. Petersburg (Seraphim), then informed him of the accomplishment of the re-union, and, in the name of the Church of all the Russias, complimented him, as the representative of the re-united clergy, on so wished-for an event. Philacet, the metropolitan of Kieff and Galicia, read the synodal decree addressed to the re-united clergy ; and the metropolitan of Moscow and Kolómna the supreme confirmation of the ordinance of the Synod, changing the name of the Greco-Uniate ecclesiastical college to that of the Lithuanian College of White Russia, and appointing for its president the Lithuanian bishop, Joseph, who was, at the same time, raised to the dignity of an archbishop. The most reverend Joseph presented the thanks of the whole re-united body ; and, after mutually greeting each other with the kiss of peace, they all repaired to the synodal church, where a grateful ‘Te Deum’ was offered up to Almighty God.

"The happy spectacle and the re-union was repeated at Vitebsk, Polotsk, Velije, Suraje, Orsha, Minsk, and Vilna. Without agitation or disturbance, brother returned to brother; and, from that time, the whole of the population of the western region of the empire, with the exception of the properly so-called Lithuanians and Jmudi, is become not only Russian, but also Orthodox."

*Page 108.*¹

"The Russian army is known to all Europe, which for more than a hundred years has resounded with our victories; but never did our army attain to such a pitch of discipline as it now may boast of. The military ordinances carefully revised, reduced to unity, ameliorated and augmented from the most important rules and regulations of the operative army, to the utmost minutiae, and the management of the commissariat, have revived and harmonized all the parts of so vast and complicated a machine, the chief strength of which lies in its proper arrangement. All the obligations of service, all the conditions of authority and responsibility, have been defined with greater accuracy, and a regular audit appointed."

Page 109.

"Military promotion has, in the course of the last twenty years, taken a new direction; now-a-days, it is difficult for an officer who has not received a fundamental and solid education to obtain a commission. The guards, the army, and the fleet, are yearly replenished, for the greater part, from such as have been reared in the cadet corps. The engineer and artillery schools, and other establishments for military instruction, are under vigilant inspection; therein future officers, from their youth up, become accustomed to the order of service, to the unconditional accomplishment of their duties, learn the military art experimentally and scientifically, acquire an emulation to noble ambition, and enter the world with a mind enlightened, and with a soul full of the most lively gratitude to him who cares for them as his own children."

Page 110.

"Our home security, the order of the administration, our reputation and property, are protected by the national statutes, reduced to a perfect system, accessible to all now-a-days, to all comprehensible, and annually corrected and augmented according to the dictates of experience. Of course, the very best laws are powerless, the most prudent measures fruitless, when in the general mass there is no inward, moral persuasion of the indispensable necessity of a friendly cooperation with the Government; but, thanks to the Almighty, Russia is not in such a position; with love, with confidence, she turns her regard upon her monarch, and each estate devotedly honours his commands. The laws, as the expression of the imperial will, are to us sacred."

Page 111.

"But this is not all; our wants and necessities, our merits and failings, clearly analysed, maturely and sagaciously deliberated upon, together with

the ukase on the subject of entail, the establishment of a class of honorary citizens, commercial tribunals, an amicable division of previously unsurveyed lands, a new order of administration of the state, with many other measures, are beyond all doubt bringing our social condition to a state of perfection.

“New ways and resources are opened to the industry of the country, and new means granted for its active development. Its very success rejoices the heart of the sovereign; and, constantly animated by his beneficent attention, it will rapidly approach that state when foreign wares will only be required to satisfy inordinate luxury.”

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“A new direction, more conformable to the general welfare of the people, has been given to the education of the young. The time is gone by when the children of magnates, of landlords, distinguished or obscure, even of wealthy plebeians, received their education abroad, forgot their native tongue, acquired a strange manner of looking on all about them, and returned to Russia with souls impassive to everything that was dear and agreeable to a Russian heart. That time is gone by, when our domestic tutors were not unfrequently profoundly ignorant men, immoral adventurers, often banished from their country, and received by us into the bosom of our families, merely to prattle in the French language. Two imperial regulations have saved a whole generation from a moral plague. Since the year 1831, the youth of Russia have been brought up preferably in the educational institutions of the country: since 1833, Russia has been delivered from an irruption of foreign adventurers, who took alarm at the threat of a severe examination at the universities.

“Never was our education so liberal, so complete, and, let us boldly add, so conformable to the true necessities of the empire, as it is now. Even in the first year after his accession to the throne, the Emperor, by repeatedly visiting the educational institutions, without any previous notice of his Majesty’s intention having been given, became convinced that they stood in need of many things—of competent masters, well regulated uniform order, of active and enlightened instruction. The pupils of the gymnasia, and the district seminaries, were formerly lodged in crowded rooms, and brought up without regard to cleanliness. The Petersburg university, founded not long ago with the most brilliant expectations, presented a melancholy spectacle; the lecture-rooms were deserted. The design of the founder, to make this institution the principal nursery of enlightenment in the capital of his empire, was not successful; it withered visibly under the onerous influence of people opposed to true advancement. Disorders of various kinds, indicative of a sort of debility, of a species of stupor, were not likely to attract the young to the other altars of science. Yet all was resuscitated, all re-animated, all flourished, at the will of the Emperor.

“The first and chief care, at the very beginning of his Majesty’s reign, was to introduce into all the establishments uniformity and order, to provide efficient masters, to appoint a vigilant superintendence, and to train

meritorious persons to perform the difficult duties of preceptors. Very soon the charters of the high, middle, and inferior educational institutions were renewed; the activity of the universities was concentrated in their sphere of action; the professors were exempted from many embarrassments unconnected with their functions; and their salaries, raised to more than double the former standard, with many other privileges, placed them in a position enviable even for a foreigner."

Page 114.

"The gradual transformation for the better of the composition of the university body, in consequence of limiting the term of service of a learned professor to five-and-twenty years, supplying the chairs with young masters of fresh energies, but not, however, without their having taken the learned degree of doctor,—arranging a course of lectures on jurisprudence, on the principles adopted at the foundation of the compendium of the laws of the Russian empire,—founding faculties,—enforcing the study of sciences of general utility,—creating new regulations for attaining a learned degree,—and many other measures, excited remarkable activity in our universities. The instruction afforded in them acquired the character of a solid and learned elucidation of truths, according to the principal branches of learning, and conformably to the contemporary state of science in the spirit of the country's laws. Their lecture-rooms were filled with numerous auditors. The gymnasia were also remodelled, more in unison with their principal design—to prepare youth for the higher education of the universities. Besides this, in some of them, lectures on practical science were founded, which opened to the working class the means of obtaining such technical knowledge as was indispensably necessary to it. Distinct seminaries, with each returning year, are more and more multiplied. Accessible to all conditions, they extend, primarily and generally, useful knowledge to all ranks of society.

"In an equal degree, during the last twenty years, the country's other nurseries of education have flourished. The military educational institutions, from the time that the Grand Duke Mikhail Parlovitch took them under his rule, have received a new form; and there is no doubt that they can bear inspection with the best in Europe. But the institutions for the education of young ladies, brought to the highest degree of perfection by the activity of the never-to-be-forgotten Empress, Maria Féodorovna, have not only not lost their former splendour; but, in consequence of the indefatigable care of the sovereign himself, his consort, their majesties' daughters, and daughter-in-law, fear no comparison with any in Europe.

"Not satisfied with the palmy state to which all the former academical institutions have been already brought, the Emperor continually presents new means of education, adapting them to the national necessities. The university of St. Vladimir, at Kieff—the military academy—the law-school—the Technological institution—the cadet corps in the Governments—the institutions for young ladies through the whole extent of the empire—

many special schools, both military and civil—village schools—asylums,—all those establishments, in association with the former, will at length accomplish the idea of Betskii, which fascinated Catherine II. by its greatness, and astounded even her by the vastness of its design—to educate the rising generation so as to rear, as it were, a new race of men possessing all the good qualities of the old stock, but without its imperfections and prejudices.

“The future is known but to God. If, however, universal and fundamental education may serve as a sure pledge of the future, of which there can scarcely be a doubt, then a happy lot is in store for Russia.”

Travels in Siberia by S. S. Hill, vol. i. page 60.

“With Russian subjects, from the prince to the serf, there is no difference in their relation to the sovereign. To the sovereign all his subjects are as the members of one family, and equal to one another. But this will more particularly appear, if we take a slight review of the rural institutions which are established throughout several districts, and in the villages in many parts of the country.

“These institutions belong to the patriarchal component of the mixed form of government above described. Their organization is of a popular character, and they present so remarkable a feature in the Russian system of government and social economy generally, that they ought not to be passed over in the shortest account that could be given of the country. Their organization is not, however, in all parts where they prevail, alike. But we will chiefly consider them in those districts where the serfs of the crown are in the majority, and where the crown is more free to perform what it lists, and where, too, they have lately undergone modifications which will doubtless, ere long, lead to a similar reorganization of all the rest.

“The institution is a community or commune, formed after the model of a family, in the relation of its members to one another and to their common head, upon a more or less grand scale. The chief, or presiding magistrate, is elected by the suffrages of the people, and is variously named, according to the degree of importance of the particular society over which he presides, as we shall presently see. This body possesses all the soil that lies within the bounds of its ascendancy, of which every member is entitled to an equal proportion, but of which he enjoys only the usufructs. Thus, at the decease of the father of a family, the estate which he has enjoyed does not go to his children, but reverts to the whole society, every individual member of which is entitled to an equal share. Thus, it will be seen, that this community and the grand family of the nation are herein the copy and reflex of one another. The sovereign is the chief of the whole nation, and every community severally is one of the members of his grand family, all of which are equally under his patriarchal authority and protection.”

“Out of a population of about 73,000,000, there are in Russia about 36,000,000 in that state of bondage which some denominate slavery, and

others serfage ; but which at least resembles, though it is not exactly the same as, that of our peasantry under the feudal system of the middle ages. These serfs are nearly all of the purely Russian blood of the Sclavonic race, very few of the rest of the several other races having been at any time subjected to the same degradation. We must refer to the origin of these relations between the noble and the peasant, in order to show their true character.”—Vol. i. p. 63.

“The Russian Church may be considered, then, to be thus now constituted: the Emperor is the supreme head of the Church, and all ecclesiastical affairs are administered by the Council or Synod such as it was established by Peter the Great, and which is composed both of ecclesiastical and lay members, not limited in number.

“The Synod, as regularly constituted, consists of two metropolitans, two bishops, the highest secular priest of the realm, the procurator or attorney-general, two secretaries of state, five under-secretaries, and a certain number of the lesser officials in the civil service of the Government.

“Among the most remarkable of the ordinances of the Russian Church, considered in regard to its influence upon the manners of the people, is the partial celibacy of the clergy, and the rigour with which marriage is required where celibacy is not enjoined. Thus, while with the higher dignitaries, who are always of the monastic order, which is termed that of the black clergy, celibacy is required ; with those of the secular order, or that of the white clergy, who are of every grade, and are called popes, marriage is enjoined even before they can be ordained. Nevertheless the popes, in case of the decease of their wives, cannot form a second alliance, and, consequently, in that event they usually enter the monastic order, through which they may now attain the highest dignities.”—Vol. i. p. 67.

“The dissenting sects of all denominations are said to be not less than fifty in number, and to include every degree of superstition, from the more moderate, which arises from the mere veil drawn by misguided zeal over their better reason, to the most gross and the most shocking that were ever combined with the name of Christianity. Some have no priests ; but these, many Italians and many Spaniards might say, must be the most fortunate of them all. Others only differ in certain rites, which appear to us to be mere childish objects of contention. Others have merely their churches built in different forms from the rest ; but would think it monstrously wicked to enter any house of prayer of any other form than that in which their own is constructed.”—Vol. i. p. 70.

“Returning to what properly regards the predominant Church, we cannot fail to be struck with the advantages which the Russian Church possesses over the Church of Rome, as well in its effects upon the morals of the people, as in relation to the world at large.

“One of the first things that strikes a Protestant stranger, after his arrival in Russia, is the great tolerance, not only of the state, but even of the clergy and people, whether towards foreigners, or towards the different sects within the country. In a single street in the modern metropolis, and

that, too, in which he finds the much-frequented cathedral of Kazau, he may enter a Lutheran church, a Romish church, one belonging to the Sunnites, another to the Schiites, an Armenian church, and at least two more, of the very names of which he perhaps never heard before. But, besides these, he may find many other churches of other sects, in the different parts of the town, including, of course, an English church.

"The next advantage of the Russian Church over the Italian, is the performance of the divine offices in a known tongue, the Sclavonic, which, though it may at this day be considered by many as at least a half-dead language, is, nevertheless, better than the Latin, on account of its being still intelligible to the classes that most need instruction.

"The reading of the Scriptures, both in private and in public, the former of which the clergy rather recommend than discourage, may also be considered among the advantages of the Russian Church.

"Certain restrictions, however, are conjoined with this privilege, though not every one even among ourselves, perhaps, will differ from the Russian clergy concerning the value of these. By the Russians it is deemed improper that girls at too tender an age should be acquainted with the history of vices and crimes, found in the Old Testament more especially, but also in the New. All of the delicate sex, therefore, are restricted, until they attain the age of thirty, from acquiring any other knowledge of the sacred writings than such as they may obtain from passages that are used in the churches, and from the portions that appear in certain authorized publications.

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"We had, previously to the journey we had undertaken together, severally visited the two great capitals, as well as some other towns of the empire, and we had now seen many of the villages. We had mixed more or less with the inhabitants everywhere, and had had the opportunity of observing something of the character and manners of the people, and of comparing these with such as we had observed among the people of the elder nations of Western Europe. To express our impressions in a few words, it must suffice to say, that we both quitted Russia Proper with high opinions of two out of four classes of the people with whom we had come most frequently in contact, or with whom we had had the best opportunity of associating, and with the reverse impression of the remaining classes. The Russian educated gentleman, and the mujik or peasant, had by their suavity and politeness, however differently those were displayed, wherever we met them, and in all transactions we had had with them, equally gained our regard and esteem. But of the inferior classes of the commercial part of the population, and the under classes of the chinovnik or officials generally, we unwillingly entertained the most unfavourable impressions. Nevertheless, the good elements are so predominant in the proper Russian character, as it must be perceived from the conduct of the peasant, whose most conspicuous qualities are piety, loyalty, fidelity, hospitality, quickness, and everlasting good humour, and are so deeply seated, that we may hope, as an accomplished education has finished the gentleman, some improvement in the adaptation of the education of the other classes may effect great and early

changes in their manners also, and in their moral character. It is, however, at present said, and, I am persuaded, with good reason, that such knowledge as these classes have been able to acquire, has hitherto tended rather to corrupt than improve both their manners and moral conduct, and become a positive evil instead of a blessing to themselves and all their fellow-subjects."—Vol. i. p. 71, &c.

"But not to guides with pistols, daggers, and other weapons, which we have seen prepared for their protection, did this good family wholly trust for their security. According to the commendable custom of their country, they had fixed upon the hour previous to their departure, to invoke, with the aid of the chief pope of Yakautsk, the favour and protection of Heaven during the arduous journey; and as the pope, with his assistants, was already in attendance, and the hour appointed for the performance of his sacred offices at hand, I willingly accepted an invitation which was given me to join in their pious duties.

"When we were all assembled in the largest apartment in the house, the pope, with his assistants, bearing the holy water and some other little appurtenances to Russian worship, took his place in the centre of the room, with the crucifix in his hand, and his face turned towards the holy corner, in which a picture hung, while the rest of the party knelt; and in this so lately pagan land the simplest adorations of the Christian party were now sung, and their prayers offered up to Heaven for the safety of the travellers, and for the happy issue of their adventurous journey.

"The service was in the Slavonic dialect, but with such simplicity and feeling, and apparent neglect of the enforced ceremonies of the Church, were the sacred offices performed, that the language in which the prayers were uttered needed not to be translated, to touch the hearts of all that were present. As the hymn especially, with which the service concluded, was sung, it seemed as if there were nothing wanting to the purity of the worship of our first parents, when 'they lowly bowed adoring' Him, who out of nothing called them into being, or of that of men before they first bowed the knee before gods made of their own hands, or worshipped worse images of their imaginations.

"When all our orisons were duly paid, the pope gave us his benediction, with a most liberal sprinkling of holy water, of which I received my full complement, and of which I am bound, indeed, to say, that I was never, upon such occasions, stinted on account of my nation and religion, and that I never received less of anything the Church had to bestow, in the way of blessing, than the most pious Russian.

"As soon as the touching service was over, the scene changed to worldly affairs, in the immediate preparations for the departure of the travellers, and I now took leave of my amiable friends, and, an hour afterwards, they set out on their perilous journey."—Vol. ii. p. 222.

The following extracts, regarding the state of Russia, are chiefly extracted from that curious and valuable work, entitled "*Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign, how it would, and how it may be extinguished*,"

by H. C. Carey, Esq. of Philadelphia, so well known for his many valuable statistical and political writings. The judicious mode pursued for extinguishing serfdom in Russia is very valuable and important.

"The industry of Russia," says a recent American journal, "has been built up, as alone the industry of a nation can be, under a system of protection, from time to time modified as experience has dictated, but never destroyed by specious abstractions, or the dogmas of mere doctrinaires. Fifty years ago manufactures were unknown there, and the caravans trading to the interior, and supplying the wants of distant tribes in Asia, were laden with the products of British and other foreign workshops. When the present Emperor mounted the throne, in 1825, the country could not produce the cloth required to uniform its own soldiers; further back, in 1800, the exportation of coloured cloth was prohibited under severe penalties; but, through the influence of adequate protection, as early as 1834, Russian cloth was taken by the caravans to Kiakhta; and at this day the markets of all Central Asia are supplied by the fabrics of Russian looms, which, in Affghanistan and China, are crowding British cloths entirely out of sale, notwithstanding the latter have the advantage in transportation; while in Tartary and Russia itself, British woollens are scarcely heard of. In 1812, there were in Russia 136 cloth factories; in 1824, 324; in 1812 there were 129 cotton factories; in 1824, 484. From 1812 to 1839 the whole number of manufacturing establishments in the empire more than trebled, and since then they have increased in a much greater ratio, though, from the absence of official statistics, we are not able to give the figures. Of the total amount of manufactured articles consumed in 1843, but one-sixth were imported. And along with this vast aggrandizement of manufacturing industry and commerce, there has been a steady increase of both imports and exports, as well as of revenue from customs. The increase in imports has consisted of articles of luxury, and raw materials for manufacture. And, as if to leave nothing wanting in the demonstration, the increase of exports has constantly included more and more of the products of agriculture. Thus, in this empire, we see what we must always see under an adequate and judicious system of protection, that a proper tariff not only improves, refines, and diversifies the labour of a country, but enlarges its commerce, increases the prosperity of its agricultural population, renders the people better and better able to contribute to the support of the Government, and raises the nation to a position of independence and real equality among the powers of the globe. All this is indubitably proved by the example of Russia,

for there protection has been steady and adequate, and the consequences are what we have described."—*Pages 326, 327.*

"It is absurd to do what travellers insist on doing—that is, to judge every nation by the highest standard, and pronounce each a failure which does not exhibit the intellect of France, the solidity and power of England, or the enterprise, liberty, and order of the United States. All that should be asked is, whether a people has surpassed its own previous condition, and is in the way of improvement and progress ? And that, in respect of industry, at least, Russia is in that way, her show at the Exhibition may safely be taken as a brilliant and conclusive proof.

"Russia is powerful, and is becoming more so daily. Why is it so ? It is because her people are daily more and more learning the advantages of diversification of labour and combination of exertion, and more and more improving in their physical and intellectual condition—the necessary preliminaries to an improvement of their political condition. Turkey is weak ; and why is it so ? Because among her people the habit of association is daily passing away, as the few remaining manufactures disappear, and as the travelling pedlar supersedes the resident shopkeeper."—*Page 328.*

"We have an increase in three years of almost sixty per cent., proving a steady increase in the power to obtain clothing, and to maintain commerce, external and internal, directly the reverse of what has been observed in Turkey, Ireland, India, and other countries in which the British system prevails ; and the reason of this is, that that system looks to destroying the power of association. It would have all the people of India engage themselves in raising cotton, and all those of Brazil and Cuba in raising sugar, while those of Germany and Russia should raise food and wool ; and we know well that when all are farmers, or all planters, the power of association scarcely exists : the consequence of which is seen in the exceeding weakness of all the communities of the world in which the plough and the loom, the hammer and the harrow, are prevented from coming together. It is an unnatural one."—*Page 329.*

"There does not prevail that marked distinction between the modes of life of the dwellers in town and country which is found in other countries ; and the general freedom of trade, which in other countries is still an object of exertion, has existed in Russia since a long bygone period. A strong manufacturing and industrial tendency prevails in a large portion of Russia, which, based upon the communal system, has led to the formation of what we may term 'national association factories.'

"There exists no such thing as a trade guild or company, nor any restraint of a similar nature. Any member of a commune can at pleasure

abandon the occupation they may be engaged in, and take up another ; all that he has to do, in effecting the change, is to quit the commune in which his old trade is carried on, and repair to another, where his new one is followed.

"The tendency of manufacturing industry is, for the most part, entirely communal. The inhabitants of one village, for example, are all shoemakers ; in another, smiths ; in a third, tanners, only ; and so on. A natural division of labour thus prevails exactly as in a factory. The members of the commune mutually assist one another with capital or labour ; purchases are usually made in common, and sales, also, invariably ; but they always send their manufactures in a general mass to the towns and market-places, where they have a common warehouse for their disposal." — *Page 330.*

"In the Government of Yaroslaf, the whole of the inhabitants of one place are potters. Upwards of two thousand inhabitants, in another place, are rope-makers and harness-makers. The population of the district of Uglitch, in 1835, sent three millions of yards of linen cloth to the markets of Kybecek and Moscow. The peasants, on one estate, are all candle-makers ; on a second, they are all manufacturers of felt hats ; and, on a third, they are solely occupied in smiths' work, chiefly the making of axes. In the district of Pashechæ, there are about seventy tanneries, which give occupation to a large number of families ; they have no paid workmen, but perform all the operations among themselves ; preparing leather to the value of about 25,000 roubles a year, and which is disposed of on their account in Kybecek. In the districts where the forest trees mostly consist of lindens, the inhabitants are principally engaged in the manufacture of matting, which, according to its greater or less degree of fineness, is employed either for sacking or sail-cloth, or merely as packing mats.

"We have here a system of combined exertion, that tends greatly to account for the rapid progress of Russia, in population, wealth, and power.

"The Russian," says our author, "has a great disposition for wandering about beyond his native place, but not for travelling abroad. The love of home seems to be merged, to a great extent, in love of country. A Russian feels himself at home everywhere within Russia ; and, in a political sense, this rambling disposition of the people, and the close intercourse between the inhabitants of the various provinces to which it leads, contributes to knit a closer bond of union between the people, and to arouse and maintain a national policy and a patriotic love of country. Although he may quit his native place, the Russian never wholly severs the connexion with it ; and, as we have before mentioned, being fitted by natural talent to turn his hand to any species of work, he in general never limits himself in his wanderings to any particular occupation, but tries at several, but chooses whatever may seem to him the most advantageous. When they pursue any definite extensive trade, such as that of a carpenter, mason, or the

like, in large towns, they associate together, and form a sort of trade's association ; and the cleverest assumes the position of a sort of contractor for the labour required."—*Pages 331, 332.*

"A recent English traveller in Russia presents a different state of feeling as there existing. 'The Russian coachman,' he says, 'seldom uses his whip, and generally only knocks with it upon the footboard of the sledge, by way of a gentle admonition to his steed—with whom, meanwhile, he keeps up a running colloquy, seldom giving him harder words than, "My brother—my friend—my little pigeon—my sweetheart." "Come, my pretty pigeon, make use of your legs," he will say. "What now! art blind? Come, be brisk! Take care of that stone, there. Don't see it? There, that's right! Bravo! hop, hop, hop! Steady, boy, steady! What art turning thy head for? Look out boldly before thee! hurra! yukh! yukh!"

"I could not,' he continues, 'help contrasting this with the offensive language we constantly hear in England, from carters and boys employed in driving horses. You are continually shocked by the oaths used. They seem to think the horses will not go, unless they swear at them ; and boys consider it manly to imitate this example, and learn to swear too, and break God's commandments, by taking his holy name in vain ; and this while making use of a fine noble animal he has given for our service, and not for abuse. There is much unnecessary cruelty in the treatment of these dumb creatures, for they are often beaten when doing their best, or from not understanding what their masters want them to do.'

"Of the truth of this, as regards England, the journals of that country often furnish most revolting evidence ; but the mere fact that there exists there a society for preventing cruelty to animals, would seem to show that its services had been much needed."—*Page 333.*

"The landholders,' says the same author before referred to, 'having serfs, gave them permission to engage in manufactures, and to seek for work for themselves where they liked, on the mere condition of paying their lord a personal tax (*obrok*). Each person is rated according to his personal capabilities, talents, and capacities, at a certain capital ; and according to what he estimates himself capable of gaining, he is taxed at a fixed sum, as interest of that capital. Actors and singers are generally serfs, and they are obliged to pay *obrok* for the exercise of their art, as much as the lowest handicraftsman. In recent times, the manufacturing system of Western Europe has been introduced into Russia, and the natives have been encouraged to establish all sorts of manufactures on these models ; and it remains to be seen whether the new system will have the anticipated effect of contributing to the formation of a middle class, which hitherto has been the chief want in Russia, as a political state.'

"That such must be the effect cannot be doubted. The middle

class has everywhere grown with the growth of towns and other places of local exchange; and men have become free, precisely as they have been able to unite together for the increase of the productiveness of their labour. In every part of the movement which thus tends to the emancipation of the serf, the Government is seen to be actively cooperating; and it is scarcely possible to read an account of what is there being done, without a feeling of great respect for the Emperor, 'so often,' says a recent writer, 'denounced as a deadly foe to freedom—the true father of his country, earnestly striving to develop and mature the rights of his subjects.'

"'For male serfs,' says the same author, 'at all times, until recently, military service was the only avenue to freedom. It required, however, twenty years' service, and by the close of that time the soldier became so accustomed to that mode of life that he rarely left it. A few years since, however, the term was shortened to eight years, and thousands of men are now annually restored to civil life, free men, who, but a few years previously, had been slaves, liable to be bought and sold with the land.'

"Formerly, the lord had the same unlimited power of disposing of his serfs that is now possessed by the people of our southern states. The serf was a mere chattel—an article of traffic and merchandise; and husbands and wives, parents and children, were constantly liable to be separated from each other. By an ukase of 1827, however, they were declared an integral and inseparable portion of the soil.

"'The immediate consequence of this decree,' says Mr. Jerrman, 'was the cessation, at least in its most repulsive form, of the degrading traffic in human flesh, by sale, barter, or gift. Thenceforward no serf could be transferred to another owner, except by the sale of the land to which he belonged. To secure to itself the refusal of the land, and the human beings appertaining to it, and at the same time to avert from the landowner the ruin consequent on dealing with usurers, the Government established an imperial loan bank, which made advances on mortgage of lands, to the extent of two-thirds of their value. The borrowers had to pay back each year three per cent. of the loan, besides three per cent. interest. If they failed to do this, the crown returned them the instalments already paid, gave them the remaining third of the value of the property, and took possession of the land and its population. This was the first stage of freedom for the serfs; they became crown peasants, held their dwellings and bit of land as an hereditary fief from the crown, and paid annually for the same a sum total of five roubles (about four shillings for each male person); a rent for which, assuredly, in the whole of Germany, the very poorest farm is not to be had; to say nothing of the consideration that, in case of bad harvests, destruction by hail, disease, &c.,

the Crown is bound to supply the strict necessities of its peasants, and to find them in daily bread, in the indispensable stock of cattle and seed-corn, to repair their habitations, and so forth.

"By this arrangement, and in a short time, a considerable portion of the lands of the Russian nobility became the property of the state, and with it a large number of serfs became crown peasants. This was the first and most important step toward opening the road to freedom to that majority of the Russian population which consists of slaves."

We have here the stage of preparation for that division of the land which has in all countries of the world attended the growth of wealth and population, and which is essential to further growth, not only in wealth, but in freedom. Consolidation of the land has everywhere been the accompaniment of slavery, and so must it always be. —*Pages 334 and 335.*

At the next step, we find the Emperor bestowing upon the serf, as preparatory to entire freedom, certain civil rights.

"An ukase permitted them to enter into contracts. Thereby was accorded to them, not only the right of possessing property, but the infinitely higher blessing of a legal recognition of their moral worth as men. Hitherto the serf was recognised by the state only as a sort of beast in human form. He could hold no property, give no legal evidence, take no oath. No matter how eloquent his speech, he was dumb before the law. He might have treasures in his dwelling, the law knew him only as a pauper. His word and honour were valueless, compared to those of the vilest freeman. In short, morally, he could not be said to exist. The Emperor Nicholas gave to the serfs, that vast majority of his subjects, the first sensation of moral worth, the first throb of self-respect, the first perception of the rights and dignity and duty of man. What professed friend of the people can boast to have done more, or yet so much, for so many millions of men?"

"Having given the serfs power to hold property, the Emperor now," says our author, "taught them to prize the said property above all in the interest of their freedom." The serf "could not buy his own freedom, but he became free by the purchase of the patch of soil to which he was linked. To such purchase, the right of contract cleared his road. The lazy Russian who worked with an ill will toward his master, doing as little as he could for the latter's profit, toiled day and night for his own advantage. Idleness was replaced by the diligent improvement of his farm; brutal drunkenness by frugality and sobriety; the earth, previously neglected, required the unwonted care with its richest treasures. By the magic of industry, wretched hovels were transformed into comfortable dwellings, wildernesses into blooming fields, desolate steppes and deep morasses into productive land; whole communities lately sunk in poverty, exhibited unmistakeable signs of competency and well-doing. The serfs, now allowed to enter into contracts, lent the lord of the soil the money of which he

often stood in need, on the same conditions as the Crown, receiving in security the land they occupied, their own bodies, and the bodies of their wives and children. The nobleman preferred the serf's loan to the Government's loan, because, when pay-day came for the annual interest and instalment, the Crown, if he was not prepared to pay, took possession of his estate, having funds wherewith to pay him the residue of its value. The parish of serfs, which had lent money to its owner, lacked these funds. Pay-day came, the debtor did not pay, but neither did the serfs produce the one-third of the value of the land which they must disburse to him in order to be free. Thus they lost their capital, and did not gain their liberty : but Nicholas lived, the father of his subjects.

"Between the anxious debtor and the still more anxious creditor, now interposed an Imperial ukase, which, in such cases, opened to the parishes of serfs the imperial treasury. Mark this ; for it is worthy to be noted, the Russian imperial treasury was opened to the serfs, that they might purchase their freedom."—*Page 336.*

"The Government might simply have released the creditors from their embarrassment, by paying the debtor the one-third still due to him, and then land and tenants belonged to the state,—one parish the more of Crown peasants. Nicholas did not adopt that course. He lent the serfs the money they needed to buy themselves from their master ; and for this loan (a third only of their value), they mortgaged themselves and their lands to the Crown ; paid annually three per cent. interest, and three per cent. of the capital ; and would thus in about thirty years be free, and proprietors of their land. That they would be able to pay off this third was evident, since, to obtain its amount, they had still the same resources which enabled them to save up the two-thirds already paid. Supposing, however, the very worst, that through inevitable misfortunes, such as pestilence, disease of cattle, &c., they were prevented satisfying the rightful claims of the Crown,—in that case, the Crown paid them back the two-thirds value which they had previously disbursed to their former owner, and they became a parish of Crown peasants, whose lot, compared to their earlier one, was still enviable. But not once in a hundred times do such cases occur ; while, by the above plan, whole parishes gradually acquire their freedom, not by a sudden and violent change, which could not fail to have some evil consequences, but in course of time, after a probation of labour and frugality, and after thus attaining to the knowledge that without these two great factors of true freedom no real liberty can possibly be durable."

"The free peasants as yet constitute a small class, but they live as free and happy men, upon their own land ; are active, frugal, and without exception well off. This they must be, for considerable means are necessary for the purchase of their freedom ; and once free and in possession of a farm of their own, their energy and industry, manifested even in a state of slavery, are redoubled by the enjoyment of personal liberty, and their earnings naturally increase in a like measure.

"The second class, the Crown peasants, are far better off (setting aside,

of course, the consciousness of freedom) than the peasants of Germany. They must furnish their quota of recruits, but that is their only material burden. Besides that, they annually pay to the Crown a sum of five roubles (about four shillings) for each male person of the household. Supposing the family to include eight working men, which is no small number for a farm, the yearly tribute paid amounts to thirty-two shillings. And what a farm that must be that employs eight men all the year round! In what country of civilized Europe has the peasant so light a burden to bear? How much heavier those which press upon the English farmer, the French, the German, and above all the Austrian, who often gives up three-fourths of his harvest in taxes. If the Crown peasant be so fortunate as to be settled in the neighbourhood of a large town, his prosperity soon exceeds that even of the Altenburg husbandmen, said to be the richest in all Germany. On the other hand, he can never purchase his freedom; hitherto, at least, no law of the Crown has granted him this privilege."—*Pages 337, 338.*

That this, however, is the tendency of every movement, must be admitted by all who have studied the facts already given, and who read the following account of the commencement of local self-government:—

"But what would our ardent anti-Russians say, if I took them into the interior of the empire, gave them an insight into the organization of parishes, and showed, to their infinite astonishment, what they never yet dreamt of, that the whole of that organization is based upon republican principles; that there everything has its origin in election by the people; and that that was already the case at a period when a great mass of German democrats did not so much as know the meaning of popular franchise? Certainly the Russian serfs do not at the present day know what it means; but without knowing the name of the thing, without ever having heard a word of Lafayette's ill-omened '*Trône monarchique environné d'institutions républicaines*,' they choose their own elders, their administrators, their dispensers of justice and finance, and never dream that they, slaves, enjoy and benefit by privileges by which some of the most civilized nations have proved themselves incapable of profiting.

"Space does not here permit a more extensive sketch of what the Emperor Nicholas has done, and still is daily doing, for the true freedom of his subjects; but what I have here brought forward must surely suffice to place him, in the eyes of every unprejudiced person, in the light of a real lover of his people. That his care has created a paradise; that no highly criminal abuse of power, no shameful neglect, prevails in the departments of justice and police, it is hoped no reflecting reader will infer from this exposition of facts. But the still existing abuses alter nothing in my view of the Emperor's character, of his assiduous efforts to raise his nation out of the deep slough in which it still is partly sunk, of his efficacious endeavours to elevate his people to a knowledge and use of their rights as

men—alter nothing in my profound persuasion that Czar Nicholas I. is the true father of his country.”

We are told that the policy of Russia is adverse to the progress of civilization, while that of England is favourable to it; and that we should aid the latter in opposing the former. How is this to be proved? Shall we look to Ireland for the proof? If we do, we shall meet there nothing but famine, pestilence, and depopulation. Or to Scotland, where men, whose ancestors had occupied the same spot for centuries, are being hunted down that they may be transported to the shores of the St. Lawrence, there to perish, as they so recently have done, of cold and of hunger? Or to India, whose whole class of small proprietors and manufacturers has disappeared under the blighting influence of her system, and whose commerce now diminishes from year to year? Or to Portugal, the weakest and most wretched of all the communities of Europe? Or to China, poisoned with smuggled opium, that costs the nation annually little less than 40,000,000 of dollars, without which the Indian Government could not be maintained? Look where we may, we see a growing tendency toward slavery wherever the British system is permitted to obtain; whereas freedom grows in the ratio in which that system is repudiated.

That such must necessarily be the case will be seen by every reader who will for a moment reflect on the difference between the effect of the Russian system on the condition of women, and that of the British system on the condition of those of India. In the former, there is everywhere arising a demand for women to be employed in the lighter labour of conversion, and thus do they tend from day to day to become more self-supporting, and less dependent on the will of husbands, brothers, and sons. In the other, the demand for their labour has passed away, and their condition declines; and so it must continue to do while Manchester shall be determined upon closing the domestic demand for cotton, and driving the whole population to the cultivation of sugar, rice, and cotton, for export to England.

The system of Russia is attractive of population, and French, German, and American mechanics, of every description, find demand for their services. That of England is repulsive, as is seen by the forced export of men from England, Scotland, and Ireland, and India; now followed by whole cargoes of women, sent out by aid of public contributions,—presenting a spectacle almost as humiliating to the pride of the sex as can be found in the slave bazaar of Constantinople.

DON COSSACKS.

Amongst the bugbears and humbugs called forth to alarm us, that of being overrun by the Cossacks, who are supposed to be a people something akin to devils or demons, is not the least prominent. A clergyman of no mean celebrity, Dr. Cumming, and who might have been supposed to know better, asks in his sermons, entitled "*War and its Issues*," p. 65, "What does a Don Cossack know of Christianity? Your arguments fall on him as snow-flakes on ETNA;—go and preach to him the Gospel to make him a Christian first." Now we reply to this derision, it is only necessary to state facts, namely, that the Don Cossack is a Christian. His faith is that of the earlier Greek Church, and purer than it is now practised in the Greek Church in Turkey, or than the Russian Church, with all the reforms which have taken place in it of late years. Such are the Don Cossacks, after ages of cruel persecutions by the Tartars, the original race from which the Turks descended, on the one hand, and by the Turks and the Polish Roman Catholics on the other. Dr. Clarke gives us the following not very terrifying picture of their life and manners; but previous to extracting this, let us attend for a moment to the cause of their voluntary submission to the crown of Russia, as we find the interesting facts stated in Cantemir's "*History of Turkey*," Book IV. pp. 287—289. It will show us something not very generally known of the character and conduct of the Turks, Poles, and Hungarians, very faithfully, it is believed, drawn by the hand of dear-bought experience. The following is the speech of their chief, *Doroshenko*, hetman of the Sari Camysh Cazagy, (*Cossacks of the Yellow Reed*), to his followers on the occasion :—

"I imagined (says he) that, oppressed and contemptuously treated by the Poles, we might find a sure refuge under the protection of the Turks. They were so remote from our borders that there seemed no reason to fear them; and their name so formidable to their enemies, that a ship under their colours seemed to be as safe as in the very harbour. To these considerations were added the promises made to us, such as we could scarce have asked for; namely, the enjoyment of our civil and religious liberties, freedom from tribute, and a large share of the booty which we should gain in their service. That they would perform these promises I was inclined to believe, chiefly because they seemed the more desirous of our friendship, as they had more than once found us formidable enemies. But how little *sincerity* is to be expected among infidels, is sufficiently evident from what we have seen with our own eyes. When, to demonstrate my fidelity, I marched in the Polish war to their assistance with a good part of the army, I was not

only not received with due honour, but treated with contempt, and, like a traitor, commanded to return home. They were jealous of our being eye-witnesses to their conduct, and apprehensive lest the sight of our churches turned into mosques, contrary to the most solemn engagements, and the *transplanting* the inhabitants into barren lands, should open our eyes and teach us what we were to expect. When a peace was concluded with the Poles, they freed us indeed from the yoke of that nation ; but so freed us that they have laid a heavier on our necks. Hence they voluntarily resigned to the Poles the chief bulwarks of their country, Bialocerskiew and Pawolocz. Hence they, who at other times, upon the slightest injury, breathe nothing but fire and sword, pass over in strange silence the prohibition of commerce, and other Polish acts, by which we are daily exhausted, and the best part of our blood sucked out ; that weakened and deprived of our strength, we may be rendered incapable of making any resistance whenever they shall think proper to impose their tyranny upon us. These were the artifices of the Othman princes, by which they founded and immensely enlarged their empire ; to *overcome* Christians by Christians, to subdue both when exhausted by a long war, and when subdued, to treat them at first with lenity, and afterwards, by degrees, to lay so heavy a yoke upon them, that the weight may at last stupify the bearers. If any should doubt of this, or imagine I speak out of envy to the Turks, he will have a convincing proof in the princes of Moldavia, who *were not subdued by the Turks with arms*, but allured by mild speeches and promises of liberty to a voluntary submission, and yet are now oppressed with the same servitude as the rest of the Christians under the Othman dominion. Taught by these examples, I too late lament our error ; however it is not so late, but a remedy may be applied to the wound, if you will show yourselves worthy your name and ancestors. But resolution alone is not sufficient ; strength is required in order to defend our religion and country, and to rescue ourselves from unjust servitude ; strength, I say, without which resolution is nothing but a head without a body. Since we are not equal to bearing both a Turkish and a Polish war, it is necessary for us to desire the assistance of our neighbours ; but of whom, it is our business to consider. We have already made sufficient trial of the Poles, and I imagine none of you will ever think of putting yourselves again under their yoke. The Hungarians and Germans are more solicitous about their own than the affairs of their neighbours. In short, there remains only the Czar of Russia, to whose father my predecessor, Bogdan Kiemielniski, many years since promised fidelity, but we were afterwards obliged, by force of arms, to abandon our engagements. If the word subjection appears disagreeable to any person, let him consider that liberty once lost, if it cannot be restored to its former lustre, will inquire, not where it may be freed from all, but where it may enjoy the easiest, conditions. We have nothing to fear as to our churches from a prince of the same religion as ourselves,—nothing as to fortunes from a prince who possesses much more by right than he can take from us with injustice. He is at present master of the best part of our country ; and, having amassed a vast treasure during a long peace, he can

easily defend us against any enemy whatever. That we should fly to his protection, we are obliged by justice, and the fidelity promised him by our fathers, and indeed by the necessity of our affairs, and the remembrance of his *former gentle dominion over us*. Nor is there the least doubt but he will both receive us with open arms as lost sons, and defend us as the bulwarks of his kingdom against our enemies."

The Russian sovereign readily accepted their allegiance, and from this period the Don Cossacks have remained faithful, grateful, and useful subjects of Russia. Their defection from the Turks, hurried the Ottoman Government into a war with Russia, in which victory declared for the latter power.

From Edinburgh Review, vol. xvi. pp. 362—365. Clarke's Travels.

"The account given of the Don Cossacks places that people in a perfectly new point of view. Instead of a horde of savages, nay, of the very worst of savages, as they are represented all over Europe, entirely from the habits of those whom the Russians have in their armies, and from the studious calumnies of the Russians, our author found them an innocent and daily improving race of men, infinitely less barbarous than the best of the Russians, and living among themselves in peace, comfort, and even wealth. Were we to add that he describes them as a civilized and a highly polished people, it might be suspected that we were misled either by our own enthusiasm, or by that which we had imbibed from our author. Yet so it is. We shall give one passage from many which might be selected to the same purpose.

" 'In Tscherschaskay they live an amicable and pleasant life. Sometimes they have public amusements, such as balls and parties of pleasure. Once they had a theatre, but it was prohibited. In some of their apartments we observed mahogany book-cases with glass doors, containing a small library. They are, in every respect, entitled to praise for their cleanliness, whether of their persons or their houses. There is no nation (I will not even except my own) more cleanly in their apparel than the Cossacks. The dress of their women is singular: it differs from all the costumes of Russia; and its magnificence is tested in the ornaments of a cap somewhat resembling the mitre of a Greek bishop. The hair of married women is tucked under this cap, which is covered with pearls and gold, or adorned with flowers. The dress of a Cossack girl is elegant—a silk tunic, with trowsers fastened by a girdle of solid silver, yellow boots, and an Indian handkerchief round the head. A proof of their riches was afforded in the instance of the mistress of the house where we lodged. This woman walked about the apartments without shoes or stockings, and being asked for some needles to secure the insects we had collected, opened a box in which she showed us pearls to the value of 10,000 rubles. Her cupboard at the same time was filled with plate and costly porcelain. The common dress of the men in Tscherschaskay was a blue jacket, with a waistcoat and trowsers of white

dimity ; the latter so white and spotless that they seemed always new. The tattered state of a traveller's wardrobe but ill fitted us to do credit to our country in this respect. I never saw a Cossack in a dirty suit of clothes. Their hands, moreover, are always clean, their hair free from vermin, their teeth white, and their skin has a healthy and cleanly appearance. Polished in their manners, instructed in their minds, hospitable, generous, disinterested in their hearts, humane and tender to the poor, good husbands, good fathers, good wives, good mothers, virtuous daughters, valiant and dutiful sons—such are the natives of Tscherchaskay. *In conversation the Cossack is a gentleman ; for he is well-informed, free from prejudice, open, sincere, and upright.* ”—Pages 292—294.

CIRCIASSIANS.

“The account which our travellers give of the Circassians presents a remarkable contrast, in almost every particular, to the foregoing sketch of the Cossacks. With the exception of the ferocious valour which the men, like all savages, possess, and the singular beauty of form which distinguishes the women, no one estimable quality is to be traced in either the description or the occurrences relating to this barbarous tribe.”

CHAPTER X.

CIRCASSIA—CHARACTER OF ITS PEOPLE—SCHAMYL THE IMPOSTOR—WHITE SLAVE TRADE IN CIRCASSIA AND TURKEY—BLACK SLAVE TRADE IN OTTOMAN TERRITORIES—GEORGIA AS IT WAS AND IS, ETC. ETC.

SCHAMYL.

AMONGST the new idols which we have selected for national admiration and worship, is the restless Caucasian chief and fanatic, daring impostor, and open *blasphemer* of the power and authority of the MOST HIGH—SCHAMYL. It is with pain it is perceived that a nobleman of such high standing and great abilities as Lord Lyndhurst should take this daring impostor and his ferocious companions under his wing. Surely his Lordship does not choose correctly, or he might have found and selected much more formidable weapons with which in party warfare he could have assailed the British Government and the Emperor of Russia. But his Lordship has made his selection, and therefore this public act of his on a public question comes fairly under review. The following is his Lordship's allusion to Schamyl and Circassia, in the House of Lords, June 19th, 1854 :—"Can it be supposed possible, after we have encouraged the Circassians *by every means in our power* to oppose themselves to the Russian forces, that we are prepared to restore their country again to Russia, by placing that power in the same position which she occupied before the war? (Hear, hear.) How unjust would that be to the Circassians, and to our allies in that part of the world! I think it would be wrong to conclude that such a course of proceeding could by any possibility, or under any circumstances, be adopted."—(*Report of speech, Morning Chronicle, June 21st, 1854.*) Here we have it stated, from high authority, that Great Britain has long encouraged these half savage tribes to act as they have done; an avowal which confers no honour upon this country. Thus encouraged, the prospect of hostilities between Russia and Turkey set these mountaineers in motion. Consul Yeames tells us (Part II. p. 162) that "the present disturbances in the Caucasus are notorious,

extending even to the south-western frontier, excited perhaps by emissaries, or by the near vicinity of a Mussulman army said to be now forming in that part of the Ottoman empire."

Of this man the *Times* of Sept. 15th says:—"Schamyl is employing fire as well as sword against his enemies. There is reason to fear that he has put all the unfortunate Russian ladies to death who had fallen into his hands.¹ Schamyl, *the gloomy fanatic*, with his bloodthirsty *Murides* (a kind of body guard), is not likely to be a favourite here in England." "The Tchetchenses, and Lesghians, and other tribes over which he rules, border (the Lesghians) within fifty miles of Teflis." The next day the same journal told us: "Schamyl has gained a great victory over the Russians at Teflis." "It is by exploits such as this (the destruction, *if true*, of 80 or 100 villages), by hard and frequent blows in well fought fields, and not by diplomatic negotiations, which lead to nothing, that the Emperor Nicholas will be brought to feel the hopeless nature of the struggle into which he has rushed, and that peace will be restored to the world." Thus the bloodthirsty impostor, Schamyl, becomes at once a hero and a god, when he engages to aid the allies and attack Russia! Let us attend to the character of this man, and the cruel tribes over which he rules, as these are drawn by an admiring and friendly hand as regards him, and by impartial authority as regards his people:—

Wrazhall's Schamyl.

"Schamyl rules over the subjected tribes of the Daghistan and Tchetchenia, as absolute monarch; and has exerted himself strenuously to form one nation out of them. The execution of this great plan, however, is attended by almost incalculable impediments. A number of tribes, among whom we may especially mention Karach, Andi, Salatan, and Andalal, obey the Imam rather through fear than attachment; for the Russians, well aware of the value of these districts, employ all their influence, and spare neither presents nor promises, to bring the inhabitants on their side. If, however, Schamyl remains several years longer in the unimpeded possession of these countries, it may be assumed that he will succeed, through his continual right selection of means, in fusing them permanently with his other possessions.

"The difficulties with which the Imam has to contend appear greater the more closely we examine into the condition of Daghistan before his time: he does not form his army of the chivalrous men of the Adichè, Ulychs, and Shapsuch; tribes, some of which have been degraded by years of slavery, others educated in robbery and plunder,—in whose hearts ambitious and ignorant priests had destroyed every feeling of reverence for religion,—who knew no other laws than traditional customs and their own

¹ Princess Orbellian, and several other ladies of rank, who attempted to resist their brutality, were first abused, and then literally hewn to pieces!

will—these were the principal members out of which Schamyl formed the terrible body whose soul he is. The most fight from a pure love of liberty ; many however, as can only be expected, for more ignoble ends. Some are seduced by the hope of booty, others by the fire of the eloquence, or fear of the certain revenge, of the Imam ; but the object of all is the expulsion of the Russians from Daghistan.”—*Wraxhall's Schamyl*, p. 71.

“In order to gain a higher degree of dignity, Schamyl has impregnated his Murides with the idea, that he carries on a regular correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey, and the Egyptian Pasha. The Russians assert that he frequently writes forged letters for this purpose, in which these princes give him assurances of friendship and speedy assistance, and that he then sends these false letters to the kadis and priests, with orders that they should be read in the mosques and national assemblies.

“His *pretended communications* with Allah and the Prophet he wisely allows only to occur once, at the most twice, in the year ; and, usually, about the time he is about to execute some great design.

“In order to prepare for the solemnity, he goes either into a hidden cave, or shuts himself up in his apartments, where he spends three weeks in fasting, praying, and reading the Koran. During this time, the house is most strictly guarded, and no one is allowed to enter. On the evening of the last day of his retirement, he assembles the highest leaders, and clergy, and announces to them in a solemn voice that Mahommed, the prophet, has appeared to him in the form of a dove, has given him commands, revealed great mysteries, or warned him to continue in the holy war. After this, he shows himself to the immense crowd that surrounds the house ; sings a few verses from the Koran ; and then holds a long speech, full of religious zeal, and hatred to the Russians. In this speech, the most important portions of the new revelation are announced to the people ; and, after this, a solemn hymn is sung by the entire assembly, all the arms-bearing men draw their daggers, renew their oath of fidelity, and hatred to the Russians, and then disperse, with the exclamation, ‘God is great ! Mahommed is his first prophet, and Schamyl his second !’

“The kadis and mullahs return to their aouls ; announce to the people all the miracles they have witnessed and heard ; and, through the whole country, a week of universal rejoicing and festivity follows the long fast of their adored Imam.

“Through his strict love of justice, to which even some of his many relations have fallen victims, it was only natural that Schamyl should have a number of powerful enemies, not only amongst the Tchetchenzes, but among the Lesghis, and he would long ago have fallen through the exercise of the blood revenge, were he not so personally cautious in the choice of his guards. He never appears alone. Access to his person is a matter of extreme difficulty to all who do not possess his confidence. He also is very particular about the strict performance of the appointed ceremonies ; any one who approaches him must, without distinction of rank or person, stoop down to the ground, and kiss the hem of his garment.”—*Page 72.*

"They form, at the same time, Schamyl's secret police. They have a watchful eye everywhere, and one accused by them is *executed without further inquiry*. Even the judges and priests are not safe from their prying eyes ; and they are the mortar, which binds together the stones out of which Schamyl has raised the fortifications of his power."—*Page 66.*

"It cannot be denied, that this trade with Circassian and Georgian girls has, at times, great drawbacks for themselves. The unhappy creatures, who are generally put on board the steamer that sails from Trebizonde, reach Constantinople in a most deplorable condition. Any one not thoroughly acquainted with the state of the case, may, perhaps, almost envy the captain who has under his charge such a poetical cargo ; but, unfortunately, these girls are as carefully guarded as if they were so many casks of leeches for the Marseilles market. They are, naturally, separated as much as possible from the remaining passengers, and huddled together, wrapped in their dusty clothes, like so many negro slaves. They are usually attacked with eruptions of the skin ; for they are most commonly sold by their parents through avarice or poverty, and *are delivered to the purchaser almost in a state of nudity*. If they were to be provided, in the first instance, with clean, respectable clothing, the whole of the profits would be lost. A ragged shirt, and a piece of linen to confine it round the shoulders, is the costume in which they huddle together, and whisper about the splendour promised them, or dream and think of their home from which they have been driven among strangers in this condition. The slave-dealers, with that narrow-mindedness which characterises every dealer in human flesh, feed these future favourites, during the voyage, on water and millet-broth. It may be easily imagined, that they reach the end of their journey in a condition which is of such a nature, that only a few connoisseurs of hidden charms would venture to express an opinion about them. At times, if the merchant wishes to get rid of his wares as quickly as possible, he drives his flock, in the miserable condition in which they have landed, to the market ; or, at the most, throws a feridjii over the poor creatures' shoulders—chance generally directs the sale. The buyer keeps at a distance from his merchandise, like a physician from a patient sick with the plague, and drives them before him to one of the numerous institutions where beings of this sort are polished up for the harem. A number of old women earn their living by polishing up this raw material. Through the application of remedies, which are guarded with great mystery, the girls are speedily cured of their disease, cleaned, and dressed with clean clothes, so that it is difficult to recognise them, if a person had seen them previously in their miserable condition on board ship."—*Wraxhall's Schamyl*, p. 92.

CIRCASSIANS—CHARACTER.

The inhabitants of the Caucasus are Alani, Suenes, Giguis, Caracicks or Cari Cherkis, or Black Circassians—so called because their country is always darkened with fogs and clouds. They are the fairest people in

the world. They were anciently Christians, but now profess no religion, but live by robbery and rapine, having nothing "*that can entitle them to humanity but speech.*" They are tall and portly, and their very looks and speech show their savage dispositions, being the most resolute assassins and daring robbers in the world.

"They have but one room for their whole family, and so lie all together. The men are well-shaped, and the women so handsome, that they seem born for commanding love." "They are witty and civil ; but, to balance that, haughty, deceitful, cruel, and impudent. The men have, also, many mischievous qualities, and there is no wickedness to which they are not addicted ; but that which they most delight in is theft. This they make their employment and glory. They justify it as lawful to have many wives ; because, they say, they bring us many children, which we can sell for money, or exchange for necessary conveniences : yet, when they have not wherewithal to maintain them, they hold it a piece of charity to murder infants new-born, as also they do such as are sick and past recovery ; because, they say, they free them from a deal of misery."

The gentlemen of this country have full power over the lives and estates of their servants, to sell or dispose of their wives and children as they think fit—the whole family without exception, but altogether, both males and females ; the king with all his train, to his very grooms, and the queen with her maids and servants." "Their discourse at their merry meetings is, with the men, about their wars and robberies, and, among their women, obscene tales of their amours."—(Chardin, vol. ix. Pink. Coll. pp. 142—144.)

MINGRELIA.

Mingrelia is but thinly peopled, because of their wars, and the vast numbers sold to the Turks and Persians by their nobility. The prince's revenue is derived from exports and imports, impositions of fines, and the slaves he sells. His slaves serve him for nothing. The religion of the Colchians was formerly the Greek Church ; St. Ambrose preached among them ; but now the Mingrelians are fallen into a profound abyss of ignorance and darkness, and have not the least idea of faith and religion, but look upon life eternal, the day of judgment, and the resurrection, as mere fables devised by men." "They (the priests) understand not the form of baptism, but let polygamy be practised, and permit the mothers to bury their new-born children alive. All their business is feasting and banqueting, when they are drunk almost daily." "Their greatest festivals are when an idol is carried through their country, when they put on their best clothes, and make a feast,

and get ready a present for their idol. Their mourning for the dead is altogether barbarous, and like that of people in despair: the women rend their clothes, and tear their hair and flesh, beat their breasts, cry, yell, and gnash with their teeth, like people mad or possessed: the men, also, tear their hair and thump their breasts," &c.—*Pages 145, 146.*

GEORGIA.

A fine and beautiful country, inhabited by Turks, Armenians, Georgians, Greeks, and Jews, who have their churches and synagogues. These inhabitants are, for the most part, Christians, after the Georgian ceremonies. On the right hand, going south to Gore, lie the ruins of a great city, now only containing 500 houses; formerly, it had 12,000.

"The complexions of the Georgians are most beautiful. You can scarce see an old, ill-favoured person among them; and the women are so exquisitely handsome, that it is hardly possible to look upon them and not be in love with them. They are tall, clean-limbed, plump, and full, but not over fat, and extremely slender in the waist. The Georgians are cheats and knaves, perfidious, treacherous, ungrateful, and proud. Drunkenness and luxury are such common vices among them, that they are not scandalous in Georgia." "The women are as vicious and wicked as the men, and contribute more than they do to that general debauchery which overflows the country." "The nobility exercise an absolute tyranny over the people who are their vassals; making them labour as long as they please, *without food or wages*; challenging a right over their estates, liberty, and lives; and selling their children, or making them their slaves."—*Page 180.*

Previous to Georgia coming under the dominion of Russia, 12,000 slaves, chiefly females, were exported to Turkey and Persia. But, under Russia, that odious traffic was completely abolished. In the mountainous districts known under the name of Circassia—extending from the mouth of the Kuban to Derbent and Baku in the Caspian, a distance of about 520 geographical miles from north-west to south-east, and in breadth from 30 to 60 miles on the average—about seventy different languages are spoken, and, in several instances, one language is confined to three or four villages. These remnants of different nations are engaged in perpetual feuds with each other. On the north-east side of the chain, in Lesghea, and some intermediate districts, that gross impostor, and ferocious freebooter, Schamyl, has, of late years, been endeavouring to bring the population, scanty as it is, under his own sway. Since Chardin's day, the inhabitants of these districts have adopted a mongrel sort of Mahommedanism. Amongst them are to be found the miserable and degraded remains of what, in early

times, were flourishing Christian communities, now rapidly renovating under the sway of Russia.

Transcaucasia under Russia. Baron von Haxthausen.—Page 81.

“Transcaucasia is rich in corn and salt; and any serious fluctuation in the price of these articles is prevented by free communication, and the purchase of salt at a fixed price from the Crown stores. The hills and valleys, which were formerly passable only on mules or horses, and in a few parts in wagons drawn by oxen, are now everywhere traversed by tolerable roads; the post service is under the best regulation for travelling, and intercourse is facilitated by a regular postal communication, which has been carried to the most distant communes.

“The Emperor’s care is extended likewise to the religious and spiritual wants of the inhabitants. The neglected state of the dominate Greek Church, of the Armenian, the Lutheran (consisting of the colonists from Wurtemberg), and the Roman Catholic Churches, as well as the two Mahommedan sects, was exchanged for discipline and order, with the aid and cooperation of the respective clergy of these religious bodies. Churches and chapels were restored or rebuilt, whilst education, and a provision for the clergy of every faith, were secured.

“In Teflis, Nankha, and Chamaka, institutions have been established to promote the cultivation of corn, silk, and wine; and, in the Government departments, artisans and labourers are trained for this wide field of agricultural enterprise. Free instruction is provided, in the excellent military schools, for the sons of the numerous and poor nobles. Every chief town of the circle contains a school, amply endowed, for the education of the sons of nobles, merchants, and the upper class of citizens. The gymnasium, and the institute for daughters of men of rank, are supported in a manner corresponding to the education required. The pupils who distinguish themselves at these institutions, have free admission to the Imperial universities, and the polytechnic schools of St. Petersburg and Moscow. The sons of meritorious native inhabitants are received into these schools; and entire corps have been formed, principally of the sons of Mahommedans of rank, who never before passed the limits of their own country. Many of these Asiatics have made remarkable progress in science and civilization, in the schools opened expressly for them at St. Petersburg; whilst almost all return to their homes with feelings of affectionate attachment to the Emperor, and gratitude for the advantages of European civilization.

“Nor have literary acquirements been neglected. A catalogue of the books and manuscripts in the library at Echmiadzin, has been prepared and printed; rare documents have been either purchased or transcribed; and correct impressions of all the inscriptions, dispersed in various public buildings in Transcaucasia, have been collected.

“Well knowing, however, that the success of the best efforts and arrangements, in such institutions, mainly depends on the zeal with which they are carried out, the Emperor has encouraged the choice of able assist-

ants, by assigning them nearly three times the ordinary amount of salary, together with considerable sums of money to defray the expenses of travelling and establishing themselves. Every five years, these salaries are increased; and provision for old age, and pensions to the surviving relatives of these officials, are the rewards of steady, zealous, and upright conduct, in the service of the state in Caucasia."

In reference to the state of the mountain districts of Circassia, and of the white slave trade as now renewed and carried on with Turkey, the following selections from letters of well-informed and able correspondents of some of our daily journals, at present in these parts, may suffice to give the reader a correct idea of the present state of things:—

"Bardane, May 25th, 1854.

"At present the only trade that may be said to be carried on here is that in women; and this seems to be extraordinarily active at present, from the large prices obtainable in Constantinople, and the removal of all obstacles. I have been told, from good authority, that a girl bought for fifteen purses here is sold in Constantinople for forty. Numbers of little boats arrive all along the coast, from Trebizond, almost every day. They haul themselves up on the beach, and spread the sails on the sides of the boat to form tents; here the captain sits, and the natives bring down to him their girls to exchange against his cargo—which generally consists of calicoes, prints, and other stuffs, and in salt. There is no money in the country; so that all the bargains are struck with reference to so many pieces of calico—each piece being called a 'mal'; one mal is worth about 15s., and twenty-five 'mals' make a Turkish purse. The Circassian girls thus sold, though all young, are by no means all pretty, though many are not unworthy of the reputation for beauty which Circassian women have always enjoyed. They are generally the children of serfs, it being considered disgraceful for a freeman and a Mussulman to sell his children. I may here mention that the inhabitants are divided into two distinct classes—the freemen (or Circassians proper), and their serfs or slaves. The serfs cultivate the country, and are the property of their master, who can sell them, or otherwise dispose of them, independently of the land; but they never sell the head of a family without his wife and children. The girls, as they grow up, are often sold to Turkish slave dealers, and one half of the price they fetch belongs to the master, and the other half to the father. The master, indeed, generally halves in this way with his serfs the whole produce of his lands; but as very small tracts of land are put into cultivation, scarcely anything beyond the local consumption is produced, and the serf cannot become rich. The serfs are not Mussulmans, nor do they appear to have any sort of religion; they are armed, and generally fight the quarrels of their masters, who treat them very kindly. By another opportunity, I hope to be able to send you some further information on serfdom and the tenure of land in Circassia, which I have not been able to collect as yet. As we are going to Socha to-day,

I leave this letter behind me, to go by the steamer we are hourly expecting, in case it should come in our absence."

"Bardane, May 29th.

"We went to Sotcha on the 25th, as I anticipated in my last, and came back again the next day. Sotcha is the Turkish name for the next Russian station on the coast (Fort Navaighinski).

"My friend the Imam had told me that our host, Hadgi Jacob, possessed two beautiful daughters—two girls, he said, who would be worth a hundred purses each in Constantinople; but their father was too rich to condescend to profit in this ignoble manner."

"Trebizond, July 18th.

"Since my last I have taken pains to examine into the details touching the Circassian slaves. I find that there are from about nine hundred to a thousand of these poor creatures ready to be embarked for Constantinople. The *British* steamer *Phoebe*, that left yesterday, received on board forty-two women and sixty-odd boys; their ages vary from three to twenty. I find also that it is not true that the parents accompany their children, to dispose of them to rich men. The slaves are in general kidnapped, and brought down by speculators, who sell to other speculators; and a Turkish officer, Faik Bey, who has been disgraced at Kars, and sent away from thence to Batoum, from which place he was likely sent adrift,—has thought proper to come here on the infernal slaving speculation. I am assured, also, that several Georgian girls (and consequently *Christians*) are among the victims."—*Standard*, August 9th, 1854.

"We were to remain for the night in the house of one of the notables of Sotcha, Hadgi Jacob Aga, and, as it was getting late, we proceeded there at once. All Circassian houses are alike; they all consist in a group of huts collected together on the side of a hill. We had arrived somewhat unexpectedly, and this was not yet quite ready to receive us, so a walk was proposed to a neighbouring hill, from whence we could get a view of the Russian fort Navaighinski, built at the bottom of the valley, on a hill commanding the sea. On the road I gained over the affections of an Imam, living on Hadgi Jacob's estate, by giving him a pipe-load or two of my tobacco, and had an interesting conversation with him. He had come from Trebizond, of the neighbourhood of which he was a native, some three years since, in the hope of gaining a little money here in his priestly calling; but, 'Inshallah!' he said, despondingly, 'I have not gained a single para.' He deplored most wofully the spiritual state of the country. 'There are no mosques,' he said, 'no minarets, no medressés, no pious foundations. I have just succeeded in getting together some twelve or thirteen softas, and I teach them in a hut which Hadgi Jacob has liberally placed at my disposal; but they live scattered about, and are obliged to come a long way to be taught, and are irregular in consequence. But before Mohammed Emir Bey came here it was much worse; then there were scarcely any mollahs at all in the district. Inshallah! we shall be better off

presently. The *English are now come to our help* ; they are a great nation. We shall perhaps be soon able to build mosques and minarets. In the fort the Russians have abandoned a church in very good condition. If, with the help of the English, Socha becomes a town, that church only wants a minaret to become a beautiful mosque.' He was very loud in his praises of Emir Bey, and extolled his theological learning as much as any of his other qualities. Mohammed Emir Bey seems indeed to be a man of very superior attainments, as far as I have hitherto been able to judge. Like Schamyl Bey, on the other side of the Caucasus, he is an apostle of Mahometanism as much as a warrior chief. He has undertaken to regenerate this side of the Caucasus, as Schamyl Bey did the other, by *reviving* the spirit of Mahometanism, almost extinct, or perhaps never thoroughly established. He calls the population to arms, as much for the defence of this faith as for the maintenance of their independence. He has established in every district, in almost every house, Imams, whom he has summoned from Constantinople and other parts of Turkey : he has founded medressés, for the education of native Circassians as priests ; and mekkémés, for the administration of justice according to the laws of the Koran."

"In a former letter I mentioned to you some details about the Circassian slave trade. Whether it be to please the English, or really from sincere horror of it, Begtchet Pasha is using his best endeavours to put a stop to it. Since the disappearance of the Russians on the coast, it seems to have taken a *fearful increase*, and a number of boys and girls have been despatched in the Trebizond and Samsoun boats. The country is very thinly peopled at present, and were such an emigration to continue long, there would be no hands left to till the ground, which is now very sparingly cultivated, from the want of hands. The boats which carry on the slave trade all belong to the coast between Trebizond and Samsoun, and are therefore under the control of the Turks. Begtchet Pasha has issued a regulation compelling them to take, before sailing, a pass from himself or his agents, stating the number and quality of their crew and passengers, and prohibiting them from embarking any slaves, under penalty of not being allowed to disembark them on Turkish ground. If this measure were strictly adhered to, there is no doubt it would most effectually stop the slave trade. But as long as the Circassians find a market for their slaves, I doubt whether they will give up such an easy and profitable source of income."—*Morning Chronicle, August 2.*

House of Lords, Thursday, July 13.

THE SLAVE TRADE ON THE CIRCASSIAN COAST.

"The Bishop of Oxford rose to put a question to his noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which was upon a subject of great interest, and of which he had given notice. There had within the last few days appeared in the public journals a series of statements which would

lead their readers to suppose that the first effect of the deliverance of the Circassian coast from Russian domination had been the revival there, in one of its worst forms, of the worst crime to which human nature was exposed—the slave trade. The statements to which he alluded were such as this, which he had taken from one of the daily papers: ‘The only trade which may be said to be carried on here is that in women, and this seems to be extraordinarily active at present, from the large prices obtainable at Constantinople, and the removal of all obstacles. I have been told upon good authority, that a girl bought for 15 purses is sold in Constantinople for 40. Numbers of little boats arrive all along the coast from Zetigond almost every day; they haul themselves up on the beach, spreading the sails on the side of the boat so as to form a tent. Here the captain sits, and the natives bring down to him their slaves to exchange against his cargo, which generally consists of calico prints, and other stuffs, and salt. There is no money in the country, so that all bargains are struck in reference to so many pieces of calico, each piece being called a *mal*, and one *mal* worth 33s. It appears on the other side of the water (Trebizond) every boat that arrives from the coast of Asia brings eight or ten girls or boys, destined for the Constantinople market. It is right to add, that when the coast was blockaded by the Russians, this traffic necessarily ceased; but now that communications with Trebizond are free, the *rush is immense*. I hope that our Government at home will bear this in mind, and put an end to such practices.’ He (the Bishop of Oxford) thought it of great moment to call the attention of their lordships, and especially of her Majesty’s Ministers, to such statements as this.

“The Earl of Clarendon said that he had read the paragraphs to which his right reverend friend had referred, with feelings of horror and repugnance similar to those which his right reverend friend had just expressed. Their lordships were well aware what were the customs and the social system, if he might call it so, of Turkey, and need not, therefore, be told of the extreme difficulty that existed in the way of inducing a *Mahometan Government to entertain this question seriously, or to take steps to insure the abolition of this abominable traffic*. But, notwithstanding these difficulties, the efforts of her Majesty’s Government, and of other Governments, had been directed to this subject; and although her Majesty’s ambassadors at Constantinople had stated reasons why they feared that the abolition of this traffic was *almost impossible*, yet two or three years ago Sir Stratford Canning, acting upon instructions which he received from Lord Palmerston, did bring the matter formally and seriously before the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He (the Earl of Clarendon) regretted to state it, but he did not *consider that he could afford reasonable hopes that such interference on the part of foreign Governments would be successful in altering the customs and habits of the Ottoman subjects*. He (the Earl of Clarendon) had not received any recent information upon this subject, and he was, therefore, unable to inform his right rev. friend whether the description which he had read was correct in stating that this trade had greatly increased since the withdrawal of the Russians from the coast, or whether this description

merely referred to an ordinary traffic. He had, however, the satisfaction to state, that since his noble and right reverend friend gave him notice of this question, he had seen a despatch from Admiral Dundas saying that his attention had been called to this subject, and that the strictest orders had been sent to the officers commanding her Majesty's naval forces off the coasts of Georgia and Circassia to intercept and prevent by all *friendly means* this traffic. This was the first opportunity which we had had of directly interfering with the traffic, and he hoped he need not assure their lordships that all possible means would be taken to put an end to it."

WHITE SLAVE TRADE.

"The newspaper accounts of the Circassians must not be credited; they will do nothing themselves, generally speaking, but look to others to do their work. Slavery continues the order of the day, and several thousand young and lovely girls have, since March last, been exported to the Constantinople market. Each consignment is accompanied by one or two men, who only return for fresh lots, after spending at Constantinople the greater part of the produce of their vile traffic; so that but little of the money comes into the country, and many good hands, which might be better employed, are absent therefrom.

"The British consulate at Batoum, usually the port of embarkation of slaves, is said to have been re-established (after having been some time abandoned), and a Mr. Charles Calvert, from Damascus, the brother of the consul at the Dardanelles, is stated to have received this appointment; but we much doubt whether he will be able to do more than keep a tally of the number of these *victims to Turkish lust*, for checking the same is out of the question."

"Schamyl, it is reported, has been forced by the Russians to raise the siege of Mzchet, and to retreat to the frontiers of Daghestan, where he is gathering reinforcements."

The *Times* informs us about Circassia, in the words of a British officer at Bardane, that two Turkish trading vessels arrived, and fired a salute as they anchored:—

"A French officer told me these boats had arrived to *export a freight* of the same nature as the blue-eyed girls I told you of; each ship would hold 200 of them. He met an old gentleman in the woods, with two Circassian girls, his daughters, one about twelve, the other fourteen years of age. He was told by the old gentleman each was ready, and would be happy to become the personal effects of any of us, for 10,000 piastres (80%). These Circassian girls look forward to this as being settled in life, and going to Stamboul is a fulfilment of their best wishes and desires; just as a young lady in London makes an '*eligible*' match. At home she wanders about in a plain and rough dress, only dreaming of the gold and decorations that may one day fall to her lot at Stamboul. From this place the young ladies

have, for years, been highly valued in the harems of the great men of Stamboul."—*Times*, June 16th, 1854. *British Officer of a Steamer, Bardane*, May 22d, 1854.

The destruction of the Russian forts on the Circassian coast of the Black Sea, erected and maintained chiefly to suppress that infamous and degrading slave trade, has left the Circassians full liberty to carry on their traffic—the only trade that they have, or that they covet. I know not what honour, credit, or advantage, Great Britain is to gain in alliances with such people, and I feel assured that, if the people of this country knew the facts, they would not tolerate for a moment the application of their strength to encourage and maintain a general system of slavery and the slave trade, while they are exerting that strength so effectually to put an end to such conduct and proceedings in other quarters of the world.

"Trebizond, June 24th.

"It is right to state, that the slave trade is greatly on the increase here. Every boat that arrives from the ports of Abhasia, brings in *eight or ten girls* or boys, destined for the Constantinople market. It is right to add, that, when the coast was blockaded by the Russians, this traffic necessarily ceased. But now that the communications with Trebizond are free, the rush to dispose of *daughters, sons, sisters, &c.* is immense. I hope that our Government at home will bear this in mind, and put an end to such ill practices. I regret also to mention that the Austrian steamers do not raise objections to convey the slaves to Constantinople, and every boat takes eighty or a hundred down."—*Morning Herald*, July 11th.

CIRCASSIAN SLAVERY.

"Succoum Kale, August 16th, 1854.

"I here met an old Polish soldier, who, after having deserted about twenty years ago from a Russian regiment, fell into the hands of the mountaineers of Tchetchenew, who sold him as a slave to the Circassians. He remained among the latter people in the capacity of a domestic servant, until the breaking out of the present hostilities with Russia. The Naib, being then desirous of securing the favourable opinion of the Europeans, restored him to liberty, and conducted him to Succoum Kale, where he became employed as a domestic servant. The greatest source of his happiness, in the first days of his freedom, was that he was fully able to use his feet in walking. I must inform you, that when a man is condemned to slavery by the mountaineers of the Caucasus, they make, in the middle of the soles of his feet, a large incision, into which they introduce a horse-hair, over which they afterwards let the wound close. The poor slave can then only walk on the tips of his toes, and of course moves about as little as possible. He is, however, thus enabled to attend to the only duties imposed on him, namely, following the women in the fields,

and aiding them in their various labours.”—*Morning Herald*, Sept. 29th, 1854. *Correspondent*, *Succoum Kale*, Aug. 16th, 1854.

But Turkey carries on, not only an extensive white slave trade, but a most extensive slave trade in African blacks, from Northern and Central Africa. Throughout the whole Turkish empire there has been, and is at this moment, a very great African slave trade carried on. The markets of Constantinople, Cairo, and all the Arabian western coast, are abundantly supplied with black slaves from the interior of Africa, and with Christian slaves from Abyssinia. Every Mahomedan in Arabia, but more especially in Mecca, Medina, Djedda, &c., has numbers of slaves; and the temple of Mecca is chiefly kept and guarded by slaves, male and female, many of the former being eunuchs. Burckhardt, the celebrated traveller, who visited all these places as a Mussulman pilgrim, says, that the scenes of debauchery and licentiousness practised in the very temple were such as he could not with decency describe. The accompanying memorandum of the occurrences of yesterday, will show the African slave trade with Turkey (for to Turkey all go) at this moment. The writer is travelling under the auspices of our Foreign Office, for the purpose of exploring the interior of Africa. The number stated by him is only one caravan out of many for the year, and by one road out of several. The places are in the Turkish dependency of Murzuk, and all are for the Turkish markets, and for the harems of the great men in Constantinople and other Turkish towns; while the traffic in question is carried on before the eyes of the British Vice-Consul stationed at Murzuk:—

“While at Gatrone, between Murzuk and Tegerry, the great caravan arrived from Bornu, with 400 to 500 slaves, mostly consisting of girls and boys under twelve years of age. It was the first time,” says Dr. Vogel, “that I got some idea of what slavery and the slave trade actually is. The unfortunate captives, being forced to carry burdens of as much as twenty-five pounds in weight on their heads, had lost the hair, and even the skin of the crown of the head. Besides which, they had to cross the desert in iron shackles, which are taken off only on their arrival in Murzuk; and they are maltreated during their march in the most terrible way, receiving the scantiest food possible.”—*Dr. Vogel, Tegerry*, Nov. 4th, 1853. *Athenæum*, January 21st, 1854.

In further proof of the destination of these slaves, we read in the *Morning Chronicle* of February 14th, in a letter from their special correspondent, that he went on board the Austrian Lloyd's steamer, from Constantinople (January 17th) for Trebizond, with a Turkish pasha and his harem of fifteen women, several of them originally white

slaves, and these accompanied by a deck-load of white female and black female slaves. Such scenes are of every-day occurrence in every part of Turkey.

In reference to Circassia, about which so much is said, the whole population, with the exception of the chiefs, are slaves, and bought and sold as such. The great cause of their dislike to the Russian Government is because, from the time that power got the command of the sea-coast, she attempted to put down this slave trade, especially the traffic of selling their children to Turkey and Persia ; but, notwithstanding every vigilance, they still smuggle many by way of Trebizond and Sinope, to Constantinople.

Such is the empire, such is the people, such is the profligate and brutal system, which, without one redeeming quality, has desolated for centuries the finest countries under heaven ; such are the conduct, the principles, the proceedings, the despotism, the tyranny, the cruelty, and the injustice, which Great Britain has leagued herself to defend, support, and maintain in their " integrity " and " present condition." This we fondly, proudly, and solemnly proclaim to be our " national honour," and for our " national interests." Vain effort ! culpable prostitution of terms, and of power ! for, until we can reverse the decrees of the Eternal, and wither the arm of the Almighty, we cannot accomplish the object.

CHAPTER XI.

MAHOMMEDANISM AND CHRISTIANITY—RISE, DECAY, AND DESTRUCTION OF THE FORMER—RISE, INCREASE, AND FINAL SUPREMACY OF THE LATTER—HISTORICAL AND SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES AND PROOFS—THE YEAR 1854 THE PERIOD DETERMINED FOR THE OVERTHROW OF MAHOMMEDANISM, AS AN INDEPENDENT POWER, BOTH AS CALCULATED BY THE MAHOMMEDAN ERA AND THE SCRIPTURAL PROPHETIC WRITINGS.

HITHERTO the question has been considered and dealt with in reference to the state and conduct of all those countries as applicable to and connected with worldly interests and concerns alone. But a higher object must also be attended to; we must consider these countries, governments, and people as accountable beings, and reflect how they stand in reference to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. This is the most important point, and most worthy of consideration. Who, then, are the Turks, and what is the Turkish empire? A short allusion to the former; and their appearance in the world, may and must here suffice: the latter is a system of political despotism of the fiercest and most barbarous description, supported, and maintained, and guided by a religious system of the most obvious and daring imposition ever heard of, and directly opposed to the power, and majesty, and revealed will of the SOVEREIGN of Heaven and Earth; a system and a power whose duration He has determined, and fatal doom He has irrevocably pronounced. What HIS mouth has spoken his ARM can execute, in opposition to all human councils and might.

Let us begin with the foundation of the system, by bringing forward the great impostor and his authority, in proof:—

Creed. From the Koran, Chap. XIX. p. 248, intituled Mary, revealed at Mecca.

“ In the name of the most merciful God,

“ C. H. Y. A. St. A commemoration of the mercy of the Lord towards his servant Zacharias, when he called upon his Lord, invoking him in secret, and said, O Lord, verily my bones are weakened, and my head is become white with hoariness; and I have never been unsuccessful in my prayers to thee, O Lord. But now I fear my nephews, who are to succeed

after me, for my wife is barren ; wherefore, give me a successor of my own body from before thee, who may be my heir, and may be an heir of the family of Jacob ; and grant, O Lord, that he may be acceptable unto thee. And the angel answered him, O Zacharias, verily we bring thee tidings of a son, whose name shall be John ; we have not caused any to bear the same name before him. Zacharias said, Lord, how shall I have a son, seeing my wife is barren, and I am now arrived at a great age, and am decrepit ? The angel said, So shall it be ; thy Lord saith, This is easy with me ; since I created thee heretofore, when thou wast nothing. Zacharias answered, O Lord, give me a sign. The angel replied, Thy sign shall be, thou shalt not speak to men for three nights, although thou be in perfect health. And he went forth unto his people, from the chamber, and he made signs unto them, as if he should say, Praise ye God, in the morning and in the evening. And we said unto his son, O John, receive the book of the law, with a resolution to study and observe it ! And we bestowed on him wisdom, when he was yet a child, and mercy from us, and purity of life ; and he was a devout person, and dutiful towards his parents, and was not proud or rebellious. Peace be on him the day whereon he was born, and the day whereon he shall die, and the day whereon he shall be raised to life. And remember in the book of the Koran, the story of Mary ; when she retired from her family to a place towards the East, and took a veil to conceal herself from them, and we sent our spirit Gabriel unto her, and he appeared unto her in the shape of a perfect man. She said, I fly for refuge to the merciful God, that He may defend me from thee ; if thou fearest him, thou wilt not approach me. He answered, Verily, I am the messenger of thy Lord, and am sent to give thee a holy son. She said, How shall I have a son, seeing a man hath not touched me, and I am no harlot ? Gabriel replied, So shall it be ; thy Lord saith, This is easy with me ; and he will perform it, that he may ordain him for a sign unto men, and a mercy from us ; for it is a thing which is decreed. Wherefore she conceived him, and she retired aside with him in her womb¹ to a distant place, and the pains of childbirth came upon her near the trunk of a palm-tree. She said, Would to God I had died before this, and had become a thing forgotten, and lost in oblivion ! And he who was beneath her called to her, saying, Be not grieved ; now hath God provided a rivulet under thee ; and do thou shake the body of the palm-tree, and it shall let fall ripe dates upon thee ready gathered. And eat, and drink, and calm thy mind. Moreover, if thou see any man, and he question thee, say, Verily, I have vowed a fast unto the Merciful ; wherefore I will by no means speak to a man this day. So she brought the child to her people, carrying him in her arms. And they said unto her, O Mary, now hast thou done a strange thing : O sister of Aaron, thy father was not a bad man, neither was thy mother a harlot. But she made signs unto the child

¹ Page 249 : " For Gabriel blew into the bosom of her shift, which he opened with his fingers, and his breath reaching her womb, caused the conception," &c.

Mary, aged 13 years, went six, seven, or more months ; others say, was conceived full grown (nine months) and born *within an hour*. See Jallalo-d-din and Al Beduwi-yahya.

to answer them ; and they said, How shall we speak to him, who is an infant in the cradle ? *Whereupon the child said, Verily, I am the servant of God ; he hath given me the book of the Gospel, and hath appointed me a prophet.* And he hath made me blessed wheresoever I shall be, and hath commanded me to observe prayer, and to give alms, *so long as I shall live ;* and he hath made me dutiful towards my mother, and hath not made me proud or unhappy ; and peace be on me the day whereon I was born, and the day whereon I shall die, and the day whereon I shall be raised to life. This was Jesus the son of Mary ; the word of truth concerning whom they doubt. IT IS NOT MEET FOR GOD THAT HE SHOULD HAVE ANY SON ; GOD FORBID ! When he decreeth a thing, he only saith unto it, Be ; and it is. And verily God is my Lord, and your Lord ; wherefore, serve him : this is the right way. Yet the sectaries differ among themselves *concerning Jesus ;* but woe be unto these, who are unbelievers, because of their appearance at the great day. Do thou cause them to hear, and do thou cause them to see, on the day whereon they shall come unto US TO BE JUDGED : but the ungodly are this day in a manifest error. And do thou forewarn them of the day of sighing, when the matter shall be determined ; while they are now sunk in negligence, and do not believe. Verily, we will inherit the earth, and whatever creatures are therein, and unto us they shall all return."

Sale's Koran, Chap. LXXI. p. 449.

"Verily, God loveth those who fight for his religion in battle array, as though they were a well-compacted building. Remember when Moses said unto his people, Oh, my people, why do ye injure me, since ye know I am the apostle God sent unto you ? And when they had deviated from the truth, God made their hearts to deviate from the right way ; for God directeth not wicked people. And when Jesus the son of Mary said, O children of Israel, verily I am the apostle of God sent unto you, confirming the law which was delivered before me, and BRINGING GOOD TIDINGS OF AN APOSTLE WHO SHALL COME AFTER ME, AND WHOSE NAME SHALL BE AHMED ;¹ and when he produced unto them evident miracles, they said, This is manifest sorcery. But who is more unjust than he who forgeth a lie against God, when he is invited unto Islam ? And God directeth not the unjust people. They seek to extinguish God's light with their mouths : but God will perfect his light, though the infidels be averse thereto. It is he who hath sent his apostle with the direction and the religion of truth, that we may exalt the same above every religion, although the idolaters be averse thereto. Oh, true believers, shall I show you a merchandise which will deliver you from a painful torment hereafter ? Believe in God and in his apostle ; and defend God's true religion with your substance,

¹ For Mohammed also bore the name of Ahmed ; both names being derived from the same root, and nearly of the same signification. The Persian paraphrast, to support what is here alleged, quotes the following words of Christ : "I go to my Father, and the Paraclete shall come : " the Mohammedan doctors unanimously teaching, that by the Paraclete (or, as they choose to read it, the Periclyte, or illustrious), their prophet is intended, *and no other.*

and in your own persons. This will be better for you, if ye knew it. He will forgive you your sins, and will introduce you into gardens through which rivers flow, and agreeable habitations in gardens of perpetual abode. This will be great felicity."

That this religious belief is unchanged the following will show :—

"May the Most High, out of regard for His holy prophet OUR LORD, vouchsafe ever to grant success to my Sublime Porte, and abundantly to bestow happiness, in this world and in the next, upon all those who shall have evinced zeal in his sacred cause."—*Turkish Hatti-scheriffe*, 18 Moharrem, 1270 (31st October, 1853). *Official Papers*, Part II. p. 245.

However strange it may appear, still it is not the less true, that in numerous quarters, more especially in England, the disciples of this impious school, and believers in this blasphemous creed, are considered as almost ranking with the followers of the purest Christianity! To such a length does presumption, hypocrisy, and unbelief proceed, to obtain sympathy for the Turks, Schamyl, and other religious impostors. Their dangerous argument was, that in reference to the being of *one true God*, there was little if any difference between the disciples of Mahommed and the disciples of Christ! These reasoners forgot altogether the precept, that "to whom much is given, of them much will be required;" and that if Mahommed and his followers knew so much and so correctly regarding the true nature of God, they must have known Him also as the author of Christianity, and his will and decrees in reference to it. With all this, in fact, the originator of Mahommedanism was acquainted. They must have known, they did know, His divine law and irreversible decrees—"I am Jehovah," saith the Most High, (Isaiah xlii. 8,) "that is my name: and my GLORY will I not give to another, neither MY PRAISE to graven images." Further, "Jehovah said unto MY LORD, Sit THOU AT MY RIGHT HAND until I MAKE thine enemies THY FOOTSTOOL,"—and moreover, Let "the heathen rage, and the people imagine vain things," and let "the kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord Jehovah and HIS ANOINTED,"—"yet HAVE I SET MY KING upon my holy hill of Zion," and where he must "reign until HE hath put all enemies under HIS FEET." With this knowledge, the crime, the sin of the imposter Mahommed and his followers, and his daring usurpation, becomes deeper and greater. Amongst the false gods of antiquity there was not one against whom the wrath of the Almighty was so strongly directed as BAAL, that pretended Deity, who usurped, as his peculiar right, one of the highest attributes of Jehovah, namely, HIS ETERNITY AND SELF-EXISTENCE, for so the Hebrew word, or particle, "*el*," or "*el*," connected with the supreme Being,

always and correctly signifies. The advocates, therefore, of the Koran, on the principles and for the purposes mentioned, are merely the ancient BAALITES resuscitated, again attempting to raise their heads, and lead us into the worship of a false, intolerant, and cruel deity, such as Mahommedans, against the TRUE LIGHT, have chosen to follow. But the sin of Mahommedanism becomes of a deeper dye when we remember that, not content with dethroning THE SON OF GOD, their prophet, or rather their impostor, usurps the place and *the office of* THE HOLY GHOST,—not only “speaking against,” but denying his being, and exalting Mahommed into his place. A sin, a crime, which on the part of any created being, our great Redeemer himself has, and most emphatically, told us, “*shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.*” (Matt. xii. 32.)

Founded upon this *wicked* delusion, the daring impostor promulgated a system the most ridiculous, but at the same time, to his expected votaries and victims, the most alluring—that his was the only and true religion. It was inculcated as a duty to propagate it by the sword. To the Jew and the Christian the terrible offer was, “the Koran, the tribute, or the sword;” but to the Pagan it was, “the Koran or the sword.” From this decision there was no appeal. All who believed it were sure to reach Paradise hereafter. When there, they were to enjoy supreme felicity, thus : They were to rise from the grave as at the age of thirty years, and of the stature of ADAM, sixty cubits, or 180 feet. They were to have *seventy* hours, black-eyed damsels, of equal age and strength, created for each, and out of pure heavenly materials, unknown to flesh and blood, and whose virginity was to be daily renewed. They were to have three meals every day, each consisting of 300 dishes of the most exquisite cookery, served to them by seventy attendants, created especially for each. A branch of the tree TUBA was for each, and as often as they might wish, to come and place a branch by them, and pour out wine in any quantity to satisfy them, and that of a quality far surpassing anything that mortal creatures can conceive. They were also to have each a domain allotted to them, so large that it would require 10,000 years to ascertain the actual boundary thereof. Such enticing things may readily be supposed to tickle the fancies and the feelings, if any such there be, of those cooped up in Downing Street, and all other similar places, and make them exert all their energies to gain proselytes to aid and support the power that believes in—supports Islamism, and promises such results. I will not follow further the additional doctrines propagated and believed by the impostor and his followers—compared to which, the doctrines of Joanna Southcote and Joe Smith are sanity and reason. The reader

has placed before him the head and front of the idol, which the world is now imperiously called upon to support and maintain, and to fall down and worship and adore before his lascivious shrine!

TURKS.—This people were originally a Tartar race, and slaves to the great Khan of the Geougen, whose seat was on the banks of the river *Till* or *Tula*, a branch of the *Orchon*, which it joins about half-way between *Kiakhta* and *Kara-Koroum*, the future capital ($43^{\circ} 30'$ N. Lat. and 103° E. Long.) of *Zenghis Khan* and his immediate successors.¹ The slaves rebelled against their masters. One bloody battle, which covered thirteen miles of country with the bodies of the slain, attested the total defeat and destruction of the latter. The wretched remains of the vanquished fled to the westward, pursued by their implacable enemies. The conquerors advanced to the north and the west, sweeping all before them with havoc and ruin. Their cavalry, in millions, traversed the countries they vanquished and desolated. They fixed their central quarters on *Mount Altai*. They invaded and conquered *Turkestan*, and drove out the *Nephalite*, or *White Huns*, from the abode which they had usurped. Here the *Turks* came in contact with the *Persian empire*, at that time strong enough to check them in their career. In their bloody wars with that empire and *Affghanistan* they mixed so much with the female captives as to improve their breed, and to bring them more into the family of the *Southern Asiatics*. The next we hear of them was about the thirty-second year of the Emperor *Justinian* (A.D. 545), when a message from *DISABUL*, their great Khan, came to threaten him for his affording protection and countenance to the wretched remains of their vassals or enemies, the *Igour Ogour*, or *Avars*, or a mixture of both. A hollow truce was maintained between the two emperors, the power of the *Romans* being still so great as to prevent the *Turks* from penetrating further to the southward and westward. The *Roman empire* was succeeded in 633 by the *Arab*, which completely checked the *Turks* for a long time (about 400 years), during which period the *Turks* embraced the *Mahommedan religion*, affording to them, no doubt, at the time, similar allurements as those which, in our time, draw *Europe* to admire and to follow their footsteps. But the strength of the *Arab power* became decayed. In the years 997 to 1028, *Mahmoud the Gaznevide*, the *Turkish Sultan*, overran and desolated *Hindostan*. His empire was succeeded by *Togrul Beg*, of the *Seljukian tribe*, who, 1038 to 1063, extended his dominion from the *Oxus* to the *Euphrates*; having, in 1050, made a bloody and destructive inroad into the *Greek empire* to the south of the *Caucasus*, and to

¹ The Persian poet, *Shich Saade*, who fled before them from *Chorasan*, says of them: "They are all sons of men, but are like bloody wolves!"

the west of the Caspian Sea. After his death his successor, Alp Arslan (the Valiant Lion), again invaded the Roman empire with a large Turkish host. Passing round the northern coasts of the Caspian Sea, he crossed Mount Caucasus, and invaded the Eastern Roman empire. After many bloody encounters they fixed the seat of their power at Iconium, having stripped the Eastern empire of some of its finest provinces. Here, about the year 1220, they were joined by Soliman, the father and founder of the present tribe and race, and who fled from the eastern coasts of the Caspian and borders of Turkestan, to escape the march and power of the Tartars, now mustering in formidable array under Zenghis Khan. This branch of the Turks, like their immediate predecessors, had conquered Syria and Palestine, and driven out the Arab power, and committed all those oppressions and cruelties on Christians which gave rise to the Crusades. The appearance of Holagou in the south, and Batou in the north, for a time prevented the Turks from directing their arms against the decayed Eastern empire. On their disappearance their whole power was directed against the remains of that empire, when an offence and affront given by Bajazet to Tamerlane provoked his anger, the effects of which had nearly proved fatal to the Ottoman empire. When his power vanished, the progress of the Turks, to the total overthrow of the Eastern Roman empire, and the capture of Constantinople, was steady and unvaried, tearing treaties to pieces at their pleasure, until at last, in 1453, under Mahommed IV., they finally accomplished their object. From that period their history becomes so much connected with the history of Europe, that further minute reference to it is here considered to be unnecessary. The destruction and bloodshed which accompanied all their footsteps are almost incredible, and too painful to dwell on, and which are attested by the ruin, as at this day, of the finest countries in the world. Could the waters of the Propontis speak—could they resuscitate the dead that have been *sacked* and tumbled into them by thousands on thousands, they would disclose to the world the fearful murders that have been openly and secretly committed at Constantinople, which cry aloud for vengeance, and which will most certainly receive certain and commensurate punishment. One of the titles of their Sultan is "*the shadow of God*." He is believed by all true believers to be inspired and guided by the Spirit of the Almighty, and that none of his actions are amenable to human laws or tribunals. He may put to death, as mere amusement, *fourteen* of his subjects daily, without exciting any remarkable feeling or observation. Murad IV., during a reign of *seventeen* years, murdered about 14,000 men (Cantemir, Part I. p. 250), killing them by day or by night, as

suit his fancy. In the treasury at Constantinople they have and preserve two remarkable and precious relics, namely, Mahommed's shirt, which is washed once a-year with great ceremony, and one of the Prophet's teeth, which was knocked out in one of his earliest battles, and which, they say, created the angel Gabriel the greatest concern lest he should be punished by the Supreme Being for neglect of his duty in guarding the person of the great Prophet!¹

Pursuing the immediate subject under consideration, we have in the Mahommedan religion and its disciples—the Turkish empire—blasphemy and impiety to their acme, and far exceeding that of the proud Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Persian, the Roman empires and kings. We have here the SON OF GOD—the Creator, the Redeemer, the Saviour and the Judge of the world, *dethroned* by a daring and profligate mortal, and which blasphemy and usurpation has been believed and followed as truth by myriads during a period of 1260 years. There is no mistaking the monster power nor monster "*delusion*" here adverted to, and to ascertain correctly who he is, and his fate, it is only necessary to have recourse to the oracles of Divine Truth, as these are contained in "*the Scriptures of truth*." The rise, the history, and the destruction of the hideous monster, are recorded in terrible and unmistakeable characters therein.

It would be foreign to my present purpose to go at length into the events clearly portrayed in the Book of Revelation, and so fully confirmed by history. My immediate object is with the rise and downfall of those systems of tyranny and false or corrupted religion which belong more specifically to the present times. I need not enter upon the great facts and historical narratives of the periods of the first four trumpets, which bring before us, in graphic colours, the swarms of barbarians which issued from Central and Eastern Asia, that great womb of nations, and which poured themselves, swarm succeeding swarm, upon the Western Roman empire, until amidst desolation and destruction previously unknown in the world it was utterly subverted. Nor need I, nor can I, here advert at length to the devastation committed by and amongst these barbarians themselves, where the forward swarm was generally swept from the face of the earth by a succeeding swarm more ferocious and formidable than the other, and beautifully represented by a flow of waters vomited forth by the Great Dragon, or Paganism, to sweep away the Church of Christ. The state of Europe to this day attests these terrible truths. The darkness and ignorance

¹ If the Sultan would send the "*shirt*" and the "*tooth*" to the Turkish loan shareholders in London, as a show, he might pay the yearly interest of her loan from the proceeds; the easiest and readiest way he will ever pay it. London loves novelties!

which, in consequence of these merciless ravages, overspread Europe, was dreadful, and are finely imaged by the opening the *BOTTOMLESS PIT*, from whence issued that smoke and ignorance which darkened *the sun and the air*, and took away from mankind the light and breath by which they could discern true knowledge, and by which they could be instructed, and their spirits live in purity and peace. But dreadful as the miseries had been which mankind in Europe had endured for nearly 500 years, still these were comparatively light to those which were about to be inflicted on other and guilty portions of this world. This truth is represented as being emphatically announced by a heavenly messenger (chap. viii. ver. 13), “flying through the midst of heaven, saying with a loud voice, *WOE, WOE, WOE*, to the inhabitants of the earth by reason of the other voices of the trumpet of the three angels which are yet to sound.” The commencement of this fatal period took place with the close of the fifth century (probably in the years 565—569, the latter the year when Mahommed was born), as we shall see as we proceed with the consideration of it, and to which I now return.

We have seen that the Koran not only denies all the Divine attributes and mission of our Saviour, but places Mahommed above him, and usurps the place of the Holy Ghost by boldly daring to declare the great imposter to be that Divine Essence ! In short, it dethrones (the pen trembles to write the expression) the *SON OF GOD*, and gives his place to Mahommed !! Human temerity and folly can go no further. Now let us ascertain who and what that mortal is who does this. The beloved Apostle settles this point, 1 John, chap. ii. ver. 21, &c. : “No lie is of the truth. Who is a liar, but he that denieth that *JESUS IS THE CHRIST*? He is *ANTICHRIST*, that denieth the Father and the Son. Whoso denieth the Son, hath not the Father.” Chap. iv. ver. 2 : “Every spirit that confesseth that *JESUS CHRIST* is come in the flesh, is of God : and every spirit that confesseth not that *Jesus Christ* is come in the flesh, is not of God : and this is that *ANTICHRIST* whereof ye have heard that it should come ; and even now already is it in the world,” though comparatively concealed and unknown. The Apostle Paul warns Timothy, (1 Tim. iv. 1,) — “Now the *SPIRIT* speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to *seducing spirits*, and doctrines of devils ; speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their conscience seared with a hot iron.” In his Epistle to the Thessalonians, that great Apostle fixes the truth and the fact upon an imperishable basis.

2 Thessalonians, chap. ii. vers. 1—12.

Ver. 1. “Now we beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord *Jesus Christ*, and by our gathering together unto him,

Ver. 2. "That ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by letter, as from us, as that the *day of Christ* is at hand."

Ver. 3. "Let no man deceive you by any means ; for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that MAN OF SIN be revealed, the son of perdition ;"

Ver. 4. "Who opposeth and exalteth himself *above* all that is called God, or that is worshipped ; *so that he, as God*, sitteth in the temple of God, SHOWING HIMSELF THAT HE IS GOD."

Ver. 5. "Remember ye not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you these things ?"

Ver. 6. "And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be *revealed* in his time."

Ver. 7. "For the *mystery of iniquity* doth already work : only he who now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way."

Ver. 8. "And then shall that WICKED be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with *the spirit of his mouth*, and shall DESTROY WITH THE BRIGHTNESS OF HIS COMING :"

Ver. 9. "Even him, whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders,"

Ver. 10. "And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish ; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved."

Ver. 11. "And for this cause *God shall send them* STRONG DELUSION, that they should believe A LIE :"

Ver. 12. "That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."

Now, there is no mistaking this. It applies to Mahommedanism, and to Mahommedanism alone, because no Christian power or sect, however corrupted, denies the divinity and Divine mission of the Saviour. Mahommed—Mahommedanism, therefore, is ANTICHRIST—that "WICKED"—"THE SON OF PERDITION," whom "the Lord shall CONSUME with the spirit of his mouth, and *destroy* with the BRIGHTNESS of his coming."

Now let us turn to other passages of the sacred volume, to enable us to ascertain the period of the rise, progress, and destruction of this particular delusion and tyranny, which, with others of a similar description, must be destroyed by the brightness of the Saviour's coming—that is, by the universal diffusion of true Christianity. Here again we have clear and firm ground to stand upon. We find it in the Book of Daniel, and in the Book of the Revelation of St. John, wherein the whole majesty and sublimity of the Scriptures are condensed into the shortest space, inimitably adapted to the objects and truths to be shown, and at the same time so plain, that any one who

faithfully, carefully, and humbly reads the sacred volume, may understand it.

The first reference is to the Book of Daniel. In chap. vii. we have the history of the world till Christianity shall become supreme in it. I shall not insult Christian readers by extracting at length the passages referred to, but leave them with a general reference to consult their Bibles, alluding only specifically to the passages that bear more particularly on the great subject. Daniel's account alludes, in its details, more particularly to the dispensations of Providence which bore upon the history of the Eastern world, and the fate and fortune of the chosen people. In the Little Horn we have the history of Mahommedanism, from its commencement to its close, as one of the greatest oppressors. Horn, in Scriptural language, always means kingly power and dominion. Three horns were plucked up by the roots, and fell before this one. Now the Mahommedan faith subdued totally three kingdoms or states, and no more, viz. Arabia, Persia, and the Eastern Christian empire. Next, this horn had "a mouth speaking great things." "He shall," says the Prophet, "speak great words against the Most HIGH, and shall wear out the saints of the Most HIGH, and think to change times and laws; and they shall be given into his hand until a time, times, and the dividing of time," forty-two months, or 1260 prophetic years: but then comes the punishment—"and the judgment shall sit, and they shall take away his dominion, to consume and destroy it unto the end." Here we have the character of Mahommedanism faithfully portrayed, and its destruction equally emphatically delineated. The Book of Revelation is equally explicit, and goes more into detail on this and other similar points. In chap. xiii. vers. 1—10, we have the vision of the first Beast that "rose up out of the sea"—the unstable country of Arabia with the characteristics of the Roman dominion; namely, the leopard with the feet like a bear and the mouth of a lion (the true characteristics of the Mahommedan ferocious power and intolerance), as also the following:—"And there was given unto him a mouth speaking great things and blasphemies, and power was given unto him to continue¹ forty-and-two months. And he opened his mouth in blasphemy against God, to blaspheme his name and his tabernacle, and them that dwell in heaven," &c.; but mark his fate in the emphatic declaration against the destroying horsemen: "He that hath an ear to hear, let him hear. He that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity; he that *killeth with the sword* must be killed by the sword. Here is the patience and the faith of the saints." In short, as the power and dominion of Mahommedanism was maintained by the

¹ The marginal reading, "*to make war*," is the best.

sword, so it must, by Divine decree, perish by the sword, that is, amidst war and violence. But other parts of this sacred book are still more explicit on this subject. Here we have had to look to vision only, but next we have the revelation of what that vision was intended to represent.

In chap. ix. its whole contents contains the history of Asia in particular during a period of 960 years; namely, from 570 to 1532. From the hideous darkness and ignorance which overspread the world with superstition and irreligion, on the opening of the bottomless pit—that is, giving the great adversary full power to work his will—we are told there came forth *locusts*, whose power was to continue twice 150 years. The imagery chosen beautifully delineates the Arab character and distinctive conquests. They had tails like scorpions, “and stings in their tails;” which, in Scripture language, is emphatically explained thus: “the prophet that teacheth lies, he is the tail;” as their prophet did. The Arab power rose to its greatest height and extent at the end of 150 years from its first appearance, but continued to maintain itself in considerable independence for 150 more, after which it continued to decline, and was finally shattered and subdued by other rising and violent powers. Deep as this woe was, the Arab tyranny being so great, that, “in those days, men shall seek death, and shall not find it; and they shall desire to die, and death shall flee from them”—dreadful as was the state of misery under this the fifth trumpet, it was far surpassed by what took place under the next, or sixth. To this the reader’s particular attention is now called. Four angels were loosed, who were bound in the river Euphrates. Rivers are often put in Scripture for countries and peoples. The Euphrates was the greatest river in Asia known to the Hebrews, and round which the most important events connected with their history took place. It is, therefore, here properly put to represent all Asia, to which quarter of the world the events recorded under this trumpet more especially refer. They were appointed “for an hour, and a day, and a month, and a year,” (I would choose the marginal reading as the most correct, namely, “at an hour,” &c.) “to slay the *third part of men*.” This is a terrible carnage, but the power appointed is commensurate to the dreadful work, 200,000,000 of combatants; and that this might make the deeper impression, St. John emphatically adds, “I heard the number of them;” all horsemen, out of whose mouths issued fire, and smoke, and brimstone; the most terrible engines selected to accomplish and complete their work of destruction.

The numbers here given in both cases, we may be assured, are perfectly correct, as we know from history that their fearful ravages also were. “Four” in Scripture does not always mean that particular num-

ber, but often "all," as the "four winds" of heaven mean, at times, all the winds of heaven. Now we know enough of the history of Asia to test the accuracy of these terrible images. "The tails of these horsemen were like serpents, and they had heads, and with them they do hurt." The Scripture clearly explains, in another place, those expressions thus: "The ancient and honourable, they are the head; and the prophet that teacheth lies, he is the tail." Between 960 and 1453 we had four terrific irruptions of immense powers and forces in Asia. First Mahommed the Ghaznavide; second, Zenghis Khan; third, Tamerlane; and fourth, the Turks. The armies of these nations were, as is well known, chiefly horsemen.

It is here only possible to glance at the terrible and important instances of the formidable hosts, and wide-spread destruction and devastation, that, during this awful period, spread over the Eastern world. The first invasion of China, by Zenghis Khan, was with an army of 700,000 men. He was met, by the Chinese, with hosts still more numerous. In battles, sieges, and diseases, millions of men were cut off. He next invaded Turkestan, Chorassan, and Afghanistan; and from the Upper Irtish and the Jaxartes, to the banks of the Indus, the country was literally desolated. He carried with him 700,000 men. He was met by Mahmoud of Ghiznee, in Transoxiana, with 400,000, and the latter were nearly destroyed. The three cities of Merat, Nissabour, and Herat, contained 4,300,000 souls; they were all put to the sword, and the cities razed. So barbarous were the conquerors, that their common boast was, "they could gallop their horses without stumbling over the places where the proudest capitals had once stood." He afterwards sent his grandsons, Cublaï, Holagou, and Baatu; the first to China, the second to South-western Asia, and the third to Northern Asia and Eastern Europe, each with 500,000 men. In his first invasion of China, ninety cities in the northern provinces were stormed and destroyed. In Pekin, the ancient capital, the people were forced to devour one another in the siege. The wood of the palace burned during the space of four days! In his first encounter with the Sultan of Charizme, 160,000 Charizmians were slain. From the Caspian to the Indus they ruined, in a few years, a tract of many hundred miles, which was adorned with the habitations and the labours of man; and five hundred centuries have not been sufficient to repair the ravages of four years. The conquest of China by Cublaï was attended with, if possible, a greater slaughter of the human species. Kissing, the royal residence of one of the provinces, containing 1,400,000 families, was completely desolated; and, during the siege, near a million of registered funerals passed through its gates for

interment, cut off by disease and famine alone! Under his reign, and in consequence of his wars and devastations, 13,000,000 of his subjects perished by famine. Holagou swept Persia with desolation; took and ruined Bagdad, and cut off the last Arabian caliph that reigned in that place; and accident alone prevented him from marching into Syria and Palestine, to aid the Crusaders against the Turks. Baatu found Russia torn to pieces, and weakened by intestine wars. He overran and desolated the eastern and southern parts. He retreated, and returned again with a formidable army; penetrated westward; took and destroyed Moscow. Vladimir, and other cities, soon shared the same fate. Such were his ravages, that the whole country was little more than a desert. Laden with booty, he returned to the banks of the Don. Next year he returned; besieged and took Kief, and ruined it so utterly, that he left only "*smoking ruins*." "It seemed," says the historian, "as if a deluge of fire had passed over the country from the east to the west, and as if pestilence, earthquakes, and all the scourges of nature, had concerted to insure its destruction. Wherever they came, the whole face of nature was laid waste; towns and villages burnt; all men fit to bear arms cut to pieces; and women and children, with old men, carried into captivity. They who resisted, and they who surrendered in hopes of mercy, and under the promise of it, shared the same fate;—a cruel death was their common doom, amidst extreme tortures." Town after town, city after city, were quickly involved in one common ruin. The Tartars fell back for the moment. In two years, Baatu returned. The noble city of Kief fell. The slaughter was horrible. All Russia, to the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic, must have been ruined, had not the Prince got Baatu to turn his arms against Poland and Hungary, as countries more worthy of his pursuit. He took his advice; he desolated the cities of Poland; obliterated the cities of Cracow and Lublin; filled nine sacks with the right ears of the slain on the fatal field of Lignitz; passed the Carpathian mountains; and, says Gibbon (vol. xi. p. 421), "the whole country north of the Danube was lost in a day, and *depopulated* in a summer; and the ruins of cities and churches were overspread with the bones of the natives!" The metropolis, Strigonium, was taken; and, after a promiscuous massacre, three hundred noble matrons were put to death in the presence of the great Khan. Thence, returning through Moldavia and Southern Russia, Baatu fixed his residence on the banks of the Wolga. By indescribable misfortunes, Russia at this time saved eastern and central Europe from utter desolation.

Tamerlane succeeded Zenghis Khan and his successors in the work of destruction. His army, led against the Khan of Kipchack, was so

large, that it extended thirteen miles from wing to wing. He swept the country to the north of the Caspian, and towards the Don, with, to use his own words, "the wind of desolation." He then turned his arms against India, having conquered all the countries intervening between Samarcand and the Indus. In the sack of Delhi the slaughter was so great, that the great river, Jumna, ran deeply discoloured with human blood ! On the plain, and in sight of the city during the siege, he massacred 100,000 Indian prisoners, and piled their heads in heaps. He marched against Georgia and Persia ; destroyed the Chaldee Christians with most unrelenting fury ; sacked Ispahan, and piled up near its ruined walls 90,000 human heads. Aleppo shortly afterwards shared the same fate ; and 70,000 human heads, piled up after the slaughter, attested the victory, and the cruelty by which it was won. The Turkish emperor, Bajazet, insulted and defied him. Tamerlane marched against him with 700,000 men. They met at Angora ; Bajazet's army amounting to 400,000 men. Three hundred thousand warriors left their bodies on that bloody plain ;—Bajazet was taken prisoner, and the Turkish army dispersed. The conqueror maintained a friendly feeling to the sad remains of the Greek empire. While the Ottoman empire appeared to be irretrievably ruined, it was saved by Tamerlane marching back to Samarcand. After a few months' stay there, he marched, with a large army, for the purpose of conquering China ; but death arrested his career at Otrar, and the world was delivered from a chief of great ability, but justly styled, from the ruin he brought upon it, "THE Destroying Prince." Ten times afterwards did the Moguls, with numerous armies, invade India ; and ten times, after indescribable bloodshed and destruction, they were defeated, and compelled for a time to relinquish their prey. The immense armies that the Turks, the proud and savage successors of the Moguls, afterwards led against Europe ; their capture of Constantinople, and the havoc and misery that they created in Asia and in Europe—are well known, and need not be repeated here. Still, all that has been previously stated is but a few of the more conspicuous items, in the bloody volume containing the records of nearly 400 years. Terrible and bloody as the wars in Europe have been, still they are but as a drop in the bucket and a grain in the balance, when compared with the great battles that have been fought, and the millions of men that have been slaughtered in those which have been fought in Asia. From the Hellespont to China, and from Northern Siberia to the Indian Ocean, the description which Sir Robert Ker Porter gives of the ruins of Ecbatana, and other places in Persia, becomes applicable to all the tract of Asia just adverted to. "In some places

I had seen," says he, "smouldering pomp, or sublime desolation ; in this, every object spoke of neglect and hopeless poverty. Not majesty, suitably seen passing to final dissolution in the spot where it was first blasted ; but beggary, seated in the place kings had occupied, squalid in rags, and stupid with misery."—"Immense districts in these parts of Asia, formerly cultivated like a garden, are now become dreary wastes and barren sands. Such was Khorassan, Carisme, Transoxiana, &c. Deserts, 200 or 300 miles in extent, are now found, where the country was, formerly, a perfect paradise. Ancient Persia was watered by innumerable wells and aqueducts, leading from springs in the hills at a very great distance, and this continued at a vast labour and expense ; these were ruined in those horrible invasions of the Tartars and Moguls, and the country, consequently, became uninhabitable. In the province of Khorassan there were 42,000 wells : at Tauris, 400 are lost." (Gibbon, vol. vii. p. 303.)

The fearful ravages of the Moguls and Tartars were most appalling, and may here be briefly noticed :—

"The tremendous wars carried on by Mamood and his successors, and by other Mahomedan invaders and conquerors of Hindostan, and the wars carried on by the Mongols and Tartars against the same country ; also the terrible contests carried on by the powers established in Hindostan against each other ; together with the wars of the Mongols and Tartars against China, and other countries in that quarter of Asia ;—contests which continued, almost without interruption, from the year 1000 till the end of the 15th century, above 500 years ; and during which frightful period, thousands and hundreds of thousands, many millions of human beings, perished annually by the sword and by famine,—by the horrors and consequences of war. In the year 1022, the deaths in one month amounted in Ispahan to 40,000 ; and in Hindostan whole countries were wholly depopulated, from famine and the consequences of war. The armies assembled in these wars were very great. In 1191 the Hindoos opposed Mahommed Ghazi with 200,000 horse, and, in 1192, they again opposed him with 300,000 horse ; and, in the dreadful battles which followed, these armies were nearly cut to pieces, with a mighty loss to the conquerors also. In one battle, betwixt Cuttub, the general of Mahommed Ghazi, and the Hindoos, near Delhi, the carnage was so great, that the mighty river, Jumna, was discoloured with human blood ! And in another battle with the same general, in the year 593 of the Hegira, 50,000 Hindoos fell on one bloody field. In the year 1298, the Moguls, after repeated invasions of Hindostan, again invaded it with 200,000 horse, and were opposed by Alla I. with 300,000 horse, besides foot without number, and were compelled to retreat, after a dreadful struggle. The cavalry which Alla could muster amounted to 475,000. In the year 1305 the Mongols again invaded India ; when, out of a host of at least 120,000, only 3,000 escaped for the moment, but the whole were afterwards put to death ; and even after, in

another invasion, they suffered another bloody defeat. Ten times did the Mongols attempt the conquest of India to the west of the Indus, but they were never able to make any impression upon it. In the year 1337, 100,000 Hindoos perished in an attempt made by Mahommed the Second to invade China; and, on two occasions, this savage tyrant led out his army to butcher the inhabitants of whole districts, merely to gratify his love of blood; and, in consequence of invasions, and his cruel government, the famine in Delhi in the year 1342 was so great, that men ate one another. In 1397 Tamerlane invaded India, bearing in his train fire and sword. Besides the massacre of 100,000 Hindoos in cold blood, before Delhi, that famous city was for many days given up to pillage and massacre by the whole Tartar army, and which massacre was so dreadful, that some streets were rendered impassable by the heaps of dead; while the Hindoos, in despair, and according to custom, massacred their wives and children with their own hands, and then consumed their remains, themselves, and their dwellings, by fire! Such were the scenes which during centuries followed each other, annually almost, in India; and which scenes, from similar causes, for a period of upwards of 500 years, were spread over all Central Asia. And in Asia, from the Dardanelles to the Indus, and from the Oxus to the Deserts of Arabia,—the whole presented only one vast field of destruction, carnage, blood, and death, too frightful to contemplate, and too horrible to dwell on."

Added to all these cruel ravages, there occurred others scarcely less destructive. There were the Crusades, which, during the same period of time, terrified and devastated Western Asia. Above 6,000,000 of combatants left Europe for the Holy Land, in order to rescue it from the Mahommedans. In their march they were almost as formidable to their supposed friends as they were to their open enemies. Steady supporters of the Latin Church, they conquered Constantinople, and a large portion of the Eastern Christian empire, as a lawful and proper enterprise. This conquest they retained for a long time; maintained by war and violence. At last they were overcome; and, also, all their projects in the Holy Land were, after centuries of strife and blood, finally discomfited. The destruction of human life from this cause only, during a long period of time, was incredible. Very few of the 6,000,000 of Crusaders that left for the East, ever returned to Europe!

Amidst these horrid devastations occasioned by war, the world was visited by a pestilence of the most destructive description. Between 1345 and 1349 it ravaged Asia and Europe, especially the former, in which quarter of the world it first originated. I have transcribed the following mournful account of its progress from that excellent miscellany, *Chambers' Journal*, May 19th, 1832; and which has been, I believe, taken from a very able article that had appeared in that very useful periodical, *Frazer's Magazine*. The narrative presents a most painful and appalling picture to our view:—

"This dreadful pestilence, like the cholera, made its first appearance in the East. It arose in China, Tartary, India, and Egypt, about the year 1345. It is ascribed, by contemporary writers, to a general corruption of the atmosphere, accompanied by the appearance of millions of small serpents and other venomous insects, and, in other places, quantities of huge vermin with numerous legs, and of a hideous aspect, which filled the air with putrid exhalations. Making every allowance for the ignorance and credulity of the age, it appears evident that some natural causes had contributed to corrupt the air and load it with pestiferous vapours. Thus it came into England in the year 1368; where it had rained from the previous Christmas till Midsummer, almost without ceasing. Great inundations followed, and accumulations of stagnant water, by which the whole atmosphere was poisoned. It appears that, in many countries, there were also earthquakes, and tremblings of the earth. In many of the accounts given of the convulsions of nature, we may presume there was a good deal of exaggeration. But the testimonies are too numerous and respectable to leave any doubt, that, before and during the pestilence, the elements were in a state of general convulsion which seems unparalleled in history.

"The plague extended its ravages from India into the more western parts of Asia; into Egypt, Abyssinia, and thence into the northern parts of Africa. It proceeded over Asia Minor, Greece, and the islands in the Archipelago, almost depopulating the regions over which it stalked. It may be literally said to have decimated the world, even though we were to take this term as implying the destruction of nine, in place of one, out of ten. The plague appears to have stayed five or six months in one place, and then to have gone in search of fresh victims. Its symptoms are minutely described by many writers, and appear to have been the same in every country that it visited. It generally appeared in the groin, or under the armpits, where swellings were produced, which broke out in sores, spitting, and vomiting of blood. The patient frequently died in half a day; generally within a day, or two at the most. If he survived the third day, there was hope; though, even then, some fell into a deep sleep, from which they never awoke.

"From Greece, the plague passed into Italy. The Venetians, having lost 100,000 souls, fled from their city, and left it almost uninhabited. At Florence, 60,000 persons died in one year. France next became exposed to its ravages, and the mortality was horrible. The malady proceeded northward through France, till it reached Paris, where it cut off 50,000 people. About the same time it spread into Germany, where its ravages are estimated at the enormous amount of 12,400,000 souls.

"At last, this fearful scourge began to be felt in England. About the beginning of August, 1348, it appeared in the seaport towns on the coasts of Dorset, Devon, and Somersetshire, whence it proceeded to Bristol. The people of Gloucestershire immediately interdicted all intercourse with those of Bristol; but in vain. The disease ran, or rather flew, over Gloucestershire; thence it spread to Oxford; and, about the 1st of November, reached London. Finally, it spread over all England, scattering everywhere such destruction, that, out of the whole population, hardly one person in ten was left alive. Incredible as this statement may appear, it seems

borne out by the statements of contemporary annalists. In the churchyard of Yarmouth, 7,052 persons who died of the plague were buried in one year. In the city of Norwich, 57,374 persons died in six months. In the city of York, the mortality was equal. In London, the dead were thrown into pits, forty, fifty, or sixty into one, and large fields were employed as burial places, the churchyards being insufficient for the purpose. No attempt was made to perform this last office with the usual decency and care. Deep and broad ditches were made, in which the dead bodies were laid in rows, covered with earth, and surmounted with another layer of bodies, which were also covered. The mortality fell chiefly upon the lower classes of society; and, among them, principally on old men, women, and children. In these respects, this plague seems to have differed from some of the plagues in the seventeenth century, which fell particularly upon the upper classes. (See *Journal*, No. 1.) It was remarked that not one king or prince of any nation died of the plague; and of the English nobility, and people of distinction, very few were cut off. Among the higher order of the Church, the deaths were rare. It appears that no precautions could prevent the influence of the contagion. The bonds of society were loosed; parents forsook children, and children parents. Some fled to the country; others locked themselves up in their houses; and many went on board vessels. But everywhere the fugitives were followed; for the destroying angel had a foot on the water, as well as on the land.

"The pestilence spread into Wales, and into Ireland. As to the Scots, they are said to have brought the malady upon themselves. Taking advantage of the defenceless state of England (or, rather, determined to avenge the injuries they had suffered under the Edwards), they made a hostile irruption, with a large force, into the country. But they had not proceeded far, when the plague overtook them. They perished in thousands, and carried the disease with them into Scotland, where its ravages were soon as destructive as they were in England. Early in the year 1349 the plague began to abate, and by the month of August it had entirely disappeared. Its consequences, however, continued for some time to be severely felt. During the prevalence of the disease, the cattle, for want of men to tend them, were allowed to wander about the fields at random, and perished in such numbers as to occasion a great scarcity. Though the fields, too, were covered with a plentiful crop of corn, much of it was lost for want of hands to reap and gather it in. The last dregs of this great plague were drained by that unfortunate race, the Jews. A belief spread over several countries that they had produced the pestilence by poisoning the wells and fountains—and in many places they were massacred in thousands by the infuriated populace. In several parts of Germany, where this persecution chiefly raged, the Jews were literally exterminated. Twelve thousand of them were murdered in the single city of Mentz; and multitudes of them, in the extremity of their despair, shut themselves up in their houses, and consumed themselves with fire. The extent of such atrocities, in a barbarous age, may well be imagined, when we remember the outrages which were at first produced, in some parts of the Continent, by the cholera panic."

It cannot, therefore, be doubted, that during the period mentioned *one-third* of the human race was cut off. From the Jaxartes to the Indian Ocean, and from the Indus to Persia Proper, inclusive, this part of Asia, about the Christian *Æra*, contained a population equal to that of the Roman empire in its greatest extent, or 120,000,000; it now does not contain more than 20,000,000, if so many. *ONE-THIRD* of men—the number specifically stated by St. John—would, taking the population of the world at 1,000,000,000, give 333,000,000, which, destroyed in the space of 500 years, will give 6,550,000 yearly!

But let us come to the concluding catastrophe, prefigured under the seventh vial. This we find delineated in inimitable language, in the 16th and succeeding chapters, for the occurrences given in the latter are but fuller details of what is contained in the end of the former. The sixth vial, we are told (ver. 12), was poured out upon the “great river Euphrates, and the *water thereof was dried up*, that the way of the *KINGS OF THE EAST* might *be prepared*.” In other words, the supplies of men and armies from those countries from whence such fearful and destructive swarms had issued, were cut off, from the depopulation of the countries adverted to. And is it not so? What obstruction now remains to prevent the reestablishment and re-peopling of Western Asia and Northern Europe? None from the causes alluded to. The kings of the East are readily found to be the Jews, converted to Christianity and restored to their own land, as they will be, with much extended territory; for we are decidedly informed by Isaiah, that they will “take them captive whose captives they were, and they shall rule over their oppressors.”¹

Along with this drying up of the great river Euphrates, the Apostle tells us, that *three* unclean spirits, like frogs, came out of the mouth of the dragon, and out of the mouth of the beast (the second beast, mentioned chap. xiii.), and out of the mouth of the *FALSE PROPHET*—that is, false teachers—under the emblem of the dirty, and unclean, and ugly animal, the frog—“spirits of devils working miracles, which go forth unto the kings of the earth and of the whole world, to gather them to the battle of that great day of *GOD ALMIGHTY*.” The prophet Zechariah, referring to the very subjects before us, shows what thy words “unclean spirits” mean, when he says (chap. xiii. 2), that the Lord “will cause the prophets and *the unclean spirits to pass out of the land*,” that is, false doctrines and lies are to be rooted out from this earth. The great enemy of mankind finding—knowing that his reign

¹ In proof of this the reader may consult: Isaiah xi., xii.; xlix. 13—26, but especially 19—23; lx., lxi., lxii., and part of lxiii.; Zeph. iii. 8—20; Rom. xi. 15; Rev. xx. 4—6; Ezek. xxxvii.; Dan. vii. 27; Zech. xiii., xiv.

was drawing to a close, and that he could not retain all, as he had formerly done, and that all the old delusions were worn out, tries some new devices to deceive and enthrall. And is not this so? In China, Pagan, we see a new, corrupted system of Christianity brought out to overthrow Paganism. In the Moslem world we see the Wahabys disputing the authority of the Koran, and putting forward errors and theories of their own; while Schamyl, the great impostor, preaches the doctrine that he is the greatest and last Mahommedan prophet that is to appear in latter days, and to establish the true faith—Islamism—upon a foundation not to be shaken. In the Latin Church we find it redoubling its energies to spread and to sustain its errors and its power; and amongst the different sects professing reformed Christianity, discord and division more and more, and daily, prevail. At this moment, also, there prevails in everything, religious and political, civil and sacred, a general and the most hideous system of organised falsehood ever before witnessed or experienced in this world; and to which the press, the steam, and the telegraph give increased and terrible energy. In public and in private life, and transactions of every kind, the object is to gain a point, regardless of the means employed to attain the immediate end sought, or the consequences that may follow, providing that fraud and falsehood succeed in misleading, inflaming, and maddening the minds of men. All these things—“*doctrines of devils*”—are leading to and precipitating, as their author, the great enemy of mankind, calculates they will lead to, the terrible catastrophe under consideration, and to the bitter, bloody struggle which the world has to witness. In this state “HE,” the adversary—or rather “THEY,” the corrupt frogs—“gathered them together into a place called in the Hebrew tongue ARMAGEDDON,” or the mountain or empire of the Gospel, for so the word “*mountain*,” in Scripture, when used to denote systems and states, always means.¹ And is it not so? Do we not see the world, as it were, assembling around the Turkish empire, as their prey? for “where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together.”²

After a solemn warning, “Behold, I come as a thief!” addressed by

¹ So Isaiah, alluding to this very epoch (chap. ii. 2): “And it shall come to pass in the LAST DAYS, that the MOUNTAIN of the Lord’s house shall be established [prepared] on the *top* of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the *hills* (kingdoms), and all nations shall flow unto it,” &c. Speaking of the Babylonish empire, the Prophet Jeremiah says (chap. li. 25): “Behold, I am against thee, O DESTROYING MOUNTAIN, saith the Lord, which destroyest all the earth; and I will stretch out my hand upon thee, and roll thee down from the rocks, and make thee a BURNT MOUNTAIN.”

² The Sultan of Turkey is the “*Padishah*,” Caliph, supporter of the Temple of Mecca, and the acknowledged HEAD of the Mahommedan “DELUSION.”

the Redeemer, in his retributive power, to the world; "blessed is he that watcheth and keepeth his garments, lest he walk naked and they see his shame;" the announcement of the closing scene, and all its terrible consequences, is made. The imagery is grand, descriptive, and terrible, and is well deserving of attention; it runs thus:—

Ver. 17. "And the seventh angel poured out his vial into the air; and there came a great voice out of the temple of heaven, *from the throne*, saying, IT IS DONE."

Ver. 18. "And there were voices, and thunders, and lightnings; and there was a *great earthquake*, such as was not since men were upon the earth, so mighty an earthquake, and so great."

Ver. 19. "And the great city was divided into *three parts*, and the cities of the nations fell: and great Babylon came in remembrance before God, to give unto her the cup of the wine of the *fierceness of his wrath*."

Ver. 20. "And every island fled away, and the MOUNTAINS WERE NOT FOUND."

Ver. 21. "And there fell upon men a great hail out of heaven, every stone about the weight of a talent:¹ and men blasphemed God because of the plague of the hail; for the plague thereof was exceeding great."

This is figurative and terrible, but correct language. No human wisdom could use words so appropriate, as a due consideration of them will show. "The great earthquake," or shaking, as the original word bears, means, by the correct interpretation given of earthquake by St. Paul (Heb. xii. 27), "the removal of those things that are shaken;" while none ever had occurred in the world so great as this. "The great city" means the whole political-religious systems of the world combined, Paganism, Mahommedanism, and corrupt Christianity thus, chap. xvii. 18 tells us that "the WOMAN which thou sawest is that GREAT CITY, which reigneth over the kings of the earth"), divided into three parts, each to receive its proportionate punishment; but "*great Babylon*," belonging to one particular part, was specifically marked out as the object of divine vengeance. Islands and mountains, in Scripture language, are intended to designate kingdoms and empires; and, figuratively, the "great hail" means destructive weapons of war. And is not the world, at this moment, divided into three parts? and in the contest that is at hand, is it not clear that it must be of a magnitude such as was never before witnessed in this world, and certain to be attended with such consequences amongst and to the whole human race, as the world had never before witnessed in any age? This is, I humbly conceive, obvious and certain. The result will be to tear up, to their foundations, kingdoms and empires as at present constituted. They will flee away, and be found no more; they will be succeeded by something

¹ Eighty-five English pounds.

better. The struggle will be wide, terrible, and destructive ; but, judging from the nature of the imagery employed, all most rapid in its effects, it will not be so long as other great changes and convulsions in the world have been.

The whole tenor of this important chapter (the 9th) is grand and magnificent in the extreme. That it applied to the world in general, and to all Asia in particular, is shown by the following, thus :—

Ver. 20. “And the rest of the men which were not killed by these plagues, yet repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils, and idols of gold, and silver, and brass, AND STONE, AND OF WOOD : which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk :”

Ver. 21. “Neither repented they of their murders, nor of their sorceries, nor of their fornication, nor of their thefts.”

How true is all this, as established by the future history of this world ! Hence the punishments which quickly followed. No part of Western Asia or Eastern Europe, however, between 960 and 1560, worshipped *Idols* of STONE AND OF WOOD ; therefore to Eastern Asia it must apply, and the sphere of the trumpet specifically extend. There is, also, something extremely grand and interesting in the solemn and emphatic announcement made by the seventh angel, when he had poured out his vial, namely, “IT IS DONE !” From henceforth Christianity becomes the ascendent power, and her enemies must ultimately yield to her law and to her sway.

The most direct and immediate consequence is stated in chap. xix. 11 to the end, the awful and sublime imagery used being ushered into notice by the solemn and sublime thanksgiving of the restored untainted Church on earth, for the completion of their period of suffering and subjection, and the triumphant appearance of their irresistible leader and head, represented under the character and state of the blessed in heaven. The verses specially mentioned deserve to be read with the deepest awe, reverence, and attention, as it brings before us, in all his might and majesty, the immortal Head of the true Christian Church, armed to the battle which was to avenge Him on all his enemies and opponents, and to establish his doctrine and Church, universal and triumphant. The scene represented is worthy of the terrible result :—

Ver. 11. “I saw heaven opened,” says the holy apostle, “and behold a WHITE HORSE ;¹ and he that sat upon him was called FAITHFUL AND TRUE, and in righteousness he doth judge and make war.”

Ver. 12. “His eyes *were* as a flame of fire, and on his head were many crowns ; and he had a name written, that no man knew, but he himself.”

¹ WHITE always represents VICTORY.

Ver. 13. "And he was clothed *with a vesture dipped in blood* :¹ and his name is called THE WORD OF GOD."

Ver. 14. "And the armies which were in heaven followed him upon white horses, clothed in fine linen, white and clean."

Ver. 15. "And out of his mouth goeth a *sharp sword*,² that with it he should smite the nations : and *he shall rule them with a rod of iron* :³ and he *treadeth the wine-press* of the fierceness and wrath of Almighty God."

Ver. 16. "And he hath on his vesture and on his thigh a name written, KING OF KINGS, AND LORD OF LORDS."

The remaining verses of this sublime chapter contain, in inimitable and just language, the description of the terrible contest, represented under the imagery of a great battle, and its certain and triumphant results, the utter annihilation of the opponents of the true religion of Christ, as these are represented by the beast—meaning thereby a wild ferocious animal, or ferocious, blood-thirsty, and persecuting tyranny, as the Latin Church has been ; and the FALSE PROPHET, or Mahommedan *delusion*, in everything that was ferocious, cruel, persecuting, and remorseless, resembling the other. These both, we are told, were taken and "*cast alive* into a lake of fire burning with brimstone," that is, overtaken with irresistible and total destruction, and were never again to be heard of in this world. The fate here mentioned is that which was denounced as specifically to be the fate of the *little horn*, and the great beast from which it sprang (Daniel vii. 11, 26) : "But the judgment shall sit, and they shall take away his dominion, *to consume* and *to destroy* it unto the end." From this SENTENCE there is no escape ; from this judgment there IS NO APPEAL !

Belonging to and connected immediately with this great contest and its results, are parts thereof which, for their particular importance, are separately described in the 17th, 18th, and part of the 19th chapters. The first gives us the vision of "BABYLON THE GREAT," represented under the image of a FEMALE, who had broken her marriage vows, proved herself unfaithful to her husband, and who, having done this, gloried in her shame, by having her criminal intercourse with multitudes emblazoned on her forehead, after the manner of voluntary and irreclaimable harlots in some countries in the East. This figure or allegorical representation represents corrupt religion as that has appeared in the whole post-diluvian world, and supported by the great empires which had existed, ending in that which succeeded the Roman, the corrupted Latin Church, which sprang out of the other, substituted itself in the room of Paganism—which, in short, had the wound unto death, yet

¹ See Isaiah lxiii. 1—6, but especially ver. 3, the sublime description of the terrible events now under review and about to commence, chap. xi. 4.

² Isaiah xi. 4.

³ Psalm ii. 9.

did live. This allegorical representation of the abandoned female carried by a ferocious beast, comprehended every species of corrupt religion which has appeared in the world unto our times, and Mahomedanism amongst the rest. These, in fact, come under the comprehensive name which follows: "And the WOMAN which thou sawest is that GREAT CITY which reigneth over the kings of the earth"—every part, and branch, and support, and worshipper of which, was, amidst war and violence, to be swept for ever "from the face of the earth." That the description might not be deficient or mistaken, we are told that the waters, on which the whore sitteth, "*are peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues.*"

The heads or empires of this great beast, or tyranny, were the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Babylonian, the Persian, the Macedonian, the Roman, which then existed, and the great Papal succession, as seventh head, with all the characteristic tyranny and ferocity of its immediate predecessor—Paganism; for while we are told that he had "two horns, like a lamb," he "spake as a dragon," as Paganism had always done. Belonging to this, and out of this, sprang an eighth head, which goeth into perdition (chap. xvii. 11). Who that is that goeth into perdition has been already clearly shown, namely, the Mahomedan system of delusion and tyranny. In reference to the subject of "*ten kings*," it may be remarked that the word "*ten*," in Scripture, does not always mean that specific number, but, on the contrary, frequently means "*many*." But, whatever the number is, we are emphatically told that though they would support the great beast, or tyranny, and "*harlot*," during the Divine pleasure; yet that in the end they should turn against the religious corrupter, and devour and utterly destroy her—"eat her flesh, and burn her with fire," waste and spoil her utterly!

This was "*BABYLON the Great, the mother of fornications*," or corruptions of every kind, and which have disturbed and tormented the earth; but there is a part and portion of her dominions and state, namely, "*Great Babylon*," whose punishment is more minutely described in chap. xviii. throughout. The judgment is terrible, irreversible, and complete, and clearly belongs to that more specific portion of tyranny and false religion which settled itself in the Eastern world, namely, the Mahomedan religion and power. To this the special attention of all the prophets and apostles was constantly and closely directed, and they always keep in view the type of it—*old Babylon*,¹ the great oppressor and destroyer of the people of God. It is, I humbly think, clear that it is the great Mahomedan delusion and usurpation, and, included in and inseparably connected with it, the great capital of

¹ See Isaiah, chaps. xii. xiv.; Jeremiah, chaps. i. li.

the Mahommedan power, that is here more particularly pointed out by St. John. The details of the destruction which ensued apply more particularly to it than to the capital of any other corrupted state in this world. The destruction was to be complete—not a vestige was to be suffered to remain. The imagery denoting this is majestic and descriptive in the extreme: ver. 21—"And a mighty angel took up a stone like a great millstone, and cast it into the sea, saying, Thus with VIOLENCE shall that *great city Babylon* be thrown down, and SHALL BE FOUND NO MORE AT ALL." This terrible and just catastrophe is accompanied by a solemn and affecting warning, joined by a strong anathema upon all who neglect or disregard it. To this I would seriously and urgently direct the attention of my readers: ver. 4—6. "Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues: for her sins have reached unto heaven, and *God hath remembered her iniquities*. Reward her even as she rewarded you, and *double unto her double* according to her works: in the cup that she hath filled FILL TO HER DOUBLE"! This doom is irreversible: "Seek ye out of the book of the Lord, and read: no one of these shall fail, none shall want her mate: for MY mouth it hath commanded, and HIS SPIRIT it hath gathered them." (Isaiah xxxiv. 16.) "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good? (Numb. xxiii. 19.) Neither French garrisons nor British fleets can avert the downfall, though both may and will share in the punishment here denounced, by mixing themselves up for worldly views, objects, and interests, to preserve, if they could preserve, in its integrity and independence, the enemy and the opponent of the great Creator of heaven and earth!

The inquiry now becomes necessary, namely, Is this the period of the world's history when such a great change may be expected to take place? Here Scripture, with history, supplies us, the former especially, with safe and unerring guides. The power and dominion of these oppressors and corrupters of Christianity were to continue *forty and two months*,¹ or 1260 prophetic years. In the month of June, 609, Mahommed first announced his religion to his wife, Cadijah, and his family. Three years thereafter, or 612, he publicly promulgated his faith, and chose Ali as his vizier; and thus, on a small scale, established a kingly system and authority. Suppose the latter year as the commencement of the hideous "*strong delusion*" and "*lie*," then this is the year 1270 of the Mahommedan era, calculated by lunar years.² Those

¹ Rev. xi. 2, and xii. 14; and Daniel vii. 25.

² We are now, since last October, in 1271, A. H.

first 1260 prophetic years are 1242.749 of our years, and dating those from 612 brings us to the year 1854. Again, 1270 lunar years are 1232.045 of our years, and dating those from 622, the Mahommedan era, taking into account the portions of the years of both periods, we come to 1854, as before—the period of the actual commencement of the overthrow of the Mahommedan power! And is it not so? The perusal of the official documents which have been considered tells us, in the most decided manner, that, from the beginning of 1854, Turkey and her sovereign can no longer act an independent part. They can only move as France and England command them. They can neither declare war, nor make peace, nor fight, with or for any power or object, but as the two powers order and command; and which order and command, be what these may, Turkey and her Sultan must obey! The Mahommedan power, as independent, was “to *continue* forty and two months.” (Rev. xiii. 5.) The marginal reading, however, is here the best translation, namely, “*power to make war* forty and two months.” It was on the 9th of March, 1854, that the treaty between France, England, and Turkey was signed at Constantinople, by which Turkey is bound to obey these powers in everything, especially as regards war and peace. The document was exchanged at Constantinople on the 8th of May; and from the completion of this treaty must clearly be dated the overthrow of Mahommedanism as an independent power—the Sultan of Turkey being considered as the head chief of the Islamite world. Calculated carefully and minutely, we shall find the periods agree to an hour. There is no error in the calculations of unerring wisdom. Like as in the deliverance of the children of Israel, after the expiry of the predicted thralldom of 430 years, which terminated in “the self-same day” that they came out of Egypt; just as the seventy years’ captivity of the same people in Babylon did terminate; so, we may be assured, and in fact do see and know, that the predicted thralldom and persecution of Christianity cease, and shall cease for ever, and that the convulsions and changes amongst men which are to produce that great event are begun.

How long the great contest will last that is to terminate in, comparatively speaking, universal peace, there is no specific data given to determine; but as the imagery employed to portray it is all of the most violent and rapid working kind, so we may conclude that it will be short, yet commensurate with its objects and extreme violence. The language used in the description of all these terrible and decisive events is metaphorical, but most expressive; and none other could have been chosen to bring the terrible subjects into such a short compass as we here find it. The struggle is represented as being *one great*

battle, and the commander and leader of the army arrayed and marshalled in the cause of *truth* and justice, the Omnipotent God, the *Saviour and the Judge of the world*; that is, all their actions and pursuits should be directed and supported by his Divine wisdom and irresistible power. How fearful and bloody the struggle against the enemies of truth and Christianity, in this their death-struggle, was to be, is laid before us in awful colours, in the fourteenth chapter, where mighty angels are described as the reapers gathering, as grapes are gathered in the harvest, the people of the World, to throw them into the "*great wine-press of the wrath of God*," which press was trodden without the city, and "blood came out of" it, "even unto the horse-bridles, by the space of a thousand and six hundred furlongs,"—200 miles, and say, four feet deep. Who it was that trode this "great wine-press of the wrath of God," we have already shown—the Son of God, in his capacity of the Judge of his enemies, and the avenger of the cause of his long and grievously oppressed and cruelly treated servants through so many ages!

So great was to be the convulsion, so terrible the overthrow, so great the victory and change, that we are told by Him who cannot err, that every kingdom (hill) and mountain (empire), as these at present stand in the world, were to flee away and not be found; and the only refuge and security for the good, virtuous, and peaceable, was, to take care and not to mix themselves in any way in the strife; otherwise, if they did, they must expect to suffer in the contest. Let us not be mistaken: the struggle described, and here foretold, will most certainly take place. He has told us, who cannot err, "*Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my word shall not pass away*." When general destruction and ruin was about to come upon his devoted country and countrymen, he reproached them for not attending to and discerning "*the signs of the times*," which if they had done, they would have been delivered from the terrible fate which overtook them; and he warned his true followers, when they perceived discords, tumults, and wars that were to take place, then to flee from Jerusalem, because its total destruction was at hand. The conduct of every Christian nation and people ought to be the same in the terrible wars that most certainly are at hand; for if they voluntarily join in, and take part in them, they cannot and will not escape their full share of the general calamities and evils which must ensue.

When the SAVIOUR of mankind came into this world, he came the messenger of peace and good-will, and bestowed his peace upon men; but with the eye of Omniscience, which sees the past, the present, and the future alike, he saw that the evil passions and interests

of mankind would quickly transform his religion of peace into discord and the sword. It is with men of this description—alas! still the general mass of mankind—that we have now to contend, and with whom the battle of “the *mountain of the Gospel*” must and will be fought, to terminate in victory, which will banish war and violence from the world for a period of *one thousand years*! It is impossible to look at and consider the present agitated state of this world, in almost every corner thereof, and not to perceive that the catastrophe and change foretold is at hand, “even at the doors;” and every man and nation of true Christian faith and feeling will, as a matter of duty and safety, attend to the warning voice of their God. The great enemy of mankind, and his followers and dupes, will not let go their hold of worldly power and pleasures without a terrible contest; therefore, “Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues: for her sins have reached unto heaven, and GOD HATH REMEMBERED HER INIQUITIES. Reward her even as she rewarded you, and double unto her double; in the cup that she hath filled fill to her double.” Who is so bold, or so godless, that he should voluntarily brave such punishment and such vengeance—“the vengeance of our God, and the vengeance of his temple!”

In looking around the world, we perceive the Latin Church everywhere making the greatest exertions, with recourse to pretended miracles, “signs and lying wonders,” to establish and extend her power and authority as the Universal Church, and bringing kings and empires, as in the case of Austria and France, to obey her. On the other hand, the change that has taken place in Spain threatens to weaken, if not ultimately to subvert, her power in that country—the commencement of that disunion that is to overthrow her. In Mahommedan countries, we perceive Islamism—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa—making desperate exertions to raise itself to its former predominance. In all these quarters, we perceive them encouraged by Great Britain and France; we perceive them arming, and furiously rushing to arms, and pressing forward to the great battle scene in the empire or “MOUNTAIN OF THE GOSPEL.” In those parts of the Circassian coast abandoned by the Russians, we perceive with regret that Christian schools and churches are abandoned and destroyed, or the latter turned into mosques, the members of which the muftis boast they are to extend under the ægis of Great Britain! But all those efforts will prove of no avail. The two corrupt powers must fall nearly together—the Latin last, as it rose last. The present stir in both, is a momentary death struggle:

“So dying tapers give a blazing light.”

In the East, we perceive the Greek Church in a great commotion, ready to assert its independence of, and freedom from, the chains of Islamism ; at the same time, with serious schisms within itself. According to accounts from Constantinople, Lord Stratford is endeavouring to get the leading clergy of the Greek Church in that place to separate themselves from the Greco-Russian Church ; and, by way of weakening the power of Russia, and promoting *peace and good-will* in that quarter, advising the other to excommunicate the Russian Church, and to claim a superiority over it.

Asia, Pagan, is agitated to its foundations, and calling for change. In Africa, and over a large portion of America, tumult and confusion prevail. Amidst Protestants, great disunion and a love of change prevail. Falsehood, in almost everything, the work of the "*frogs*," or teachers of false doctrines—seems to lead and guide mankind, and teaches them to advocate and look to change, however violent the change may be, or uncertain and destructive the result. All these things, with the sadly disjointed state of political affairs, have paved the way for a struggle such as the Scriptures of truth have predicted will take place in the world, and of which every sincere and honest Protestant should, to the utmost of his power, keep clear. The following is the notice from Constantinople adverted to, as it has been transmitted by a correspondent of the *Morning Herald*, a little while ago :—

"I am also positively informed that the Porte, aided by Lord Stratford, has finally obtained from the Greek Patriarch that the latter should denounce the conduct of Russia in regard to the Orthodox Church, which is placed under his guardianship, and not that of the Emperor Nicholas. This proclamation, if it is thrown into circulation, cannot fail to have an immense effect among the lower classes of Christians in the Ottoman empire, who are under the impression that their own ecclesiastical authorities openly side with Russia. Your readers are aware that the Patriarch, repeatedly pressed to issue a manifesto to the Greeks, has refused to do so—tendered his resignation rather than sacrifice his own personal feelings, which are in favour of the Porte's enemy."

Although, as has been stated, the imagery employed under the *seventh vial* denotes rapid operation, still the magnitude and number of the great events, changes and devastations, that were or are to take place under it, clearly point to a considerable time as its sphere of operation ; though, as in reference to the events and occurrences under the other vials, the time of the duration of the punishments under the seventh vial may be comparatively short. One great event under it—the conversion of the Jews to Christianity, and their return to the country of their forefathers, for Christians they must become

before they can be re-established in it—must take a considerable time; because, first, “they shall look upon ME *whom they have pierced*, and they shall mourn for HIM as one mourneth for his only son.” (Zech. cxii. 10.) The numerous and terrible wars that must and will take place throughout the world, will occupy some time to expend their fury and to see general tranquillity restored. In looking at the periods of the first six vials, (350 years,) it will not be too much to allow thirty years for the period of the duration of the events to take place under the Seventh.

“HAIL,” in Scripture language, when metaphorically used to express the movement of war, always means the weapons used in war by armies. In this case we are told that the hail was great, every stone about the weight of a talent, or 85 lbs. The balls now used in artillery, both by land and sea, and especially for artillery employed in besieging cities, as this prophetic hail was to be used, carry balls even exceeding 85 lbs. It is, therefore, that “hail,” or destructive weapon of war, which is here indicated. It was to be under such hostile operations and weapons that “*the cities of the nations fell*.” Is it not so, and certain to be so, to a terrible extent, in the contest begun, and which there is little reason to doubt will rapidly spread over the world? France and England, especially, proclaim that in carrying on warlike operations, destruction of cities, not preservation, is to be their sole aim and their work! Other nations will doubtless follow their example; and some of them, with probably even greater ferocity than the others, may carry out such detestable work. It is further evident, that such is the jealousy amongst different powers about who is to hold Constantinople, that it is extremely probable that, either from internal convulsion, or from external war, or from both, this great capital may be utterly destroyed, in order to prevent any power from again seating itself upon its site, which could shut up the navigation of the Black Sea and rule in the Mediterranean. Therefore it is more than probable that this celebrated capital is the “*Great Babylon*,” that, according to Revelation xviii. is to be completely destroyed!—destroyed, too, unquestionably, amidst war and violence. For “a mighty angel,” one of those spiritual beings, each of whom “*can wield these elements*” at the command of his Immortal Sovereign, takes up a stone “like a great millstone,” and dashes “it into the sea,” with this irresistible and all-powerful declaration and anathema: “*Thus WITH VIOLENCE shall that great city Babylon be thrown down, and be found no more at all!*” And this done amidst that awful convulsion that shakes this world—under which KINGDOMS fled away, and EMPIRES are not found!

CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSION.

RECAPITULATION OF PRINCIPAL TOPICS—ADDITIONAL OFFICIAL REFERENCES TO GENERAL HEADS—LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S NAVIGATION LAWS—FIGHT FOR THE FOOD WE ARE TO EAT—DISTORTIONS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS BY THE ALLIES—THEIR CROOKED POLICY—BIND TURKEY NECK AND HEEL—FRENCH AND ENGLISH ALLIANCE—DANGERS FROM IT—UNION WITH AUSTRIA, ALLIANCE STILL MORE DANGEROUS—CLARENDON AND SAXONY—MENACING DESPATCH—THE FOUR POINTS—REJECTED BY RUSSIA—SAXON SPIRITED REPLY—GOVERNMENT, THROUGH THE "TIMES," THREATENS TO EXTINGUISH PRUSSIA AND SWEEP AWAY ALL THE STATES OF EUROPE AS ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATIES OF 1815—THREATS OF THE ALLIES INEFFECTUAL—MUST FAIL—THE SCRIPTURES POINT OUT THEIR FATE—COST OF WAR, ETC. ETC.

IN all that has been already said, and in all that is about to be stated, let it be distinctly understood, that when nations are spoken of, it is their general policy and actions, and not the character of individuals, otherwise than as public servants, that are animadverted upon, or praised, or censured, as evidence appears. Likewise, also, in reference to the subject of religious belief, it is the conduct and proceedings of established systems, and not the private character of individuals, but their public conduct, that is brought into notice for praise or for censure.

Further, into the history of the war going on it is not my intention to enter; that must be left to the future historian. My sole object has been to show how the war has been brought on, and how it might have been avoided; remarking simply, that every drop of blood we spend in it, or treasure we lavish, is not only a waste, but goes to increase the power and influence of France, and to restrict and cut down that of England.

"Coming events," we are told, "cast their shadows before." During the discussion on the Navigation Laws it may be remembered that Lord

John Russell defended the old Manning clause on the ground of necessity in reference to manning the navy; for, said he, the day may soon come when we will require that navy to FIGHT FOR US *in order to procure the bread we may require to eat*. The operations of the war against Russia are, it is presumed, directed accordingly against those parts of that empire where the greatest supply of grain that we require is procured. Therefore, and with this view, no doubt, of conquest, our Government, through the *Times* (July 22d, 1854), announced that the lands of Turkey and other places were to be cultivated by rich British merchants; a result which can only be gained and secured by conquest and the possession of the territory. This is something new for our agriculturists to consider, especially as they are great supporters of the present war. Lord John will doubtless be seen transporting them to the plains round the Sea of Azoph, there to cultivate grain (wheat) to make into bread that we may eat, and at the same time probably bestow upon them a priest of the Latin Church and a Mahomedan mufti (Siamese twins, they are inseparable) to teach them how to worship the gods of the new country!

Considering the whole state and condition of the Russian empire and people, it may safely be asserted that no country in Europe has made such advances to prosperity as they have done. Attention to agriculture has, in every age, been considered the sure foundation and proof of knowledge and civilization. The extension of agriculture, and the produce of agriculture throughout the Russian empire, has, during the last few years, been exceedingly great, as her exports will testify. During 1853 Russia exported (the produce of the year) to different countries 7,000,000 quarters of wheat, the average value of which could hardly be less than 21,000,000*l*.! Other grains, flax, hemp, linseed, and tallow, are produced to an incredible extent. Much of the wheat is produced in Southern Russia, especially near the Sea of Azoph. A few years ago scarcely a quarter of wheat was exported from that district; last year the exports amounted to about 1,900,000 quarters! From the war operations in that quarter it would appear that Lord John and his allies are determined, as much as is in their power, to destroy all this rising industry, and reduce the districts around to their former state of barbarism—the French and English way now-a-days for spreading peace, independence, knowledge, and “CIVILIZATION” among men! In this way, and in this view of the subject, Lord John and his colleagues will have two strings to their crooked bow—in short, one string to secure supply by conquest, and another to secure protection by the destruction of foreign supply: in other words, protection to British agriculture by the destruction of that

of another people !! Such is the work and the wisdom of coalition—like bringing fire and water together into one place.

The course pursued by the Russian Government in reference to that great and necessary work—the emancipation of the serfs throughout the empire, is so judicious and just, that in a few years more they will all be free, either as labourers, mechanics, or agricultural proprietors, as may be their own pleasure, and educated and prepared for perfect freedom, and this without loss or injury to their former superiors. In the meantime their labour, and their property derived from that labour, are protected wherever they may choose to go to reside in any portion of the Russian empire, upon paying for a time limited by law a small sum yearly to their former superiors. One serf, now an old man, according to Mr. Hill, has raised himself by his native genius and industry to the position of a great manufacturer of iron-ware and cutlery, to the extent of 125,000*l.* yearly, while he pays his lord only 50*s.*, and who retains him in his station on account of the immense service he renders to the whole country in his neighbourhood ; nor does the other complain of this remaining part of his vassalage. Had England adopted the same prudent course with the large number of slaves in her colonies, she would have saved 20,000,000*l.* addition to her national debt, and more than 150,000,000*l.* of the real property of her faithful subjects, which she has destroyed or rendered unproductive, and at the same time improved the comforts and condition of those freed slaves much beyond what we find it at present to be.

The population of Russia is steadily and rapidly increasing, while that of nearly all the other countries of Europe is almost stationary. New villages, towns, farms, and houses, are rising up in every corner, a proof that they have a Government that attends to the interests of all, and that the population know and feel it.

Lord John, during parliamentary discussions last session, along with others, complained bitterly that Protestant Northern Germany was too much Russian. So far good. It is likely they will, and it is proper that for their own safety and welfare they should, continue so. But Lord John and his colleagues do not, as they might do, tell us the cause of this. It would not have been politically wise to have done so. It is this : Ever since the days of Queen Elizabeth the Protestants over Europe have looked to England as a rallying point and a stay against the tyranny and intolerance of the Latin Church. But the moment that Great Britain passed the Roman Catholic Bill, which left the United Kingdom to be ruled by engines of Rome and political profligates amongst ourselves, from that moment the Protestants on the Continent saw that they could no longer depend upon her for that

assistance and support in the hour of danger from the growing power and strength of the Latin Church, in that terrible struggle which they saw, and all who are not wilfully blind do see, is approaching with rapid strides. In this dilemma they were compelled to look for support elsewhere. There was no other power sufficiently strong and sufficiently antagonistic to the Latin Church but Russia. They therefore wisely turned their hopes to her. She readily met them. She married her royal family into several of the German royal families, and thus acquired great family, domestic, and political influence. It is this influence and power that the United Kingdom, under blind and infatuated administrations, have neglected and lost, and have now allied themselves and their country with France, the great political head and support of the Latin Church, and which has called forth our fleets and our armies, and, strange to say, misled and maddened our population, to crush and destroy, if they can, that Protestant combination and support—destruction which, if it could be accomplished, is sure to be followed by their own humiliation and degradation, when they will find some morning the feet of Rome and France upon their necks and their heels, without an ally to aid, or capable of effectively aiding them. This is a correct state of the case, and calls for both immediate attention and decision. We are led by France and Rome, and dare not move but as they direct us ! We cannot stop. We dare not say to France, Stand still !

It is impossible to go through the official papers published, and to dig out from them, with that labour and patience which such an undertaking requires, the real truth, so often and so studiously concealed, or attempted to be concealed, without coming to the conclusion, independent of every other accessible authority, that we have acted wrong, and have entered upon a terrific contest, that, so far as we are concerned, might have been, and ought to have been, avoided. This will doubtless by some be said to be un-English, and defending Russia. If to tell truth in the boldness of truth is to defend Russia, that cannot be helped, and does not alter, but confirm, the facts stated ; and it is because I am English, and deprecate and fear the consequences of this struggle we have been plunged into, that truth compels me to state these things, and to call things by their right names, whether these may be generally pleasing or not.

Much has been said about the violation and abrogation of treaties. Now, if one thing is more clear than another, it is, that the secret object of France and England, if not Austria also, and of the ambassadors of these powers, was to deny and destroy the validity of all the existing treaties and engagements that had been made between Russia and Turkey during the last 100 years ; and this because they aver that,

under those treaties, especially that of Kainardji, Russia had acquired a preponderating influence in Turkey, arising from the religion of Russia, being that of the great majority of the population of the Ottoman empire. This was really their great object; commenced by France, but which she did not at first avow openly, nor till all other weapons of aggression failed, when recourse was had to this most dangerous, dishonourable, and I will add unjust proceeding; because, if done in one case it may be done in other cases, and then the established order of things in Europe would be turned topsy-turvy, because, forsooth, the Turks wanted to go to war, and France wanted to support them.

Lord Clarendon (*Secret Correspondence*, p. 20, March 23d, 1853) confesses and dreads this when he deprecates the assembling an European Congress to discuss the affairs of Turkey, because "of the jealousies that would then be evoked, the impossibility of reconciling *the different ambitious and divergent interests that would be called into play*, and the certainty that the treaties of 1815 *must then be open to revision*, when France might be prepared to risk the chance of an European war to get rid of the obligations which she considers injurious to her national honour, and which, having been imposed by victorious enemies, are a constant source of irritation to her!" This is giving us a peep behind the scenes, and shows us the moving spring of all the present turmoils and dangers. The plain meaning of this remarkable declaration is, that France having thrown aside, and intending to throw aside, all the treaties of 1815, and decided to fight with some one or all of them who had imposed these treaties complained of upon her, she told England, "I can only remain at peace with you on condition that you assist me in making war upon Russia." We can easily get the Turks to violate their engagements with Russia, tie the kettle to her tail, and get up a delightful chase, assisted as we will be by all the knaves and the fools throughout Europe." Equally determined on our part as France was, to fight some one, we no doubt thought it the most prudent course to take an opponent who resided at some distance rather than one at our own doors—the question of the justice of the proceeding was of little moment. And all this, we are told, is sound morality, justice, liberty, and civilization! But might does not constitute right, nor success justice, otherwise all the aggressive wars of Napoleon I. were proper and justifiable.

The treaties of 1815 were concluded by the general voice of Europe after a war the most just, extensive, and general, ever witnessed in Europe. If these, according to Lord Clarendon, can be fairly broken by the power whose profligate ambition compelled them, and because

under such circumstances they were imposed, so may the treaty which the allies threaten to impose upon Russia in a war manifestly unjust on their part. And if made under the supposed circumstances, it will most assuredly be broken, and where then is the boasted certainty for the peace of Europe ?

Doubtless these powers and their clever but not over-scrupulous ambassadors would have been glad if they could, without a general war and its enormous dangers and expenses, have succeeded in their "*palpable humiliation* of Russia," as Stratford confesses, when accomplished, it would be ; but these diplomatists, like all other political intolerants, could not perceive that the more they strove to gain their point, the more it became the interest and the duty of Russia to guard against and counteract it and resist it. If the independence of Turkey was perilled by the supposed or real preponderance which the influence—the fair and unavoidable influence—alluded to, gained to Russia, so certainly was her peace and independence perilled if Turkey, supported by both France and England, succeeded in the acquisition which they sought, and were determined to obtain. They planted thereby their feet on the neck of Turkey, and on her prostrated body erected their batteries, garrisoned with guns of the longest range, such as those of Seymour and Stratford in the diplomatic world, and those of the much-renowned long-gun admiral Chads in the naval gunnery world. Not one of them, however, thought for one moment what the results would be to themselves or to their country and the world, allowing they succeeded in gaining their object, and those ulterior objects, which success, if success attends them, is sure to lead to.

They have, by their conduct and proceedings, left Russia no alternative but complete humiliation, or victory. They sought, as they now acknowledge, to strip her of that which was justly her due, and which deprived of, will lower her power at home, and her proper influence with the rest of the world ; and leave her, as they intended to leave her, the laughing-stock of their miserable and degraded tool, the irreclaimable and ferocious Turk of Constantinople, and the bloody and destructive blasphemer and impostor of Circassia—SCHAMYL. I, for one, fairly acknowledge, that I mistake the Russian character, and power, and resources, and also mistake the signs of the times, if Russia is to be so humiliated and crushed without a struggle which will shake more thrones than one, from the Atlantic Ocean to her borders in Europe, to their foundations. When we talk so boldly and so flippantly of curtailing treaties as we please, and of stripping nations of territories held by them as lawfully as we hold any of our own, and those, too, guaranteed by our name ; are we prepared to tear up the *remainder* of

the treaties of 1815, and to restore to Holland the colonies (Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and Dutch Guiana), which we received from her in lieu of Belgium, guaranteed to her by all the powers of Europe, but which we afterwards, while retaining the equivalent received, wrested from her by open violence, and application of brute force, ten-fold more aggravated than the occupation of the Principalities by Russia; admitting this act to have been unjust. Are we prepared to do this? And, if not prepared, we become—dignify or degrade the act as we will—the most tyrannical and profligate of mankind.

Let us look a little more in detail into these important matters. Our objects, we were ostentatiously told, were the integrity and independence of Turkey. We are supremely disinterested; and so, also, are our gallant allies, the French. But the Eastern world allows great latitude in political morals and intentions. Old Mehemet Ali, who, it will be acknowledged, was no fool, though a bit of a rogue, when he was told, by the celebrated traveller Burckhardt, at Mecca, in 1815, of the peace of Paris, and the small reserve that England had retained for her great exertions and expenditure, would not allow that she could be so unwise and disinterested as Burckhardt had made it appear. "She must have something more in view," said he, "and that something must be Egypt." "*No great king*," said Mehemet, "*ever draws his sword but to fill his purse*;" or, as his Highness might have added, when he has got the purse full, to keep it so. This truth cannot be denied. Lord Stratford, who has lived so long in Constantinople, where political profligacy is greater than in almost any other quarter of the world, and who must, therefore, be a most competent judge in all such matters, tells us (Part II. p. 167), "The Sultan and his ministers cannot be blind to a truth that is obvious to every one. They *must perceive*, that their hold upon the sympathies of an AUXILIARY POWER is one which has its origin in the sense entertained by that power of *its own interests*." Here is "a Daniel come to judgment." Count Nesselrode, who can see as far into a millstone as Lord Stratford, fully understands this; and the Turks are more stupid and vindictive against Russia than we take them to be, if a glimmering of this light has not already burst upon them, and if they already see not that a change of masters—admitting that Russia had been their master—will make matters to them, if Turks they remain, worse instead of better!

The balance of power in Europe requires, we are told, that a Mahomedan sovereign and creed should be maintained at Constantinople; that a Greek kingdom, or Christian empire, as formerly, cannot now be thought of, or tolerated. So says Lord Clarendon. (*Sec. Correspondence*.) What says his Lordship, in another part, on this subject? Part I.

p. 294, he tells Lord Stratford thus: "Your Excellency will plainly and AUTHORITATIVELY state to the Porte, that this state of things cannot be longer tolerated by Christian powers." "And her Majesty's Government conceive that very little reflection will suffice to satisfy the Turkish ministers, that the Porte can no longer reckon upon its Mussulman subjects as a safeguard against external danger, and that, without the hearty assistance of its Christian dependents, and the powerful sympathy and support of its Christian allies, the *Turkish empire must soon cease to exist!*" Well, how is this assistance and support to be obtained? How is "the most crying injustice under which the Rayahs of the empire *have laboured for centuries*" (Stratford, *Protestants in Turkey*, p. 4), to be removed? Mr. Ward tells us (Greek Papers, pp. 213, 214), that the Greek population care not one straw how despotic Russia may be, if they can only be delivered by her aid from her present degraded state; and, with regard to Turkey, "the one thing to which they look is ITS DOWNFALL, no matter by what means, or *by what power it may be effected.*" How will—how can, Lord Clarendon, as a Christian, support and maintain a system and a power like this; viewed with such just hatred by 15,000,000 of people of that name and religion, living, and thus to be compelled to live, under its sway? He cannot.

Let his Lordship open his eyes, and let things within the scope of their vision teach him knowledge and understanding. Let him look at the office in which he writes. It is a good image of the Turkish empire. Can he uphold it? No! he must pull it down, and reconstruct it. None of the old materials can again be used, or prove good for anything. As soon as the buildings near it were taken away, it was obliged to be propped up; and there it stands amidst its fellows, like a certain animal with one ear, the astonishment and dread of all neighbours and beholders; especially of foreigners, who look tremblingly at the structure as they approach it, and cogitating how they may get safely out, when they enter into it upon business. It has just got three props, like Turkey—two near each other, like France and England, supporting the main portion of the house; and one at a distance from these, and a little crooked, like Austria, supporting a protruding wing. His Lordship must pull it down, and reconstruct it; or, some rough wintry morning, it may tumble about his ears, and smother some cabinet council, when deliberating about Turkey; while Musurus, Collerado, and Walewski, waiting to report progress, may also be cut off. Whether any European mourning would take place when the catastrophe occurs, must be left to time to show. But down it must come, or be taken down; and there is strong reason

to believe that both it and the Turkish empire will be swept away together; and it will, of course, depend upon the architect and workmen who may be employed in reconstructing either, to replace them with something better. Certainly none of the present hands can do so, unless they reform and change their present views and principles.

Apropos about this subject. Every stranger looks upon the props, but especially the waste ground and nuisances adjoining it, with amazement; and those who have been in Turkey declare, that it is an exact picture of extensive districts of that empire. Our American cousin, when he surveys it with his sharp, calculating eyes, wonders why it is not turned into that which will produce some dollars yearly income. "What can be the reason why it is not so?" said our cousin lately. The answer was, "Why, it is generally believed that the ministry are considering whether they should fill up the space with harems, for the ministers of the day; or with a mosque, to enable them to perform their devotions with speed, amidst urgent business." "Well," said our cousin, "that is some reason for delay; and I *guess* that harems will yield the largest annual return!"

"France and England united," says Lord Clarendon (Part I. p. 399), "and resolved to stop at no sacrifice for the object they have in view, there is little doubt that we could *cripple the resources* of Russia," that "the exclusion of that power from the Greek protectorate and from the Principalities would be secured"—"but Turkey, in the meanwhile, might be irretrievably ruined; and we might find it impossible to restore her integrity, or to maintain her independence." Doubtless all this is possible; nay, more than possible: then how is it to be averted? Oh! it is by reforming and remodelling Turkey! But who is to be the reformer and remodeller? Not British fleets and armies directed against Russia, certainly. If there is one thing clearer than another, it is the boasts and promises that were made on all hands that the reformation of Turkey, her Government, and her people, and her institutions, and her position, physical, moral, and political, was to be the first and greatest care and object of the allies. Those who knew Turkey and human nature, its passions and interests, knew that all this was impracticable under the rash hands and "*noble pride*" that proposed it. Well, what is the result of all these boastings and claptrap promises? Why, that all their schemes are impracticable, and must be abandoned. I quote from the *Times* again, well knowing that, on such subjects, it is the direct organ of Government. The following important article bears official impress, and was, probably, never out of London, though dated Paris, where, if it originated at all, it most probably came from the British embassy. It states:—

"The following is from the pen of a person to whom we are often indebted for valuable information :—

" ' We are far from sharing the opinion of the German journals, which imagine that a new conference, held at Vienna, is on the point of concluding peace on the bases proposed in the letter of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney. The demands of our cabinet are certainly very moderate, too moderate even to secure guarantees for the future, and to satisfy the noble pride of the two great nations. But it should be first remarked, that the letter of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as well as the promises of the British ministry, lay down as a principle that peace shall not be negotiated on the re-establishment of the *status quo* ; that the English and French people require a modification, both of diplomatic treaties and of the Russian territory itself, and that portions of that territory are indispensable to insure the attainment of the different objects mentioned in the letter. It appears certain, moreover, that we have, at this very moment, undertaken the conquest of the Crimea, and we have reason to know that the allies intend to keep possession of Sebastopol, in order to guard in future against the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea. On the other hand, it is indispensable, in order to secure to Germany the free navigation of the Danube, that Russia should cease to command the Sulina mouth of that river. Now, we are convinced that Russia will never consent to surrender either the Crimea or the Sulina, unless she is completely disabled; and that it would be easier to reconquer one-half of the empire than to obtain from her the cession of the smallest part of her dominions. There lies the insurmountable obstacle. The honour of the two nations, as well as of their cabinets, is pledged to change the *status quo*, and the honour of Russia is pledged to maintain it. War, and a long war, is consequently inevitable. Independently of that material obstacle, we anticipate others, resulting from the conventions to be entered into between the allies. Will Sebastopol be kept by England, or by France? Will that fortress be given to one, and Bomarsund to the other? Those are serious questions, and the more we examine them the more we remain convinced of the danger of a policy which obliges us to mount guard at the door of the Czar, to keep him under close arrest. But there is a much greater difficulty in the way of the ratification of the conditions proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, namely, the opposition of the Ottoman cabinet, which cannot really accept them. Before the war, and under the pressure excited by Prince Menchikoff, the Divan had, it is true, offered to grant the five great powers a certain right of protection over its Christian subjects. But the war has since annulled all the rights of protection formerly imposed by Russia, and the Porte, after its glorious victories, cannot alienate its sovereignty over the Principalities, or over the rayahs, in behalf of a collective or isolated protectorate. It must be recollected that the war has been undertaken, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys twice repeats in his letter, to maintain the integrity of the power of the Sultan. Now, we should inflict upon it the most mortal blow, if we were to confer on one or several foreign sovereigns a right to interfere with the internal affairs of the nation. Would any monarch in Europe submit to such vassalage? What nation would not feel indignant at it? Turkey has certainly conquered a rank which authorizes her to be as proud

as any other power. As respects the free navigation of the Danube and the Straits, *the Sultan, in virtue of the law of nations, has a right to refuse or grant a passage through them.* It must also be observed that all stipulations to that effect are binding only in time of peace, and are set aside by war. It is, consequently, evident that the portion of the Danube flowing through the Ottoman territory forms part of the empire, and that the Sultan *may lawfully interdict its navigation, or subject it to certain duties.* It would be strange indeed if the allies of the Sultan, who have allowed him to bear the brunt of the war, *should conclude a peace at his expense, and to the benefit of Germany,* whose conduct has been hitherto so ambiguous, and who does not even appear disposed to declare war. We accordingly do not believe that the Porte, in justice to herself, can concede to any power the protectorate of the Wallachian provinces or of its subjects, the free navigation of the Danube, *or the free entrance into the Black Sea, which, if granted to ships of war, would expose Constantinople to permanent danger.* *The allies will, consequently, be obliged to modify their pretensions.* With respect to the anxious desire of Austria to secure the free navigation of the Danube, we see but one mode of accomplishing it—that is, by obtaining from Turkey the complete cession of the Principalities, and *compensating her for their loss in another quarter;* and by wresting Bessarabia from Russia. All this is practicable; but can only be achieved by an earnest and energetic war, and by curtailing the power of Russia.”—*Times, August 22d, 1851.*

These statements are true, and the beginning of difficulties, even supposing that Russia does nothing, and is incapacitated from doing anything: a point not to be calculated upon with safety. Besides, where, after these intentions of seizing a large portion of the Russian territories, is the morality or the sincerity of the famous Vienna conference, which, on the 5th of December, 1853, lays it down as a law not to be departed from, “*that the existing war cannot, in any case, lead to modifications in the territorial boundaries of the two empires!*” It is, like other national laws, made to be broken, or used as a weapon of deception.

“A *policy of suspicion,*” says Lord Clarendon to Lord Cowley (Part I. p. 93), “*was neither wise nor safe, and often led to hasty determinations.*” The present position of the United Kingdom attests the truth of the above just saying. It is this “*policy of suspicion,*” this “*incurable mistrust*” in reference to Russia, which have produced the convulsion which proceeds to shake the world, and which has brought England to ally herself with a new friend, against an old and tried ally; which, in short, has brought her to combine with the most despotic powers in continental Europe, to support and maintain the most odious despotism and tyranny, political and religious, that ever scourged and disgraced the world. In reference to religion, we have armed the daughter reformed against her unreformed parent, to crush and to keep her

(Greek Church) in cruel bondage and slavery,—in short, to combine with man against the decrees and the power of Omnipotence. We may dignify or degrade our position as we will, and as vanity and interest may lead and mislead us, but such is our position before the eyes of the world, and before the eye of the great Judge of heaven and earth.

It was France which began and fomented the quarrel which has produced this sad state of things. She did it for a political object, and made the question of the Eastern Churches a weapon to gain the support of the Latin Church to the Government of France, in France ; and, whatever was its form or designation, also to forward her designs in the East, and those against Russia. The struggle, therefore, become political, remained between those powers, who each endeavoured to gain her objects with Turkey ; the one, Russia, to obtain her alliance, in order to secure her territories in the East from molestation ; and the other, France, to procure the assistance of Turkey, by bringing her to quarrel with Russia, in order that she might be able, by such aid, to forward her designs against Russia. The whole intrigue is now manifest to the most careless observer ; even if it were not decidedly acknowledged in the pages of the official documents. In Part I. p 305, June 25th, 1853, M. Drouyn de Lhuys tells us about the “*embarrassments of a power who, under the opposing influence of two opposing currents of equal strength, conceived it could only keep its balance by alternately contracting contradictory engagements!*” Do we require any further evidence, to show the secret moves in the whole affair, and that Russia, consequently, was justified, and owed it as a duty to herself, more especially when she found England ungenerously turning against her, to take every measure in her power to guard against the danger with which she was threatened, and which has broken upon her with so much violence ? Whatever she now yielded, would have decreased her power, and served only to pave the way for fresh demands and fresh humiliations. It would have doubtless been pleasing for her antagonists to have attained their objects without trouble and without bloodshed. Whatever be the issue, she fights the battle now with greater honour and more chance of ultimate success, than she would have done by her enemies being more numerous and united, and better prepared, and having by “*threats and caresses*” coerced more states against her. The eyes of the Protestants of Europe, and even of England, will not always remain shut to the cause of the present war, and to the dreadful dangers which are about to assail them. We ought to have awaited the progress and the issue of the contest ; not marshalled ourselves, as we have done, against those who with us fought and gained the battles of European independence, which France will

never forget, and which she appears to wish to fight over again, with hopes of a different result. While it is most proper and most desirable that we should remain on the most amicable terms with her, it does not follow that we are called upon to aid her in aggressive and ambitious wars, whether these are undertaken to increase her vanity, or to gratify her vengeance against any power to which she owed a grudge for reasons real or pretended.

Every step that the powers now in alliance with Turkey and for Turkey take, and have taken, proves that they are wrong. If they are justified in interfering to protect the Christians in Turkey, because they are oppressed and cruelly treated, especially because they are Christians, surely Russia could not be blamed for doing so. The fact, also, that they demand this of Turkey, proves that it is necessary, and that Russia advanced nothing that was false to justify her interference. The formidable power that has been brought against her, goes to prove that, instead of her power being able to overwhelm Europe, it is not adequate to her reasonable and necessary protection, and falsifies all those statements that her power was dangerous to the peace and to the liberties of mankind; statements made merely to muster feeling against her, and as a justification of the meditated aggression against her for no just cause whatever; for there is not a shadow of proof, in all the documents that have been produced to the world, to show that she really meditated a single aggressive proceeding, of any of the multitude charged against her. To all these charges she gave the most positive contradictions, while all that her opponents adduced to support their cause is amidst and actuated by "incurable mistrust," "a policy of suspicion," "the weakness of Turkey." It simply comes to this, that they are of *opinion* that Russia meditates aggression. This is all they can say. They bring forward no charges but suppositions, suspicions, and *opinions* of so and so, and charges founded upon falsehoods—intentional falsehoods, and proved again and again to be so.

The occupation of the Principalities has been thundered over Europe, and repeated till even its advocates have become wearied and ashamed of it. That was brought upon Turkey by her own proceedings, conduct, and injustice towards her neighbour. She violated the word, the promises of her sovereign, and the treaties made by her emperor; she did this "*coerced*" by France, and refused all reasonable and fair redress. If she was weak, that was the most cogent reason possible, neither of her own accord, nor by the advice of any other power, to offend or injure without cause her stronger neighbour. The Turks violated their solemn engagements with Russia. This is not denied. Russia sought redress by peaceable means. It was denied

her. Then how but by hostile proceedings could she bring Turkey to reason? None have attempted to show how this could otherwise be obtained than by the application of force, in some shape or other. "She *rejected*," says the *Times* of September 10th, 1853, "*the terms recommended to the Sultan by the rest of Europe*." "The Porte," says Count Buol,¹ "MUST consider the occupation of the Principalities as a *direct consequence of its inefficient answer* to the Russian Cabinet, and will have to bear all the responsibility of it. . . . And if the Porte thinks, that, notwithstanding the gravity of the circumstances, it can decline any description of diplomatic engagement—even *such an one* as would be confined to a promise given in a note—it would, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, commit a *grave error*, which might have the most disastrous consequences." On this, the case, as regards Russia, might be left to rest. The Turks violated their engagements with Russia without any provocation or pretence. The latter sought, as she was entitled to do, redress. It was denied her; and, by all the laws which have hitherto regulated the affairs of states, Russia had a right, without even sending a second message, after the departure of her ambassador, to take possession of any portion of Turkish territory—Constantinople itself if she could take and hold it, till redress was given to her. There was no fiction or fable in the wrong that Turkey had committed. It was committed *before* the world, and patent to it. We trumped up a quarrel with Russia in a cause not our own, and seek redress for it; and because we do not gain it, we go and take possession by force of the Black Sea, in violation of treaties as between us and Russia, and which, says M. Drouyn de Lhuys,² "our vessels, as far as the season will admit, will cruise in the Black Sea, and will interrupt all the maritime communications of Russia with her Asiatic provinces. We should thus retain the Black Sea AS A PLEDGE until the evacuation of the Principalities, and the reestablishment of peace." Thus we go and, without cause, do that which we condemn in Russia for doing with cause! Such are the effects of Liberal coalitions!

"It is but justice to admit that Russia," says Lord Stratford (Part II. p. 235), "had something to complain of in the affairs of the Holy Places; nor can it be denied that much remains to be done for the *welfare and security* of the Christian population in Turkey," &c. In the same Part, p. 297, Sir H. Seymour, in his account of an interview with Count Nesselrode, where he admits to him that Lord Clarendon considered that to "obtain such guarantees as should effectually guard against all future differences in the question" was

¹ Clarendon to Westmorland, July 9th, 1853, Part I. p. 353.

² Drouyn de Lhuys to Walewski. Dec 17th. 1853, Part I. pp. 307—310.

reasonable and fair, Count Nesselrode observed, "that in the construction to be placed upon *this sentence* lay the whole question pending between the two Governments." This is the truth. Seymour and Stratford thought enough was given in the Sultan's word and firman; Nesselrode, that the guarantee should be "a solemn national engagement." So every reasonable being will think; and it is because this was refused by Turkey we are now at war with Russia!

But we have other proofs of the justice of the claims of Russia. That most impartial diplomatist, Sir H. Seymour, informs Lord Clarendon (Part I. p. 263) thus: "If the Russian Cabinet require only that the settlement of the Greek and Latin dispute at Jerusalem should be made permanent and binding, by means of an act of as stringent a nature as the capitulations between France and the Porte, I am bound *in honesty to state* that the demand corresponds closely with the intentions which had REPEATEDLY BEEN MADE KNOWN TO ME!" Well, this was exactly what Russia did require, and, as the affairs at Jerusalem always formed a portion of the treaty of Kainardji, as regarded religious subjects, so all that referred to them referred also to the whole Christian Churches in the Ottoman dominions. No reasoning was ever so weak or so absurd as that which maintained that, because the Greek Christians were so numerous in Turkey, it was, therefore, not safe to grant to them the same privileges that were enjoyed by a smaller number belonging to the Latin or other Churches. Instead of this being so, besides the innate justice of the case, policy and political reasons demanded that the majority should not be worse treated than the fractional minority!

The violation of treaties and national engagements, therefore, so loudly and so liberally proclaimed, began with Turkey, not with Russia. We hear a great deal at present about the violation of the laws of nations, and from quarters, too, that ought to blush whenever they allude to such subjects. Where were these modern laws of nations when this country, while at profound peace with Denmark, and without a single fault on her part to charge against her, or previous notice given, battered her capital about her ears, and carried off her fleet? Where were our modern laws of nations when we went, in the midst of peace with Turkey, and, professing profound respect for her and peace with her, we destroyed her fleet at Navarino, and deprived her of Greece? How fearfully this roll might be extended, without inquiring into movements in India or in Africa. But all such proceedings, we are told, arose from political necessity, and self-preservation and interest. Be it so. Then what is just for us is also just for Russia; and is it not self-preservation and necessity, on her part,

that obliges her to take similar, but less forceful measures to guard against powerful attacks on our part, and on the part of our new and not over-scrupulous allies?

But let us turn for a moment to examine this so much lauded French and English alliance. In the first place, it is cemented by base and rotten materials, in being connected with Turkey. Next, its very magnitude and power, while wielded by human hands and guided by human counsels, by no means immaculate nor endowed with *absolute wisdom*, is its condemnation, and increases tenfold all the dangers that may—that certainly will—proceed from it to the world. It threatens, bullies, and assails, all who may venture to differ from it, to dispute its honesty or its principles, not only in Europe, but in the world. It sets itself up, like the Golden Image (theirs more terrible, as formed of brass, iron, and clay—Romanism, Islamism, and corrupt Protestantism) of the great and impious Babylonian king, and calls upon all nations, when they hear the sound of all kinds of martial music—French and English—to fall down and worship it; or, if any do not that, they must be consigned to the burning fiery furnace formed by their wrath, heated by their anger, filled by their power, to consume to utter destruction! Where are treaties under it? Scattered to the four winds of heaven, or openly declared to be made to be violated—waste paper! They take the poor Sultan by the nose, and by a “*douce kind of violence, and a beguiling him by the soft arts of love, as it were,*” they *compel* him, and counsel him as necessary to his *independence*, to sign a treaty with Austria, to give her sole possession of two provinces which he claims as his; and having got this done, the whole is set aside, and violated with open ostentation and without shame, by admitting the Turkish hosts into them, in common with themselves, and the new and unprincipled holder, or rather haughty and hypocritical holder. What power in Europe, particularly the small Protestant states, such as Holland, Hanover, Saxony, can venture to oppose it, or raise their voices against any one of its proceedings or actions; or even, while it exists, dare to express a free opinion? Not even in England is it now safe to oppose such a combination. Those who do so are instantly threatened with excommunication, by the power of France and the aid of the Latin Church amongst us. With one hand, this formidable combination of all *the talents* and all the profligacy of Europe holds out to one state the certainty of rebellion amongst her subjects, and support given to them, if such does not coalesce with them; and to another power, a support and a guarantee that no such rebellion of its people, however just that might be, will be tolerated. This is the case with Austria. How tempting the bait, and how strong the application

of the political screw must have been, is best shown from the following decided resolution, previously taken by Austria. In Part II. p. 164, "Count Buol stated that the position of Austria, in the contest which had arisen, was, and would continue to be, that of strict neutrality." It is from England and France alone, says Lord Clarendon (Part I. p. 399), that Turkey can expect assistance: "in *the event* of a struggle, all the other powers would be found neutral *or would become hostile*." And in Part II. p. 133, Austria stated that if Turkey rushed into hostilities, she (Austria) would not only not "follow her," but would abandon her to the fate that would await her! Such, also, is the case with Prussia, and, in short, with all the smaller states of Germany, especially the Protestant states thereof. Popery, Islamism, and profligate Protestantism—for deeply profligate it must be before it could ally itself with the two former—are now banded together to crush nations, to suppress human expression, feeling, and thought, except such as their wrong heads and tyrannic power, backed by fleets and armies, shall tolerate and dictate. The prospect to the civilized world, under such a system, is dreadful. It may, it will for a time deluge this world with blood; but, as certain as a Supreme and Omnipotent Being rules the universe, so surely will the authors thereof be cut off in their own destruction—caught in their own snares!

Proofs undeniable and not to be contradicted are ready at hand to substantiate the charges here made. Take first what follows:—

The preceding paragraph was scarcely finished when the journals of the day brought to my hands the following most important state paper, addressed by the Government of Saxony to the British Government. I transcribe it at length, as it appears in the *Morning Herald* of the 30th October, no other journal having considered it just or proper to publish it. Its importance at this moment cannot be overrated; it confirms to the letter everything that has been said about the dangers to humanity, justice, and liberty, that may arise from the present English and French alliance, as intended to be applied to the public affairs of Europe. It already proceeds to extinguish liberty of thought, and action, and opinion, in every state, more especially small states, that may, for the most just and cogent reasons, differ from that alliance in opinion. The previous cant about defending the weak against the strong, has proven, as might have been anticipated, that when, as in their case, the strong threatens and oppresses the weak, therefore it becomes justice! Saxony, be it remembered, is an old and sincere Protestant state. Hence it is bullied by English statesmen. Lord Clarendon must have lost his judgment to pen such despatches and reproaches as the state document alluded to informs us he has

penned on this occasion. The firmness of the Saxon Government deserves the greatest praise, and the thanks of Europe ; and it is to be hoped that that patriotic firmness will be continued. It is sure to succeed, and baffle all the threats and insolence of such communications, unworthy the English name, and derogatory to the character of the English nation.

LORD CLARENDON AND THE GERMAN STATES.

Despatch from the Saxon Minister of the Interior, Von Beust, to the Saxon Minister in London, Count Von Bitzthum, dated July 9th, 1854.

(TRANSLATION.)

"Mr. Forbes has shown me a despatch of Lord Clarendon's, from which it appears that the Bamberg conferences have greatly displeased his lordship. Up to the present time, Count, we, on our part, have not the slightest reason to be dissatisfied with those conferences ; and, indeed, the answer of Austria and Prussia to the note of the eight powers, was such as to remove every misgiving. Nevertheless, it is impossible for us to be indifferent to the opinions of the British cabinet, and we should have been ready to do our utmost to allay its sensitiveness, and to explain the grounds upon which we have acted, *had the representations made to us been clothed in those forms of courtesy which are due to every sovereign state, however circumscribed its boundaries may be.* But the language which Lord Clarendon has thought proper to apply to us, *is such that it has required all the respect which we entertain for the Government of her Majesty* to induce us to reply to it.

"In order to make myself master of the contents of the despatch, I applied to Mr. Forbes for a copy of it, *but he declined to comply with my request*, on the ground that his instructions did not warrant him so doing. Now, when such serious charges are made by one Government against another, and when the despatch containing these charges has, as I am assured, been made public at other courts by the English embassies, it does appear to me that the Government attacked ought, at any rate, to be placed in the position of examining and answering the charges made against it. I, on the contrary, was compelled to endeavour, by reading the despatch a second time, to impress its contents on my memory.

"Lord Clarendon says he flatters himself 'that the states which met at Bamberg will receive an answer suitable to their *ill-advised intervention.*' This answer is well known, and we are not aware, although we hope it may be so, whether the cabinet of London is satisfied with it. We, on our part, are perfectly satisfied that the two great German powers have taken no occasion in their note to accuse us of '*ill-timed intervention*;' and had we laid ourselves open to such a charge, Lord Clarendon himself will, no doubt, admit that it would have been more fittingly brought against us by the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, than by that of London. If it had not been for the reproaches which have reached us from London, I should not have been aware that the course we have pursued partook, in any degree,

of the nature of an 'intervention.' *The so-called Eastern question* has been repeatedly discussed in conferences, without the German Confederation having taken part in them; and I am not aware that any German power of the second rank has been in any way mixed up in them. In consequence of a treaty made by Prussia, and of an invitation from the two great German powers, the other German states were necessitated to express an opinion on a point concerning the Confederation. We had, therefore, a duty to fulfil, and a right to exercise; and we cannot see how any power, however hostile its dispositions, *could claim to exercise over us a right of control* or intervention in such a case. I cannot omit to state that the French envoy has also imparted to me the contents of a despatch from his Government; but M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch bears the stamp of the most considerate politeness, abstains from all comment on the Bamberg decisions, and is limited to a single point, namely, the privilege which we claim on behalf of the German Confederation to take part in the negotiations for peace.

"In endeavouring to remember the points of Lord Clarendon's despatch, it occurs to me that some of his reproaches should not have been directed to us, but to Russia. He accuses that Government of having, at all times, endeavoured to sow dissension between the Governments of Germany, and also of holding up revolution as a bugbear by which to keep them in subjection. Without assuming to ourselves the office of defending Russia—an accusation also made against us in another passage of the despatch—I cannot forget the efforts made by Russia, at a time when the internal tranquillity of Germany was disturbed, to restore unanimity between the great German powers. As to the revolution which Russia is said to hold up to us as a bugbear, no one is better acquainted with its existence than I am. In the beginning of 1849 I was summoned to the councils of my country, and I had to meet the bugbear face to face. Two months later I saw it deluge the streets of Dresden with blood, during six days. I then learnt how to deal with it, and am consequently enabled to tell Lord Clarendon that a man may know that it is a stern reality and yet not be terrified by it. Lord Clarendon adds, that we can now have nothing to fear from revolution, *in consequence of the alliance of Austria with England and France. I should be the first to reject the evil suggestions which this combination might call forth*, but I cannot altogether agree with Lord Clarendon, that it is by the liberal policy of the great powers that revolution has been disarmed. The experience of the years 1848 and 1849 has read us a bitter lesson, and has made us very doubtful as to whether or no the action of the Governments was directed to put down the revolutionary party. But, according to Lord Clarendon, it is Russia who threatens us with revolution, protects the disturber of the peace of Europe, and is now trying, by means of her agents, to excite disturbances in Greece and Hungary. I am not accurately acquainted with what is passing in those countries, but, having been placed by the confidence of my sovereign at the head of the Ministry of the Interior and the Police, and consequently knowing the movements of the revolutionary agents in Germany, I am enabled to assert

that the land from which they came *was not Russia*, and that the passports with which they were provided *were not Russian*. There is another consideration which I cannot altogether omit—namely, *that if Russia is the protectress of revolution, it is strange that all the agents of revolution have been engaged for years, both openly and secretly, in endeavouring to excite a war against that power*. I hope I may be pardoned for this digression, for I am aware it has as little to do with the great question of the day as the Bamberg note had to do with the revolutions of 1848.

“I must now come to the *more direct and serious charges* made by Lord Clarendon, and I blush to have to answer them. His words are, that we ‘are so utterly blinded, that we cannot understand that in a great crisis like the present we ought to lay aside our petty jealousies, instead of sacrificing the interests of Germany to Russian intrigues.’ I was curious to see in what manner Lord Clarendon would convict us of *sacrificing Germany to our petty jealousies*, but he has adduced neither facts nor arguments, and he would have found it difficult to do so. We can only regret, but cannot reply to, such random and unfounded accusations. It is the same with the charge ‘that we have made the divisions of Germany a public spectacle for Europe.’ Facts give a better answer than words. *The unity of Germany has never been better assured than at the present moment, and never has the principle of the Confederation been subjected to a severer test*. Both the great German powers have proved, by their declaration of the 16th of June, that they respect the constitution of the Confederation, as well as the independence of the smaller powers; while the latter have proved themselves independent and worthy members of the Confederation, by examining most minutely the propositions made to them, and ultimately accepting them, as conducive to the unity of Germany. We fear not the recollections of Bamberg, although Lord Clarendon, at the close of his despatch, seems to *threaten* us with them. We have been acting for Germany; we have not pretended to interfere with the rest of Europe. Should we be called upon to do so, we trust that the same justice and moderation which has been shown by Germany may also prevail in the councils of Europe.

“You are aware that the Bamberg note was *discussed and accepted by eight powers*; but the despatch which Mr. Forbes showed to me has, as I believe, been directed only to the *Government of the King*. I do not ask for an explanation upon this point. What I have already written will satisfy you that we do not shrink from the responsibility of an act in which we took part. You are aware, Count, how high a value we place on the good opinion of the Government of the Queen. You can also imagine how painful these discussions must be to us; but I am nevertheless convinced that the English Government, which so jealously watches that everybody’s rights should be everywhere respected, will not consider it a crime on our part if we boldly and fearlessly maintain our own. Nor will Lord Clarendon, who is so enlightened and so unbiassed by party feelings, take offence at our freedom of speech, which is based upon truth. I am quite certain that, on the contrary, he will regret having attributed our conduct to motives which are quite foreign to us.

"Be so good, Count, as to read this despatch to Lord Clarendon, and should he ask for it, give him a copy of it.

"Receive, &c.

(Signed)

"BEST."

The preceding important state paper demands the most attentive and serious consideration. Amongst other things, we learn from it that France, England, and Austria will allow no power to dispute their opinions and authority with impunity, or any people to rise in arms against the Government that rules over them, not even those who are subjected to the barbarous sway of the Koran. It at the same time destroys the monstrous falsehood, that Europe has so long been commanded to believe, and which has been attempted to be thrust down our throats with goose-quills, but now to be crammed down our windpipes at the point of the bayonet, namely, that all Europe was opposed to Russia. Now we are here told that, besides Saxony, eight German powers think as she does, and are opposed to the tyranny of France, England, and Austria; and further, that these eight or nine states are determined to continue to think for themselves, and to guard their own interests against every threat that may come from England and her allies. The union of Austria with the other two great powers, Saxony states, and states truly, increases greatly the danger to the cause of the liberty and independence of other nations. This is a self-evident fact. There is not an Englishman, with the blood of an Englishman in his veins, who will not denounce and deprecate, and try as soon as possible to escape from the clutches of, such a formidable and dangerous combination. What, it is asked, is to hinder such an alliance, under Louis Napoleon, from displacing an English Ministry, any day he chooses, which declines to support his political projects? If report states truly, he is already, with British support, trying this. And what, it is asked, is to hinder, under such a combination, a French and Austrian army to come here and instal Cardinal Wiseman, or Pro Nono himself, as Ecclesiastical Primate of England; or put a Mahomedan ulema into the desecrated church of St. Paul's, converted into a mosque? Under such an alliance there is nothing, humanly speaking, to hinder such a result, but that spirit of Protestantism still existing throughout Europe, and which an English Ministry is so seriously working to bully and to put down.

Threatening Russia with insurrections and support to those in her Asiatic provinces, M. Drouyn de Lhuys says, in the paper previously quoted: "Meanwhile, the *influence of the West*, almost unknown in those quarters, will penetrate there; the dangers to which our presence will expose a rule badly settled (Russian Asia), the new relations and

interests it may develop in countries lost to the commerce of the world ; such, M. le Count, are the various grounds for reflection with which such a demonstration, *executed with vigour*, is calculated to inspire the cabinet of St. Petersburg." Lord Clarendon¹ turns his threatenings in another manner, calculated to alarm and *coerce*, in whichever way the matter may be viewed : " If the Russian army," says he, " proceeded beyond the Principalities, and other provinces of Turkey were invaded, a *general rising* of the Christian population would probably ensue, NOT IN FAVOUR OF RUSSIA, nor in support of the Sultan, BUT FOR THEIR OWN INDEPENDENCE ; and it would be needless to add that such a *revolt* would not be long in extending itself to the Danubian Provinces of Austria ; but it would be for the Austrian Government to judge of the effect it would produce in *Hungary and in Italy*, and the *encouragement it must give* to the promoters of *disorder* throughout Europe, WHOM AUSTRIA HAS REASON TO FEAR, and who even now would appear to think that *the moment is at hand for the realization of their projects*." Do we require plainer language to tell us how Austria has been coerced into the extremes of France and England against Russia ? But will her coalescing with them deliver her from those " she has reason to fear ? " And, after this, can it be doubted that Hungary and Italy are to be prevented from revolting against Austria by the application of force on the part of France and England, as the price of her joining them in their vindictive attack upon Russia ?

Let us try their profligacy and *sincerity* in the cause of justice and liberty a little further. A few weeks ago one of the Members of Parliament for Glasgow, Mr. Macgregor, and in his public capacity, told and assured his constituents that he had only a short time previous had an important and private conversation with one of the members of the present Government, when he (Mr. Macgregor) told him that the British Minister who should in any way oppose the efforts of any people to rise against their Government for the purpose of gaining their freedom, ought to be impeached ; and that the Minister assured him no such opposition would ever be offered on the part of the British Government, and that the ministers who might act otherwise ought most certainly to be impeached ! Well, has this been done ? has this resolution been carried out with Austria, with Italy, and Hungary ? No, the reverse has been promised. Has it been carried out in reference to the Greek Christian population of Turkey ? No ! The cruel wrongs and oppressions of four centuries are to be continued as regards them—the whole power of France, England, and Austria combined, is to be continued to be exerted to keep them in grovelling

¹ Clarendon to Westmorland, July 14th, 1853, Part I. p. 265.

subjection to their cruel lords, because the policy of France and England require it and command it! Not one generous motive, act, or effort in their favour is to be permitted on the part of their fellow-Christians and fellow-nation in the East. So France and England will it, and use brute force and insult to secure it! The following scene in the Greek Papers¹ ought to cover Downing Street with confusion, and the nation with shame. The bull-dogs of France and England on this occasion seem to have been well selected for their work. By their menacing messengers to the King and Queen of Greece, says Wyse, the English champion, "no other impression has been made than a *feeling of resentment* at the course pursued by France and England, and a fixed determination to abide all the chances of resistance to their counsels. . . . 'Gentle means,' said the King, 'might win him, but against threats he was inflexible.' . . . The Queen was, if possible, more excited (*emportée*). She indulged in the strongest invectives *against* M. ROUEN and the *French* Government; and when he ventured to suggest that the movement was *not national*, but emanated from an intrigue of the Court, *both started up with tears in their eyes*, and the King exclaimed, '*What! not national?* It is the whole nation as one man; and such language proves only *you do not comprehend us or the Greek nation*.' Whenever the King appeared to waver her Majesty interfered, and with *powers of persuasion which could not be resisted*, and which showed against what influences his Majesty had to contend, overbore every chance of return to calmer and wiser conclusions!"—that is, subjection to the mandates of France and England. Against all such appeals the hearts of the two French and English terriers were steeled. They knew they would be applauded in Paris and in London. The British Legislature wants a few members with the spirit of the Queen of Greece, and they would soon carry this generous nation with them, and deliver it from the most galling combination and political tyranny and delusion that ever cursed any country.

But mark, further, this overbearing spirit and those despotic intentions. "Further inaction would then, for reasons that have been already stated to Count Buol," says Lord Clarendon,² "have been dishonourable to England and France, who alone *were the competent judges* of the duty that their honour prescribed, and who, upon such a question, *could certainly not be expected to take counsel with any other power!*"

"Sic volo, sic jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas."

Why, Lord John must have bit his Lordship. Alone the judges! No!—the present generation can judge you, though it may not be

¹ Wyse to Clarendon, March 17th, 1853, p. 123.

² Clarendon to Westmorland, Jan. 17th, 1854, Part II. p. 370.

able to beat you ; but posterity will judge your Lordship, and your unholy alliance, with a stern and irrevocable judgment. It is truly distressing to see a nobleman so highly gifted and generous committing himself thus. It bodes ill for his country, and shows the baneful effect of good men getting associated with bad company.

We have adverted to some things that have occurred, and have been seen, of the objects, and intentions, and plans, and schemes, of the unholy alliance ; still we have seen little of the dangers and mischiefs which it appears it has yet in store for us. The subsequent extracts from late columns of the *Times* ought, it is conceived, to awaken the most serious consideration and fear in the breast of every one that has any regard for the honour and the safety of his country. I quote from the journal in question because, from its immense circulation, — exceeding that of all the daily journals put together — and its great literary abilities, it is selected by the potentates who compose the new alliance as the surest means of carrying their objects, whether these be for peace or for war, to lead or to mislead, or humbug, the public ; softening it down, or irritating it to madness, so as best to secure the object sought, however wicked or atrocious that may be ; or if it should happen once in a year to select it, is the most efficient channel to check public feeling when it happens to be running headlong in a wrong direction. The articles I allude to are contained in the leading articles of the *Times* of Sept. 18th and 19th. The most material parts are here faithfully extracted, with regret, here expressed, that my limits do not enable me to give them at full length.

September 18th, 1854.

“The granite fortifications on which he relied for his security in the North turn out emphatically to be ‘food for powder!’ Their final destruction, and the capture of his northern fleet, is a matter which awaits the convenience of the allies. Wherever the borders of his vast empire abut upon civilization, he sees nothing before him but irritated enemies, armed with all the implements of destruction which science has invented, *and the wealth of the world at their backs*,—within the limits of his empire bankruptcy, misery, and discontent,—behind him the wastes of Asia. It is difficult to say how he calculates the chances of the game upon which he has risked the existence of his empire ; but to men of ordinary understanding they would just now appear to be singularly unpromising. Turkey alone has humbled him in his pride, and Europe is against him. He cannot count upon the support of a single nation, and upon the *goodwill but of a single Government, which would be swept from power in twenty-four hours should they attempt openly to espouse his cause*. Whether the catastrophe takes place this year, or a year hence, is a matter which principally concerns the Czar himself, for the conditions of 1855 will be harder than those of 1854. Let him

not deceive himself. Europe perfectly understands the meaning of the contest in which it has been called upon, most unwillingly, to take part. There is no danger that France and England will separate upon this question, either now or in times to come. *The French Emperor knows well enough that he carries France with him in the Russian war, and that his own position has been infinitely strengthened by the untimely crusade of the Russian Czar.* He knows, too, that if any German power should make a mistake, *it is he who must profit by its error.* It is superfluous, however, for the moment, to follow this subject out through its various consequences ; suffice it to say, that England will be true to the ally who has been true to her. It remains to be seen whether this alliance will be able to deal with the great problems of European society when Russian influence has been withdrawn from the calculation, without bloodshed or commotion. Shall we at length see on the continent of Europe liberty without disorder, and government without tyranny and oppression ? The annihilation of such a power as the *prestige* rather than the actual strength of Russia undoubtedly was, is the most important incident which has occurred in the political history of Europe since 1815. It is idle to talk of a restoration of that *prestige*. The statesmen whose duty it will be to prescribe the terms of peace on the side of Western Europe could not do it, if they would. The declaration of the Prussian king, that he will not stand tamely by and see the European force of Russia materially damaged, *is not worth the breath with which it was uttered.* He has of his own choice stood aloof from the counsels and the perils and the sacrifices of the allies,—he will be compelled to remain a stranger to their ultimate decision, whether he will or no. Time was when he could have saved his brother-in-law from destruction, by rendering the instant pressure upon him irresistible ; but his nerve and judgment failed him at the critical moment, and now—it is too late.”

September 19th, 1854.

“ We cannot advance and recede, demand and hesitate, promise and deny. If we interfere at all we have no alternative but between that of procuring *instant submission* and a *general European war*. . . . An executive minister is at his post to act, and not to *feel*. . . . The rule has never been transgressed without our having ample cause to regret the inadvertence which did not shrink from involving the honour of England in order that a sentence might be pointed in a despatch, or a cheer elicited from the thick-and-thin partisans of an idea. . . . From this, however, to active interference, there is a great step indeed. England can only act at a great crisis in the world's history, and then in a manner worthy of her own position and of the importance of the cause. Those who have accused us of holding back should look to what is passing in the Black Sea at the present moment, and ask themselves if action of that kind can be called into play, saye for the most momentous causes, without rendering the habitable globe one large battle-field, and entailing endless misery upon mankind.

“ It is not for a slight cause that six hundred ships, freighted with the disciplined valour of the picked troops of France and England, have been

directed against the stronghold of that sovereign *who is the incarnate principle of despotic government*. The operation is one which will modify history, either by its own success or by the success of others which will follow upon it, should the present attack, contrary to reasonable expectation, be frustrated. *France and England, once fairly roused into action, will not be balked of their purpose*; and that purpose is to take ample security that the semi-barbarian power of the Russian Czar shall no longer disturb the tranquillity of Europe. *We are not answerable for the remoter effects of the policy which has been forced upon us, although we know well what those effects must be upon the polity of nations*. It is, however, a course of action which will do more to free the nations of Europe from the stern thralldom in which they have been held since 1815 than all the desultory risings of self-styled patriots in the various countries of Europe. When their masters can no longer rely upon the bayonets of a foreign supporter, they must learn to rely upon the hearts of their own subjects, or prepare for a conflict in which their weakness will be brought face to face with the strength of a gigantic opponent. *The defeat of the Czar means the inauguration of a more liberal policy than has yet prevailed from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, or a page in history the like of which is not yet contained in the annals of Europe*. England, then, has struck her blow at last. If her strength has not been put forth in a manner to gain the applause of the distempered fanatics who have caused precious blood to flow like water in cases where the sacrifice could be of no avail, at least her present interference is marked by three qualities which will commend it to the applause of rational men. *In the first place, we do not imperil the safety of any helpless people or nation*. If we fail, at least there will be no series of military executions and massacres to commemorate England's failure. The consequences of our policy recoil upon ourselves, if we have miscalculated our strength, or mistaken our position; others will reap the benefit of it if we succeed. In the second place, there is parity between the means employed and the end in view. A sufficient force is employed to overcome the resistance which may be expected. It was the Duke of Wellington who said that he never would risk a great battle, unless compelled, save with reasonable certainty of success. Now, although this may not appear a sufficiently high-flown idea to meet the exigencies of romance, at least it is a more practical one—a notion far more calculated to maintain the existence of states, and to guard them against dire calamity. It is very true that we are not rousing an unarmed multitude to contend against disciplined troops, prepared with all the munitions of war; but we have better chances of obtaining our ends than the gentlemen who see fit to adopt that course for the liberation of Europe. *In the third place, we have the direction of the measures—of course, in conjunction with our great ally—upon which the success of the operations must depend*. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this consideration, for we more than suspect that the fierce declaimers who have so abused us for withholding the 'moral' support of England in the hour of their need, would have dealt in a strange manner indeed with the resources England might have placed at their disposal when the hour came for *dis-counting* ideas into realities.

"The kings and the ministers of kings who have so freely abused us, *can scarcely hope that the chapter of the 'subsidies' has been torn out of the history of England or blotted from the recollection of Englishmen.* The nations, too, must forgive us if we refuse to intrust the honour of our country to the keeping of the first severe and sallow man who chooses to dub himself the archpatriot of a particular people. We have not forgotten the nature of the support our troops met with during the peninsular war from the people whose freedom they were endeavouring to purchase with their blood. We have not *forgotten the history of our failures* in South and Central America, in the Spanish Peninsula, and in the modern kingdom of Greece. The simple truth is, that a stranger's hand cannot manufacture freedom and send it home to the first customer who may desire it—on credit—as he would a penny roll. *If you free a people from the dominion of their masters when they are not able to win that freedom for themselves, you do so at the expense of succeeding to the masters you have displaced.* That is the law of nature and the tradition of history. Freedom is a plant of home growth; it cannot be imported from abroad and acclimatized; the action of a people must be upon the pathway of their own destiny. Woe to themselves and those they would benefit, if they *mis-take the feebleness of the stranger for their own strength.*"

Here are startling statements, and statements, it is to be feared, intended to be realized in all their strength and in all their daring and naked deformity—here, insolence and menace, surpassing anything ever shown by Napoleon I. in his greatest strength, or Zenghis Khan in his highest barbarian fury. It is degrading, and far below the dignity of the British Government, and cannot be too soon repudiated if not correct and not intended. Here we are told that a great power like Prussia is to be swept from the earth in "*twenty-four hours,*" and that any declaration he makes in favour of Russia "*is not worth the breath with which it was uttered.*" The power that uttered such a menace must be deranged, but not the less dangerous, if armed and abroad. Let them try. There was a day when there was not a woman in Prussia who would not have sold the clothes from off her back to enable her sovereign to find money to resist even less audacious threats on the part of Napoleon I. Such, it is to be hoped, yet live in Prussia, and will live in it so long as it continues to be Protestant. We are further told that everything in Europe is to be changed and remodelled by, and to suit the policy of France and England; that the terrible and just contest which terminated in 1815 only tended to establish tyranny and oppression in Europe, and that France and England, by now pursuing exactly a similar course of policy, namely, overturning by relentless force, as France did from 1792 to 1812, are to change all things, and bring about a perfect millennium under their beautiful system of military coercion and terror, and general devastation, "*armed with all the*

implements of destruction which science has invented !" We are also told by this official oracle, that the Christians in Turkey may remain as they are, that their state requires no haste to dwell on it, and that "to free a people from the dominion of their masters when they are not able to win that freedom for themselves, you do so at the expense of succeeding to the masters you have displaced." Therefore, Islamism, riot in the East uncontrolled ! If this is true, it is much to be lamented that it was not sooner found out ; it would at least have saved solemn promises and claptrap bravado being expended upon it by political knaves and charlatans. Further, we are told that the sovereign of Russia "is the incarnate principle of despotic power," to be lawfully hunted down ! This is too bad from the organ and the eulogist of France, Austria, and Turkey, all three of which are not only most despotic governments, but whose despotism is supported and maintained by military force and power. The British Government must be hard run for political ammunition and arms to support its cause when it has recourse to such sweeping revolutionary declarations and designs, before which, if carried into effect, her Indian empire could not, and ought not to stand one day. It also is purely despotic.

But there is a still more ominous declaration put forth in the above manifestoes ; namely, that Napoleon III. "knows well enough that he carries France with him in this Russian war, and that his own position has been *infinitely* strengthened by the untimely crusade of the Russian Czar. He knows, too, that if any German power should make a mistake, it is he (Napoleon III.) that must profit by its error !" Well, then, Napoleon III. having France with him in this Russian war, no more cogent reason can be adduced than this, that he should not have England with him in the strife. But this menace also tells us that, if Germany does not assist the holy alliance—for after such unqualified applause we must not call it *unholy alliance*—she is to be overrun and extinguished by France, aided by England. But what is of still more serious importance, and exhibiting a mournful prospect to Europe and to France herself, is, that the throne of Napoleon III. can only be "STRENGTHENED" and maintained by carrying on foreign and aggressive wars. It is greatly to be feared that there is too much truth in the harsh announcement made ; and with the greatest respect for France as a nation, and also for her present sovereign as a man, still this disposition, so fiercely proclaimed, gives warning of a dangerous state of things, and affords a melancholy and cheerless prospect for the future, not only to France herself, but also to all her neighbours. In the Downing Street thunder, however, as directed against Russia and Germany, the voice that makes it is still but

mortal, while it is a threat intended and expected to terrify. It is the language of the bully, who knows that he has a bad cause on hand ; the menace of the bravo, who trembles at the prospect of the storm which he perceives that he has so greatly aided to raise—

“Trembling and talking loud went Fear ;”

and that it will, if it has not already produced a totally different result to that which was anticipated, and instead of fear and submission, has called forth a spirit of independence and indignation against the menacing power. It is most desirable that this country should remain at peace with France, and surely we are not to be told that we cannot do so without engaging with her in any crusade against other countries that she may meditate or rush into from any cause or motive whatever.

Having arranged all this mass of destruction and human misery and violence to his satisfaction, and as things certain and inevitable, the Government trumpeter, after throwing dust in the eyes of his countrymen, presumes—dares to make the attempt to practise the same fraud on his Maker, and calls upon his countrymen “to be of good cheer during the hour of suspense,” and being thoroughly honest and good men, insinuates that they might “*with confidence* come before Almighty God” as suppliants meriting his protection and consideration ! Like the Pharisee of old (Luke xviii. 11, 12), he says, Thank God, we are not like other men ; we fast twice a-week, give tithes of all we possess, love to sit in the highest rooms at feasts, and when we give alms, sound a trumpet that all the world (Turkey and Rome) may know it. “They do not despoil any one,” “nor aim at conquest ;” in short, we are not like that “*impious publican*,” the Emperor Nicholas ! Such are the “*blind guides*” that this country follows and is called upon to follow !

“France has,” says Napoleon III.,¹ “as much, and perhaps more, interest than England that the *influence* of Russia should not extend indefinitely to Constantinople. To reign over Constantinople is to reign over the Mediterranean.” This would prove to be the case if Constantinople were in the hands of France, or perhaps in the hands of England, but certainly not if it were to remain in the hands of the Turks, or if it should come into the power of Russia ; because the latter power (Russia) has not a navy to cope with either France or England ; and still less has Turkey a naval force adequate to oppose either. The danger then is, that if France gets Constantinople, she would thereby “*cripple*” Russia, and, in defiance of England, command the Black Sea and also the Mediterranean. There stationed, and firmly established, the united powers of England and Russia, in all her strength, could only control and drive her out. France at Con-

¹ Speech, March 2d, 1854.

Constantinople and Algiers, commands Egypt and Syria; and under such circumstances, a French army and influence in Georgia and Anatolia would be infinitely more dangerous to our East Indian possessions than anything that ever Russia could do, even if she intended anything—but which she does not—against our Indian possessions. The efforts of Russia to disturb these, is a piece of humbug and delusion that has lasted long enough. The danger that England has to apprehend in India, will arise from internal, not from external, force: and the application of that internal force is more likely to be accelerated than retarded by England employing her whole force, naval and military, against Russia, or any part of Russia, whether in the Black Sea or in the Baltic. We have helped to place 70,000 Frenchmen in the Black Sea and the Dardanelles; and he must be a great simpleton who does not see that they will retain their position there as long as the “*interest*” and glory of France are considered by France to require it!—always allowing her to be the judge of the time and the reason.

“Russia,” says the same French document, “possesses almost exclusively the two interior oceans, from which she can dart forth upon our civilization.” The civilization here alluded to is not defined, nor is it material; but cannot the Imperial mind perceive, that as France and England possess the will and the power to “*dart*” into these interior seas—which are far distant from the limits of either—to overwhelm Russia, therefore it is just and proper that Russia should have the power to “*dart*” out from these seas, to meet in battle those who threaten and come to overthrow her. The reasoning here advanced is only French Imperial reasoning, and as such goes for little in the scale of reason and justice!

In reference to the delusions of dangers to India from Russia, it is a monstrous proposition to maintain that the Ottoman empire must be maintained to prevent—as if that could prevent—the apprehended consequences. A large portion of the world, and that in its finest parts, is not to be kept in chains and degradation, lost to itself and to the rest of the world, on account of India. Moreover, it is remarkable and most inconsistent, that while we put down the political power of Mahommedanism in India, we should put forth all our strength to prop it up as a political power in Eastern Europe and Western Asia. If it is not “*interest*” that leads us to do this, what is it?

“Enormous lying” led us into this war; enormous lying sustains it; enormous lying will carry it on, and lead us on, step by step, till we cannot advance without danger, nor retreat without defeat and disgrace. In this odious system of deception, if British functionaries do not take part, as I for one believe they really do, they at least eagerly swallow everything they hear, and transmit it to mislead their

Government and to irritate their country—the objects for which the falsehoods were invented. In this odious and dangerous system our enormous consular establishments figure to a most reprehensible extent in everything and on every occasion. This system wants some pruning; and had Lord George Bentinck lived, I know it would have secured it. The public, the Government, and the Legislature are, or have been made fully aware of the grievous fictions which Sir H. Seymour transmitted from St. Petersburg, about the immense armies and great military movements which Russia was making in her southern provinces, especially about Bessarabia. From the earliest period of 1853 he began this system. Every page almost of the Correspondence is filled with the idle and mischievous reports which evil-minded people sent him, till England believed that Constantinople and Turkey were then about to be devoured by Russia. What says Consul Yeames, at Odessa, as late as the 7th of October? (Part II. p. 183): “The design of *offensive* hostilities may not be entertained here; and it is a *fact* that no *preparations for them have been made, or can be made for a long time to come*. Since the first occupation of the Principalities, there have been no movements of *troops that way*. They may rather be apprehended on the Asiatic frontier.”

To-day we are told that Russia is a power so strong and so voracious that she can swallow up Europe at a mouthful. To-morrow we are told that she is powerless and exhausted, and that Turkey can beat her single-handed. Then why not let Turkey do it, and settle her own quarrels? Such inconsistency shows our ignorance or our dishonesty, or both; and is by no means creditable to the character of this country.

For more than twelve months we have been told by our public instructors, that the Emperor Nicholas was much worn down by the dread of the united action and might of France and England—that he was wasting away, and had become almost bent double. We had this latter fact certified by an admiralty official. Well, let us hear what a brave British naval officer, who saw him only the other day, says of him; namely, Lieutenant Royer, of the *Tiger*, on his introduction to the Emperor by the express desire of the latter (p. 168):—“He was standing in the middle of the room, dressed in the plain dark-blue uniform of a general-in-chief, and wore a simple white enamelled cross at the button-hole in his shirt. I expected to see a fine tall man; but was not prepared to find his Imperial Majesty *so much superior to the generality of men* in height and appearance. He certainly did not look more than fifty; nor were there any *particular signs of care* on his countenance, at least not more than one

sees in every man of his age. His *features were fine and regular*, his head bald on the centre, and *his eye expressive of mildness*, quite in accordance with his words"! And this is the care-worn madman! We forget how much we lower the character of our country, and irritate great nations, by such ungenerous and false accusations as have been made, and how little honour we should gain by vanquishing opponents, if these were really the mad and degraded people that we represent them!

We do not, we are told, combat for religion. That can readily be believed on the part of a Government in whose eyes all religious systems are the same—Islamite, Mormonite, Romanite, and any other *ite*. Nor does Great Britain combat for *interest*. This is not to be credited. Witness Sinope—we ostensibly regarded the carnage and destruction there as an insult upon the *honour* of England; in short, the destruction of the Turkish fleet there only touched our *interest*, inasmuch as having idly taken in hand to watch Russia in the Euxine, and to preserve Islamism rampant, it will require more British ships, and consequently increased expense, to perform the discreditable work after the destruction of the Turkish fleet, than before it! *Inde ira!* And hence Sebastopol, and the Russian fleet there, are to be destroyed, in order to *save the expense* of a British fleet and armies in the Euxine, to protect a power that is not worth the protecting!

How loud we boast—how inconsistent in our actions and proceedings! A Mussulman Turk oppresses Christians, affronts and defies a Christian power, denies redress when calmly sought. We defend the former, and slaughter the latter. But when the petty Roman sovereign dared to exercise a direct political prerogative, the actual prerogative of our sovereign, within our realm, and sent priestly hosts to our shores to put his acts into execution, what did we do? Instead of sending an army and a fleet to the mouth of the Tiber—as we ought to have done, and as the case demanded, in order to compel that small potentate to relinquish his offensive movement and give us satisfaction and a "*material guarantee*" for security for the future,—we make a religious matter of it—produce Ecclesiastical Titles' Bills, only to have them emasculated and prove good for nothing. And why did we act thus? Because there was a French garrison in Rome, and we *dared* not disturb its repose. Can this be denied? We embrace the false prophet, and bend the knee before his brother in iniquity—that tyranny that has "two horns like a lamb, and speaks as a dragon." Notwithstanding the boasts of our independence and power, the Protestant United Kingdom is at this moment ruled, our Ministry maintained in power, and our Legislature directed, by the

creatures of the Papal power—a few Irish Roman Catholic priests, British renegadoes, and constituencies, and the representatives returned by those, the most, as we are told, corrupt and profligate that ever disgraced this country. Hence we are plunged into an unnecessary and impolitic war; and hence we shall be continued in it till our pockets get lighter, or we get our skulls cracked, when daylight and common sense and honesty may get into them.

We announce, that in conjunction with France we are contending for "the *freedom of the seas*," and to prove this, we desire "the command of the Black Sea and the Baltic!" What Napoleon I. in all his strength and power never ventured to demand, or even to think of, his successor, backed (wonderful!) by England, calls for! Will the nations around the shores of either submit to this insolent demand? Will Europe, prostrated and threatened as she is, submit to it? Will the United States of America acquiesce in it? Certainly not! And why not the command of the Straits of Dover? why not also the Straits of Gibraltar? why not the mouths of the St. Lawrence, from the impregnable islands of St. Paul's and Miquelon? and why not the southern mouths of the Red Sea, or Straits of Babelmandel, as the Foreign Office must know, and do know, was the object of the French Government under the Thiers' administration, about fourteen years ago? All these things would follow in due course, after that which has been so insolently demanded is, if it can be, obtained; when the mouth of the Thames would be the next requisition, then not to be resisted.

We have just had, and most properly thanked Heaven for, a bountiful harvest. And what do we do after this act of humiliation? Why, like the thoughtless Israelites of old, we grow *fat and kick*, and go forth in the pride of the arm of flesh to browbeat the world, and spread fire and sword, blood and destruction over it, amongst all who resist our march, or show any inclination to do it. And this we call Christianity, industry, justice, and "*civilization*!"

We are told that we are fighting to secure and maintain the *BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE*! Well, we have been fighting for this bubble, and chiefly with France as our opponent, for nearly three centuries. It has cost this country above 3,000,000,000% of money, and many millions of lives; and the rest of Europe more lives, and probably as much money; and we are, if we are to believe the *BALANCE* oracles, as far from our purpose as ever. We thought we had gained it after a bloody struggle of twenty-five years. And what we had gained, we now go forth to destroy. Russia is the only counterpoise to France in the balance, as regards the continent of Europe; crush her, if we

can, and where then is the balance of power? France may then place her foot upon the neck of Europe, and also of England, without the latter then having the power to prevent it, but by a sanguinary contest within her own borders, and such scenes of bloodshed and devastation there as we are now busy in spreading over the world!

Unfold the map of the world. Is it not clear that three-fourths of the Russian empire and people are dependent upon the free navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, for their communication with the rest of the world? Is it just that she should be deprived of that? or will she submit to be so, while she has a man or a rouble left her? Certainly not. And I, for one, trust that she will not yield, in order by doing so to aggrandise any other great power whatever. Russia, we are told, is a growing, increasing, and grasping power:—so are France and England; both extend their victories daily in Africa, Asia, and Australasia. They come in contact with barbarous peoples, which, it is admitted, compel them, in some measure, in self-defence, to subdue them, and thus to extend their dominions. While these two powers have added enormously to their dominions, and, we presume, also improved them, and thereby proportionally increased their strength and resources, Russia, while she has scarcely added an inch to her dominions since 1815, has, however, vastly, and for the benefit of the human family in general, improved her own territories, &c., doing in Asia what France and England are doing—or at least what they proclaim they are doing—in India, Australia, and Africa; spreading industry and knowledge amidst tribes the remains of most barbarous and ruthless conquerors, which for centuries have never known or enjoyed security, peace, or education—she is re-peopling depopulated countries, and restoring the desolations of many generations. Do we envy her in this work? Yes, we do; and say that she shall no longer be permitted to have peace, and the means to preserve it, in those quarters!

Now, in reference to the possession of Constantinople, it is quite clear that the Turks cannot retain it in their possession much longer. Who then is to obtain it amongst the European powers, and which of them has the deepest interest in its fortune? Russia, most certainly. England scouts the idea of gaining and retaining it. Well, then, we have to choose between Russia and France. Our interest and our safety clearly go with the former, rather than with the latter. Russia could never wish the Dardanelles closed against any commercial power, because the interests of *three-fourths* of her dominions require that that passage should remain open. Not so with France; she could only retain it to curb Russia, and to advance her own exclusive

interests and dangerous power. Russia placed at Constantinople would meet French power in the Mediterranean; and the collision that would ensue between them could only tend to exhaust the strength of each, and bring advantages to Great Britain, if we remained at peace with Russia. This latter power can never suffer France to establish herself, or maintain herself there. But necessity can only induce Russia to look to the possession of Constantinople, which would weaken, instead of strengthening her power; because her territories, so greatly extended, would render these more vulnerable to any great maritime power, such as the United Kingdom. Hence it would always, and under all circumstances, induce Russia to remain at peace with Great Britain; give her the benefit of, and the preference in the trade with her dominions; and this, more than anything else, would tend to curb the restless and insatiable ambition of France.

In the present unhappy contest, England comes before the world in quite a new character. In all her former wars, she fought and she conquered to preserve, and not to destroy. Destruction—stern, unrelenting, and general—is now her avowed, applauded, and immediate object; and she shows the world a base spirit, and her weakness, when she says, I will utterly destroy, because I cannot keep! She proclaims it as the destruction of *Government* establishments only; as if the property of any Government was not the property of the population of a country; though even to that she does not very strictly confine herself. Are not the dockyards, ships, and fortifications of England and her colonies the property of the people of England, and produced and paid for by the taxes extracted from their pockets and labour? Certainly. So it is with Russia. Therefore the hypocritical pretence of injuring or destroying Government property only, is all humbug, and of a piece with the rest of the *delusions* which are spread amongst us, to deceive and cheat us out of our money and our senses. Eager for the crusade against Russia and the Greek Church in Asia, England and France marshal their hosts for the battle. Singly, they thus admit, they could not accomplish the object; united, they said, or they thought, they could do it. They had scarcely advanced a step, when they were obliged to seek further help, and proceed to gain it by *coercing* Austria, and are also endeavouring to *coerce* the rest of Continental Europe! It is not the humble individual who writes this that has placed his country in this humiliating position. It is her rulers and her people who have confessed that the United Kingdom now cannot do that which she formerly could do and did do. Even if the fact had been so,—but which may be disputed,—they ought to have been the last to proclaim it, and that they are now placed in a position where they

must play second fiddle to France, and move as she directs them! To this state we have reduced ourselves! Is this the sad result of all our liberal policy?

Russia has been accused of concealment, and underhand dealings with this country, in everything regarding this Eastern question. But this admitted,—but which it is not,—what has been our conduct to her in reference to this question? On the 5th June (Drouyn de Lhuys, Part I. p. 229), we commenced our negotiations with France for a determined league to oppose her. On the 2d August, Lord Clarendon (Part II. p. 22) satisfies Count Walewski that England “in conjunction with France” was ready, and had determined “to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey.” On the 13th August (Part II. p. 54), we find Count Nesselrode telling Count Brunnow about the *late confidential overtures WHICH SIR HAMILTON SEYMOUR had been instructed to make to us* on the part of the British Government, of a conciliatory disposition, on which we set a high value.” On the 8th June (Part I. p. 233), *three days* after he had begun negotiations with France hostile to Russia, Lord Clarendon instructs Sir H. Seymour to tell Russia thus: “The Emperor cannot doubt the *warm feelings* of friendship towards himself entertained by our gracious Sovereign, and his Imperial Majesty must also be aware that *it is both the duty and the desire of her Majesty’s Government* to maintain the most cordial relations with Russia, feeling how essential such relations are to the peace of Europe, and viewing, as they do, with *alarm and abhorrence* whatever may tend to the interruption of that peace.” In Part II. p. 181, Oct. 11th, 1853, Sir H. Seymour tells Count Nesselrode: “You may be very certain that no disposition, *however slight*, exists with us to humiliate either Russia or the Emperor, or even to *deprive Russia of any portion of her just influence*.” In the same Part (II. p. 349, Dec. 26th, 1853) Sir H. Seymour again tells Count Nesselrode: “Dismiss, I pray you, from your mind the unfounded notion of the existence, on the part of her Majesty’s Government, of a desire to *humiliate Russia: no feeling of this sort exists*. Do not imagine, either, that it can be for our interests that Russia should be injured: *quite the contrary!*” Lord Clarendon (January 28th, 1854, Part I. p. 399) tells us that France and England united could and would “cripple the resources, &c. of Russia.” And Lord Stratford tells us (Part II. p. 167) that “the interests of France and England are *adverse* to those of Russia,” which declaration led the Turks to depend upon those two Western Powers, whatever their conduct and proceedings might be! Is all this our *sincerity*?

Considering the whole subject deeply and attentively, the conclusion

is forced upon the mind, that the attack by England and France has long been brooding and festering in the public mind, and meditated by the two nations ; otherwise the hostility now evinced could hardly have broken out to such an extent and with such virulence as it has done, and which sets all prudence, reason, and common sense, at defiance. Lord Stratford, however, does not mince matters in his desire for haste, to keep up the spirit thus artificially created. In No. 70, Part II. p. 74, he says : "There are, no doubt, reasons for exhausting all the means of negotiation to avert a disaster ; but there are also reasons for pursuing negotiation with vigour to a definite end, and still more for preparing and combining other and stronger ways of rescue, in case of diplomatic failure." In Part II. p. 205, Seymour tells Count Nesselrode : "Certainly Russia had possessed a claim to obtaining a full acknowledgment of *her rights* at Jerusalem, a *security* against their being called in question afresh ; but that the *whole difference* between us had, from the commencement of the affair, been this, that *an undue extension had been sought upon a particular point !*" that is, the construction of the treaty of Kainardji. In short, the sooner war ensues the better, says the ambassador ; while Lord Clarendon, in one of his calmer moods, tells us (Part II. p. 144, No. 135), "*If Europe is, for such causes, to be exposed to the calamities of war, they will be without parallel in history.*" This is, no doubt, true ; and yet now we have war, and there is too much reason to fear that its course and duration "will be without parallel in history." There is a broad hint in a letter from Lord Stratford (Part II. p. 244) that they delayed—"held on" to gain more time, because "the exportation of grain to England and France is going on to a great extent !" Well, a rogue in grain may make a tolerably good diplomatist !

The conduct of Austria in the matter has been, so far as we have proper authority to guide us, deceitful and disgraceful in the highest degree. Down to the beginning of 1854 she continued to act as an impartial arbitrator ; but, threatened by France and England with insurrections in Hungary, Galicia, and Italy, and an actual attack by France in Italy, and the promise of a slice of Turkey, or Russia, or of both, she turns round on her former friend and benefactor, and involves Prussia in a treaty totally at variance with her feelings and interests, and from which she cannot get clear without some sacrifice of character. This was done to involve her in direct hostilities with Russia, so as to aid efficiently the dangerous schemes of France and England against her. It is difficult to find language sufficiently strong to characterise the conduct of Austria in the manner that it deserves. It is a stain, not only on

her character as a nation, but also a stain upon the character of nations in general. It marks her name with ingratitude to a magnitude and extent that no time can efface. But for the generous and efficient assistance from Russia in the Hungarian rebellion, in 1848, the Austrian empire would have been dislocated and overthrown. The Roman Pontiff has, as is now well known, seconded the threats of France and England, and driven Francis Joseph to act as he has done. The safety of Austria, Prussia, and the smaller German States, consisted and consists in combining with Russia against France and England : coalescing with those two powers will only secure their destruction. But let both Rome and Austria beware, and remember that there are many millions of Protestants and adherents of the Greek Church in Austria, and further, that amongst her population are many millions of the Slavonic race,—of that portion of the human family to which 60,000,000 of Russians belong. The very fact that when Austria, and the rest of the continent of Western Europe, were torn to pieces by violent republican revolutions, Russia, instead of attacking Turkey, assisted to secure their thrones, is an invincible proof that Russia had no such designs against Turkey in view as have been attributed to her.

On the 14th June, the Sultan, *commanded* by England and France, contracted a treaty with Austria by which the latter was with her troops to occupy the far-famed Danubian Principalities, and, if they could not get the Russians out by *negotiation*, “to employ, in case of need, the number of troops necessary to accomplish that object.” No authority in the Principalities was “to *exercise* any control over the imperial army.” And the two parties engage “not to enter into any accommodation with the imperial court of Russia which shall not have for its *starting point the sovereign rights of the Sultan and the integrity of his empire.*” Not one syllable appears in this treaty to allow any other troops to enter these Provinces but Austrian troops !

We have already noticed and considered various protocols as the basis of treaties of peace, and observed how these vary. The latest of this prolific and dishonest family is one called “THE FOUR POINTS,” hatched in Paris, and, as a matter of course, consented to in London. It is here subjoined as propounded by *M. Drouyn de Lhuys* (Paris, July 22d, 1854), and is another proof and instance of the frauds and delusions to which these ambitious states have recourse to support their unjust and rotten cause ; a cause which they find and feel is daily sinking in the estimation of every honest man in every country of this world. Russia, in justice to herself, refuses to listen to them. Austria, says Count Nesselrode, joins the Western powers, in order “to impose upon us, *with them*, conditions which, in the openly avowed idea of the latter, have for

their object to materially *humiliate* Russia, and not, *as they pretend*, to secure the balance of power in Europe, but to *change it* for their *exclusive* benefit, or to compromise it indefinitely." "Nothing therefore remains to us, to our great regret, but to *accept the position which has been created for us*, and to wait until events produce a more favourable opportunity for opening negotiations for peace."¹

"Russia, for instance, has taken advantage of the exclusive right of surveillance, which treaties have conferred on her, over the relations of Moldavia and Wallachia with their suzerain, to enter these provinces, as though she were acting on her own territory. *Her privileged position on the Black Sea has enabled her to found establishments on that sea, and to form there a naval force, which, from the want of any counterpoise, is a perpetual menace for the Ottoman empire.* The uncontrolled possession by Russia of the principal mouth of the Danube has caused to the navigation of that important river moral and material obstacles, which affect the commerce of all nations. Lastly, the articles of the *treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, relative to religious protection, have become, in consequence of an unwarranted interpretation, the original cause of the struggle which Turkey now maintains.* On all these points there are new regulations to be established and important modifications to be made in the *status quo ante bellum*. It may, I think, be said, that the common interest of Europe would require:—1. That the protectorate hitherto exercised by the imperial court of Russia over the Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, should cease for the future, and that the privileges granted by the sultans to the provinces dependent on their empire should be, in virtue of an arrangement to be concluded with the Sublime Porte, placed under the collective guarantee of the powers. 2. That the navigation of the Danube to its mouth should be released from all impediments, and subjected to the principles sanctioned by the Congress of Vienna. 3. That the treaty of the 13th July, 1841, should be revised in concert by the high contracting parties, in the interest of the balance of power of Europe, *and in the sense of a limitation of the power of Russia in the Black Sea.* 4. That no power should claim the right of exercising an official protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, to whatever rite they may belong, but that France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, should lend their mutual cooperation to obtain from the initiative of the Ottoman Government the sanction and the observance of the religious privileges of the different Christian communities, and take advantage, for the reciprocal interest of their co-religionists, of the generous intentions manifested by his Majesty the Sultan, without any attack resulting from it for the dignity and independence of his crown."

What has just occurred shows the value of treaties in the eyes of the members of this holy alliance, and the extent of their honour and sincerity in their most solemn public acts and proceedings. While these

¹ Nesselrode, Despatch to Baron Budberg, at Berlin, dated, St. Petersburg, August 14th, 1854.

sheets were going to press, an important reply from Austria, dated Sept. 30th, to Prussia, has made its appearance. In it the profligate sovereign and ministers of Austria tell Prussia and the world, and tell them, too, with exultation, that Austria cannot under that treaty hinder, nor do they mean to hinder, Turkish troops, English troops, or French troops, to enter these Provinces and pass the Russian boundary, to attack Russia on her own dominions; but if Russia in her turn should drive back any or all of these troops into the Principalities, that then Austria would consider herself at war with Russia, and join all the others to attack her and to enter into her dominions! The history of the world does not furnish us with an instance of greater profligacy or cowardice than is here exhibited by Austria. Justice will, most assuredly, overtake such criminal and disgraceful conduct. Yet such powers prate about the violation of treaties!!

Lord Clarendon has stated (No. 88, Part II. p. 95), and Lord Aberdeen has repeated more than once in the House of Lords, that there existed "no treaty stipulations" that bound Great Britain to assist Turkey in her quarrel with Russia. We rose, entirely from a generous and *disinterested* feeling, to protect the weak against the strong, without any consideration for the fact that it was the weak who had offended the strong on this occasion, and did so because she was quite aware, and was made well acquainted with the fact, that the jarring interests and jealousies of the Western powers of Europe would, to advance and secure their own interests, support her in that wrong, however far she had carried or might carry it. Their Lordships and this country seemed to consider that no treaties were or could be violated by any power, except those treaties which existed between Russia and Turkey. But they might have reflected, that the first movement of a British fleet to assist Turkey against Russia, and the menace it conveyed, was not only a violation of the treaties between this country and Russia, but of all the treaties of 1815, and proceedings of the Congress of Vienna, by which those treaties were acknowledged and guaranteed. By our first hostile feeling and movement against Russia, we tore asunder, without any open declaration of war, all the treaties of 1815 that bound European nations together. To those treaties Turkey was no party. And one treaty thus specifically violated, so might another be; and the same force that was applied to tear the Russian treaty asunder might be applied, and has been applied by France and England to tear up those between them and other countries. Though the act may not be in some instances completed, still the hostile principle is established that goes to enforce it.

Lord Aberdeen has been much and grossly, but unjustly abused for

holding back instead of advancing the cause of the war. On the contrary, his lordship has been the greatest advocate for precipitating hostilities with Russia. In No. 103, Part II. p. 113, and in No. 108, Part II. pp. 114, 115, we are told that, in reference to the non-acceptance by Turkey of that note, it was directed, by himself and Lord Clarendon, who rashly and unconstitutionally assumed all the powers of the cabinet on the occasion, that the Vienna note should not again be pressed upon Turkey; and that the fleets should be directed to move to the Turkish waters, and should be "called up to Constantinople for the security of British and French interests, and, if necessary, for the protection of the Sultan." For these acts the two noble Lords have much to answer for, and will yet have to answer to the country. Taking possession of the sea was just as great, nay, a greater violation of the laws of nations, as it is called, than taking possession of any portion of land, belonging to any power, by another power. These two acts placed England in direct hostility with Russia; they formed menaces and showed intentions that could not be mistaken. They precipitated the war, and rendered it from that moment unavoidable. They emboldened the Turks, and they irritated Russia; in fact, they compelled the latter power to have recourse to arms to maintain her power and independence. Lord Aberdeen, therefore, the head of the cabinet, did not retard, but precipitated the war.

The British Government sadly neglected its first duties on this and other occasions. They not only allowed the country to be misled, but suffered them to remain in ignorance on the most important subjects, nay, encouraged them to be ruled by error. The Government, instead of guiding and instructing the country, as they ought to have done, and as it was their duty to do, suffered themselves to be driven by the country; they, consequently, have raised a storm which they cannot allay, and which will, at an early day, return upon their own heads with a terrible retribution. We see the unseemly and dangerous spectacle of the party in power, by every art and exaggeration and misrepresentation, even to direct falsehood, that they can use, seeking to maintain themselves in power; and another party, by similar proceedings and the cry for war, endeavouring to gain that power and to displace their opponents, by alleging that they are not sincere in their intentions to carry the contest on with activity. The reasons advanced by some of the latter, in aid of their war views, and to gain popular applause, are sometimes not only ridiculous, but ludicrous. Thus, Mr. Newdigate, a strong and honest Protectionist, told a public meeting, about two months ago, that we ought to go to war with

Russia, because she laid an import duty of *ten per cent.* upon foreign commodities imported into Russia! Amidst this war of parties the public mind is left misinformed and misled on most essential and important points, and, in consequence, most dangerous steps are taken, and proceedings forced upon the Government, willing to listen to those, though most dangerous and hostile to the national character, interests, and honour. "In the multitude of counsellors," says the *wise man*, "there is safety." Of course he means honest counsellors; but when the multitude become counsellors, the history of all nations shows us that there is neither safety, peace, nor justice.

Lord Stratford tells us that the Turks are "*cruel and fanatic.*" The history of their race and religion attests this, throughout Asia and Europe, in indelible and disgraceful characters. Why, therefore, was he so eager to call that cruelty and fanaticism into active operation? To show the public what kind of spirit his lordship has been the chief cause to evoke, the following tale is extracted from the columns of one of our most cautious and ably-conducted public journals, namely *Bell's Weekly Messenger*. Let Lord Stratford and the country peruse it, and see what the world has to expect, in the contest which has been precipitated by his lordship more than others:—

EXECUTION OF A SUPPOSED RUSSIAN SPY.

"The criminal was led out to a spot in view of all present. Ishmael Pasha and his staff alighted. The preparations for execution were very soon finished; nothing, in fact, having been done except the binding of the man's eyes, and the tying of his hands more tightly. No paper was read, nor anything said explaining the cause of the man's execution. The pasha gave the signal to nine soldiers, who were placed at twenty-five yards from the condemned man, to fire. Three fired first, but only one of their shots took effect: it made him stagger and fall. Another three then fired, but with little more effect; after which the remaining three discharged their muskets at him. Four balls, in all, seemed to have struck him, but, as he was not dead, three other soldiers were ordered to fall out of their ranks, and to fire upon him. After they had done so, several men went up to the un-killed man, and stuck their bayonets into his skull. He groaned so heavily that the crowd heard him. The want of precision with which the men fired, and the tardiness they showed in doing their work, were very reprehensible, and gave much pain to the foreign officers who had seen military executions; but the finishing part of the business was little else than revolting to their feelings. Several Turkish officers went up to the mutilated man, drew their swords across his throat, and then licked the blood from their sides."—*Bell's Weekly Messenger*, June 3d, 1854.

That nobleman, Lord Stratford, has played his cards very ill, not only for himself, but for his country. While he aimed at, and

believed that he had reformed Islamism, and crushed the Greek Church, that he might substitute in its place in Turkey some purer faith of his own, he has, in fact, as far as lay in his power, prostrated both. The Turks tried to overreach him ; and they have, in their cunning, overreached themselves. He has misled his country by a tissue of fables and misrepresentations regarding the state of Turkey ; precipitated Great Britain into a dangerous war, wherein, while Turkey will fall, his country will lose both in resources and character, and France enter into possession of all the advantages which she calculates may be gained. The clap-trap about seeking the freedom of the seas—as will soon be found, if it has not already been found, out, in more quarters than one,—means that the Black Sea and the Mediterranean should belong to France—become French lakes, and all that are in them to be under her control and command.

Nations, we are told, from high authority, have no cousins ; no, nor relatives, nor gratitude of any kind. They never had ; and they never will have, so long as they are guided by the passions and interests that rule and direct mankind. What a proof Austria affords of this truth, in her conduct to her late deliverer, Russia ! nor are we behind her in the course of ingratitude against the same friendly power. She broke the giant's arm, by her patriotism and firm resistance, in 1812 ; and, consequently, saved England from certain invasion, and all its terrible consequences,—saved her from being added, as our formidable enemy, Napoleon I., threatened he would do, as one of his tributary provinces and mushroom states subjected to his sway. We go now to crush the power that saved us, and raise up and assist that power that then threatened to pull us down. If we expect any disinterested friendship from France, or assistance in the day of danger, we live in a dangerous delusion. Crush Russia, if we and France can do so, and we enable this ally at once to place her foot not only upon the neck of Europe, but also upon our own. It matters not what her sovereign, or even her people, may at present intend ; it is what her people, goaded on by national ambition and Popish influences, will compel him and them to do, that we must keep in mind.

While these pages were going through the press, the official note from Baron Manteuffel to the British Government, dated Berlin, September 5th, made its appearance. In it Prussia decidedly tells Lord Clarendon that she will lend her "moral support" at St. Petersburg "to the four points," in the sense she applied to the protocols to which she had already been a party ; but at the same time this will be done "in a way that should place beyond doubt that she would not recognise any obligations on her part to *enforce them by military*

cooperation against Russia!" This resolution of Prussia, doubtless, occasioned the thunders of Downing Street, the Tuileries, Vienna, and the Vatican, to be directed against her, through the columns of the *Times*, on the 18th and 19th of the same month, as has been already noticed. Such bullying, however, defeats itself, as clearly appears to have been the case on this occasion. Because France and England have chosen to quarrel with, and to go to war with Russia, for any cause or for no cause, it is monstrous that Prussia and every other state should be *compelled* to follow their footsteps and join with them in tyranny. Why do not they also try to force the United States to follow the same course? The answer they would get if they made the attempt may easily be guessed. Moreover, why not compel Protestant Holland to join them also?

Russia, it is quite evident, had no intention of overthrowing the Ottoman Government. Her Government, again and again, disclaimed any such intention. It was not, in fact, her interest to do so. Turkey could never "cripple" nor control Russia; but Turkey, coalesced with and "*coerced*" by France and England, could do so to a serious extent. What Russia never thought of before war was declared against her by France and England, now becomes a duty and a necessity on her part; she has now to contend not only for her independence, but, to a great extent, for her existence as a great power. And she will contend against her gratuitous and inconsiderate enemies. She sought only religious liberty for 15,000,000 of Greek Christians in Turkey. The allies, to counteract her influence (for these or for Turkey, those allies care not one straw), demand not only full religious liberty, but an equality of *civil rights*, to all the above multitude of people. Let them obtain this, and where is a Mussulman Government and power in those parts, that is now ruled by the Sultan? A schoolboy might answer the question. The affections of these 15,000,000 of enfranchised Christians must ever go with their co-religionists, that is, with Russia. If the allies try to maintain, as they say they mean to do, a Mahomeddan sovereign dominant in Turkey, the Christian population will never submit to it, and the more political power they obtain the less likely are they to continue to do so, and the more they will be inclined to coalesce with Russia, and look to her for aid to obtain their liberty and independence from the grievous Ottoman yoke. England and France united cannot prevent this result. Russia knows her ground, and she will not quit it. So long as the church of St. Sophia remains a mosque, so long will the Christian population of the East remain hostile to the power that rules over it; and if it is

attempted to turn it into a Latin cathedral, as report says is meditated by Rome and by France, then an enmity against those who do so, equal to the enmity against their present Mahommedan rulers, will be the certain result, and under such circumstances, continue to add to the influence of Russia in that quarter of the world.

Of the characteristic spirit and haughtiness of the Turks, we have a striking instance in their manifesto of October 4th, (Part II. p. 154—159,) where the Porte, despising the treaties with Russia, boasts of their intention to maintain the religious privileges and immunities which their nation had granted to the Greek Christians in Turkey "*before the existence even of Russia as an empire*"! Russia became a state under Rurik, about 840, and soon after a Christian nation, before the present race of Turks left their habitations, between the Caspian and the Sihon or Jaxartes, to escape from the arms of Zenghis Khan. The Russians are, moreover, one of the most ancient nations of Europe, and known to the Romans, in their early days, by the name of *Sarmatæ*; and were ever known as superior to other nations in personal elegance and strength. They dwelt on that part of Russia, between Borysthenes and the Don, and from Kieff, northward and north-eastward; and this long before the Turks existed, or were known as slaves to Tartar tribes or people.

As regards the British empire in India, we see it perilled in the same way, and from the same cause, that the Ottoman is now endangered. With our conquest we did not spread Christianity, that sure and true amalgamator of nations. We have kept them, Mahommedans and Hindoos, a separate people from ourselves, exactly as the Mahommedans have done with the Greek Christians in the Ottoman dominions. They will mark at this moment the inconsistency of our national conduct. We cage and keep down without much ceremony, Emperors, Ranees, and Ameers, in India, and these too Mahommedans; while in Eastern Europe and Western Asia, we rise in arms to support and maintain Mahommedans against Christians, and liberate every marauding chieftain we can find out to help us to oppose the latter! What, suppose the Mahommedans in India should take it into their heads to rise against us in a religious and political contest? What could we do to prevent it? We have aided and called forth the fanaticism and fury of that creed against Christians, and they may neither be able nor willing to make any distinction of Christians. They are, if possible, as fanatic in India at this moment as they ever were, if they might exercise their feelings. The last number of "*The Church Missionary Intelligencer*," for November 1854, (Paper 256—259, &c.) gives us

numerous instances where the missionaries of that Society find, in their discussions with the Mahommedans, the latter broadly intimating that the best way to defend their religion was by the application of the sword, and that, if they dared, they were ready to do so. Another striking and important fact it disclosed to us in the number of the publication mentioned, (p. 258,) that the priests of the Latin Church, the twin brother of the *False Prophet*, in the form of a Bishop, comes forward, "*helping the Mussulmans by his advice and his books, as much as he can, to enable them the better to oppose us.*" Thus we find the LATIN CHURCH is everywhere in a state of the greatest activity ; and if it once gets itself established at Calcutta, Delhi, and Constantinople, as it is really intended it should be, then neither British fleets nor armies could prevent it from crushing Mahomedanism, and *banishing Protestantism* from those quarters of the world, and with the latter, human liberty and independence.

To-day we are told that the Christian population of Turkey are so ignorant and degraded that they are incapable of any improvement. If so, who has degraded them ? Have 1000 years of Islamite tyranny ever, in one instance, tended to instruct or to raise them from degradation ? To-morrow we hear that they have, of late years, so rapidly improved, that in future they may safely and properly be left to themselves and their hard-hearted rulers in everything connected with their welfare for the future. A writer in *Blackwood's Magazine*, November Part, 1854, p. 500, and who writes from what he saw with his eyes and heard with his ears in Turkey, settles the point of improvement thus : "*Men have been impaled by the road-side for selling the remainder of their crop after they have paid the tenths ;* and we have known a man killed, in full Divan, with a battle-axe, for refusing to sell his crop to the governor of the town in which we were residing at the time !" And at p. 502 the same writer tells us, and tells us truly, "that in all civilized countries a very great diminution has been made in the expense of transport since the conclusion of the last war ; but, in Turkey, the expense of transport has of late years been *increasing*, and hence the cultivation and export of several articles peculiarly adapted to the soil and climate have diminished !" What an improving country and good government that of Turkey must be ! It is, moreover, rather a singular, though to me not unexpected circumstance, that the Government which is, and that which is expected to be, have got all their clever workmen at present employed to prove that Turkey never can be improved unless agriculture is extended and protected in it ; and that as the Turks can never accomplish either the one or the other, so therefore Great Britain, as a *duty*, must get

such a hold of the country as will enable her to do it. Disinterested souls!

Amongst the ridiculous and acrimonious propositions on foot in order to cover our blindness and ignorance, is that one to prohibit the trade in Russian produce through independent and neutral ports—Memel, for example. This place is in Prussia, and a great eye-sore to some of our speculators. But is it the only one? Let those, and such as those, take up a map, and they will see that there is a water communication between the Dnieper and the Vistula, and consequently that all the produce from some of the finest provinces of Russia can reach the Baltic by the Vistula and Dantzic. A Prussian merchant buys that produce in Russia. It becomes lawfully his. It is not contraband of war. We cannot—we dare not stop such a trade, even if we were so unwise as to cut off our nose in order to be revenged on our face to effect it. Well, if we cannot stop this trade, we cannot destroy the resources of Russia and vanquish her, say the advocates of brute force in everything. For that there is no just remedy. We should have thought upon this sooner. But then Russia will grow rich in spite of us. Very probably she will do so; she is getting money and resources more and more every day. Well, let us tell these wise men how this comes to pass. Russia is now nearly independent of the world for every real necessary that her population requires for food, raiment, or comfort. She can do without luxuries. She therefore keeps her money at home which she previously lavishly expended in French wines, French ornamental furniture, and jewelry, and knickknackeries. Ask the Parisian manufacturers of these things how much they now feel the want of that Russian trade. They will tell you, their Government will or can tell you. The continuance of a Russian war is, under such circumstances, more likely to starve Paris than to starve or to ruin Russia! Next, we are told to cut off her supply of salt required for Finland and Poland, &c. Well, do so. Then there is to the north of the sea of Aral and the Caspian, plains so immense, and composed of it, that a quantity can be found to supply the whole world for a million of years. They can carry it through Russia by means of the Caspian, the Wolga, the Ural, and their numerous tributary streams. Moreover, Prussia, or any other continental nation, could consume the Russian produce they bring in, and export their own to this country!

We have heard much of late about "*the disturber of Europe.*" Applied as it is, and has been, to the present sovereign of Russia, the charge is most unjust and most ungenerous. More than once and at a great expense and inconvenience to himself, he has saved

Europe from disturbance instead of creating it. Twice he has, since 1820, saved the Ottoman empire from destruction. The disturbers of Europe, the official despatch from Saxony tells us, do not travel with "*Russian passports*," but with ———, the Foreign offices of London and Paris may fill up the blank at their leisure and their pleasure. The disturbers of Europe nestle in London and Paris. The last place, in particular, has been their head quarters for more than three centuries. The disturbers of Europe are those men who, in money speculations, "*discount*" victories—anticipated or fabricated—those men who pronounce with composure a carnage like that of Alma "*a good butcher's bill*" (the actual jargon of *bourses* and money-grinders)—such men, in short—tigers in human shape—who call out to slay as many men as possible, and they will not grudge the cost of doing so. Let us have as much blood and flesh as possible for our money! We can afford it. It is true that we owe 800,000,000*l.*, but all that we will honestly discharge the moment Mahomedan power is firmly established in Eastern Europe and in Western Asia! The disturbers of Europe are the men who propose, as Lord Aberdeen told the House of Lords, "*horrible notions*"—indiscriminate slaughter and destruction. These are the disturbers of Europe—of the world—they and the Government which suffers itself to be led or driven by them—an unholy and merciless coalition, each of whom separately would, had they the power, "*sell a boy for an harlot and a girl for wine that they may drink!*" Men, in short, like the following :—

"Sebastopol, Oct. 26th—Constantinople, Oct. 28th, 1854.

"Menchikoff had asked for three hours to bury his dead; *but it was refused*, on the ground that the *allies had no dead to bury*, themselves, and thought there *would be no reciprocity!*"—*Times*, Nov. 9th, 1854.

And next, the French cavalry officer, who writes under the walls of Sebastopol, Oct. 26th :—

"The Russians are frightened at the French, and call us devils. As regards the English, they have *much less fear* of them. They acknowledge in us a very *marked superiority*; THIS IS TO THEIR PRAISE. The battle of Alma has had a magnificent success—more than 12,000 killed and 8,000 wounded remaining on the field. *You see that the sum total is HANDSOME!!*"—*Morning Chronicle*, Nov. 9th, 1854.

Such beings are the disturbers, and proper tools for the disturbers, of Europe!

Amongst the remarkable occurrences of the day, is the singular appearance of the more prominent organs of public instruction, who lately failed in energy to defend successfully a high and valuable

British interest, now standing most prominently forward as the defenders of a rotten cause, and in support of that cause urging the propriety and practicability of defending and maintaining *the integrity and the independence* of the Ottoman empire. It is, however, too late. In national guilt, the day of grace is often neglected, and in this instance has been allowed to pass away. The irreversible decree is gone forth against it, and the Mahommedan population thereof, as a ruling power. They have long been the *rod*¹ in the hand of the Most High, to punish a corrupt people. These punishments, in tyranny, oppression, cruelty, and injustice, they inflicted, not for His sake, but to gratify their own ambition, tyranny, and injustice. In them, therefore, the world is about to behold another instance, out of the many that the history of nations affords to those who study it, namely, that when "*the rod*" has performed the work for which it was appointed, it is broken and thrown into the flames! The position of Mussulmans is now similar to the position of the irreclaimable Jews, as recorded in 2 Chron. xxxvi. 16: "But they mocked the MESSENGERS OF Gop, and despised his words, and misused his prophets, until the wrath of THE LORD arose against his people, till there was no remedy." There is a time, therefore, when there "is no remedy" for continued national transgression in this world. Let the United Kingdom never lose sight of this great and important truth.

What can our present Premier think, if he has time to think at all, upon the present position of this country? He was one of the noble host who aided to put down, and who did put down, the gigantic tyranny of France forty years ago. He now joins her, to enable her to put her heel once more upon the heart of Europe, Great Britain included. Every blow that we inflict upon Russia, we inflict two upon ourselves. He told us lately at Aberdeen, that the union and power of his Government was to carry out the principles of Sir Robert Peel. Were his principles to join France, threaten Europe, insult every principle of true liberty, attack friends, assist profligate people in every quarter, such as in Turkey? It may be so; and may, amidst the contradictions which human nature exhibits, especially under *liberal* principles, account for the judgment and the apparent insincerity of all the great guns of the agricultural interests of this country—supporting, as they do, his most inveterate and dangerous warlike policy. If the toils and labour of this country from 1793 to 1815 are valueless, and to be blotted from our national records, why is not the debt contracted to support these toils and labours expunged also?

¹ Isaiah x. 5 fully explains the metaphoric meaning of *rod*, thus: "O Assyrian, the *rod* of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is mine indignation."

Sir H. Seymour has told us, in one place, that French threats had "frightened the unfortunate Turks;" and in another, that French threats had procured for France "a moral influence at Constantinople." Of these facts there can be no doubt; and having succeeded so well at Constantinople, it is not to be wondered at that the sovereign of France should make the attempt by similar means in other quarters, and that, confident of his position, he should aim at higher game, as the annexed remarkable communication proves that he has done. He knows that he has Great Britain hooked, and that he can manage her at his pleasure:—

"The Emperor has addressed the following letter to Mme. de St. Arnaud, dated St. Cloud, October 16th:—

"You know, Mme. la Maréchale, that no one takes a larger share than I do in the grief which oppresses you. The Marshal united himself in my cause from the day when, quitting Africa to take the portfolio of the war department, he co-operated in the re-establishment of order and authority in this country. He united his name to the military glories of France from the day when, decided on landing in the Crimea, *in spite of timid counsels*, he gained with Lord Raglan the battle of the Alma, and opened to our army the road to Sebastopol. I have, therefore, lost in him a devoted friend in difficult trials, as France has lost in him a soldier always ready to serve her in the hour of danger. So many claims to my gratitude and to that of the public are doubtless without power to assuage a grief like yours, and I confine myself to assuring you that I transfer towards you and the family of the Marshal the sentiments with which he had inspired me. Accept, Madame la Maréchale, the sincere expression of them.

"NAPOLEON."

Look around, and see what our efforts are producing; and what we are gaining, and must gain, from the blood and money we spend, and must further spend. In Asia, we replace the church by the mosque, the Christian pastor by the Mahommedan mufti. In Circassia, we extinguish the feeble remains of Christianity which has there existed since before the days of Justinian; and we restore to its former strength the detestable Circassian white-slave trade; and at the same time, with Turkish prosperity and safety, the vast African black-slave trade, which Turkey in all her borders carried on, and has long and always carried on. British bayonets, ships, sailors, and soldiers maintain and guard all these vile systems, openly and before the eyes of the whole world; and this too at the very moment we are denouncing, in the Western world, evils and actions of a similar description. This is our present position. This is our present work, or rather but one portion thereof, all being of a similar kind and description. The very muskets, that are so profusely used to help robbers to become more independent, are taken by the Abhasians, to whom they are given, to

invade their neighbours, and to purchase or catch their wives and daughters to carry to Constantinople, to sell them for slaves!!

In Part I. p. 228, Lord Clarendon tells us that in this Eastern question, the views "*and interests of England and France were entirely identical.*" And in Part I. p. 228, M. Drouyn de Lhuys tells us, that France and England united would maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire in their present condition." And France and England united are strong, but after all their might is only human. Can they oppose with success the decrees of the Sovereign of the Universe? Can they, in their pride and self-sufficiency, "hold the waters in the hollow of their hands?" Can they "weigh the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?" Can they, in their pride and self-sufficiency, recal the days that are past? Can they collect the scattered clouds of yesterday? Can they bind the sweet influences of PLEIADES, or loose the bands of ORION? Can they send lightnings, that they may go and say unto thee, Here we are?"

"Can thy arm measure with an arm Divine?
Or canst thou thunder with a voice like mine?"

No! No! France and England united can do none of those things; and till they can do them, they cannot maintain the Ottoman empire and the Mahommedan rule in their present position in Asia and Europe; but they will, in their attempts to do so, bring down on their heads the severe and terrible punishments and destruction which the Almighty has decreed shall fall upon the Mahommedan empire and *delusion*. Let them read its history, accompanied by the Omnipotent decree: "He who leadeth into captivity, shall go into captivity; and he who killeth with the sword, shall be *killed by the sword.*" Let them read their fate in the fate of ancient Babylon (see Isaiah xii. xiv.; and Jeremiah l. li.), and that of obstinate and devoted Jerusalem. "Though Babylon should," says Jeremiah, li. 53, "mount up to heaven, and though she should fortify the height of her strength, yet from me shall *spoilers* come unto her, saith the Lord." And of wicked and irreclaimable Jerusalem, the same prophet says, (xxxvii. 10.)—the threatening warning directed alike to all ages and nations—thus: "For though ye had smitten the whole army of the Chaldeans that fight against you, and there remained but wounded men among them, *yet should they rise up every man in his tent, and burn this city with fire!*" No human might, nor mortal diplomacy, can turn aside the decrees and the judgments of *THE Almighty*. Neither Stratford's cunning, nor Seymour's petulance, though backed by France, England, Austria, and Turkey; nor national feelings misled; nor national prejudices called forth, can avert or turn aside what Omnipotence has decreed. Lord Clarendon

probably did not consider the matter in this light, when he, nevertheless, predicted (Part II. No. 100, p. 111), that the apprehended "*war would entail the dissolution of the Ottoman empire.*" But as light began to dawn, he states, in the Secret Correspondence, p. 20, "that the first cannon-shot may be the signal for a state of things more disastrous even than those calamities that war inevitably brings in its train." Little did Sir H. Seymour imagine "the storm" he coveted and did his utmost to call forth, when, in his ignorant pride, he bullied the venerable Count Nesselrode, with the announcement "that it mattered little to her Majesty's Government (that is, the Government of England), *whether the storm broke now or two years hence!*" Indeed; but it does matter a great deal whether we should have aided to call forth that "*storm,*" to rush into it—that "*storm*" which is to sweep from the face of this earth kingdoms and empires who gratuitously mix themselves in it, and who will receive of the punishment decreed against the great aggressors and every auxiliary:—"Reward her even as she hath rewarded you; as she hath done, do unto her,"—"double unto her double,"—"for she hath been *proud* against the Lord, AGAINST THE HOLY ONE of *Israel!*"

In their boasted and indissoluble alliance, England and France Papal come forward in the face of the world to protect, support, and maintain, as it may suit their self-interest and ambition, the two great corrupt religious systems, that have so long trampled upon, enslaved, and scourged the world. First, that of the false prophet; secondly, that of the second wild beast, or tyranny, personified in that one that had two horns like a lamb, and spoke as a dragon; "the immediate successor of his great and ferocious predecessor, who was "wounded to death by the sword, and did live." The TWO WESTERN POWERS not only take the cause of these two odious systems of fraud, force, and iniquity in hand, but they reduce them to a state of servile obedience to them, mount on their respective thrones, and united they proceed to exercise all the power of both before their eyes, and to do their will with greater energy and effect than those, in their decayed state, could themselves do. Dignify or degrade it as we may, this is our position—our unenviable position; a position in which the future Christian historian will record our actions and proceedings. They thus become united as one tyrannic power (the Siamese twins of the political world) for the same object and purpose. They, in short, become one savage beast or tyranny, and probably may—we may fear, certainly—represent that beast which was to make his appearance at this eventful period, which was to collect all the forces of the "kings of the earth" to fight under their banners, "against the Lord, and AGAINST HIS ANOINTED;" which kings were, however, only to have "*power one hour*"

with their master,—showing how short this new reign of terror is to be. Still, all their rage and fury were controlled, and by Almighty power, “to fulfil his will,” and to make these kings and their masters the instruments of destroying that which they had been collected to support and maintain. These will in the most *disinterested* manner turn upon the IDOL they had previously worshipped, and “*eat her flesh and burn her with fire.*” The great and unholy combination and collective force,—kings, counsellors, ministers of state, and followers of every rank, especially volunteer followers,—all the “mixed multitude” that join themselves to them, are however to be destroyed. Neither fleets nor armies, long guns nor short guns, nor “*irritated enemies armed with all the implements of destruction which science has invented, and with the wealth of the world at their backs,*” can resist the artillery of Heaven—the arm of Omnipotence. Amidst carnage previously unknown in the world, victory is certain to the “KING OF KINGS.” “The beast was taken, and with him the FALSE PROPHET that wrought miracles before him. These both were cast alone into a lake of fire, burning with brimstone”—bold metaphorical expressions to denote utter extinction. “And the remnant were slain with the sword of Him that sat upon the horse, which sword proceeded out of his mouth: and all the fowls were filled with their flesh!” Let not Lord John Russell and his colleagues and followers doubt, or deceive themselves:

GOD WILL DEFEND THE RIGHT.

But to conclude. Who is to blame? That point is sufficiently settled by the consideration of the whole of the official papers referred to. France, at the commencement of her late republican revolution, first announced the abrogation of the treaties of 1815, and then broke the treaty of 1841, by sending, as a matter of course and of *right*, a three-decker line of battle ship to Constantinople, to browbeat the Turk into surrender of rights contrary to treaties with Russia; which rights, gained by France as she demanded, constituted the Latin Church, and France as its head, the supreme Christian Church in the East. Russia claimed redress. After much difficulty it was yielded to her; but no sooner yielded to her, than it was again taken away at the threats of France. Menchikoff came to Constantinople. After much negotiation, a settlement of the question of the Holy Places *as between France and Russia* was agreed to, but a settlement of the points in dispute between Russia and Turkey was, in the main point, refused on the part of Turkey. In this refusal, after having pressed Turkey to yield the point in prudence and in justice, France and England—secretly meditating war while preaching peace—turn suddenly

round ; bully Russia ; support Turkey ; and finally declare war against Russia, because she would and could not yield that which Turkey ought to have done, and which those powers and the other great powers in Europe pressed her to do. French threats and menaces, says Sir H. Seymour, "*frightened the unhappy Turks.*" So he thought ; while the happy, not the "unhappy" Turk, was glorying in his shame, and calculating that while so doing he might, as in the days of yore, refuse redress with safety ; because the jealousies and interests of Christian powers would bring some of them to support him, and by "*setting Christian against Christian,*" as in bygone times, he would, in the *mêlée* thus created, regain all that in past times he had justly lost, and become as great and powerful as ever ! Vain hope ! He has produced by his perfidy and cunning the strife he sought ; but, in doing so, he has sadly miscalculated his position, and the feelings of Christendom ; and by the course he has pursued, he has raised a storm, which, however it terminates in reference to others, he cannot allay, and which is sure to sweep him and his power from the face of the earth. His counsellor and adviser, Lord Stratford, the real PADISHAH at Constantinople, finds himself equally out in his calculations ; and that by his insidious advice he has brought an old house about his own ears and the ears of the Ottoman Government. Lord Stratford advised, and doubtless by the command of his Government, the Sultan and his ministers on all occasions ; told them, as he himself tells us, what they ought to do ; while Lord Clarendon (No. 180, May 24th) acknowledges that the union of France and England gave "CONFIDENCE" to Turkey in all her more violent and rash proceedings,—in fact, produced them. Unfortunately for the United Kingdom, she, during this serious emergency, had Lord Stratford at Constantinople, and Sir H. Seymour at St. Petersburg, to represent her. These diplomatists, by false reports, led her into the present war, to support and maintain a power, which both Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon tell us decidedly we were under "NO TREATY OBLIGATIONS" to assist or maintain, and, consequently, were not called upon to interfere in any active way in any quarrel that that antichristian power might, according to its old custom, get into with her neighbour. Under such circumstances, we were not called upon by any principle of honour or immediate interest, political or commercial, to interfere as principals in the contest. The war on our part was unnecessary and impolitic, and cannot, therefore, be just. If we had had any other ambassadors at Constantinople and St. Petersburg, we should have had no war with Russia. Moreover, in our course of proceeding we have, in the blindest, silliest manner possible, "*followed in the wake of Turkey*" and of France ; while, if the Foreign Office do not know, they ought to know, and they might know, that a

solemn compact exists between the sovereign of Rome and the Emperor of France, to the effect that the present war is to be made the means of establishing the Latin Church as the *supreme Church* in every quarter in the world, and especially in the East! The Turks, for the basest and most ambitious purposes, were first to blame. The British Government, from imbecility or ignorance, and a subserviency to France, were next to blame; and the people of England have themselves to blame, for allowing themselves to be so grievously humbugged and misled as to induce them to rush into the present terrible contest, the enormous cost of which they will most certainly have to bear. It would be well for us if we, as Christians, would adopt and follow the pure Christian maxim, to "take the beam out of our own eye, before we attempt to pull the mote out of our brother's eye."

Let us glance for a moment at the cost of our actions, confining our observations only to the more important items. First, the enhanced price of grain. Taking into account the decreased cultivation of wheat in Ireland (2,500,000 qrs.), the crop of the present year, rather above an average in Great Britain, is only equal to what it was in full years a short time ago. This leaves a deficiency for internal consumption of 4,500,000 qrs., rather more than *one-fifth* deficiency upon the whole consumption. Every one knows how greatly such a deficiency must enhance prices. Wheat is now 80s. The remunerating price being taken at 56s. will leave, on a moderate estimate and an average, 20s. as the enhanced price. All other grains bear a similar ratio. There is no source from which any supply can be obtained. Turkey, Egypt excepted, has none, but requires large external supplies; Russia, the former great and sure source of supply, sends us no more. Therefore, while the war lasts, we may calculate the enhanced price as above. The total yearly enhanced price for food, and for different articles, and other increased expenditure, will stand thus:—

Wheat	£25,000,000
Other grains	25,000,000
Increased price, hemp, &c. (manufactures)	3,000,000
Marine insurance on 250,000,000% at 10s.	12,500,000
Freights transferred to foreigners	5,000,000
Increased price of malt liquors and spirits	7,500,000
Ditto candles	3,000,000
Ditto coals	8,000,000
Increased taxation, 1854	10,000,000
Vote of credit, spent	4,000,000
Got in debt further, at least	10,000,000
Amount for first year	<u>£111,000,000</u>

Now this enormous sum (still it is not all, and in some things only the beginning of increased burdens) is surely a severe penalty to pay on account of Seymour's diplomatic misrepresentations, and *confiscated wardrobe animosities*; and for Stratford's diplomatic fables, concealments, and *resentments*; and for the errors, or the knavery, or both, of a cabinet and a legislature, which have suffered themselves to be misled and imposed upon by them, and by their and our allies.

APPENDIX.

I. NESSELRODE'S DESPATCHES.

It is considered unnecessary to advert minutely to Lord Aberdeen's letter, 14th Sept. 1829, to Lord Heytesbury, at St. Petersburg, regarding the treaty of Adrianople ; first, because the Government has not thought it prudent to give us the Russian reply to that letter ; and secondly, because the war payment exacted by Russia from Turkey chiefly complained of was subsequently reduced to a very small sum—a fact which has been disingenuously concealed. Annexed is an important circular despatch extracted from "THE GREEK PAPERS," from Count Nesselrode, showing the views of Russia regarding the Greek revolt, in reference to which so much misrepresentation had gone abroad. We, in fact, claim a monopoly in instigating insurrections ; and while we scatter these to the utmost of our power into the Russian territory, we denounce her, even on *suspicion*, for having recourse to similar hostile weapons, in order to counteract our efforts to injure her.

Count Nesselrode to Russian Diplomatic Agents abroad.

[TRANSLATION.]

"St. Petersburg, $\frac{2}{14}$ March, 1854.

"SIR,—The annex to my memorandum of the 18th ult. has enabled you to communicate to the Government, under whose authority you are placed, a faithful and detailed account of the causes of our difference with Turkey, and of the efforts employed by us to bring Turkey to a more just appreciation of our demands, and of the unlooked-for difficulties caused by the interference of the cabinets of Paris and London, as well as of the hostile position they have taken against us, whilst they come forward as peace-makers between us and the Ottoman Government.

"Affairs now have become very serious, and consequently we fear for the tranquillity of Europe. We are persuaded by our duty to the Courts

which to the present moment have judged of our acts without prejudice and impartially, not to cease to keep them informed of the course of affairs, by which they may judge with the same justice of the position into which great European powers have tried to place the future relations between Russia and Turkey, as well as the obligations prescribed to the Emperor on this subject.

"One of these obligations affects nearly the conscience of the whole of Russia and that of its prince. This obligation relates to the state of the Christian people subject to Turkey; so much the more as the Government and the Ottoman people, *both excited by their fanaticism, encouraged by the sympathy and the aid which the Christian powers grant them with unjustifiable haste*, whilst, we say, they think they can with impunity commit the greatest crimes.

"Some of these people, especially those in the neighbourhood of independent Greece, *driven to despair* and having lost all hope of improving their condition, have taken arms to be able to shake off their yoke, *become insupportable*.

"This revolution, foreseen and predicted for several years, occupies and excites now the minds and the press of Europe, on account of the subsequent contradiction of those who wish to *sustain the power of the Crescent* and the rights of the Sultan; they only can explain it to us. Here is the contradiction: these same powers *who declare war against us* because we have wished to *maintain the religious rights* of the Christians in Turkey, say that they wish to accomplish for the Christians the enjoyment of *the same civil rights* as the Mussulmans.

"We will not pronounce fatal fears; but these *tardy promises which they make now*, and which accompany their acts which proclaim them, we fear that they will have no other result *than to excite further the oppressors against the oppressed*, to occasion bloody revenge, and to prevent effectually in the end, the submission of these people to the Turkish dynasty.

"On our part, we have never required from the Porte, on behalf of his Christian subjects, anything but what was just, practicable, and sanctioned by the acts of the Sultans. But, whilst others than ourselves come and occasion troubles and calamities which weigh on our fellow-Protestants, and drive them to an unequal and bloody conflict, certainly we cannot deny to our *struggling fellow-Protestants our sympathy and our assistance*.

"If the revolution of which we speak takes a wider spread; if it become an obstinate and bloody battle, and of long duration, like that of the Greeks in 1821, we believe that any of these Christian powers, if she did not wish to oppose it to her conscience, could aid in bringing these people to submit anew to the Ottoman yoke; the Emperor, in any case, would not hear of countenancing it.

"During the time of the war, the same as during the establishment of peace, the condition of these people will be the subject of the Emperor's care. We hope, moreover, that God will not suffer, *on account of unjust hostilities against Russia*, that Christian princes allow their armies to contribute to the work of extermination. These renegades, gathered together

at the camp of Omar Pasha, plan, without doubt, at this moment, against those who have taken up arms for their hearths and their churches.

"It is in this way, Sir, that we ought to contemplate the revolution (of Epire), the consequences of which we avoid, and which we have not called for, and of which our conscience is free, having done nothing, and which it does not depend upon us, to prevent, notwithstanding our desire.

"You are requested to make use of all that we have communicated to you above, in order that you may be able to refute *the false reports and the malevolent interpretations* which, in these circumstances, people will endeavour to spread against Russia and her dispositions."

Memorandum by Count Nesselrode, delivered to her Majesty's Government, and founded on communications received from the Emperor of Russia subsequently to his Imperial Majesty's visit to England in June 1844.

(Translation.)

"Russia and England are mutually penetrated with the conviction that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the state of independence and of territorial possession which at present constitutes that Empire, as that political combination is the one which is most compatible with the general interest of the maintenance of peace.

"Being agreed on this principle, Russia and England have an equal interest in uniting their efforts, in order to keep up the existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to avert all the dangers which can place in jeopardy its safety.

"With this object, the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings; and without interfering without absolute necessity in its internal affairs.

"In order to carry out skilfully this system of forbearance, with a view to the well-understood interest of the Porte, two things must not be lost sight of. They are these:—

"In the first place, the Porte has *a constant tendency* to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon it by the treaties which it has concluded with other powers. *It hopes to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousy of the Cabinets.* It thinks that if it fails in its engagements towards one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility.

"It is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails in its obligations towards one of the great powers, it is the interest of all the rest to make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly towards the Cabinet which demands just reparation.

"As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other Cabinets, it will give way, and the differences which have arisen

will be arranged in a conciliatory manner, without any conflict resulting from them.

"There is a second cause of complication which is inherent in the situation of the Porte; it is the difficulty which exists in reconciling the respect due to the sovereign authority of the Sultan founded on the Musulman law, with the forbearance required by the interests of the Christian population of that empire.

"This difficulty is real. In the present state of feeling in Europe, the Cabinets cannot see with indifference the Christian populations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of oppression and religious intolerance.

"It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman Ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them that they can only reckon on the friendship and on the support of the great powers, on the condition that they treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness.

"While insisting on this truth, it will be the duty of the foreign representatives, on the other hand, to exert all their influence to maintain the Christian subjects of the Porte in submission to the sovereign authority.

"It will be the duty of the foreign representatives, guided by these principles, to act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address remonstrances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation.

"By persevering in this system with calmness and moderation, the representatives of the great Cabinets of Europe will have the best chance of succeeding in the steps which they may take, without giving occasion for complications which might affect the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire. If all the great powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-founded expectation of preserving the existence of Turkey.

"However, they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolution that empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the friendly Cabinets to prevent it.

"As it is not given to human foresight to settle beforehand a plan of action for such or such unlooked-for case, it would be premature to discuss eventualities which may never be realized.

"In the uncertainty which hovers over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application; it is that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished, if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common.

"That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, in a common interest of conservatism and of peace.

"In order to render their union more efficacious, there would remain

nothing to be desired but that England should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view.

"The reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is very simple.

"On land Russia exercises in regard to Turkey a preponderant action.

"On sea England occupies the same position.

"Isolated, the action of these two powers might do much mischief. United, it can produce a real benefit: thence, the advantage of coming to a previous understanding before having recourse to action.

"This notion was, in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London. The result was the eventual engagement, that if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common.

"The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner:—

"1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present state, so long as that political combination shall be possible.

"2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists, and in conjunction with each other to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own states and the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

"For the purpose thus stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna.

"Conflict between the great powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained, even in the midst of such serious circumstances. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the Emperor agreed with her Britannic Majesty's Ministers during his residence in England, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed."

II. TARTARS.

AMONGST the additional and *respected* allies that we are ready to pick up, we proceed to get hold of the Tartars resident in some parts of South-eastern Russia. These are now but comparatively few in number; and have of late years been by degrees brought, by the energy of the Russian Government, into a state of considerable civilization and settled habits. These people are of the same race as the Turks—in fact, brothers of the human family; and are the remains of those fearful and ferocious swarms of demi-savages which nearly 900 years ago issued from Eastern and Central Asia, and spread the extremes of desolation and destruction over all Asia, and also over a large portion of Europe. We are, it appears, about to call out and aid the few survivors of them to resume their ancient work; a line of conduct which the future impartial historian will doubtless correctly designate, and justly and severely denounce. In those parts of Russia eastward of the Caspian, the Government have on the southern frontiers established numerous and excellent schools, for the purpose of extending practical and good education amongst the population. These schools are well attended, and make great progress. Even the Kirghises, one of the most uncultivated and independent of the tribes on the southern Asiatic frontier of Russia, readily send their children to these schools, visit them, and encourage them to attend to their education; and thus the parents themselves become more and more reconciled to the advantage of knowledge and a settled life, and desirous of not only living at peace with Russia, but to look to her for assistance to protect them against the inroads of their barbarous neighbours. All this progressive and most beneficial improvement in these countries we go not only about to disturb, but to destroy, and to call forth the passions of the people to resume the devastating work of their ancestors! But the counsels and arm of Omnipotence are wiser and stronger than ours. The following is the picture of our new allies, as drawn by Sir J. Chardin, about 150 years ago. Let Englishmen look at it, and take shame to themselves for seeking the assistance of such associates:—

Chardin, vol. ix. pp. 163—165. (Pink. Col.)

“Every Tartar that goes into the field carries with him two horses, which are taught to follow without being led; and are consequently useful to, without embarrassing their master. On these horses they lay a sack

of rye meal, and another with biscuit and salt, which is all the baggage and provisions wherewith they are encumbered. It is only a few of the commanders that are provided with tents; the rest pass the night in the following manner:—They carry with them four sharp stakes, which they drive into the ground, and upon these they fix their mantle, which serves for a bed; their wooden saddle supplies the place of a pillow; and a coarse thick cloth, which is thrown across the horse's back, under the saddle, becomes a coverlid. The horses are tied to the pickets, with pretty long cords; and while their masters sleep, the beasts very handily remove the snow with their forefeet, and feed upon the grass that is under it, taking now and then a mouthful of snow to moisten it. When a horse tires, his master cuts his throat upon the spot, and distributes his flesh among his friends, who make him the same compliment when occasion offers. The best part of the flesh they cut in slices of an inch thick, and these they place very neatly under the saddle of the horse they ride upon. When they have travelled three or four leagues, they dismount, turn all the pieces of flesh, and mix them very carefully with the sweat, which they turn up with their fingers; then to horse again, and at night they sup upon this dainty dish, which they take ready dressed from under their saddles.

“In this manner they will traverse two or three hundred leagues of ground, without ever lighting a fire, which they carefully avoid, to prevent being discovered; and they choose the depth of winter for their expeditions, that, the bogs, lakes, and rivers being frozen, they may avoid all interruptions, and prosecute their march with great expedition. Thus the Tartars march one hundred in front, that is, three hundred horses; every one of them has two, which serve for relays, as has been said before; their front may extend eight hundred or one thousand paces, and they are eight hundred or one thousand in file, which reaches four long leagues, or three, when they keep close; for at other times they extend above ten leagues. This is wonderful to those that have not seen it; for eighty thousand Tartars make up above two hundred thousand horses. Trees are not thicker in the woods than horses are at that time in the field; and to see them at a distance they look like a cloud rising in the horizon, which increases as it rises, and strikes a terror into the boldest; I mean those who are not used to see such multitudes together. Thus these mighty armies march; halting every hour about half a quarter of an hour to give their horses time to stale; and they are so well managed, that they do it as soon as they stop; then the Tartars alight too. They remount immediately and go on; all which is done only by the signal of a whistle: and when they are come within three or four leagues of the borders, they lie still two or three days in some place chosen for that purpose, where they think they are concealed; there they give out orders, and refresh their army, which they dispose of in this manner:—they divide it into three parts; two-thirds are to compose one body, the other third is subdivided into two parts, each making a wing, one on the right, the other on the left. In this order they enter the country.

“The main body moves slowly, which in their language they call *coche*, with the wings, but continually, without halting day or night, allowing but an hour to refresh till they are got sixty or eighty leagues into the country, without doing any harm: but as soon as they begin to march back, the body holds the same pace; then the general dismisses the two wings, which have liberty, each on its own side, to stray ten or twelve leagues from the main body; but that is to be understood half of the way forward, and the other half sideways. Each wing, which may consist of eight or ten thousand men, is again subdivided into ten or twelve squadrons, of five or six hundred men each, who run up and down to the villages, encompass them, making four *corps de garde* about each village, and great fires all the night, for fear any peasant should escape them. Then they fall to pillaging and burning, kill all that make any resistance, and take and carry away all that submit, not only men, women, and sucking babes, but the cattle, horses, cows, oxen, sheep, goats, &c. As for the swine, they drive and shut them up in a barn, or such-like place, and fire the four corners; so great is the loathing they have for those creatures. The wings, being allowed to stray but ten or twelve leagues (as has been said), return with their booty to their main body; which is easily done; for they leave a great track, marching above fifty in front, so that they have nothing to do but to follow, and in four or five hours they join their body again; where, as soon as they are come, two other wings, consisting of the like number as the former, go out on the right and left, to make much the same havock; then they come in, and two others go out, and so continue their excursions without ever diminishing their body, which, as has been mentioned, makes two-thirds of the army, and move gently, to be always in breath, and ready to fight their enemy, if they should meet them, though their design is not to meet, but to avoid them as much as possible. They never return the same way they broke in, but take a compass, the better to escape; for they always fight only in their own defence, nay, and they must be forced to it, without they know themselves to be ten to one; and yet would they consider of it before they fell on: for these Tartars do not enter Poland to fight, but to pillage by way of surprise. When the Poles meet them, they make work, forcing them to get home faster than their usual pace. At other times, after they have sufficiently plundered and robbed, they enter upon the desert plains in the frontiers, thirty or forty leagues in length, and being in that place of safety make a great halt, recovering breath, and putting themselves into order, if they were in any confusion on account of meeting the Poles.

“At their return from such an incursion, the Khan receives his tenth of the whole booty, which is afterwards divided amongst the several hordes, and every Mirza receives the tenth of the share that belongs to his horde; after which, what remains is divided fairly and regularly amongst all that served in the excursion. It is undoubtedly one of the most shocking spectacles that can be beheld, to see the unhappy people of all ages, ranks and sexes, that have been thus carried away,—separated from each other, and torn away by their relentless masters, who either keep and employ

them in servile work, or sell them, if they think proper, to the Turks, Persians, Circassians, or any of the adjacent nations, or to the merchants who come up into their countries on purpose to buy slaves. It is from their fortune in these kind of excursions that the Tartar princes become rich and potent; for what they receive from their parents is very inconsiderable, and they make no scruple of telling strangers, when they admire the number of their tents, horses, cattle and slaves, that what they have was acquired by their sword and bow; and that if they had been less lucky in their expeditions, they had been as poor and as miserable as any of their subjects. By leading this kind of life they become very active and vigorous, capable of enduring prodigious fatigue, so as to go without sleep for many nights together, and with little or no food for many days; but when they come to have more leisure, they will fetch this up by sleeping forty-eight hours upon the stretch, and will crowd three or four meals into one."

III. CIRCASSIAN SLAVE TRADE.

THE following is the firman lately addressed by the Sultan to Mustapha Pasha, general-in-chief of the imperial army of Batoum, interdicting the commerce of slaves in the Black Sea:—

"Man is the most noble of all the creatures formed by the hands of God, who destined him to be happy in making him free-born; but, contrary to that decision, the Circassians indulge in the strange habit of selling their children and relatives as slaves; and even of stealing children from each other, in order to sell them like animals or articles of furniture. These proceedings, incompatible with the dignity of man, and contrary to the will of the Sovereign Creator, are altogether reprehensible, and I condemn them absolutely. Wherefore, I have just given orders that, to prevent that state of things from being continued, counsels and directions should be given to the Circassians, and at the same time proper measures be adopted, to prevent the embarkation of slaves on the coast; and in order that this decision be known to all the civil and military authorities in these districts, the present firman has been rendered expressly by my Imperial divan. Wherefore, a vizir being thus informed of what I desire, you will proceed, with that zeal and high intelligence which distinguish you, to make known my sovereign will to the Circassians and all others concerned, by publishing it in the most detailed manner. You will do all that your sagacity and experience will suggest to you, to put an end to that traffic, and to prevent the passage and embarkation of slaves in the waters

under your command ; and besides, as it is urgent to punish all who contravene these orders, and are guilty of selling their children or relatives, or the children or relatives of others, you will not lose sight of that point ; in fine, you will pay every attention to do everything indicated above, and you will show full respect to the noble cipher with which the present document is adorned. Given in the second decade of the month of Mouharrem, 1271 (beginning of October, 1854)."

A second firman to the same effect was issued on the same day, to prevent the commerce of slaves in Georgia.

THE END.



